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ABSTRACT 
The main concern of this study is to focus attention on the 
wide difference which exists between the theory of optimal road price and 
investment policy,and actual road pricing and investment policy in Australia 
The study is divided into five parts. Part I reviews recent 
literature on efficient price, output and investment policy for the road 
supply industry The review highlights a variety of prescriptive advice. 
Reasons for differences in advice are offered, and an alternative approach, 
based on the theory of joint products, is suggested. 
Part II turns to the practice of roads policy in Australia and 
examines the role of the Commonwealth Government during the period 1922 
to 1980. Of particular interest is the extent to which the Commonwealth 
Government has used its powers under S96 of the Constitution to influence 
road supply decisions. 
Part III provides a detailed examination of roads policy in 
the State of Queensland. The institutional framework is examined and 
statistical and econometric methods are employed in order to throw light 
on the nature of the objectives of the Queensland Main Roads Department, and 
the criteria used for determining road fund allocation by regions. The 
analysis also examines the relationship between Commonwealth Government 
policy and the decisions taken by the Queensland State Road Authority 
Part IV extends the institutional aspects of the study by 
examining the implications of the High Court's interpretation of S92 of 
the Constitution and the importance of Commonwealth/State co-operation 
for road pricing possibilities in Australia. A number of pricing options 
are considered. 
Part V provides a short statement of the major findings of the 
study A combination of ignorance, with institutional, constitutioftal, and 
political factors accounts for the wide gap between the theory relating to 
road price, output and investment policy and the actual policy pursued in 
Australia. 
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P A R T I 
THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
1* 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE 
While a great deal has been written on the theory of optimal 
road price, output and investment policy,it is only in recent years that 
economists have shown more sophisticated interest in the study of roads 
policy in practice. In Australia's case this interest was, to a large 
extent, fostered by the establishment of the Commonwealth Bureau of Roads 
in 1964 and continued after its demise in 1975 by the Bureau of Transport 
Economics. 
Despite the significant contributions of these organisations 
there is still a great deal of work to be done by economists (and indeed 
by researchers from other disciplines, e.g. political science) to 
increase understanding of the formulation of public decisions in the 
roads sector, the constraints which help shape those decisions, and the 
consequences of those decisions for economic welfare. 
This study attempts to make a contribution to the stock of 
knowledge concerning the practice of roads policy in Australia by providing 
a detailed examination of policy measures taken at both Commonwealth and 
State level over the period 1922 to 1980 Because of the size of the 
empirical task, detailed discussion of State Government policy is 
confined to one State only, namely the State of Queensland. In pursuing 
the empirical analysis attention is focused on the important institutional, 
constitutional, and political elements which provide the framework 
within which the Australian road sector operates. While a study of this 
kind can never claim to be completely comprehensive, it is, so far as the 
author is aware, the first attempt to examine Commonwealth roads policy 
in depth over a long period of time^ and to examine the connection between 
Conunonwealth and State road policies, The study, therefore, includes a 
detailed account and an analysis of the operations of a State road authority. 
2. 
The research draws attention, inter alia, to the enormous 
gap which exists between the theoretical principles of optimal (efficient) 
road price and investment policy and the practice of roads policy in 
Australia. This is hardly an exciting result. However, unless the 
reasons for the size of the gap are understood there seems little prospect 
that much progress can be made towards narrowing the gap. Apart from 
the problem of ignorance, the major difficulties are of a political, 
institutional, and constitutional nature.. These difficulties are somewhat 
greater in the Australian context than they are likely to be in countries 
with a unitary system of Government. Thus, in Australia the Commonwealth 
Government has the power to provide grants to the States for road works 
and to determine how those funds shall be spent. The States, on the other 
hand control the road construction authorities and are clearly opposed 
to what they see as Commonwealth interference with their 'right' to 
determine how the road budget should be apportioned among the various 
parts of the road network, and the kinds of road projects that should be 
put into effect. The States also contribute to the road budget mainly by 
levying motor vehicle registration charges. 
Along with these difficulties there are a number of constraints 
(see Chapters 8 and 10) which affect the extent to which road funds can be 
shifted from one region of a State to another region within the same State. 
This has important implications for efficiency in resource use and the kinds 
of strategies that might be adopted by the Commonwealth should it wish to 
affect the regional disbursement of road funds within a State. In addition, 
there are problems posed by the High Court's interpretation of S92 of the 
Federal Constitution. The Court's role in this area is of fundamental 
importance to the issue of the feasibility of introducing an efficient 
road pricing or cost recovery strategy for the interstate road system. 
3. 
Co-operation between the States and the Commonwealth is also important, 
and indeed is of great importance to the formulation of an efficient 
roads expenditure policy, given present pricing arrangements. 
The study is divided into five parts. Part I (Chapters 2 to 4) 
provides a review of aspects of the the theory of optimal road price and 
investment policy The discussion in Chapter 2 sets the stage by 
outlining the ingredients of the competitive solution to the price and 
investment problem. Chapter 3 outlines the basis of the approach to the 
pricing and investment issue adopted by A.A. Walters and the authors of 
the Allais Report. The Chapter also provides a detailed survey of the 
variety of approaches to the road track cost recovery issue. Chapter 4 
completes the discussion of the theory by attempting an assessment. The 
approach taken is critical of the emphasis placed by Walters and others 
on the short run marginal cost pricing rule for the pricing of uncongested 
inter-urban roads. It is also contended that the importance attached 
to indivisibilities in road supply is somev/hat exaggerated - that the 
options for adjustments to capacity/quality are far greater than supposed. 
Particular attention is given to the joint cost problem in road track 
supply and an alternative framework for examining the road track pricing 
issue is suggested. 
The study turns from the realm of theory to the real world in 
Part 2 (Chapters 5 to 7) This part provides dramatic evidence of the 
enormous gap between theory and practice. A comprehensive account of 
the role of Commonwealth Government in the Australian road supply sector 
is provided. The discussion in Chapter 6 covers the period from 1922 
to 1969, while Chapter 7 focuses attention on the period from 1969 
to 1980. The two periods can be distinguished mainly because of differences 
in the extent to which the Commonwealth Government has attempted to 
influence the road expenditure decisions of the States, and for 
4. 
differences in the availability of economic advice. During the former 
period the Commonwealth was more or less forced to determine the size 
of its financial commitment to the States in an arbitrary fashion, and 
to rely on arbitrary criteria for apportioning road funds among the States. 
Between 1969 and 1975, however, the Commonwealth has had available to 
it the economic advice of the Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, and at least 
since 1975, the advice of the Bureau of Transport Economics. The discussion 
in Chapter 7 reviews that advice and examines the extent of the correspond-
ence between policy advice and the subsequent Commonwealth legislation. 
In Part III (Chapters 8 to 10), Chapter 8 provides a short 
introduction to the role of the States, and reasons are advanced to 
suggest that road fund shares among the various planning Divisions of 
the States are unlikely to be subject to dramatic changes in the short 
run. A rule-of-thumb approach is suggested. The problem is to determine 
the nature of the rule-of-thumb. 
Chapter 9 provides a detailed review of roads policy in the 
State of Queensland as enshrined in the Queensland Main Roads Acts. The 
Chapter shows that the Main Roads Acts have been largely concerned 
with the declaration of road types, and specifying financial relationships 
between the State Main Roads Department and the various Local Government 
Authorities. 
Chapter 10 attempts to gain an understanding of the basis on 
which road funds are allocated among Queensland's road planning Divisions, 
and to examine the effects, in terms of the efficiency in resource 
allocation criterion, of Commonwealth policy on the State's expenditure 
decisions since 1969. Two approaches to the former mentioned task are 
employed. The first examines the pattern of expenditure by Divisions, 
Districts, Shires and Cities in relation to various demand indicators, from 
about the late 'fifties to the mid 'seventies. The other approach adopts 
5. 
econometric procedures for the purpose of detecting a road fund allocation 
rule. Two models incorporating area and population as the independent 
variables were subject to investigation. 
The discussion in Part IV (Chapters 11 and 12) returns to the 
pricing side. As mentioned earlier the possibilities for the adoption 
of a rational road pricing policy are affected by the High Court's 
interpretation of S92 of the Constitution. The evolution of the Court's 
attitude to this Section is examined in Chapter 11, with special attention 
directed to the so-called Transport Cases. Chapter 12 draws on the 
discussion in Part I and considers the issue of efficient road pricing 
in Australia in the light of: (i) the discussion in Chapter 11, 
(ii) the attitude of government to the adoption of non-traditional pricing 
instruments (e.g. the hubometer),and (iii) the presence or absence 
of Commonwealth and State co-operation. Various pricing possibilities 
are suggested. The last Chapter provides a short statement of the major 
conclusions of the study 
6. 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORIES OF ROAD PRICE AND INVESTMENT POLICY: THE COMPETITIVE SOLUTION 
1» Introduction 
A review of the literature on the subject of road track 
price and investment policy proceeds by assuming initially (i) that 
road space is supplied by a single public authority; (ii) that the 
industry exhibits constant returns to scale; (iii) that inputs are 
perfectly divisible; (iv) that there exists one (homogeneous) class of 
road users; (v) that the rest of the economy is made up of perfectly 
competitive industries; (vi) that the road authority is required to 
1 
simulate the behaviour of competitive industry ; and (vii) that the 
road supply industry is a multi-product firm (as indeed are most public 
enterprises) capable of supplying different quantities/qualities of 
road space in various locations. At one end of the quantity/quality 
spectrum the authority is capable of supplying low quality/low capacity 
road space while at the other it is able to supply high quality/high 
capacity road space. Between these extremes we suppose that there are 
a very large number of quantity quality combinations. For instance, we 
assume that the road authority is able to vary quality while holding 
capacity constant, or vary capacity while holding quality constant. As 
an example of the latter it is possible for the road authority to 
increase the width of a road leaving surface quality unchanged; while 
1. Thus we assume that the itoad supply industry is required to behave in 
a manner consistent with the 'public enterprise' or 'public utility' 
Concept. As stated by Bonbright this concept " implies that the 
(outputs) should be offered for sale instead of being given away and 
that the sale price should bear a fairly definite relationship to 
cost, or to cost plus a fair return typically well below the point of 
monopoly profits. In other words the so called 'theory of public 
utility rates' already starts with certain presumptions about the 
relevant principles of rate determination", Bonbright, James C., 
Principles of Public Utility Rates (Columbia University Press, 1966, 
p. 26) 
an example of the former would be to leave the width of the road unaltered 
and to upgrade the quality of the surface (e.g. from dirt to gravel) In 
practice the range of options is not nearly as great as assumed here. 
There is of course a more important sense - apart from the 
above factors - in which the supplier of road space takes on the character 
of a multi- product firm. Here we refer to the fact that road supply is 
characterised by joint and common cost elements. The former arise when 
the production of one output necessarily results in the production of 
one or more other outputs. In this case it is not possible to separate 
the costs of producing each of the outputs. In contrast, common costs 
occur when different outputs are produced, but the proportions can 
easily be varied. It is therefore possible to unambiguously assign 
2 
costs to each of the outputs. 
The existence of joint and common costs elements in road supply 
is highlighted by the following: (i) the presence of peak and off-peak 
demand periods; (ii) the fact that if capacity is provided to enable 
the movement of traffic in one direction, then capacity is also available 
for traffic travelling in the opposite direction; and (iii) the fact 
that roads are constructed to meet the requirements of a variety of 
vehicle types i.e. vehicles having different weight, speed, and other 
technical characteristics. While (i) and (ii) are examples of joint 
costs, (iii) gives rise to both common and joint cost problems. The 
significance of the joint cost problem which arises out of (iii) for 
price and investment policy will be examined at a later stage in this 
3 
study. Our purpose in this Chapter is to do no more than provide a 
brief outline of the standard approach to the discussion of road supply 
2. See, for example, Kolsen, H.M., The Economics and Control of Road 
Rail Competition (Sydney University Press, 1968), Chapter 3, pp. 44-50. 
3. See Chapter 4. 
8. 
4 
under competitive conditions. 
2. The Costs of Supplying and Using Road Space 
Like any other firm the road authority will be confronted 
with two main problems. In the short-run period i.e. when not all inputs 
are variable, it will be concerned with the problem of how to make best 
use of existing road capacity, while in the long run period, it will be 
confronted with the task of determining optimal adjustments to capacity/ 
quality Before outlining the nature of the adjustment mechanism adopted 
by a competitive road supplier we briefly note the costs involved in the 
supply and use of road space. 
First, there are those costs which are incurred by the supplier 
These expenditures are usually called track costs. They may be broadly 
classified as: (i) fixed or sunk costs; (ii) maintenance costs; (iii) 
administrative costs; and (iv) signalling, lighting and police costs. 
The fixed or sunk costs refer to those costs which the road 
authority incurs when it builds roads. Specifically, they relate to 
"- any long term contractual (capital) commitments - such as the purchase 
of land, the laying down of track, etc. Once committed they are inescapable 
except in the very long run". Category (iv) above, with the exception 
of police costs, might conveniently be included under this heading. 
4. See, for example, Mohring, H. and Hartwitz, M., Highway Benefits; An 
Analytical Framework, (North Western University Press, Evanston 
Illinois, 1962) Chapter 2; Mohring, H., "Urban Highway Investments" 
in (Dorfman, R. (ed.)). Measuring the Benefits of Government Investment, 
(The Brooking Institution, Washington D.C., 1965); Roth, G., Paying 
for Roads: The Economics of Traffic Congestion (Penguin, Special, 1967); 
Walters, A.A., The Economics of Road User Charges, (International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank Staff Occassional Papers, 
No. 5, John Hopkins Press, 1968) Chapter 3. 
5. Walters, A.A., ibid., p. 23. 
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With regard to maintenance costs two categories are identified. 
There are those maintenance costs which are imposed by the user on the 
road authority and are a function of traffic volume and composition. Given 
the same traffic volume and composition these costs will vary from one 
part of the road network to another according to variations in the technical 
quality of the road network. In addition there are those maintenance 
costs which are invariate with respect to traffic volume and composition. 
They are influenced by such factors as time, and variations in climatic 
and weather conditions. Whereas the former mentioned maintenance costs 
can be directly assigned to vehicle classes, the invariate maintenance 
costs are joint to all user classes. 
Finally, administrative costs refer to those costs incurred 
6 7 
in providing " a support function to construction and maintenance", ' 
while police costs refer to expenditure incurred in providing traffic 
patrol duties and the like. 
Second, in addition to the costs incurred by the road supplier 
there are those costs referred to as (i) road user costs; (ii) congestion 
costs; and (iii) community costs. 
Road user costs refer to all of the costs which the road user 
incurs as a result of his decision to use the road. Examples of such costs 
are fuel and tyre costs, time costs, and wear and tear costs. 
Congestion costs represent those costs which are imposed on 
all road users as a result of additions to the traffic flow. Given the 
width of a road, together with other dimensions such as curvature and 
6. Haritos, Z., Rational Road Pricing Policies in Canada (Canadian Transport 
Commission, Ottawa 1973) p. 46. 
7 Clearly, not all administration costs are directly concerned with 
the administration of other expenditures. Some administration costs 
relate to regulation, research, and policy making. It might be argued 
that these are community overheads and as such should be met by the 
nation as a vvhole. See, for example, U.K. Ministry of Transport, 
Road Track Costs (London, H.M.S.O., 1968), p. 6. 
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grade, there is some volume (composition) of traffic for which it 
is unlikely that individual vehicles will impede the speed of others. 
This is usually referred to as the free-speed situation. As the 
volume of traffic is increased i.e., beyond the free-speed range, 
additional vehicles impede the movement of other vehicles thereby 
causing an increase in time and operating costs. In essence these 
congestion costs are an externality associated with road use. 
Regarding community costs, these represent those costs which 
are imposed on the community in general. They take the form of noise 
costs, pollution of the atmosphere by motor vehicle exhaust fumes, loss 
of amenity and so on. As far as our analysis is concerned we confine 
our attention to track costs, maintenance costs and congestion costs, 
community costs are assumed either to be non existent or already 
internalised. 
3. The Short-Run Problem 
We are now in a position to consider the behaviour of our 
competitive road authority in both the short-run and long-run period. 
9 
Following other writers we direct our attention to part of 
the road network and assume that the short-run situation is depicted 
by Figure 2.1. 
8. It should also be mentioned that we exclude from our analysis those 
benefits which are sometimes called "community benefits" (e.g. increased 
accessibility for all) Some aspects of the discussion in the 
literature of the subject of "community benefits" are examined in 
Chapter 4. 
9. See references, p. 8 footnote 4. 
10. It should be noted that the model depicted by Figure 2.1 is just 
another way of demonstrating the Law of Variable Proportions. 
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FIGURE 2.1 Short-Run Cost, Demand and Pricing Relationships 
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The abscissa shows traffic volume (asstiming homogeneous 
composition) in terms of vehicle miles per hour (vpJi,) , while the 
ordinate represents costs per vehicle mile. Short-run variable maintenance 
costs are assumed to be constant and are depicted by the line BB, 
Invariate costs exist, but are not shown in the diagram. The curve CC. 
represents the users average private cost function. And because it 
indicates the private marginal costs per vehicle mile that additional 
drivers will incur, it is also the marginal private cost curve. Beyond 
traffic volume X^, user operating costs (e.g. fuel and time costs) 
increase because density increases and vehicles impede one another 12 
11. We follow the practice adopted in most of the literature by using 
vehicle miles as a measure of use of the road system. 
12. Sec, for example, Walters, A.A., "The theory and measurement of 
private and social cost of highway congestion", Econometrica, 
Vol 29 (1961) Also reprinted in Munby, Denys (ed.). Transport 
(Penguin Modern Economics, 1968) 
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As road capacity is approached the private user cost function starts to 
bend towards the vertical axis. The curve CC2 represents the short 
run marginal social cost function which incorporates the effects of 
congestion (as manifested by increased time, fuel, and wear and tear 
costs) At traffic volumes greater than X^ the two functions diverge. 
This occurs because the impediment to vehicular flow caused by the 
additional vehicles not only raises the cost to the latter, but also 
increases the costs of travel for those motorists already using the 
road. The marginal social cost curve measures the total cost attributable 
to the additional (marginal) user. Thus, for a given volume of traffic 
the marginal social cost is given by the sum of the marginal users' 
total costs and the additional costs borne by all the intra- marginal 
users. As road capacity is approached the marginal social cost 
13 14 function approaches infinity, ' Finally, the line DD represents 
the demand function for use of the road per period of time. 
As can be seen from the diagram, the benefit maximising 
output would occur at that point where the demand function intersects 
the marginal social cost curve i.e. where price = P, = short-run 
marginal social cost (SRMC) The optimal traffic flow is thus X, 
At a price output combination given by the intersection of the curve 
CCp benefits to the marginal user, as measured by P^ ,^ are less than 
the costs imposed by the marginal user on all other users, as shown by 
LM. In this case output is too large. Similarly, at a price greater 
than P,, benefits to the marginal user are greater than social marginal 
costs - indicating that there are'some users excluded from using the 
road who value (in terms of their willingness to pay) the use of 
13. Observe that: flow = speed x density and that speed is an inverse 
function of density Thus when traffic is very dense, a small 
proportionate change in density will result in a greater proportion-
ate decrease in speed and therefore a decline in traffic flow. 
14. The relationship between marginal social cost and marginal private 
cost is as follows: Marginal cost - private cost x (I + elasticity 
of the cost curve). See for example, Walters, A.A., "The theory and 
measureiiicnt of private and social cost of highway congestion", op.cit. 
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the road more highly than the cost which their use would impose on other 
users and the road authority. In this case output is too small. It is 
only where marginal private benefits equal marginal social costs that 
net benefits are maximised. 
That the supplier of road space will internalise congestion costs 
can easily be made apparent by assuming that the road authority also owns the 
vehicles which make use of the road track and that these vehicles are 
operated for commercial purposes. The situation is in effect similar to 
that of a rail authority engaged in providing rail services for commercial 
gain. Clearly, congestion will not be a matter of indifference to the 
authority As already noted, increases in traffic volume beyond the 
free speed level result (by definition) in higher vehicle operating costs. 
What matters from the authority's point of view then, is the relationship 
between increased operating costs brought about by the addition of another 
•vehicle, and the effect of the latter on revenues. Intuitively, it would 
seem that the lower limit to prove would be that which actually maximises 
throughput i.e., the number of vehicle miles per period of time. The 
authority would not operate at levels of congestion which actually involve 
a reduction in throughput. Essentially, what the authority will consider 
is the effect of reducing throughput (and thus increasing speed) on 
profitability A reduction in throughput will be justified as long as 
the value of the increase in speed is greater than the loss in value 
brought about by the reduction in throughput. Short run profit 
maximisation (assuming this to be the relevant objective) is thus achieved 
when the increment to net profit from the output of the marginal unit 
is equal to the decline in net profit from slower speeds. 
Continuing the main thread of our argument, it is clear that 
whether or not the road authority will retain, in the short-run, the 
quality of the road network will depend on the relationship between 
revenues collected from road users and those costs which could be 
14. 
avoided by preventing use of the road. In terms of Figure 2.1, revenues 
collected, as shown by the area P EFP , are obviously greater than short-
run variable maintenance costs. Whether such revenues are sufficient to 
meet short-run invariate maintenance costs is another matter. Assuming they 
are, then the quality of the road will be retained. On the other hand, if 
revenues are less than total short-run maintenance costs, but equal to 
short-run variable maintenance costs, then the road authority would be 
expected (in the absence of any compelling non economic factors) to allow 
the quality of the road to deteriorate. If revenues are less than total 
short run avoidable costs then no further expenditure would be incurred. 
4. The Long-Run Problem 
4.1 Single Demand Period Model 
We now turn our attention to the process of adjustment in the 
long-run. Here the problem for the road authority is to determine (given 
its objectives), the optimal quantity/quality characteristics of each part 
of the road network. Figure 2.2 is used to examine this problem. 
In this model the SRMC curve (excluding invariate maintenance costs) 
for a section of the road network is shown to be constant up to a 
particular volume of traffic at which point the.curve becomes 
vertical - depicting a rigid capacity constraint. The curve C, 
represents the SRMC curve for road 1 which has a maximum capacity, X^, 
15. See, for example. Hedges, C.A., "An Evaluation of Commuter Transportation 
Alternatives", Hi ghway Re s e arch Re cord, No. 296, Washington, D.C., 1969. 
16. This form of the SRMC curve is adopted for convenience. As noted by 
Walters, A.A., The Economics of Road User Charges, op.cit., p. 27. 
"This simplification will enable us to sharpen the discussion of the 
principles of road pricing without ignoring the essential elements of 
the problem. We can talk about the capacity of the road and the operating 
plus variable maintenance cost, without having to trouble about the level 
of traffic and demand conditions. These artifices are useful only for 
discussion of principles; to employ them in any practical case where 
measurement and application are required would be to court serious error." 
For a traditional approach see, for example, Neutze, G.M., "Investment 
Criteria and Road Pricing", The Manchester School of Economic and Social 
Studies, Vol. 34, January 1966. 
15. 
FIGURE 2.2 Long-Run Optimal Price and Investment Relationships 
for a Single Demand Period. 
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while C represents the SRMC function associated with a road having 
a maximum capacity of X.. The long-run marginal cost (LRMC) function 
is described by the line B+A and represents the LRMC of producing given 
levels of output (i.e. given traffic volumes and speeds) In essence 
the difference between SRMC and LRMC indicates long-run capacity costs. 
All costs are expressed in cents per vehicle mile. For convenience it 
is assumed that there is only one demand period represented by any one 
of the demand functions D, to D.. 
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Suppose, that initially, capacity is given by X2 and demand 
by Dj. If the price that users of the road perceive is given by P, 
then demand for road space will exceed capacity by X2X_. A 'competitive' 
road authority would set price equal to P, , at which price SRMC is 
equal to LRMC. At this price the road is congested, but since LRMC is 
16. 
equal to SRMC the level of congestion represents the long run 
equilibritmi level of congestion for a road with capacity, X2. 
If it is assumed that demand is given by either demand functions 
D, or Dj it is clear that a road having a capacity X_ is greater than 
otpimal size. For each demand function the revenue obtained from 
setting price equal to SRMC is less than LRMC. In the long-run the 
road authority will reduce capacity until a capacity/quality 
combination is reached at which revenues from setting price equal to 
SRMC will also equal LRMC. Thus for demand function D, capacity would 
be reduced from X, to X_. In contrast, if the demand function is 
depicted by D. revenues derived from an optimal charging policy exceed 
the long run costs of a road with capacity costs X2 i.e. price = SRMC 
> LRMC. Such a situation is clearly a signal for the road authority 
to expand capacity which, given the demand and supply conditions assumed, 
means adjusting the quantity/quality of road space to capacity level 
X^. Given the assumption of a competitive road supply industry, long -
run equilibrium for the entire part of the road network will be attained 
when the price/LRMC ratios for each part of the network are equal to 
unity. There will be a wide range of demand and cost conditions for 
road space in various locations. Setting the price/LRMC ratios equal 
to unity does not imply that all roads will have the same long-run 
quantity/quality characteristics. The same conclusions emerge if we 
pursue our previous example of a road authority which also owns the 
vehicles which use the roads. In this case the road authority will 
consider the effect of capacity adjustments on throughput and speed, 
and thus, on net returns. If the objective is to earn a normal 
return on capital then capacity will be increased whenever expected 
revenues are greater than expected costs. 
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4.2 Two Period Demand Model 
So far the analysis has assumed a single demand period for 
each part of the road network. We now turn our attention to the case 
where there is more than one demand period for the same section of road 
track. This is the familiar peak demand model. Two possibilities are 
mentioned. 
The simplest case of the peak demand model is the so called 
firm peak case. Let us suppose that the demand functions D, and D. 
in Figure 2.2 represent, respectively, the off peak and peak demands 
for a section of road space having a rigid capacity constraint of 
OX^ vehicles per period of time. It is also assiimed that each demand 
function is independent of the other i.e. that demand in each sub-
period is assumed to depend on only the prices ruling in that sub-
period . 
The optimal set of prices in the short-run are P and P for 
the off peak and peak periods respectively. In the off-peak period, 
price is equal to short-run avoidable or operating costs (i.e. SRMC 
equal to B), while in the peak period,price exceeds avoidable costs. 
During the peak period the road authority earns a quasi rent. 
Clearly, in this model, the quantity/quality characteristics 
of the road track will only be retained in the long-run if the revenues 
from the sale of road space during the peak are at least equal to 
capital plus operating costs. In essence, since the capital cost 
is joint to the various (2) sub periods of the demand cycle,investment 
is worth while if P + P >^  2B + A. At price P revenues exceed B+A 
and at price P revenues are equal to B. Therefore the road authority 
will expand capacity to X. volume of traffic per period of time. The 
long-run equilibrium set of prices are P and P^ -. In this model the 
peak users are the sole contributors to capital costs and capacity 
charges are determined solely by reference to their demands. The 
18. 
off-peak period users pay a price equal to road track operating costs 
Finally, the charging of these different prices does not lead to off-
peak demand exceeding peak demand. 
The conclusion that additional capacity is warranted only 
if peak demand price in short-run equilibrium is greater than LRMC 
requires some additional comment. More correctly, the above rule is 
a sufficient but not a necessary condition for an increase in supplyr 
That this is so can be seen by examining the so called shifting peak 
17 18 
model. Following Hirshleifer, * demand and cost conditions are 
assumed to take the form depicted in Figure 2.3. 
FIGURE 2.3 Long-Run Optimal Price and Investment Relationships: The 
Shifting Peak Model 
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Hirshleifer, J , "Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing: Comment", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 72, 1958. See also Hedges, C.A., 
op.cit. 
See also Webb, Michael G., Pricing Policies for Public Enterprises, 
(London and Basingstoke, Macmillan Studies in Economics, 1976), 
Chapter 3; and Waters II, W.G., "Output Dimension and Joint Costs", 
International Journal of Transport Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1, April,1980. 
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Short-run marginal costs are the same as in Figure 2.2 and are 
represented by B up to the point where maximum capacity is reached. 
At this point the SRMC function becomes vertical. Capacity costs are 
denoted by A. The model assumes that there are two independent non-
overlapping demand periods of equal duration and that the peak and 
off-peak demands are represented, respectively, by demand functions D2 
and D, The main distinction between this model and the firm peak case 
is that the difference in the relative strength of the two period demands 
is much less in the former than it is in the latter This difference 
results in a shifting of the peak if the pricing rule adopted in the 
firm peak case is applied to the demands depicted in Figure 2.3. In 
essence, the demand functions in the shifting peak case are 
complementary, A unit addition to capacity could be justified by the 
strength of demand in either demand period alone, or by the addition 
of the demands in the sub periods because the capital cost of an addition 
to capacity is joint to each of the demand periods. The standard 
procedure for specifying an aggregate demand function for capacity 
which is joint to each sub period is to employ the method used for 
the derivation of the market demand curve for a public good. Specifically, 
the demand for capacity function is obtained by adding vertically the 
19 individual demands of the (equal-duration) sub periods. This 
function is shown in Figure 2.3 as D, •*• ^2' Strictly speaking it is 
not a legitimate procedure to add the demand curves for different products. 
The peak demand for road space, say from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. and the demand 
for road space, say from 7 a.m. to 9 a.m. are not demands for the 
19. This procedure is often used in the Public Finance literature. See 
for example, Samuelson, P.A., "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of 
Public Expenditure", The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 37, 
November 1955; Samuelson, P.A., "Contrast between Welfare Conditions 
for Joint - Supply and for Public Goods", The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 51, February 1969 See also, Hirshleifer, J., 
op.cit.; and Kahn, Alfred E., The Economics of Regulation: 
Principles and Institutions, Vol. I: Principles, (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons Inc., 1970), pp. 89-94. 
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same product. However, the purpose of the demand function D^ + D2 
is to indicate the willingness of consumers to pay for capacity. Put 
differently, the vertical addition of the separate demand functions 
enables a comparison to be made between total revenues generated 
from the sale of the different (jointly supplied) products and the 
costs of providing that capacity 
Given road track capacity X,, the optimal off-peak and peak 
charges are given by P and P, respectively- Capacity is fully 
utilised at these prices. To be more precise, the optimal pricing 
solution for the shifting peak model requires differential pricing based 
on the relative strengths of the demands for the same output level 
(traffic volume and speed) during each sub period. 
To determine the optimum size of the road track (i.e. in 
•terms of quantity/quality dimensions), the D, + D2 function is 
compared with the LRMC of meeting demand over the entire demand cycle. 
This is equal to the costs of providing an additional unit of capacity 
plus the costs incurred in utilising capacity (in this case maintenance 
costs) in each of the separate demand periods. Thus the LRMC over the 
demand cycle is equal to 2B + A. We refer to this as the joint LRMC. 
In contrast, the LRMC of providing for an incremental change in output 
separately in either period is equal to B + A and is referred to as the 
separable LRMC function. 
Given the position of the demand functions D, and D2, and 
given the optimal prices P and P, (for capacity X,), it is clear that 
additions to capacity are not warranted by a consideration of each demand 
period separately For demand function D, optimal price, P = SRMC 
which is less than LRMC (separable), while for demand function Dj, 
20. It should also be noted that it is only when there is a total 
absence of congestion that roads exhibit some of the characteristics 
of public goods. 
21. 
P, = SRMC = LRMC (separable) However, as argued above, increments 
to capacity are justified if the sum of the revenues derived from P 
and P, are greater than 2B + A. Since D, + D2 intersects the SRMC 
function for the road with capacity X, at the point P, (where P, = P +P, ) 
it is clear that road capacity X, is less than optimal. Thus the 
quantity/quality of road space will be increased until revenues are 
equal to LRMC (joint) In this case the long-run equilibrium 
capacity is given by X2 volume of traffic and the optimal off-peak and 
peak charges are, respectively, P and P, . Of course if we had started 
by assuming that revenue from the sale of the joint products was less 
than LRMC (joint) then the road authority would, in the long-run, reduce 
the quantity/quality of the road track to the point where 
D. + D2 =2B + A. 
While the above analysis of the shifting peak case has 
focused attention on two equal duration demand periods, it can be 
readily extended to any number of equal duration sub periods. However, 
21 
as demonstrated by Williamson, if the assumption of equal duration 
demand periods is removed it is necessary to weight the individual 
demand curves by the fraction of the demand cycle during which the 
demand in question applies. This also means that the output axis 
(as in Figure 2.3) needs to be respecified to relate to the period 
of the demand cycle. 
This rather brief and fairly abstract discussion of price, 
output and investment policy for a competitive road supplier (given 
the assumption of one user class) has concentrated on the link between 
optimal price and investment policy under such conditions, and on 
providing the logical first step to a review of received theory. 
21. Williamson, Oliver E., "Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under 
indivisibility constraints", American Economic Review, Vol. 56 
(1966), pp. 810-27 Also reprinted in Turvey, R. (ed.). Public 
Enterprises (Penguin Modern Economics, 1968) 
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CHAPTER 3 
ROAD USER CHARGES AND INVESTMENT CRITERIA: OTHER APPROACHES 
1, Introduction 
In this Chapter we provide a fairly detailed outline of a 
model of the road supply industry which represents the conventional 
economic wisdom regarding optimal price and investment policy for real 
world road suppliers. The model owes its most recent and detailed 
exposition to A.A. Walters and the economists who contributed to 
2 3 
what is generally known as the Allais Report. ' Our summary of the 
model is set out in terms of the following headings: (i) The Basic 
Model; (ii) The Problem of Deficits; and (iii) Second Best 
Considerations. This is then followed by a description of a number of 
contributions to the road track cost debate. Little attempt is made in 
this Chapter to critically examine the various arguments surveyed. 
An assessment of the major issues is the task of Chapter 4. 
2, The Walters' Approach 
2.1 The Basic Model 
The model of the road supply industry which we are about to 
describe has as its objective the maximization of net social benefits 
in the Paretian sense. The intention is to provide prescriptive advice 
for price, output and investment policy for real world road suppliers, 
which, if applied, would not only ensure an efficient use of resources 
1. Walters, A.A., The Economics of Road User Charges, op.cit. 
2. The Allais Report. A report prepared in 1966 for the European 
Commission by Professors Maurice Allais (Chairman), del Viscoser, 
Duguesne de la Vinelle, Oordt and Scidenfus. 
3. For other discussions see: (i) Winch, D.M., The Economics of 
Highway Planning, (University of Toronto Press, 1963); 
(ii) Neutze, G.M., op.cit.; (iii) Churchill, A., Road User Charges 
in Central America, (World Bank Staff Occasional Papers, No. 15. 
John Hopkins Press, 1972) 
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within the road supply sector, but also provide guidelines for 
determining the optimal size of the road sector. 
The principal feature of the model is that it rejects the 
investment rule of the competitive solution on the ground - to use 
Walters' terminology - "ro that roads are not putty- Road capital is 
not a malleable quantity which can be kneaded at will into just the 
4 
right shape" Instead, road capital is characterized by indivisibilities, 
lumpiness, joint products (as seen in terms of quantity/quality 
relationships), economies of scale and irreversibilities. Together 
these features are seen to provide " the real fundamental reason 
for the 'road problem' "* 
The existence of the above factors is explained by Walters 
in the following way. First, on the output side, it is noted that a 
road project must meet minimum technical specifications (e.g. in terms 
of width) if it is to be of use to some, if not all, vehicles. In 
other words, a road must be at least as wide as the narrowest motor 
vehicle. To be of use to all types of vehicles it must obviously satisfy 
a different set of technical specifications. In addition, mention is 
made of indivisibilities associated with quality improvements to road 
space. In practice, a road authority will not make minute changes to the 
nature of the surface of a particular section of the road network. As 
stated by Walters: 
" with improvements such as surfacing, it is technologically 
silly to put pavement down 1/lOOth of an inch at a time. The 
road authority can pave the whole road to a sensible minimum 
depth, or it can pave sections of the road one after another 
Both involve discontinuous or lumpy improvements."^ 
4. Walters, A.A., The Economics of Road User Charges, op.cit., p. 34. 
5. Ibid., p. 31. 
6. Ibid., p. 41, 
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Second, on the input side,there are substantial economies of 
scale to be gained over a given output range. This is explained in 
part by cost economies achieved by the purchase of large quantities 
of road making materials (e.g. gravel and bitumen), and also as a 
result of economies gained by the use of large rather than small 
forms of road building equipment. Walters takes the above 
characteristics to imply " that there are certain preferred sizes 
or types of road - just as there are technologically desired sizes 
7 
for blast furnances"- Real world suppliers of road space are thus 
seen to view changes (in contrast to the supplier in our competitive 
model. Chapter 2) in both quantity and quality of road space as having 
to be made in discrete units. For one thing there is a standard size 
lane. Roads are normally described as one lane, two lane, three lane 
and so on, rarely (if at all) as a 1.5 lane, 2.5 lane road, etc. 
Likewise, in so far as quality of thes-road is concerned, the range 
of options accepted in practice is much narrower than the range of options 
implied by the model of a perfectly competitive road supply 
industry In general a road has either an earth surface, a gravel surface, 
or a sealed surface. It is of course recognised that it is possible to 
vary the quality of a road's surface at different sections along its 
path, in accordance with variations in demand, but even so,the range 
of quality variations used seem to fall a long way short of those 
implied in the competitive model. 
An associated characteristic is the irreversibility of road 
investment. Essentially, what Walters means by this concept is that 
once a road is built " it is sunk in a particular location for a 
g 
long time" Further, irreversibilities are seen to have important 
implications for investment decisions: 
7 Ibid., p. 41. 
8. Ibid., p. 42. 
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"There are as many costs of (say) a four lane highway as 
there are paths to it. Indeed, if for some reason a three 
lane highway has been built, it might not be worth extending 
it to a four lane road; only if we are starting with a two 
lane road may it be worth building the high capacity four 
lane highway"^ 
While recognition of the existence of indivisibilities in the 
supply of road space represents an important concession to reality, 
Walters goes one step further by suggesting that they are of "- far 
more moment than in other areas of economic activity" This view is 
advanced on the ground that while indivisibilities exist elsewhere, 
they may frequently be ignored because of the size of the market. 
"In manufacturing industry there are many striking 
examples of indivisible inputs - blast furnaces, giant 
presses, the entrepreneur himself - but normally these 
indivisibilities may be considered negligible in relation 
to the size of the market. Even large indivisibilities may 
be ignored. But given the limited local market of roads, 
even small indivisibilities may be large in relation to the 
size of the market."H 
The implications of this claim for the prescriptive advice of the model 
is considered later. 
As to the matter of joint product characteristics of road 
supply, this is discussed by Walters in terms of quantity/quality 
dimensions. In the competitive model where, in the extreme case 
considered by Walters, road space is likened to putty, it is possible 
to vary quality and capacity independently of one another, i.e. it is 
possible to achieve a constant trade-off between capacity and quality. 
This is illustrated in the follov/ing way In Figure 3.1 we show 
capacity (defined by Walters as the maximum feasible number of vehicle 
trips per day) on the horizontal axis and quality (measured in terms of 
vehicle operating cost savings) on the vertical axis. 
9. Ibid., p. 42. 
10. Ibid., p. 40. 
11. Ibid. 
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FIGURE 3.1 12 Capacity/Quality Relationships 
Operation 
Costs 
'I' 
Vehicle 
cost 
savings 
Capacity 
For a given quantity of input (putty) C,, the line V,C, 
indicates the rate at which capacity and quality can be substituted, 
assuming a given volume of traffic. Similarly, the line V2C2 describes 
the same rate of transformation, given an increase in the amount of 
input (putty) For reasons already noted, it is clear that such a 
model is not a correct representation of the actual choices regarding 
quantity/quality combinations which are open to the road supply industry 
in practice. The existence of indivisibilities in the supply of road 
space are seen to give rise to a joint product relationship between 
capacity and quality-
12. Ibid., p. 35. 
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"We must, in fact, view investment in roads as having at 
least two dimensions - first the quality of the road and 
secondly the capacity of the road. There is no constant 
trade-off as in the putty case. For a given expenditure 
on a mile of road, one cannot assume that there is a constant 
rate of exchange between reductions in operating costs and 
capacity The technology of road construction and capacity 
suggest that the rate of exchange varies considerably and 
continuously We must treat the two 'dimensions' of the 
roads as joint products of the investment."13 
While it is conceded by Walters that, as a practical matter, 
the relationship between capacity and quality is not strictly rigid, it 
is nonetheless suggested that " as a rough approximation it may even 
be sensible to treat the roads as giving joint products with rigid 
14 proportions" The nature of the investment options (in contrast to 
those of the competitive 'putty' road model) which reflect the joint 
product dimensions of capacity and quality are shown in Figure 3.2. 
FIGURE 3,2 15 Joint Product Dimensions of Capacity and Quality and 
Investment Options 
Vehicle Journeys Per Day 
(Per Period of Time) 
13. Ibid., p. 35. 
14. Ibid., p. 36. 
15. Ibid., p. 37 
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Along the horizontal axis are measured vehicle journeys per 
period of time. The vertical axis depicts the total cost of a vehicle 
journey, i.e. both road user and road authority costs. Following 
Walters, the capacity options which are open to the road authority are 
represented by the functions A,, A.. Thus, a road having a 
capacity depicted by the cost function A. has a capacity greater than 
that of a road having the cost function A2, while the latter has a 
greater capacity than the road shown by the function A^ Relevant fixed 
costs for each Road A. A. are shown as F^, F^, respectively. 
Total vehicle operating and road authority variable maintenance costs 
are shown as straight lines. The short-run cost functions are 
assumed to be vertical at the point where maximum capacity is reached. 
The long-run total cost curve is described by the line F.,bcde That 
is to say, it is the locus of points which represent least cost points 
for each volume of traffic. The existence of the joint product 
dimension (as discussed by Walters) is indicated by the fact that for 
each road (of given capacity) the respective short-run total cost 
(SRMC) functions are of different slope. Thus the slope of the SRTC 
function for road A, up to the point of maximum capacity is greater 
than the slope of the SRTC function for A2 - again up to the point 
of maximum capacity-
Given such supply characteristics, the issue of what level of 
investment (and thus quantity/quality dimensions) of road space 
should be provided will obviously depend on the quantity/quality of 
road space that already exists as well as on the level of demand. 
Suppose, to begin with, that we have a road which exhibits the cost 
characteristics described by A, If we assume that the volume of 
traffic is at a level given by V^, then the Walters' model suggests that 
the road authority would not be justified in expanding capacity until 
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traffic volumes exceed V«. If the traffic volume exceeds V^ but is less 
than or equal to V^, the road authority would be justified in building 
road A^. Similarly, if traffic increases such that it is greater than 
V,, but equal to or less than V2, additional investment giving road A_ 
would be warranted. In each of these situations, expansion takes place 
when the existing road is utilized at less than capacity levels. In 
contrast, if we begin with a road having cost function A_, expansion 
is justified when the capacity constraint is reached and short-run 
costs are in excess of d. For some volumes of traffic for which existing 
roads are, for all intents and purposes, uncongested, it will be 
efficient to invest in additional capacity and thereby improve quality, 
while for others, it will be efficient to have roads that are congested. 
With reference to the case of uncongested roads, Walters states: 
"If the road is uncongested, an expansion of capacity will 
be worth nothing; such capacity cannot be sold to motorist 
for use elsewhere. It is specific both in time and place. 
It cannot be stored or transferred like electricity to a 
place where a demand exists. But it is possible, and indeed 
likely, that although there is spare capacity it is still 
wise to invest in roads since the reduction in operating 
costs may offset the capital cost. Capacity here is a 
by-product - a free good with a shadow price of zero. The 
only margin that matters is the reduction in operating costs 
- and this improvement in quality is the only raison d'etre 
of investment."1^ 
So much for the argument about the technical characteristics of 
road supply. We now turn our attention to Walters' argument 
concerning the implications of such characteristics for optimal road price 
and investment policy. 
Walters contends that indivisibilities and the joint product 
characteristics of road supply necessitate a departure from the 
prescriptive advice of the competitive model. What is proposed is this: 
16. Ibid., p. 36, 
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price-should continue to be set on the basis of short^run marginal 
costs (SRMC), while the investment decision should not be determined 
on the basis of revenue/cost relationships, but instead, in terms of a 
revenue cost/consumer surplus calculus. To explain this Walters 
examines two simple models. The main assumptions common to each model 
are first, that the non-road supply sector of the economy is made up of 
perfectly competitive industries and that resources required by the 
road supply industry are derived from a wide range of industries 
rather than from one or a few groups in particular This is a standard 
assiraiption and is made on the ground that it enables the analyst to 
ignore the effects of changes in policy in the sector under examination 
on other sectors. Thus problems of 'second-best' are ignored, or 
assumed to be unimportant. Second, an implicit assumption is that roads 
are used by a homogeneous group of users. Third another implicit assumption 
is that there are no institutional, political or other constraints on 
price and investment policy (i.e. that the model is in the Classicial 
tradition of 'least constraints') and finally, that road space is 
characterised, as discussed above, by indivisibilities and related phenomena. 
In the case of Model 1 it is assumed that the road authority 
is confronted with a choice of having to decide between having a road 
of specific quantity/quality characteristics, or no road at all (i.e. 
an 'all-or-nothing' choice) This is obviously an unrealistic situation 
but is put forward in order to highlight the issues involved. The 
relevant demands and costs conditions are depicted in Figure 3.3. 
It is assumed in the first instance that the road authority 
has actually built a road. The level of variable maintenance costs per 
vehicle journey is indicated by OL, while LK represents the level of 
operating costs per vehicle journey The capacity of the road is 
specified at X, vehicle journeys per day- We now suppose that the 
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FIGURE 3.3 Demand and Cost Conditions: The Close-Down or Continue 
Problem and the All-Or-Nothing Option 
Cost/ 
Price 
Volume of Traffic Per Period of Time 
demand conditions are described by the demand function D^D_. Given 
the maxim that price should equal SRMC, the diagram indicates that the 
price paid per vehicle journey is equal to X,I. Apart from variable 
maintenance costs, the road user pays the road authority a congestion 
levy equal to JI. The remaining component of price, MJ. represents 
vehicle operating costs. In this situation the road authority receives 
revenue in excess of variable maintenance costs equal to the area KHIJ 
Whether or not revenues are sufficient to meet invariate (time-related) 
maintenance costs plus capital costs cannot be determined from the 
diagram. However, if demand conditions are represented by the demand 
function DiD,, it is obvious that setting price equal to SRMC will result in 
OXQ vehicle journeys with revenues equal to variable mainentance 
costs. Capital costs plus time-related maintenance costs are not 
recovered by road user charges. 
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We now suppose that invariate maintenance costs must be 
incurred daily in order to keep the road open. Given that revenues 
received by the road authority are just sufficient to meet variable 
maintenance costs, the question is posed as to whether or not it is 
worthwhile to keep the road open. The answer, according to the model, 
depends on the size of consumer surplus derived by road users. In 
terms of Figure 3.3, the amount which users actually pay for the use of 
the road is equal to OKPX^. This amount, however, is actually less 
than the amount which users would be willing to pay given the demand 
curve DiDi The amount which users would be prepared to pay over and 
above the amount they actually pay, is equal to the area KNP. This 
is the amount which a monopolist road authority could extract in excess 
of current revenues if it were able to pursue a policy of perfect price 
discrimination. 
What the model requires as far as the short-run problem is 
concerned, is that the size of consumers' surplus (which is here 
equated with social benefit) should at least be equal to invariate 
maintenance costs if the road is to be kept open for use. Even if this 
assumption is relaxed, Walters' argument still requires the use of the 
consumers' surplus criterion. As stated by Walters: 
" .it may be possible to adjust maintenance expenditure to 
keep the road in various degrees of repair, or to maintain 
a variable width of road. The consequences of a skimped 
maintenance program will be manifest in increased operating 
expenses and perhaps also in increased variable maintenance 
expenses. Clearly these margins need to be balanced one 
against the other This reduces, but does not eliminate, the 
need for a consumer surplus criterion when deciding whether 
or not to keep the road open."17 
17 Ibid., p. 46. 
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And further, 
"It should be noted that the consumer surplus criterion 
might be required even if roads were continuously divisible 
and variable in the long run. If, in the short run -
through some unexpected change in demand - we had the road 
(of Figure 3.3 associated with the demand curve D,D.), it 
would simply not matter that it was possible to vary 
continuously the size and character of the highway ... The 
present reality would be that we had a road and we wished 
to know how to make best use of it or indeed whether it 
would not be better to close it. For this latter purpose 
one would again need the consumer surplus criterion."1^ 
Apart from the above arguments, use of the consumers' surplus 
criterion is advocated by Walters mainly as a means of resolving the 
long-run - investment choice - problem. 
In the all-or-nothing case, we suppose that the demand 
function for the road in question is that denoted by D2D2 in Figure 3.3. 
Further, it is assumed that demand will be maintained in perpetuity. 
There will usually be more than one demand function for a particular 
section of the road network, each corresponding to a particular time 
of day, time of week and so on. The analysis can easily be altered 
to accommodate more realistic assumptions. 
If we now suppose , given demand and cost conditions represented by 
Figure 3.3,„ that if the road is constructed, road authority revenues 
derived from setting price equal to SRMC are equal to KHIJ, and that 
this sum is equal to or greater than total long-run costs i.e. capital 
costs plus variable maintenance plus time related maintenance costs, 
then clearly on revenue/costs grounds the road is worth constructing. 
But what is the situation if revenues equal to KHIJ are less than total 
long-run costs? Should the road be built? Again, it is argued by 
Walters that to answer such a question, we need to determine the size 
of benefits which accrue to users of the road over and above those 
benefits reflected by revenues generated by setting price equal to SRMC. 
18. Ibid., p. 46, footnote 28, 
34. 
Put differently, we need to determine whether the value of consumers' 
surplus plus revenues, appropriately discounted, are equal to or greater 
than the present value of capital and maintenance costs. If this require-
ment is met, then the road is considered to be worthwhile. 
Compared with the all-or-nothing case. Model 2 is deemed to 
be more realistic in that it takes cognizance of the fact that the road 
authority has more than one option open to it in terms of project 
19 types. In this model the " quantitative importance" of the consumer 
surplus calculation is viewed to be less significant than that required 
in the all-or-nothing model. This is explained as follows The 
investment problem confronting the road authority may be either (i) that 
of starting de novo, but with the choice of a number of road types, or 
(ii) given that the road already exists, deciding what kind of quantity/ 
quality changes to make. For example, given that a road already exists 
between two points, A and B, the problem for the road authority may be 
that of deciding whether to upgrade the quality of the road for its 
entire length, or part of its length. 
For convenience, it is assumed that in the de novo case, the 
road authority is confronted with two options regarding quantity/ 
quality characteristics. These are represented by cost functions I 
and II in Figure 3.4. Each road is assumed to have identical variable 
maintenance costs up to the point where maximum capacity is attained -
road II having a greater capacity than road I. 
19. Ibid., p. 48. 
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FIGURE 3.4 Demand and Cost Conditions: Discrete Investment Options 
XQ XJ^  
Vehicle Journeys Per Period of Time 
Suppose that in the first instance the road authority 
considers the worthwhileness of constructing road I given demand 
conditions D.D, In this situation, the authority would impose a 
congestion charge, KL, per vehicle journey If it is now assumed that 
discounted revenues (over the relevant time period) are equal to or 
greater than discounted costs (capital + maintenance)^^ then it is 
obviously worthwhile to build the road. However, in terms of 
Walters' argument, it is not necessarily the case that road I should be 
built in preference to road II. Road II might be "worthwhile" if we 
consider a situation where the choice is between road II or no road at 
all. However, since road I is also a possibility, a comparison with 
that road should be made. It is at this level that it is argued that the 
calculation of consumer surplus is of less quantitative significance. 
The construction of road II will result in an increment of benefit 
equal to the area WJN. This addition to surplus can be compared with 
the additional cost involved as a result of opting for road II rather 
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than road I. If the value of benefits, WJN, placed by road users on 
the additional journeys per period of time, exceeds the additional costs 
involved as a result of choosing road II rather than road I, then the 
investment in road II is deemed to be worthwhile. In this situation 
'optimal' road user charges generate revenues which are just sufficient 
to meet variable maintenance costs. The road authority incurs a deficit. 
Let us now suppose that demand is given by D^D, and that the 
construction of road I warranted on revenue/cost grounds. If demand 
shifts to D^D- the road authority is able to earn a higher rate of return. 
The question now asked is whether it is worthwhile to construct road 
II? If road II is constructed, the road authority will extract from 
road users a congestion charge (over and above a variable maintenance 
charge) equal to MS per vehicle journey- The construction of road II, 
however, will produce an increment of consumer surplus equal to the area 
RST. Thus, according to the model, the relevant comparison is between 
the incremental costs involved (which, as Walters observes, may 
be greater than they would have been had road II been constructed 
from scratch), and revenue received by the road authority plus the 
addition to surplus. Again, if discounted revenues and surplus are 
equal to or greater than discounted costs, expansion to road II is 
deemed to be justified on efficiency grounds. 
In sum, while the concept of consumer surplus is invoked by 
Walters as an appropriate investment criterion for road project appraisal 
(assuming the presence of indivisibilities/discontinuities and/or 
economies of scale), the point is made that given the nature of the options 
open to a road authority, it will not^ as a practical matter, be necessary 
to measure entire areas under demand curves: 
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"The practical importance of this argument is that once we 
have a low capacity road, actually existing or in project, 
that could be supported by congestion levies, this road 
may be used as a base line from which to calculate 
additional, and less intractable, consumer surpluses 
on the road increment only. To that extent, one can deal 
with conceptually easier measures such as the congestion 
toll on the low capacity road rather than with the highly 
abstract valuations of consumer surplus."20 
Granted that there is a case for measuring i.e. estimating 
areas under demand curves, then it is better that they be "small" rather 
than "large" areas. So much for the indivisibilities/consumer surplus 
argument. We will consider this further in Chapter 4. For the moment, 
we will continue our summary of the Walters' model by considering the 
related matter of financial deficits. 
2.2 The Problem of Deficits 
From what has been described so far, it is clear that 
adoption of the investment rule of the Walters' model will result in 
the generation of financial deficits - at least for some parts of the 
road system. This follows from the nature of the assumptions regarding 
the technical characteristic of road supply, i.e. the assumption of 
the existence of indivisibilities, discontinuities, joint products 
and economies and diseconomies of scale. In the main, the model 
suggests that roads which have low traffic voliraies, i.e. the great 
majority of rural and inter-urban roads, will fail to generate sufficient 
revenues to meet capital and operating costs, while for urban roads, 
which are characterized by high traffic volumes, it is likely that 
discounted revenues will exceed discounted capital and operating costs. 
Let us pursue the urban road case further Following Walters, 
we suppose that there are no discontinuities in the supply of road 
space. Given this assumption and the price and investment rule of the 
model, it follows that whether or not urban roads will fail to cover 
costs will depend solely on the shape of the long-run cost function. 
20. Ibid., p. 50. 
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Suppose, for example, that the long-run cost curve exhibits decreasing 
returns to scale. Thus, given the existing supply of urban road space, 
as traffic volume increases, higher charges will be levied to reflect 
both the scarcity value of existing road space and the fact that 
increments to the supply of road space can only be made at increased 
costs. In this situation, a surplus will result. Moreover, as the 
urban road network is expanded it seems reasonable to expect that the 
positive gap between revenues and costs would increase. 
Walters contends, however, that this conclusion requires some 
modification once the assumption of discontinuities is introduced. 
He argues that "[one] can no longer be certain that the proposition of 
increasing long-run cost is sufficient (or even necessary) to result 
21 in a surplus". This is demonstrated as follows. First, it is assumed 
that urban roads are characterized by both long-run increasing costs 
and discontinuities. Second, that the road authority is confronted 
with the choice of two roads (having cost function I and II as shown 
in Figure 3.5^ and further, that "break even" prices for each road. 
given demand functions D,D, and D2D2 , are shown respectively, by P, 
and P2. For convenience the presence of the long-run increasing costs is 
not shown in the diagram: the aim is to isolate the effects of the 
22 discontinuities. 
If initially the road authority constructed road I and demand 
is given by DiD|, then revenues are equal to costs. If we now suppose 
that demand shifts to D^ D^ . and that the consumer surplus benefits 
derived by expanding the road to size II are greater than capital 
costs, then as previously argued, the road authority makes a loss. 
21. Ibid., p.51. 
22. Ibid. 
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FIGURE 3.5 Urban Roads: Financial Deficits and Surpluses 
Price/ 
Cost 
$ 
Vehicle Journeys Per Period of Time 
On the other hand, if at some later stage the demand function shifts to 
D2D2, a surplus will result. For urban roads (given the assumptions 
of discontinuities and long-run increasing costs) it is conceivable 
that the adoption of the SRMC pricing rule and the consumer surplus 
investment criterion will, over a given range of expansion, result in 
the generation of a cycle of surpluses and deficits. 
Whether such a pattern is likely to persist for any length of 
time, and, of course, whether deficits are likely to be pronounced, 
will depend not only on the size of discontinuities and the extent to 
which long-run costs increase, but also on the elasticity of demand. 
Walters' conclusion is, that for most urban areas, the effects of the 
existence of multiple discontinuities would be outweighed by the influence 
of relatively high elasticities of demand and rapidly rising long-run 
costs. In these circumstances, the model predicts that for most urban 
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road systems the application of the price and investment rules would 
tend to generate surpluses rather than deficits. For uncongested 
(low volume) rural and inter- urban roads the situation is quite 
different. Following Walters, the presence of indivisibilities and/or 
discontinuities will mean that the application of the above rules to 
this sector of the road network will fail to provide sufficient 
revenues to meet the costs of road supply. Given such a situation, 
the answer to the question of whether total road user revenues will be 
sufficient to meet the costs of the entire road system will obviously 
depend on the relative significance of urban and rural traffic. There 
are no a priori grounds for believing that the optimal price and 
investment rules of the model will guarantee that, in long-run 
equilibrium, road users as a whole will pay for the roads, let alone 
for the various parts of the road system. 
Granted that deficits are likely to be the norm, there 
remains the important matter of how the deficit is to be financed. 
Both Walters and the Allais Report concluded that there is no 
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unequivocal best way of meeting the deficit. However, it is 
suggested that it may be viewed as inequitable to impose all or part of 
the cost of the road track upon the community in general. Further, 
it is also argued that the existence of a deficit could pose problems 
of a political and institutional nature, which are likely to have 
important consequences for investment. The argument is that if the 
deficit is to be financed from the government budget, then not only 
will investment be affected by budgetary considerations, but also there 
23. For example, the Allais Report contends: " in the present state 
of our knowledge, it hardly seems possible to prove that, of all 
practical methods of raising the required funds, the least 
inefficient one would be to impose charges on the users of infra-
structure". The Allais Report, op.cit., p. 69. 
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is the possibility of misuse of resources as a result of pressure 
group activities. Such misuse could be manifested in terms of the 
distribution of road funds and, as well, in terms of the level of 
investment. For these reasons the Allais Report suggested: 
"Great progress would therefore be made toward optimum 
resource allocation if roads were freed from national 
budget constraints by "defiscalizing" the charges which 
weight on infrastructure users, i.e. by financing highway 
expenditure - however defined - from taxes which would no 
longer have a fiscal character but would be considered as 
prices."24,25 
Consideration is also given by Walters and the Allais Report 
to the implications of a budgetary equilibrium requirement for road 
user charges, given regional variations in traffic levels. It is 
emphasised that care needs to be taken in defining a region to ensure 
that inefficient pricing is minimized. Walters suggests that because 
of variations in demand elasticities, it is best that a region include 
both congested and uncongested roads. Similarly, the Allais Report 
contends first, that a region should be sufficiently large to avoid or at 
least minimize the "- economically harmful effects of applying 
27 budgetary equilibrium on too small a scale" ; second, that the size of a 
region within which budgetary equilibrium is required will need to 
depend to a large degree, on the extent of the interdependence of 
various parts of the road system - the argument being that, as long 
as " the services performed by these parts are highly complementary, 
it is economically pointless and perhaps inequitable to apply the 
28 
condition of budgetary equilibrium to each part separately" ; and, 
finally, that the equilibrium requirement should not be taken to the 
point at which it fails to provide a check against the activities of 
24. The Allais Report, ibid., p. 72. 
25. See Walters, A.A., The Economics of Road User Charges, op.cit., pp.102-103 
26. Ibid., p. 86. 
27 The Allais Report, op.cit., p. 87. 
28. Ibid. 
42, 
29 pressure groups. 
2.3 The Problem of "Second-Best" 
One of the assumptions made by Walters and the authors of the 
Allais Report is that prices in the rest of the economy are equal to 
marginal costs. Since, as a matter of fact, and for a variety of 
reasons (for example, the existence of monopoly, oligopoly, excise 
taxes and so on), this is not the case, it is important to note how 
30 this problem is dealt with by the above authors. 
In brief, both Walters and the Allais Report deny the practical 
relevance of any attempt to formulate a "second-best" pricing solution 
based on price/cost relationships for the economy as a whole. As 
stated by Walters, 
" any precise solution that could be derived from any 
given set of specified monopolistic and competitive 
conditions would be of such bewildering complexity as to 
be useless." 
And, as expressed by the Allais Report, 
"If deviations from the optimal rules in other sectors 
are considered as an accepted fact, and if policy is 
directed toward mitigating the- consequences of this 
situation by introducing compensating distortions in 
the transport sector, we run the risk of becoming 
involved in a vicious circle of measures designed to 
provide compensation in one sector for distortions in 
other sectors or are created by the very process that 
is intended to correct them."-^ ^ 
29. Ibid., p. 88. 
30. It is not considered necessary to provide a detailed review of the 
theory of Second Best. Some references are: Lipsey, R. and 
Lancaster, K., "The General Theory of Second Best", Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol^xxiv (I) No. 63, December 19561 Davis, 0. 
and Whinston, A., "Welfare Economics and the Theory of Second 
Best", Review of Economic Studies, (I) 1965; Turvey, R., Economic 
Analysis and Public Enterprises (London: Unwin University Books, 
1971), Chapter 3; and Rees, R., Public Enterprise Economics 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London School of Economics 
Handbooks in Economic Analysis, 1976), Chapter 6. 
31. Walters, A.A., The Economics of Road User Charges, op.cit., p. 92, 
32. The Allais Report, op.cit., p. 66, 
43, 
The more important issue is seen as that of ensuring optimal 
price/cost relationships within the transport sector as a whole. What 
this means for pricing policy in the road sector depends on the price/ 
cost relationship for other modes, on the degree of substitutability 
and complementarity, and on the existence of constraints on policy 
options. 
Finally, on the issue of the implications of the theory 
of second-best for the investment problem, the Walters/Allais model 
implicitly assumes that, on pragmatic grounds, a marginal benefit/cost 
33 
cut-off ratio of unity is the best policy advice that can be offered. 
3. Other Approaches to the Pricing and Financing of Roads 
While the road pricing model just described places paramount 
importance on the need to achieve an optimal utilization of existing 
capacity, a review of the literature reveals the existence of a number 
of studies which focus attention on what the Allais Report refers to 
as the budgetary equilibrium problem, or, what is more usually described 
as the road track cost apportionment issue. 
These studies attempt, to formulate a methodology for determin-
ing the costs of providing, maintaining and administering the road 
system; to provide a basis, in some instances, for apportioning 
estimated costs between users and non-users, and finally, to provide a 
basis for allocating costs among user classes. 
33. This view is expressed clearly by Winch, (op.cit., p, 155): 
"Since competitive and monopolistic industry are out of balance 
anyway, it is impossible for highways to be in balance with both 
at the same time. If we had the data to apply the theory of second 
best, we might find the cut-off point for highway projects to be 
where the ratio of benefits to costs is slightly greater than, or 
slightly less than one, and it might even be different for 
different projects. But we do not have such data, and some criterion 
is desperately needed. It is the author's contention that the use 
of a cut-off ratio of one is as good an approximation to the 
optimum as it is possible to achieve in practice. Its use would 
ensure consistency within the field of highway planning and, while 
the absence of data makes it impossible to prove that it would result 
in the best allocation of resources between highways and other 
uses.tlicro is no way of knowing, nor any reason to believe, that it 
would result in overinvestment in highways rather than underinvest-
ment, or vice versa" 
44. 
In some of these studies, the issue of apportionment is 
examined largely in terms of an equity goal (usually undefined) Such 
studies give rise not only to a variety of methods for apportioning 
road costs among users, but also between users and non-users as well. 
A classic example of such an approach is the 1961 U.S.A. Bureau of Public 
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Roads, Highway Cost Allocation Study The aim of that study was 
expressed as: 
".. to make available to the Congress information on the 
basis of which it may be determined what taxes should be 
imposed by the United States, and in what amounts, in order 
to assure, insofar as practicable, an equitable distribution 
of the tax burden among the various classes of persons using 
the Federal aid highways or otherwise deriving benefits from 
such highways."25 
While most discussions of the road track cost issue assume, 
that by and large, road users should pay for the roads, not all 
contributors agree that the main reasons for accepting this requirement 
are those which were outlined in our discussion of the SRMC pricing 
model. In some road track cost studies, such as those by Stewart 
37 
and Haritos , the argument that users of the road should be confronted 
with the costs of capital is presented as an efficiency in resource 
38 
allocation argument rather than as a constraint to be met and 
determined by other considerations. 
34. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, Final 
Report of the Highway Cost Allocation Study, House Doc. No. 54, 87th 
Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C., 1961), p. 1. 
35. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, ibid., 
Letter of Transmittal. The Secretary of Commerce, Washington D.C., 
January 13, 1961. 
36. Stewart, J.M., A Pricing System for Roads, University of Glasgow, 
Social and Economic Studies, Occasional Papers No. 4 (Oliver and 
Boyd, 1965) 
37 Haritos, Z,, Rational Road Pricing Policies in Canada, (Canadian 
Transport Commission, Ottawa, 1973) 
38, For example, Haritos, ibid., p. 35, states: "- that economic 
efficiency dictates that road costs should be recovered from the users; 
any financing out of general taxation would be inefficient. An 
efficient pricing mechanism would allocate road costs to users on the 
basis of escapability, i.e., at the time the cost takes place with 
minimum cross-subsidisation. Thus, long-run costs which are independ-
ent of utilization should be recovered by a lump-sum payment or annual 
rent ; other costs that are a function of utilization should be recover-
ed by a vehicle-mile charge." 
45. 
A short outline of some of the major approaches to the road 
track cost allocation issue is now provided. 
39 3.1 Proposals for Allocating Costs Between Users and NOn-Users 
Of the various proposals for dealing with this aspect of the 
apportionment problem, the most frequently cited are: (i) the relative 
use and predominant use methods, (ii) the earnings credit method, and 
40 (iii) the incremental cost method. 
3.1.1 The Relative Use and Predominant Use Method 
The relative use method is based on the view that the road 
cost burden should be apportioned according to the different purposes 
for which the various parts of the road system are used. Three m.ain 
purposes are identified : (a) access purposes; (b) to enable the 
movement of traffic within a community; and (c) to facilitate the 
movement of through or inter-urban traffic. The method relies on the 
use of origin and destination studies to estimate the proportion of 
each type of traffic. Annual road costs are apportioned between motorists 
and property owners according to the relative importance of each purpose 
for which each part of the road system is used. The costs attributed 
to the inter-community function are imputed to motorists, while costs 
attributed to the community are divided between motorists and property 
owners. 
39. See, for example, (i) Lebaron, A.D., "The Theory of Highway Finance: 
Roots, Aims and Accomplishments", National Tax Journal, Vol. 16, 
1963; (ii) Harbeson, Robert W., "Some Unsettled Issues in 
Highway-Cost Allocation", Public Finance and Welfare Essays in 
Honor of C. Ward Mary, Paul L. Kleinsorge, Editor. (University 
of Oregon Books, 1966) 
40. This method is described in section 3.3 2 of this chapter,, 
41. See Lebaron, A.D., op.cit., p. 310. 
46. 
The apportionment procedure adopted by the predominant use 
method is somewhat simpler For this method, as suggested by its name, 
the criterion used to determine cost responsibility for the various parts 
of the road system is the predominant function served. The road system 
is usually divided into three categories: (a) main highways or trunk 
roads; (b) access roads; and (c) other roads and streets. Since 
benefits from improvements to the first category are considered to 
accrue predominantly to motorists, this group is required to meet the 
full costs of such improvements. Financing increases in the quantity and 
quality of access roads, on the other hand, is seen to be the responsibility 
of property owners, while for the remaining category, the community as a 
whole is assumed to be the principal beneficiary of any improvement, and, 
in this case, it is recommended that funds for such improvements should be 
obtained from general tax revenues. 
3.1.2 Earnings Credit Method 
In contrast to the relative use and predominant use methods, 
the earnings credit approach gives recognition to the fact that road 
user tax revenues are generated on all parts of the road system. For 
this reason it is argued that each part of the road system, whatever 
its classification, should be credited with the amount of road user 
tax revenues which its use generates. 
This method represents a mediation between two somewhat 
incompatible assumptions: 
"(1) That each road and street system should receive an 
allocation of road user tax revenues at a rate, per 
vehicle mile of travel on it, adequate to support 
the top system of arterial and primary highways, rural 
and urban; . and 
(2) that each road and street system should receive an 
allocation of non-user tax revenues at a rate, per 
mile of road or street on it, adequate to support the .^  
bottom, or lowest system of access roads and streets." 
42. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, op.cit., 
pp. 130-131. 
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The compromise between these two assumptions is achieved as follows. 
To commence with, the costs per vehicle mile are calculated for the major 
highway and street systems and imputed entirely to motor vehicle users. 
The result is then applied to each of the remaining parts of the road 
system. The difference between revenues generated for this part of the 
road system and costs incurred is assigned to non-users - generally 
property owners. 
The second stage requires a computation of the costs per mile 
of providing the tertiary or access road and street system and imputing 
the entire amount to property owners. This estimate is then applied 
to the major road and street system and the amount allocated as 
determined on a vehicle mile basis, is assigned to motor vehicle users. 
As a third and final step, the vehicle mile costs obtained 
from the previous steps are averaged to give the user component. This 
figure is then subtracted from the total costs of the road system in 
order to determine the non-user component. 
3.2 The Annual Track Costs of the Road System 
An issue of fundamental importance to the road track cost 
apportionment problem is that concerning the appropriate basis for 
estimating the annual track costs of the road system. A review of the 
literature indicates two main approaches. They are: (i) the public 
enterprise approach, and (ii) "the pay-as-you-go" (PAYG) or current 
expenditure method. 
Both approaches were, for example, adopted by the British 
Ministry of Transport in its submission to the Geddes Committee in 1964. 
The latter was argued as the preferred method on both theoretical and 
practical grounds in the 1967 British Road Track Cost Report (RTCR)^^'^^ 
43. U.K. Ministry of. Transport, op.cit. 
44. See also. Department of Environment, Transport Policy: A Consultative 
Document, Vol. 2, (London: H.M.S.O., 1976), p. 107 
48. 
and the Allais Report, while the former approach - following the guide-
lines set down in the 1961 White Paper entitled. The Financial and 
Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries - is adopted by 
46 47 
Stewart. A similar approach is also adopted by Haritos , although 
no explicit reference is made to the public enterprise approach. 
3.2.1 The Public Enterprise Approach 
The public enterprise approach " , is an attempt to devise 
for the road system a set of accounts comparable to a public or private 
48 
firm". This in turn involves an estimation of the capital value of 
the stock of road space and a decision as to the appropriate rate of 
return to be earned on such assets. 
Both the RTCR and the Allais Report highlight a number of 
difficulties associated with the public enterprise approach to the 
estimation of the value of the road track. 
First, as the above Reports indicate, it is sometimes argued 
that since road space existed before the advent of motorized traffic, 
there is a case for imputing some value to that part of the road stock. 
The difficulty, however, is that " it is not obvious how this problem 
49 
of initial valuation should be tackled". Second, there is generally 
a statistical problem associated with the recording of expenditure 
items. For example, many expenditures which are currently labelled 
maintenance and/or minor improvements are frequently of a capital 
nature. IVhile it is generally possible to determine for the present 
which of the various items of expenditure under this heading are strictly 
capital and which are strictly maintenance, the problem of 
45. Treasury [1961], The Financial and Economic Obligations of the 
Natio^ na-liscd Industries, Cmnd, 1337 (London, H.M.S.O.) 
46. Stewart, J.M.W., op.cit. 
47p Haritos, Z., op.cit. 
48. U.K. Ministry of Transport, op.cit., p. 76, 
49. Ibid., p. 77. 
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determining what these proportions were in the past (especially the 
more distant past) can only be resolved by arbitrary means. 
A third difficulty concerns the matter of depreciation of 
capital. In some studies, no allowance is made for depreciation, while 
in others the road stock is depreciated over periods varying from 
twenty to fifty years. Apart from arguments concerning the arbitrary 
nature of chosen periods for writing off capital, the issue of whether 
road capital should be depreciated seems to be based on differences 
in opinion of the meaning of depreciation. Implicit in the Ministry 
of Transport Study is the argum.ent that (i) since a large part of road 
capital is made up of non-renewable assets, no allowance for depreciation 
is necessary, and (ii) for those assets which are subject to physical 
deterioration, maintenance expenditure avoids the need to provide for 
depreciation. In contrast, in the study by Stewart, not only are 
renewable assets assigned a thirty-year life period (notwithstanding 
maintenance expenditure) but depreciation is defined to include the 
notion of obsolescence with non-renewable assets being assigned an 
arbitrary life period of fifty-five years. Thus, it is argued: 
"Depreciation due to obsolescence relates to the future 
value of an asset. A road may become partially or totally 
obsolescent if it is replaced by a new road nearby, bypassed, 
or perhaps dovvngraded to a lower class. Again, it is con-
ceivable, though unlikely, that an alternative form of 
transport will emerge to supplant the road system and the 
possibility must be allowed for that^  in fifty or sixty years 
the road system will be worthless." ^ ^ 
As a fourth problem area associated with the public enterprise 
approach to the treatment of road space, the RTCR refers to the difficult-
ies involved in giving an appropriate value to the land component of the 
stock of capital. Two methods of determining how land should be charged 
to road users are considered by the RTCR. The first argues that road 
users should be required to pay the alternative use value of land which 
50. Stewart, J.M.W., op.cit., p. 7 
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is occupied by road space. Only if road users are prepared to pay 
such an amount should the land be retained for road purposes. While 
this makes good theory, the RTCR contends that it is not clear how such 
value can be determined in practice - especially in urban areas where 
a high degree of interdependence exists between the various forms of 
land use, including that devoted to road space. Thus the RTCR argues 
that if charges on particular roads were made to reflect fairly closely 
the value of nearby land: 
"There might follow changes in the pattern of land use, 
including the amount devoted to roads, that would 
appreciably change the values used for the initial 
valuation. Consequently, the value arrived at by taking the 
the values in force now on sites bordering roads may serious-
ly misrepresent the value that would obtain if that price 
were actually charged."^1 
The second approach to the land valuation problem considered 
by the RTCR suggests that the road supply industry should earn a return 
on land comparable to that earned by other owners of land: 
As roads are fairly well geographically spread and are 
not confined to areas of high or low values, then it 
could be argued that they should produce a rental value 
equal to the average obtained from other land. 52 
Apart from problems associated with the assumptions underlying this 
53 
method, it is also suggested by the RTCR that such a method is likely 
to produce land values, and thus rentals, higher than the alternative 
use approach because it ignores the cost of converting land to other 
uses, as well as failing to make any adjustment for changes in land 
54 
values resulting from the rent charged. 
51. U.K. Ministry of Transport, op.cit., p. 79. 
52. Ibid. 
53. The assumptions are: (i) that land currently used for road purposes 
should be used for such purposes, (ii) that past decisions to use 
land for road purposes were made on the basis that the return was 
comparable to that from alternative uses, and (iii) that as land 
values have risen over time, appropriate adjustments have been made 
to the value of land embodied in roads. Ibid. 
54. Ibid. 
51, 
3.2.2 The "Pay-As-You-Go" or Current Expenditure Method 
In contrast to the public enterprise approach, the current 
expenditure method requires that road users be confronted in any year 
with all of the expenses incurred in operating, maintaining, renewing 
and expanding the road system in that year As indicated, this method 
is the one preferred by the RTCR and the Allais Report. It has also 
recently been adopted by the New Zealand Government as a basis for its 
56 
Road User Charges Act, 1977 
The reasons advanced by the above Reports in favour of the 
adoption of this method are as follows. First, it is argued that not 
only is this method the simplest of the various approaches to obtaining 
budgetary equilibrium, but also it is the " clearest and most 
57 
objective" ; it avoids all of the problems associated with choice of 
amortization schedule, choice of interest rate and estimating the initial 
value of the capital stock. Second, the method is seen as having distinct 
institutional advantages, in that it provides for a direct link between 
investment and charging policy " whereby the effects of investment 
58 
policy immediately become apparent to all concerned" Finally, the 
59 
current expenditure method is seen by some of its advocates as having 
resource allocation advantages, on the ground that it provides a reasonable 
approximation to long-run marginal cost. The reasons for this claim and 
some of the objections which have been levelled against it will be 
examined in the next chapter 
55. See also Pryke, R. and Dodgson, J., The Rail Problem, (Martin 
Robinson, 1975), p. 220. 
56. See, for example, Stacey, A.F., Recent Changes in the Funding of the 
National Roads Board (Ministry of Works and Development, New Zealand, 
1978); and Furby, B., "Road Tax", Construction and Road Transport, 
Vol 6, No. 5, May 1979. 
The Allais Report, op.cit,, p. 131. 57 
58. Ibid., p.131 
59. See for example, (i) U.K. Ministry of Transport, op.cit., pp. 21-22; 
and (ii) Pryke, R. and Dodgson, J., op.cit., p, 220. 
52. 
3.3 Allocation of Road Costs by Vehicle Class 
It now remains to refer briefly to some of the main approaches 
which have been advocated at various times, for the purposes of assign-
ing road track costs among the various types of vehicles (vehicle classes) 
which make use of the road system. 
Two approaches are identified: (i) those which seek to allocate 
costs according to benefits received or value of service, and (iii) those 
which attempt to apportion costs according to cost responsibility-
3.3.1 Value of Service Approach 
As far as the benefit or value of service approach is concerned, 
the most frequently cited proposal would seem to be the gross ton mile 
method. This method has proved to be popular in a number of countries 
(especially in the U.S.A.), and is justified on the grounds of 
administrative convenience and that mileage and vehicle weight are 
reasonable indicators of benefit. This assumption has been challenged 
by various writers. For example, in the 1961 U.S.A. Bureau of Roads 
Report it is argued that "[when] different freight classifications are 
involved or passenger carrying is compared with freight hauling, the 
relationship of gross ton miles to value of service received from the 
highways becomes meaningless" Moreover, it is also noted that this 
method does not reflect the differential costs incurred in providing' 
road track facilities for heavy vehicles. Available evidence suggests 
that pavement requirements of the latter are determined by wheel or 
axle loads rather than gross weights. 
60. See Grubbs, Clifton M., "Problems of Highway Cost Allocation", 
National Tax Journal, Vol. XVI, December 1963. 
61. United States Deparment of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, 
op-cit., p. 227 
62. Ibid., p. 229 
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Other value of service approaches referred to in the literature 
include the differential benefit method and the benefit/cost method. 
With regard to the former method, the objective is to allocate road 
improvement costs among vehicle classes according to benefits received 
as manifest, for example, by reductions in such factors as (i) vehicle 
operating costs (e.g. fuel and oil consumption); (ii) vehicle travel 
time; (iii)traffic accidents and (iv) driving strain and annoyance. 
As far as this writer is aware the U.S.A., Bureau of Roads Study is 
the sole example ofan attempt to apply this method. * 
The benefit/cost approach is conceptually more appealing. It 
is discussed, for example, in the British Road Track Cost Report. However, 
the Report suggests a number of difficulties. First, on the cost side it 
63, Ibid , Section IV-D, 
64. The allocation formula adopted by the Report is described as follows: 
"The benefits per vehicle computed for 1964 for each 
highway system by vehicle type, registered weight 
range, type of fuel, and class of operations were first 
expressed as a set of ratios based on a ratio of unity 
for privately operated gasoline-propelled passenger cars; 
R,, R2, R,, (R, = unity) The total Federal expenditures 
for highway construction predicted for 1964(A) were allocated 
among the various user groups using the following formulas 
where "a" is the allocation for privately-operated 
gasoline-propelled cars: 
A = R^a + R2a + R_a 
a = R^ + R2 + R3 
The allocations for each group then equal the product 
of "a" and the R ratio for the particular group." 
[Ibid., pp. 218-219] 
65. In contrast to the differential benefit method the benefit/cost 
approach endeavours to ensure that each user class at least meets 
those track costs which can be unambiguously attributed to them. 
See Chapter 4, Section 5,1. 
54. 
is argued that because of the existence of joint costs it is not 
possible to ascertain (on economic grounds) the exact share of costs 
which should be borne by each user class; economic considerations 
are seen as providing a lower limit to the attribution of costs: 
". in order to attempt to determine what share of the 
total costs of capacity provision each vehicle class 
should bear the relation between capital expenditure on 
new roads and the use of the roads by particular classes 
of vehicles may be analysed in terms of the benefits occurring 
from the expenditure to the particular class since it is 
only these benefits which justify the commitment of resources. 
But because roads are joint facilities, it is not possible, 
even in this way, to determine precisely the share of total 
costs that any particular vehicle may be said to cause. 
Equally, however, the shares are not completely arbitrary 
since it makes no economic sense to attribute to a vehicle 
class more of the costs than the benefits they enjoy, and 
further limits are imposed where the possibility of "separate 
provision for the various vehicle classes exists." 
While we have no disagreement with this statement, we do not 
agree with the RTCR view that " the problem of joint cost cannot 
be overcome"- As we shall argue in Chapter 4, economic theory gives 
clear guidelines as to how the joint cost component would be apportioned 
under competitive and monopolistic conditions. 
Second, the RTCR argues that while benefit calculations of 
the kind referred to above are necessary for the evaluation of the 
economic desirability or otherwise of road improvement schemes, they 
are not, however, entirely appropriate for determining the apportionment 
of track costs among vehicle classes. Two reasons are advanced to 
support this claim. When calculating the benefits produced by road 
improvement schemes no account is taken of the existence of costs 
(disbenefits) imposed by one user class on another while using the 
joint facility. The RTCR argues that since it is reasonable to assume, 
66. U.K. Ministi:y of Transport, op.cit., .^ .nnex 15. Paragraph 17, p. 96, 
67 Ibid,, Paragraph 15, p. 96. 
68, This, of course, would not be the case if it were possible to 
impose congestion levies. 
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for investment appraisal purposes, that all vehicle classes which make 
use of a road before an improvement will continue to do so after the 
improvement, it is not necessary to provide a separate analysis of the 
loss of benefits by user classes as manifest by extra congestion costs 
caused by the sharing of facilities. Granted that such a calculation 
is irrelevant to the investment problem, the RTCR argues that " it 
would be incorrect to ignore these [i.e., congestion effects] when 
allocating cost, for both economic and equity reasons, as there can 
69 be no presumption that such losses cancel out between classes" 
The other problem mentioned is also concerned with the 
difficulties associated with benefit measurement. Here it is argued 
that, typically, in measuring the benefits from improving the quality 
of some part of the road system no attempt is made to examine the 
implications of not undertaking specific improvements for a particular 
user class (e.g. heavy vehicles) where the apparent benefits to that 
class are slight,or do not outweight relevant costs, and where, as 
a result of this, such a class is excluded from using the road in 
,. 70 
question. 
3.3.2 Cost of Service Approaches 
By far the most common approach to the problem of apportioning 
road track costs among user classes is to assign costs on the basis of 
cost responsibility A review of the literature indicates a number of 
procedures and formulae. 
69. U.K. Ministry of Transport, op.cit., p. 27 
70. In the words of the RTCR: 
"re while the benefits a.heavy vehicle may derive from 
an improvement may be small, the loss of benefit it would 
suffer if it were excluded from an improvement would almost 
always be extremely high. But the benefit from access is 
quite different from the benefits - time and op'irating cost 
savings - that current methods are capable of evaluating. 
Consequently, it is not possible to estimate how significant 
this omitted item might be." (Ibid,, pp. 27-28,) 
56. 
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To begin with, there is the cost-function method which 
classifies track costs into three groups: weight function costs; 
traffic function costs; and standby costs. The weight function costs 
are those which are associated with vehicle size or weight (e.g. 
structure of the road base and surface thickness) These costs are 
allocated on the basis of a uniform gross ton mile rate, a consequence 
of which is that smaller and/or lighter weight vehicles which do not 
require the same structural standards as those in larger size or heavier 
weight categories, are required to contribute to the costs of providing 
those standards, though, of course, at a lower rate per vehicle mile. 
As far as traffic function costs are concerned, these refer to 
those costs which vary with use, but not with weight/size dimensions 
'&,g. traffic control costs, and are allocated according to the average 
annual vehicle miles for each vehicle class - the assumption being that 
vehicles which make the greatest use of the road system should contribute 
more to the funding of such costs than those which make least use of the 
road system. Finally, standby costs refer to those costs which are 
independent of both vehicle size and weight, and traffic volume e.g. 
invariant maintenance and administrative costs These costs are 
usually allocated on the basis of a flat rate per vehicle irrespective 
of vehicle type. 
Another method employed for assigning cost responsibility among 
vehicle classes is the axle/weieht ratio measure. This method is used 
72 by Stewart, for example, and is justified on the ground that since 
" the cost imposed by a vehicle bears some relationship to the absolute 
weight of the vehicle (with its load) and the manner in which this load 
71. See, for example, (i) United States Department of Coimnerce, Bureau 
of Public Roads, op,cit,, p. 189; and (ii) Harbeson, Robert W., 
op,cit., p,202. 
72. Stewart, J,M.W., op,cit. 
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is spread over the road some formula utilizing the axle/weight 
73 
ratio is undoubtedly the best way of allocating vehicle costs" 
Costs are divided into two categories: (1) administrative costs; 
and (2) capital and maintenance costs. The former are viewed to vary 
more or less in proportion to the number of vehicle miles,while the 
latter are allocated according to the axle/weight factor Vehicle 
mileage is weighted according to the axle/weight factor and the costs 
per vehicle mile for each vehicle class determined by the following 
formula: 
Administrative Cost ^ Maintenance + Capital 
Total Vehicle Mileage Weighted Vehicle Mileage 
where W = the axle/weight factor 
A third approach is highlighted by the RTCR. The Report 
argued that the various elements of track costs should be examined, and 
those which are incurred solely for the benefit of particular user 
classes should be allocated to such classes. For the remaining costs 
(i.e. joint costs) it is recommended that these should be apportioned 
among vehicle classes according to some measure related to their use 
75 
of the road system, e.g. vehicle miles. The approach is justified 
on two main grounds. First, that it is, on practical grounds, the best 
means presently available for handling the problem of achieving an 
economically efficient allocation of track costs among vehicle classes. 
It is judged to be less efficient than a benefit/cost approach but is 
" the best available approximation to it" Second, that it 
represents an equitable basis for charging. Here the argument is that 
not only would it be unfair to extract a charge from all users to meet 
73. Ibid,, p. 19. 
74. Ibid., p. 23. 
75. See also. Department of the Environment, op.cit., p. 109. 
76. U.K. Ministry of Transport, op.cit., p. 29. 
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costs which are incurred for particular user classes, but also it is 
the case that where it is not possible to objectively assign other cost 
elements to particular user classes "... it would be accepted by most 
that no distinction should be made in charges". 
Finally, one other approach which requires mention is the 
incremental cost method. This method is by far the most popular of all 
the cost allocation procedures described in the literature. Examples 
78 
of its use are to be found in the U.S. Bureau of Roads 1961 study, 
79 
and, more recently, in a study undertaken in Australia and in the 
80 
Canadian study by Haritos. 
The first step in the use of this method is to determine the 
cost of what is referred to in the literature as a "basic road". This 
is generally defined as a road which is designed to meet the requirements 
81 
of private motor vehicles and light commercial vehicles. The costs 
of such a road are then allocated to all vehicle classes, usually on 
the basis of axle miles for pavement and shoulder costs and vehicle 
miles for other cost elements. 
77. Ibid., p. 29. 
78. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, op.cit. 
79. Review of Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Victorian Land 
Transport System (Government Printer, Melbourne, 1971). 
80. Haritos, Z., op.cit. 
81. In Meyer et al., The Economics of Competition in the Transportation 
Industries (Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 71: a "basic road" 
is defined as one which is of sufficient strength to meet the 
needs of property owners to gain access to their properties: "... in 
areas of average population density this road usually would be 
at least a two-lane construction about eighteen feet wide with 
three-foot shoulders and with a gravel surface and appropriate 
ballasting underneath. In areas of greater population density a 
low type bituminous or similar hard surfacing might be needed, 
while in areas of extremely low population density nothing more than 
a farm road consisting of two ruts cut through the dirt might be 
wanted," In this case the costs of the "basic road" are allocated 
to property owners. Increments of cost over and above this component 
are allocated among vehicle types as described in the text. 
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The next step involves determining those costs, over and above 
the basic road costs, which are incurred specifically for particular 
user classes. For example, if vehicles are classified according to 
axle load weight and if we suppose that for the basic road we have 
an axle weight category of 0-3000 lbs., and for heavier vehicles a 
classification of 3000-7000 lbs.; 7000-12000 lbs.; 12000-16000 lbs.; 
and 16000 lbs. and above, then the incremental costs incurred in upgrading 
the basic road to meet the requirements of vehicles in the 3000-7000 lbs. 
category, and then, successively for the remaining classes, are determined. 
These costs are then allocated again, usually on the basis of axle 
miles or vehicle miles, in the following way. All vehicles having 
axle weights in excess of 3000 lbs, contribute to the incremental costs 
associated with the 3000-7000 lbs. category; all vehicles with axle 
weights in excess of 7000 lbs, contribute to the incremental cost 
associated with the 7000-13000 lbs. class, and so on. 
It is by this means, i.e. the cumulative approach to the 
assignment of costs, that the joint cost problem brought about by the 
existence of different vehicle types is "solved". Moreover, as with 
other approaches to the road track cost problem considered in this 
chapter, the incremental cost method is recommended by its proponents 
82 
for both equity and efficiency in resource allocation reasons. 
82. A critical examination of the incremental cost method is undertaken 
in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORIES OF ROAD USER CHARGES AND INVESTMENT POLICY: AN ASSESSMENT 
1, Introduction 
Since our aim in the previous Chapter was simply to provide 
a summary of the various approaches to the pricing and financing of 
the road system without offering much in the way of comment, it is 
now necessary to attempt an assessment. We begin by reiterating 
some of the main reasons for differences in prescriptive advice. This 
is followed by a discussion of some of the arguments relating to the 
case for a non-user contribution to the costs of road supply. Some 
related comments are then made with regard to the efficiency arguments 
concerning the SRMC pricing/consumers' surplus investment model. We 
then proceed to examine the problem of efficient pricing for roads given 
the existence of cost complexities, especially the presence of joint 
costs since it is this problem which the various cost allocation 
procedures treat incorrectly An alternative framework for the pricing 
of the road track is suggested. We also discuss the issue of price 
discrimination under conditions of joint supply. 
2. Reasons for Differences in Prescriptive Advice 
The main reasons for variations in approach to the road 
track pricing and investment problem may be stated as follows. To 
begin with, variations in prescriptive advice can, in some cases, be 
explained in terms of differences in approach to the treatment of 
benefits derived from road supply- While a number of the participants 
to the road track cost debate have examined the problem of determining 
an appropriate charging or financing system solely in terms of a 
road user benefit cost framework, others have adopted a broader 
perspective, employing a benefit tax approach, by arguing that 
benefits from investment in road space accrue not only to users but also 
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to non-users as well, and that as a consequence, on equity grounds, 
this should be reflected in the charging/financing system. Moreover, 
it should also be noted that recommendations regarding the allocation 
of the costs of road supply among the various classes of users will 
also be affected by the concept of user charges adopted, e.g. whether 
charges are viewed as prices reflecting opportunity costs or simply 
as benefit based taxes. 
Secondly, while differences in prescriptive advice may be 
accounted for by differences in the treatment of benefits and by 
differences in the objectives to be achieved (e.g. equity versus 
efficiency), there is also conflict in prescriptive advice where 
efficiency in resource allocation is accepted as the objective for 
policy and where benefits from road supply are examined primarily 
in tenns of benefits to road users. The prescriptive advice offered by 
the Walters/Allais model, for example, differs from that recommended 
by other writers such as Stewart and Haritos. The reasons for such 
differences are, to a large extent, a consequence of differences in 
interpretation of the ingredients of an efficient pricing policy: in 
particular, to differences in interpretation of the meaning of the 
statement that prices should reflect costs. In the Walters/Allais 
model, opportunity costs refer to SRMC (including congestion costs), 
while in the other mentioned studies, capital costs are taken into 
account. Put differently, the SRMC model regards the requirement of a 
balanced budget as a constraint, dictated largely by non-economic 
considerations, whereas it is assumed, in the Stewart and Haritos 
studies, that such a requirement is an integral part of the efficiency 
in resource allocation concept. 
1. See, for example, Harbeson, Robert W., op.cit., p. 195. 
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Thirdly, variations in recommendations, given a common 
objective, may be explained in terras of differences in assumptions and 
constraints concerning price and investment policies, political and 
technical matters, and, in some cases, institutional arrangements. For 
instance, most road track cost/pricing studies assume that the size of 
the road budget (in contrast to the competitive model discussed in 
2 
Chapter 2 and the Walters' model discussed in Chapter 3) is determined 
exogenously. Differences in methods of charging will then depend, in 
part, on what other constraints are imposed; for example, whether it 
is assumed that the use of metering devices of varying degrees of 
sophistication is possible, or whether other, more conventional methods 
of charging will have to be relied on. 
This brings us to our final point, namely that there are 
also differences in approach to the issue of how the joint cost 
element of road track costs (defined as that part of the costs of 
road supply which cannot be unambiguously imputed to any particular 
vehicle class or type) should be allocated among the various user groups. 
While this aspect of the joint cost problem is ignored by some writers 
(e.g. Walters), others, such as the authors of the RTCR suggest a 
vehicle usage charge while Stewart, Haritos, Meyer et al., the Bland 
Report, and the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads Study, for example, propose 
the use of some form of technical criteria, deriving prices from 
formulae based on vehicle weights, axle loads, and so on. 
2. It is not entirely clear to this writer whether Walters is assuming a 
politically or arbitrarily determined road budget, or whether he is 
suggesting that the 'right' size of the road budget (given P = SRMC) 
can be determined by adoption of the consumers' surplus criterion. 
To assume the latter is to invite the criticism that since consumers' 
surplus is not used as a criterion for investment decisions in the 
private sector of the economy (nor indeed in all parts of the public 
sector), its unqualified use in the public sector would result in 
distortions in resource use. See p, 85. 
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3. The Pricing and Financing of Road Supply: The Non-User 
Contribution Issue 
As already observed, a number of contributors to the road 
pricing/financing issue have argued that the road budget should be 
funded on the basis of a benefit based tax structure relating to both 
users and non-users. 
While it is conceded that the provision of road space may 
generate benefits over and above those which accrue to direct users 
(as indeed might be the case for the supply of any type of commodity 
or service, whether publicly or privately supplied) it is not always the 
case that such circumstances justify a financial contribution from the 
public purse, or from particular groups of non-users. 
In attempting to clarify the argument that the existence of 
indirect benefits warrants a non-user contribution, it is important to 
distinguish between those benefits which are of a pecuniary nature 
and those which are legitimate technological economies. In the former 
case we refer to benefits which, while accruing in the first instance 
to a particular person or firm,^ are passed on in part or in full 
to another person or firm. In the latter case we refer to situations 
where there is direct non-market interdependence between economic units 
(i.e. where technological economies exist) 
To a large degree the confusion which characterizes the 
discussion of the argument in favour of a non-user contribution to the 
road budget is a consequence of a failure to recognize that many of the 
benefits which accrue to non-users as a result of improvements to the 
road system represent a transfer of benefits initially received by direct 
3, See, for example, statement of goals enshrined in Section 210 of the 
U.S.A. Highway Revenue Act (p. 44 of this study) 
4. See, for example, (i) Scitovsky, Tiber, "Two concepts of external 
economies". The Journal of Political Economy, 17 (1954), pp. 143-51; 
and (ii) Dasgupta, Ajit K, and Pearce, D,W,, Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
Theory and Practice (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, Student 
editions, 1972), Chapter 5, pp. 120-121. 
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users. For example, if additional expenditure on road space results 
in a lowering of motor transport costs, it is likely that some, (if not 
all), of the gains, will be passed on to the final consumers of the 
commodities transported by road. Clearly, the extent to which this 
will occur will depend on such factors as the degree of competition 
within the motor carrier industry and the level of charges imposed 
for the use of the improved facilities. Thus, if the motor carrier 
industry is highly competitive and the charge imposed by the road 
authority is less than the benefits received by the road users, then it 
seems reasonable to expect that the bulk of this difference will be 
passed on to other groups in the community Conversely, if the gains 
from road investment accrue to monopolistic suppliers of particular 
road services and the price charged for use of the improved facility 
is less than the benefits received by users, then it is likely that 
little of the surplus benefit will be passed on by the initial 
beneficiaries. And finally, if the price extracted by the road 
authority from direct users is equal to total willingness to 
pay, then benefits are transferred in full from road user to the 
road authority 
From what we have just said it should be fairly clear that in 
those circumstances where benefits to non-users of the road system 
are merely transfers i.e. pecuniary external economies, it is not 
necessary for efficiency in resource allocation reasons, for non-users 
to make a contribution to the costs of road supply As expressed by 
one writer: 
"The practice of incorporating either a 'benefit' or 'ability 
to pay' theory of taxation within the analytical framework of 
cost allocation may serve only to reduce the amounts assessed 
against users, and could lead to an unwarranted subsidy 
disguised in the form of a "scientific" allocation of cost. 
The result might well be a misallocation of resources and 
traffic in the domestic transportation system."5 
5. Kafoglis, Milton Z,, "Highway Policy and External Economies", The 
National Tax Journal, Vol 16, 1963, p, 75. 
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Moreover, it should also be obvious that it doesn't make 
economic sense to invoke a non-user contribution on the basis of 
benefits received, since the level of benefits (as shown above) depends 
to an important degree on the level of charges imposed on direct 
beneficiaries. If tax justice is a matter of importance, then, as 
we have already seen, equity might best be achieved by making users of 
the roads meet the costs of supplying and maintainiiig the road system. 
We now consider the nature of the argument for a non-user 
contribution to the costs of road supply when the benefits to non-
users take the form of technological economies. For convenience we 
7 
follow the approach adopted by Kafoglis. 
For example, after examining Section 210 of the U.S.A. Highway Revenue 
Act which, as noted in Chapter 3 of this study, directed the 
Secretary of Commerce to provide Congress, inter-alia, with 
information which would enable the determination of a benefit 
based tax structure for the purpose of funding the Federal aid 
highways programme, Mohring, H. and Harwitz, M., op.cit., p, 58, 
argue that: 
" it would therefore appear that the following operational 
criteria of "equity" is probably not too far from the prevailing 
Congressional view: a completely equitable tax system is one 
that would make the ratio of (or perhaps the difference between) 
benefits directly or indirectly received to the taxes directly 
or indirectly paid equal for all beneficiary groups. Adoption 
of either of these operational criteria of equity would not, it 
should be emphasised lead to specification of a single most 
equitable tax system. Quite the contrary it would be possible, 
at least in principle, to design a large niraiber of tax systems 
that would yield either benefit/tax ratios or equal net benefits 
(i.e. gross benefits less taxes) to all population members" 
And further (p, 59), 
"To determine an appropriate tax system. Congress would like 
information on comparative user and non-user benefits. These 
comparative benefits cannot be determined, however, in the 
absence of information on the tax system to be employed. 
Before a "best" tax allocation can be settled upon, additional 
information is needed on the goals it is to satisfy" 
Kafoglis, Milton Z., op.cit. 
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In order to simplify the analysis, the following assumptions 
are made: (i) the marginal cost associated with the use of road space 
is constant, i.e. marginal cost varies directly with traffic volume; 
(ii) there is only one class of vehicle; (iii) road space is supplied 
under conditions of constant costs; and (iv) that marginal cost 
includes the congestion costs imposed on motorists, but not external 
diseconomies (e.g. pollution and noise) imposed on non-users. 
The model is depicted in Figure 4.1. 
FIGURE 4.1 8 Non-User Contribution to the Costs of Road Supply 
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8. See also, Lansing, John B., Transportation and Economic Policy, 
(New York: The Free Press, 1966), Chapter 14, p. 242. 
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Traffic volume per period of time is measured along the 
horizontal axis and price and cost along the vertical axis. Marginal 
costs associated with the supply and use of a particular section of the 
road network are given by the line MC. The line D, represents the 
demand function for the use of the road by individual A. We also 
suppose that there exists an indivdual B, a non-user, who is a 
recipient of external economies generated by A's use of the road. 
The line D, describes B's demand for the use of the road by A. It 
indicates the amount which B would be prepared to pay in order to 
encourage A to use the road. 
In the absence of A and B taking account of this interdependence, 
it is clear that the number of trips undertaken by A will equal Q, at 
price P. As a consequence, individual B will receive a windfall gain 
equal to the area 0 SQ, since, given B's demand curve, D, , B would 
have been prepared to pay a price p„ for each vehicle mile travelled 
by A. Given the way in which the diagram is structured, it is obvious 
that individual B is in a position to increase his gains by offering 
to subsidize A's use of the road. A is prepared to purchase an 
additional unit of travel at a price just below P, while the value to 
B of the extra unit of travel to A is given a price just below p^. It 
follows that B will be prepared to increase his contribution to the 
costs of road supply provided that increase in A's use of the road can 
be purchased at a subsidy price per unit of travel slightly less than 
B's demand price for the extra units of travel. In a similar fashion, 
A will be willing to undertake additional units of travel up to the 
quantity Q., where, at this point, the amount A is prepared to pay 
plus the subsidy offered by B for Q, units of travel is equal to price 
P, i.e. an equilibrium demand point is attained at M (for quantity 
Qj), where the respective price and subsidy payments by A and B are 
equal to p and p, , and where p and p, = p. Other points such as M 
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can be derived given different levels of costs of road supply and use, 
and thus market price. The locus of such points, in turn, provides us 
with a collective demand for road use as shown by D . Alternatively, 
such a demand curve is derived by the vertical addition of the respective 
demand curves D and D, This procedure, as noted in Chapter 2, is 
a u 
widely used in the Public Finance literature in the analysis of problems 
associated with the output of goods and services which have significant 
public good and/or technological externality characteristics. 
The example we have just considered is one in which the 
technological external economies occur at the margin. Where the 
external economies are intra-marginal, there is no justification, in 
terms of efficiency in resource allocation, for a subsidy from non-user 
beneficiaries. Such a payment can only be justified in terms of some 
standard of tax equity. The case of intra-marginal externalities is 
demonstrated in Figure 4.2. 
FIGURE 4.2 Benefits to Non-Users of Roads Without Subsidies Paid by 
Non-Users 
Volume of Traffic Per Period of Time 
9. See also, Lansing, John B., ibid,, p. 243. 
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As in the previous diagram, the demand function D is 
obtained by the vertical summation of the demand functions D and D, 
At price P, however, both D„ and D produce an equilibrium quantity Q. 
At this quantity the demand-price by the non-user, B, for trips by A is 
zero. No gains accrue to B for an increase in the number of trips by 
A beyond Q. In this situation, the total level of benefit received 
by B as a result of A's use of the road is given by the area OLM, and is 
correctly viewed as a rent or windfall gain. Whether such a rent should 
be subject to taxation,is as mentioned above, a matter for consideration 
in terms of standards of tax equity, and no doubt, as suggested by 
Kafoglis, represents a source of revenue which governments may find 
attractive on administrative and opportunistic grounds. What is important, 
however,from the standpoint of our discussion of the user/non-user 
issue, is that the existence of windfall gains to non-users of the road 
system should not be tied to the structure of charges imposed on road 
users without at first giving careful consideration to the implications 
of such a policy, in particular, to the implications for inter-modal 
competition. 
Apart from the issue of whether the provision of road 
space results in the generation of external economies and whether 
these, in turn, warrant a contribution from non-user beneficiaries, 
there are a number of other arguments which have been advanced in 
support of a non-user contribution. 
To begin with, it is frequently suggested that private users 
of the road system should not be required to pay for any expenditure 
on the road system which is incurred specifically for purposes other 
than those required by motorists and commercial operators. For example, 
it is argued that if extra expenditure is incurred to provide stronger 
plant, wider bridges, etc, in order to meet national defence require-
ments, then such expenditure should be financed from the community 
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in general, or more precisely, from the defence budget. There would 
seem to be no objection to this argument. 
Second, it has been pointed out that roads provide joint 
products in the form of openings for light and air, fire stops, and 
so on, and that these outputs have some value to the community. It 
is doubtful, however, whether the existence of benefits of this kind 
warrant serious consideration. Apart from the problem of arriving at 
a suitable method for determining a non-user contribution, it is 
unlikely that the benefits produced (assuming that they could be assessed) 
would justify a significant non-user contribution. Moreover, it is 
difficult to justify such a share when it is recognized that productive 
activities elsewhere in the economy produce benefits of a similar 
nature, but are not considered as a matter of importance for public 
policy In view of this, it is difficult to see why road space would 
be singled out for special treatment. 
Third, it is sometimes suggested that some departure from a 
user-pay approach will be necessary because of administrative difficulties. 
Basically, the argument is that while vehicle mile costs vary considerably 
from one part of the road and street system to another,there is no 
practical means available for implementing a separate schedule of user 
charges for each part of the road system. Furthermore, since vehicle 
mile costs will, in general, vary inversely with traffic volumes, a 
level of user charges adequate to finance those parts of the road system 
which carry the greatest volumes of traffic will be inadequate to meet 
the costs of providing and maintaining the rural road system and many 
city streets. Clearly, the importance of this argument depends on the 
extent to which it is possible to vary user charges not only on the basis 
11 
10. See, for example, Kafoglis, M,Z,, ibid., p. 72. 
11 See, for example, Harbeson, Robert W., op.cit., p. 198, 
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of vehicle types, but also in terms of other factors such as purpose 
of use, time of use, and area of use. It is the view of this writer 
that the above argument is based on too constrained a view of what is 
12 in fact administratively possible. 
Finally, there is the argument that a non-user contribution 
is warranted on the ground that road investment programmes frequently 
result in the production of significant secondary benefits. While 
on occasions it would appear that the term, secondary benefits has been 
used in the project appraisal literature as a surrogate term for external 
economies (both pecuniary and technological), this is not the sense in 
which it is referred to here. For our purposes we refer to that 
use of the term, which if applied to road supply, defines secondary 
benefits as an increase in benefits over and above those which accrue 
.to direct users (excluding pure technological economies) and which 
represent either the multiplier effects of road investment on an under-
employed economy or those effects brought about by changes in the relative 
prices of intermediate goods transported by road. For example, 
Friedlaender states: 
"It is not sufficient to analyse the benefits from a major 
highway improvement in terms of the consumer alone, for 
highway transportation is not only used as a final good in 
automobile travel, but is also used as an intermediate good 
in the shipment of commodities. Therefore, a major highway 
improvement, such as the Interstate Highway system, will not 
only affect the automobile transportation costs, but will 
also affect all relative prices by reducing the shipping costs 
of all intermediate goods that are transported by truck. In 
this case, the determination of the benefits becomes 
considerably more complicated than when highway transport-
ation is used only as a final good for passenger travel,"!^ 
12. This issue is considered in more detail in Chapter H . 
13. Friedlaender, A.F , The Interstate Highway System: A Study in 
Public Investment (Am.«:terdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 
1965), p. 11 
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And again, 
" .even if all the cost savings are passed on in reduced 
transportation costs, so long as all production requires some 
transportation of commodities relative prices and hence, 
factor and commodity proportions will change, causing 
reorganization effects which transportation cost savings alone 
cannot measure."14 
And further, in a paper by Bos and Koyck it is stated: 
"It will be clear that the explanation for the lower estimates 
of the value of the road using the traditional appraisal 
methods lies in the use of a different criterion and the 
neglect of indirect effects. 
The method discussed in this paper considers the 
influence of the road on the national product. The 
traditional method considers only the flows of goods on the 
road. The method of this paper also takes into account the 
changes in the production of goods which are not transported,"15,16 
It is likely that most economists would reject the secondary 
17 
benefit-subsidy argument. As pointed out by Munby, secondary 
benefits are by no means unique to road investment. Granted this, the 
case for subsidizing road space on the grounds of the existence of 
secondary benefits is tantamount to an argument for subsidizing all 
18 intermediate goods and services which are widely used in the economy. 
14. Friedlaender, A.F., ibid., p, 14, 
15. Bos, H.C. and Koyck, L.M., "The Appraisal of Road Construction: 
A Practical Example", Review of Econom.ics and Statistics, 43, 
No. 1, 1961, p. 20. 
16. The term "Reorganisation Benefits" is also used in the literature 
for what appears to be a substitute term for secondary benefits. 
For a detailed statement of the nature of reorganization benefits 
the reader is referred to the 1961 USA Highway Cost Allocation Study, 
op,cit,, p, 5. An extract will serve to illustrate: 
[Reorganisation Benefits] 
"Improvements in highway transportation are a principal 
means by which the forces of population growth, increased 
productivity, and higher living standards function to 
transform the economic and social patterns of American 
life. This action is brought about by (1) highway-induced 
reorganisations of land use, and (2) highway-oriented 
reorganisations of the processes of production, distribution, 
and consumption. " 
17 Munby, D.L,, "The Roads as Economic Assets", Bulletin of the Oxford 
University Institute of Statistics, XXII (November 1960, p. 294) 
18. Munby, D.L,, ibid., p, 294. 
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Of the arguments considered in this section the strongest 
case for a non-user contribution rests on the existence of either 
the need for road authorities to make special provision for defence 
purposes, and/or because of the existence of significant marginal 
technological externalities. With regard to the former claim there is 
no problem if the matter is left to the Defence Department to determine 
how much of its budget it is prepared to allocate to the upgrading 
of the road system. The Defence Department is then no different from 
other users of the system. However, if the provision of road space 
for private and commercial users generates defence benefits this 
does not warrant a community subsidy to the costs of road supply 
As far as the latter argument is concerned, it would seem 
that economists find great difficulty in providing examples. Thus, for 
instance,in the paper by Kafoglis, we get no more than an assertion 
that " .one would expect that particular situations in particular 
19 
localities or states" would produce the sort of marginal relationships 
as shown in Figure 4.1, and thus qualify on efficiency grounds for 
consideration for a non-user contribution. In view of this, it is 
perhaps not unreasonable to suggest that technological externalities 
are unlikely to prove all that important, especially in developed 
economies. Even if this is shown not to be the case, there is still 
the problem of determining the size of the non-user contribution. There 
does not appear to be an entirely suitable procedure for determining 
whether or not the amount extracted from non-user beneficiaries would 
equal the minimum amount which the latter would be prepared to pay 
for the expected benefits as determined by voluntary negotiation. 
19. Kafoglis. M,Z., op.cit., pp. 76-77 
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Further, some non-users might be unwilling to reveal their true 
preferences on the assumption that the project will be adopted 
irrespective of any amount they might be prepared to contribute 
toward its cost. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the use of such allocation 
techniques as the relative use, predominant use, and earning? credit 
methods involve an implicit assumption concerning the existence and 
importance of external economies. This follows from the fact that 
such procedures require that the non-user contribution should represent 
a large proportion of total road costs for roads with low traffic 
volumes, and conversely, a small proportion of total costs for roads 
having large traffic volumes, i.e. that external economies (assuming 
that they exist) associated with the use and provision of lightly used 
roads are more important than those associated with roads carrying 
20 large traffic volumes. While no evidence has been produced to 
substantiate this assumption, it would seem that the use of these 
allocation techniques is largely a practical response to road 
funding policies, which, historically, have required a contribution 
from non-user sources to meet the cost of providing tertiary (or 
access) and secondary roads, 
4. The SRMC Pricing Rule and the Consumers' Sui^lus Investment Criterion 
A review of the Public Enterprise literature in general, and 
the road price and investment literature in particular, reveals that not 
all writers would agree with the prescriptive advice of the Walters' 
21 
model. The objections relate to the treatment of capital costs and 
the use of the consumers' surplus criterion. 
20. See, for example, Kafoglis, M.Z., ibid., p. 71. 
21. See, for example, Haritos, Z.,op.cit.; Xolsen, H.M.,op.cit.,Appendix 3 to 
4, pp. 81-92; Little, I.M.D., A Critique of Welfare Economics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition). Chapter XI; Meyer, J., 
ct al., op.cit.; Munby, D.L., op.cit.; and Nelson, James C , "The 
pricing of highway, waterway and air facilities", American Economic 
Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 52, No. 2, May 1962. 
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The view thatconsumers of public enterprise outputs should 
be required to meet infra-structure (capital) costs was expressed as 
early as the mid-nineteenth century in the writings of the French 
engineer Jules Dupuit, although one should hasten to add that most 
economists who have referred to Dupuit's work have placed major emphasis 
on his analysis of the short run welfare maximisation issue. That 
Dupuit did not adopt the view that achieving optimal use of existing 
capacity is all that charges for the use of a public project, such as 
a bridge, should aim to achieve is illustrated by the following statement: 
"As the total increases, so does the utility of the bridge 
diminish in proportion; it becomes zero when the toll equals 
0.frl5 at which price no one crosses the bridge; it is there-
fore possible for the loss of utility to rise to as much as 
102,000 francs. Does this mean that there should only be 
very low tolls or even that there should be none at all? That 
will not be our conclusion when we come to speak of tariffs; but 
we hope to show that their height needs to be studied and 
operated according to rational principles, in order to produce 
the greatest possible utility and at the same time a revenue 
sufficient to cover the cost and upkeep and interest on 
capital ."22 
Other writers have taken a similar stand. For example, it is 
25 
contended by Lewis in his well known essay, "Fixed Costs" that: 
"The net conclusion is that, at least in public utility 
undertakings and state industries, price should not 
fluctuate irregularly; should cover not only short run but 
also long run marginal cost; not only long run marginal 
cost but also preferably by way of price discrimination, 
escapable indivisible costs as well; and not only these 
but as much of the cost of non renewable assets as can be 
extracted from consumers' surplus by price discrimination 
(but only to the extent to which such assets are actually 
used). The only losses the undertaking should bear are 
losses due to mistaken foresight; where the entrepreneur has 
failed to estimate correctly the level of output, the amount 
of consumers' surplus availat^ le for renewable assets, or a 
change in replacement costs." " 
22. Dupuit, J., "On the measurement of the utility of public works" 
reprinted in Transport (Denys Munby, editor). Penguin Modem 
Economics, 1968, p. 40. 
23. Lewis, W.A., Overhead Costs: Some Essays in Economic Analysis, 
(London: Unwin University Books, 1970), Chapter I. 
24, Ibid., p.28, 
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There are a number of strands to the above view. To begin 
with, opposition to the claim that price should only reflect short 
run marginal costs (given the presence of indivisibilities and/or 
economies of scale) has been expressed on the grounds that such a 
policy would result in a redistribution of income and that these effects 
should not be ignored. This is of course recognised by Walters. 
However, it is appropriate that we briefly consider the issues raised 
in the general literature. 
The issue of the income redistribution effects of a pricing 
policy based on short run marginal costs was one of the important 
issues raised in the marginal cost controversy of the 1940s - a 
controversy spawned by Hotelling's 1938 paper^ "The General Welfare 
in Relation to the Problems of Taxation and Railway and Utility 
25 
Rates" Hotelling's model is in effect the model adopted by Walters, 
As to the matter of real income distribution,Hotelling 
adopted the view that the redistribution effects of the short-run 
marginal cost pricing rule were likely to be small if the losses 
generated were met by means of general taxation. In particular, 
Hotelling argued that if a large number of government enterprises 
were operated according to the above principles "[a] rough randomness 
in distribution would be ample to ensure such a distribution of benefits that 
most persons in every part of the country would be made better off by 
reason of the programme as a whole" 
27 This argument was challenged by Coase who suggested that 
whether or not the redistribution effects were small could only be 
ascertained after empirical investigation; more specifically, that the 
25. Hotelling, H., Paper reprinted in Readings in Welfare Economics, 
The American Economic Association (London: George Allen and Unwin 
Limited,1969, Vol. XII), pp. 284-308. 
26, Hotelling,H,, ibid., p, 299, 
27 Coase, R,H., "The Marginal Cost Controversy", Economica, Vol. 13, 
August 1946, 
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gains which would accrue to particular consumers as a result of the 
adoption of Hotelling's proposal would depend on: (i) the degree 
to which consumers are prepared to pay for the total costs of 
commodities or services produced under conditions of increasing returns 
to scale; (ii) the size of the gap between marginal and average 
costs associated with the production of such commodities and services; 
and (iii) the extent to which the increase in income which consumers 
derived as a result of SRMC pricing was spent on other commodities and 
28 
services produced under similar conditions. It was Cease's belief 
that the redistribution effects would be neither negligible nor 
29 favourable. Implicit in Cease's discussion is the assumption of an 
ideal distribution of income. Accepting Little's argument that such 
30 
an assumption is ". meaningless and dangerous", it is clear that 
if the redistributional effects are not negligible, then depending on 
whether they are favourable or unfavourable, they may be used as an 
argument for or against the marginal cost rule. 
Another aspect of the analysis of the redistribution effects 
of marginal cost pricing under conditions of increasing scale, concerns 
the issue of compensation. Hotelling had also argued that if the 
redistribution effects of marginal cost pricing were not small then 
these could easily be dealt with. However, as noted by Coase, Hotelling 
did not indicate how the process of compensation would take place. 
Instead, he simply assumed that " if society put into effect a 
system of sales at marginal cost, with overheads paid out of taxes on 
incomes, inheritance and the value of land, there would exist a possible 
system of compensation and collections such that everyone would be 
31 better off than before," Cease's response to this was to argue that 
28, Ibid., p, 177 
29. Ibid., p, 178. 
50, Little, I.M.D,, op.cit, , p. 187 
51. Hotelling, H,, op,cit,, p, 298. 
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ordinary methods of taxation could not be adopted for the purpose of 
redistributing income from consumers of commodities and services produced 
under conditions of increasing returns to scale,to all other consumers. 
More concisely, if a tax is levied on the consumption of such goods , 
this would be equivalent to introducing multi-part pricing, assuming 
the tax takes the form of a lump sum charge on consumption, and further, 
if a tax per unit of consumption is imposed,this would result in a 
divergence between price and marginal cost, which of course is what 
Si 
Hotelling argued against. 
As we have already seen the case for having consumers of 
public enterprise outputs contribute to capital costs is also argued 
on efficiency grounds. In so far as the history of this argument is 
concerned it would appear that Dupuit was one of the earliest writers 
to put forward such a view. Some evidence for this claim is to be 
33 
found in a paper by Ekelund who refers to a contribution by Dupuit 
in 1853 to the Dictionnaire de L'Economie Politique. There it is argued, 
in reference to public utilities that " the subsidy which it (the 
State) gives corresponds always to an equivalent tax which it collects. 
Not only is there no wealth produced, but there is wealth lost by 
34 
virtue of the subsidy" Ekelund goes on to point out that Dupuit 
saw a reduction in wealth as stemming from the real cost of the transfer. 
Capital investment will be " directed naturally to the most lucrative 
35 
opportunities of the moment", and further, that the granting of 
subsidies" .detours them (capital) from these practical usages and 
36 
relates them to others which are far less so" 
52. Coase, R.H,, op.cit., p. 178. 
33. Ekelund, R.B,, "Jules Dupuit and the Early Theory of Marginal Cost 
Pricing", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 76, May/June, 1968. 
54. Quoted by Ekelund, R.B,, ibid,, p. 469 (Dupuit, 1853, pp, 15-16) 
55. Ibid., (Dupuit, 1853, p. 16) 
56. Ibid., (Dupuit, 1853, p. 16) 
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Applied to road space this argument simply says that if pricing 
of road space is set on the basis of SRMC and substantial deficits are 
a consequence (given correct investment decisions), then the funding of 
the deficits by taxes imposed on the community in general is likely to 
result in welfare losses elsewhere. Moreover, there is no guarantee 
that the sum of the losses will be outweighed by the welfare gains from 
pricing optimal road investment at SRMC. 
Another argument is that if marginal cost pricing is followed 
in the road sector (or the public enterprise sector in general) when 
prices are generally greater than marginal costs elsehwere, then this 
will probably lead to over-utilisation of the road system, and to too 
many resources allocated to roads vis-a-vis the rest of the economy 
While it is not clear what the optimal pricing policy 
should be (i.e.in the absence of information regarding price/cost 
relationships in competing sectors, and in the rest of the economy), 
and while Walters argues that the existence of monopoly elsewhere in 
the economy ". provides no inkling of an argument for balancing the 
37 
road budget" , it seems to this writer that a requirement for the 
roads, as well as competing transport sectors, to earn a normal 
return on capital (subject to non-economic goals of policy) would 
be a move in the right direction. After all such a requirement 
represents the lower limit for long run survival for firms in the 
private sector of the economy. To require public enterprise to 
do likewise is unlikely to distort the pattern of resource 
37 Walters, A.A., The Economics of Road User Charges, op,cit,, p. 95, 
80, 
38 
use. Given such an objective, it would then be necessary to ensure 
that, as far as possible, prices are structured in such a way as to 
39 
maximise efficiency benefits. Adopting the Baumol and Bradford 
argument, this requires that prices for the various products produced 
by the public enterprise be inversely related to elasticities of 
demand. As we shall see, the same prescriptive advice applies in the 
40 
case of jointly supplied outputs. 
In addition to the above, the case for confronting users of 
public renteiprise outputs with the costs of capital is also advanced 
by a number of writers on the ground that it provides a check on 
investment decisions. In essence, the supporters of this argument 
contend that unless consumers are actually confronted with the total 
costs of providing outputs, one can never be sure whether the investment 
decision was correct or not. As expressed by Munby: 
38. Some recentsupport for the view that the imposition of a revenue 
constraint can be justified on efficiency grounds is provided by 
the following comments by Turvey with regard to the 1967 guidelines 
laid down by the U.K. Government for the Nationalised Industries. 
Specifically: 
"Government clearly needs money and so must raise taxes. 
But taxes on other things inevitably make the price of 
those things different from their marginal costs. Hence 
the prices of the public enterprise's products must also 
differ from their marginal costs if resource misallocation 
is not to result. The cash flow requirement laid upon 
the public enterprise is equivalent to a set of taxes upon 
its products. To impose no such requirement would thus 
be equivalent to selling them tax free in a world where 
many other things have to be taxed quite heavily. This 
would result in resource misallocation" Turvey, R., 
op.cit., pp. 19-20, 
Also, after examining the marginal cost pricing debate, I.M.D, Little 
(op.cit.. Chapter XI, p. 201) concluded: 
"The only conclusion that seems to emerge is that the 
nationalised industries should at least aim to cover 
total costs .. We have earlier dismissed the idea that 
the ratio of price;marginal cost should be equal to 
some average (unknown) value for that ratio in the 
economy We have ^een that there is nothing ideal about 
the 'proportionality' thesis. But that is different from 
saying that relative prices and relative marginal, products 
do not matter" 
59. Baumol, William J, and Bradford, David E,, "Optimal Departures from 
Marginal Cost Pricing", American Economic Review, June 1970, 
40, Sec Section 4,4 of this Chapter. 
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"There are two main considerations in relation to pricing 
policy. Firstly, prices should, as far as possible, 
reflect marginal costs. Secondly, prices as a whole 
should be such as to cover costs The second criterion 
(of covering costs) is important partly as a check on 
investment,and partly as an incentive to efficiency- As 
a check on investment, the criterion involves both a 
backward look on previous decisions to see whether they 
have been rightly taken, and a forward look in relation 
to present investment decisions. It is important that those 
who have to make decisions should know whether the public 
is ready to pay for all the resources involved in producing 
the commodities in question, but this check is much more 
indirect than in the case of currently committed resources 
which are repeatedly being used in production."41^42 
43 
Some writers, such as Little, have taken this argument a 
step further by rejecting the usefulness of the consumers' surplus 
investment criterion. It is claimed: 
"Within very wide limits, it would be anyone's guess as 
to whether the consumers'-surplus criterion would be 
satisfied or not. It will, of course, be objected at 
this point that guesswork is, in any case, impossible 
to avoid. Before the event, profitability is only 
guesswork. Surely, it will be said, if consumers' 
surplus provides a correct criterion (which, of course, 
it does not, except in very special cases) it is better 
to guess at it, rather than at profitability 
This defence is plausible, but beside the point. 
Profitability is not, of course, 'ideal' (except, again, 
in very special cases), but, at least, one knows after 
the event whether one guessed right or not. The 
great trouble with any consumers'-surplus criterion is 
that one does not know, even after the event, whether 
the criterion was satisfied. In fact, the plain truth 
is that it does not yield us a criterion at all - or if it 
can be said to yield a criterion, then it is one which is 
open to anyone's interpretation within very wide limits. "^ '^  
41, Munby, D,L,, Extract from the First Report from the Committee on 
Nationalised Industries, Session 1967-68, Vol, II, Minutes of 
Evidence (H.M,S.O., 1972), p. 588. 
42. See also,Coase, R.H., "The Theory of Public Utility Pricing and 
Its Application", Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 
Spring 1970; Little, I.M., op.cit., Chapter X, 
43, Little, I,M,D,, ibid,. Chapter X. See also. Roth, G., op.cit. 
44. Little, I.M,D,, op.cit,, p. 179. 
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Little argues that if the product under consideration (call 
it product A) is independent of all other outputs (call these B) 
in the sense that an increase in the supply of A will not affect the 
demand or supply functions of the B outputs, then for the change in 
consumers' surplus for A to represent a true indicator of the welfare 
gain, it must also be assumed that prices for the B outputs are equal 
to marginal cost. If, on the other hand, prices of the B outputs 
are greater than marginal costs, it is then argued that a small 
reduction in the supply of the B outputs would cause a small fall 
in the profits or producers' surplus from such outputs which would 
not be cancelled out by any gains to consumers. Little then suggests 
that " this smallness would not be of the second order, and might 
therefore be significant".^5 por the measure of consumers' surplus on 
A to be a valid indicator of the welfare change, it must be greater than 
the loss of producers' surplus on the B outputs. 
A second situation considered by Little is that where price 
in the rest of the economy is equal to marginal cost, and product A 
has one close substitute, call it C, All other outputs are assumed to 
be independent (in the sense defined above) of these outputs. In this 
case, a change in the supply of A (Little refers to A as being a "new 
good") will cause a leftward shift in the demand function for C and 
thus a fall in the output of C, Assuming that C is a constant cost 
industry, then it is clear that the measure of consumers' surplus for 
A provides a correct measure of the welfare change. Those consumers 
who shift to ,\ obviously gain, while those who continue to consume C 
do not lose. Likewise, there is no loss of producers' surplus on C, 
However, difficulties arise, as in the previous example, if it is 
assumed that prices for the independent outputs are greater than marginal 
costs. Some losses in producers' surplus may accrue elsewhere, in 
45. Ibid., p. 175. 
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which case the simple measure of the benefits to the consumers of A 
may not provide an accurate measure of the overall change in welfare. 
The difficulties are compounded if the substitute outputs 
are not produced under constant returns to scale , if prices are not 
everywhere equal to marginal costs, and .an increase in the supply of 
the output (or outputs) under consideration causes a shift in supply 
curves as well. Thus, Little concludes: 
"Confining ourselves, then, to the cases of either the 
introduction of a new good or an indivisible expansion 
in the production of an old one, we may say that there 
appears to be a prima facie argument for the validity 
of some form of the consumers'-surplus criterion only in 
the following cases: 
(a) when the good is independent, and the price is 
everywhere equal to marginal cost; 
(b) when there are one or two good substitutes with 
constant marginal costs, in which case the losses 
of producers' surplus elsewhere might be estimated." 
This case is only a prima facie one since Little contended 
that areas under demand curves cannot be measured. It is for this 
reason, in addition to the investment check argument, that he opts 
for profitability as an investment criterion while conceding, as 
noted earlier, that it is by no means an ideal criterion. 
While it is unlikely that any economist would deny the 
practical difficulties associated with the use of the consumers' surplus 
criterion as a measure of the welfare effects of alternative investment 
47 
projects, the existence of such difficulties does not mean that 
the consumers' surplus criterion is, as Little claimed in his Critique, 
46, Ibid., p, 179. 
47 For a different response to the consumers' surplus criterion and 
the general equilibrium issue see, for example, Harberger, Arnold C , 
"Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics: An Inter-
pretative Essay'', Journal_^f_Econom^^ Vol, IX, No. 3 
(September, 1971) 
84. 
48 49 
"... a totally useless theoretical toy". ' First, profitability can 
only be a test if appropriate means of charging are available and 
there are no constraints on their use. When the possibilities for 
pricing are limited, because of technical, economic or political 
considerations, adoption of the consvimers' surplus criterion is necessary 
if rational decisions regarding alternative policy options are to be made. 
Second, and as already observed, use of the consumers' surplus criterion 
is invoked in those circumstances where indivisibilities are very large. 
A third argument is that the consumers' surplus criterion may be justified 
on second-best grounds. 
48. Little, I.M.D., op.cit., p. 180. 
49, Apart from the difficulties raised by Little we have already seen 
that other writers such as Friedlaender (op.cit.) and Bos and 
Koyck (op.cit.) have suggested that the conventional consumers' 
surplus measure may not capture all of the benefits derived from 
an investment project. For a critical review of this issue the 
reader is referred to the following: Dodgson, J,S., "External 
Effects and Secondary Benefits in Road Investment Appraisal", 
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, May 1973. Also, 
Mohring,H.and Williamson Jr., H.F., "Scale and 'Industrial 
Reorganisation' Economies of Transport Improvements", Journal of 
Transport Economics and Policy, September 1969, Essentially the 
same conclusions are reached by these authors. To quote Dodgson 
(p. 184): 
"... there is a confusion in the literature on the secondary 
benefits of highway investment, not only on whether they exceed 
conventionally-measured benefits, but also on what the true 
level of benefits ought to be. We believe this confusion 
stems from a too ready acceptance by transport planners of 
the theorems of welfare economists. Essentially welfare 
economics is unable to give us a theoretically precise measure 
of total social benefits in a general equilibrium framework, 
though it can give us a theoretically precise measure of 
benefits, via consumers' surplus, in partial equilibrium ... 
Therefore, if we count as total benefits the change in the 
consumers' surplus area under the demand curve for transport 
we shall have a fair measure of the true benefits (except for 
the inadequacy of consumers' surplus itself . . . ) , provided we 
allow for as many pure technological externalities as our measure-
ment procedures will permit". 
Another interesting reference is: Gwilliam, K.M., "The Indirect 
Effects of Highway Investment", unpublished paper, 1974 (Centre 
for Transport Studies. University of Leeds). Gwilliam's paper 
also point to conceptual and practical problems concerning the 
treatment of indirect effects of road investment projects. 
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As far as the first argument is concerned it is clear that 
the general equilibrium problems we have referred to are irrelevant, 
if the total level of expenditure in the sector under consideration 
(e.g. the roads sector) is determined arbitrarily and if prices bear 
little relationship to costs. In this situation the consumers' 
surplus criterion (notwithstanding difficulties of measurement) is 
obviously justified as a means for determining a programme of projects 
which maximize net benefits. Assuming similarities in demand elasticities 
for the various sub projects, net benefits will be maximised when the 
marginal benefit cost ratio for each project is the same. 
Modification of this rule, however, is necessary if the 
consumers' surplus criterion is to be used for the purpose of not only 
providing a basis for choosing between alternative projects, but also 
providing guidelines as to the most 'efficient' size of the budget. 
If public investment projects are evaluated on the basis of the consumers' 
surplus criterion then the public authority is in effect acting as 
if it were a perfect price discriminator. Since such a practice is not 
a feature of the private sector of the economy, unqualified use of the 
consumers' surplus criterion for the purpose of determining the optimal 
level of expenditure for a public authority runs the risk of distorting 
the pattern of resource use between that sector and other parts of 
the economy, including those areas of government activity where investment 
decisions are made on the basis of revenue/cost considerations. Obviously, 
in the absence of a great deal of information one cannot determine the 
optimal marginal benefit cost ratio. Instead, all that one can 
suggest is that the public authority should ensure that for the selected 
level of expenditure, the ratio of project marginal benefits and long run 
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marginal costs is >_ unity and further, that the ratio of the sum of 
50 
benefits to the sum of costs is >^  unity. 
The second reason advanced in support of the consumers' surplus 
investment criterion also requires comment. Here the argument is 
that where additions to capacity are very large in relation to market 
demand a project may not be warranted if a revenue/cost approach is 
used, yet prove to be acceptable if estimates of consumers' surplus 
are made. If indivisibilities of this kind exist, then clearly there 
is a case for making use of the consumers' surplus criterion. However, 
from a practical point of view it is doubtful whether this type of 
51 
indivisibility has much importance. 
The third mentioned case for the use of the consumers' 
surplus approach is illustrated as follows . Suppose that output X 
already exists and that the pricing policy applied to X understates 
opportunity costs. Assume also that there is no possibility for 
correcting this policy. The problem is to determine whether a new 
output, Y, should be provided. Given that the pricing policy for X 
understates opportunity costs, pricing policy for Y should take this 
into account. However, this means that in order to determine whether 
the introduction of Y is warranted it is necessary to invoke the consumers' 
surplus criterion. The introduction of Y is justified if estimates of 
consumers' surplus benefits plus revenues are equal to or greater than 
resource costs, A practical illustration of this argument is provided 
by Foster and Beesley in their study of the Victorian Underground 
52 
Rail project. 
50, See, for example, Kolsen, H.M., "The Public Enterprise Concept and 
Its Application in Transport Economics", Australian Transport 
Research Forum, Sydney, 29, 30 April, 1975 (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1976). 
51, Comments on the significance of indivisibilities in the road sector 
are made later in this chapter, 
52, Foster,, CD. and Beesley, M.E., "Estimating the Social Benefit of 
Constructing an Underground Railway in London", Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society. Vol. 126 (1963). 
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5, Road Pricing and Cost Complexities 
We now turn our attention to the problem of efficient pricing 
given the existence of cost complexities. In particular, we focus 
attention on the problems associated with the presence of joint cost 
elements/indivisibilities/economies of scale and long-lived and highly 
specific assets. 
5.1 Joint Costs 
As noted in Chapter 2 by joint costs we refer to a situation 
where the production of one commodity automatically results in the 
production of one or more other commodities. Joint costs are thus 
distinguished from common costs in that the relationship between the 
products produced in the former case is a technical one, whereas in the 
case of the latter, the fact that more than one output is produced 
from a single production process is a consequence of economic choice 
rather than technical necessity. This distinction is important from 
the point of view of price/cost relationships. For joint costs the sum 
of the costs which can be unambiguously imputed to the production of 
each output (we refer to these as separable costs) is less than the total 
cost of producing the bundle of outputs. The 'right' P/LRMC ratio 
thus refers to the relationship between the sum of the prices obtained 
for the various outputs and the long-run marginal cost of producing 
the marginal bundle. If outputs X, Y and Z are joint products, then 
P^ + Py -^  ^Z 
the P/Irmc ratio is expressed as . We consider this 
^^4,Y,Z 
in more detail later. In contrast, where the outputs X, Y and Z 
are a result of economic choice, the long-run marginal cost of producing 
each output can be unambiguously determined. The fact that the supplier 
is able to choose the combination of outputs he will supply, clearly 
indicates that outputs can be substituted for each other. Thus, in a 
two product case,X and Y, the opportunity cost of producing more units 
of X can be "... ascertained by the effect of producing and selling 
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53 the smaller quantity of Y necessary to increase X." Under competitive 
conditions the long run equilibrium output of X and Y will be attained 
when the marginal rate of substitution of X for Y is equal to the ratio 
of the price of X to the price of Y, and the sum of their prices 
equals the sum of their costs. If monopoly conditions exist, then the 
equilibrium combination of outputs will be achieved when the marginal 
rate of substitution of X for Y is equal to the ratio of their respective 
marginal revenues. 
The existence of joint cost elements in the supply of road 
space is manifest in two important ways. First, as we have already 
seen, joint cost elements are present by virtue of the existence of 
peak and off-peak demand patterns. Because road services cannot be 
stored, capacity requirements will be determined by peak demands. This 
capacity is then available for use during the off-peak periods. The 
two products, peak and off-peak services, thus provide us with an example 
of time jointness. Second, joint costs in the supply of road space 
occur for the reason that while the road track is designed to provide 
services for a number of vehicle types i,e, road costs are incurred to 
provide heterogeneous outputs, not all of the costs incurred in 
providing these outputs can be unambiguously assigned to the various 
user classes. These joint or non-separable, long-run and short run 
costs, are incurred on behalf of all vehicle classes. The remaining 
costs - the separable cost items - can, as the name separable indicates, 
be " a directly assigned to a particular class, in the sense that they 
are incurred only to enable that particular class of users onto the road, 
54 
or to enable them to continue to use a road." If there were only one 
S.^. Kolsen, H.M,, The Economics and Control of Road Rail Competition, 
op.cit,, p.47 
54. Kolsen, H.M., Ferguson, D.C. and Docwra, G,E., Road User Charges: 
Theories and Possibilities. Occassional Paper No. 5 (Bureau of 
Transport Economics, (A.G.P.S,), Canberra, July, 1975) 
89. 
vehicle type (an assumption made in Chapter 2) the existence of joint 
costs would, for our purposes, be restricted to the peak/off-peak 
demand variety. Also, if each user class were provided with its 
own permanent way, the same conclusion would apply. The fact that 
roads are not built exclusively for each narrowly defined user class 
is, as mentioned earlier, to be explained in terms of the economies of 
scale to be gained by constructing road track for use by more than one 
, 55 
user class. 
The importance of the second mentioned form of jointness 
depends very much on what road policy is adopted. One limit has 
already been mentioned, i.e. the case where we have different roads 
for each vehicle class. We refer to this situation as the perfectly 
heterogeneous road case. The other extreme occurs when all roads 
are constructed to the same technical standard, referred to as the 
homogeneous road case, so that all user classes can use all roads. 
In other words,no vehicle class is excluded because it is too heavy, 
assuming that vehicle weight, rather than some other characteristic, 
is the relevant factor If this situation exists, then in terms of 
the short run period, only variable maintenance and congestion costs can 
be regarded as separable. All other costs (short run and long run) 
are jointly incurred for all vehicle classes. The proportion of costs 
which are separable and non-separable thus depends on the supply policy 
pursued by the road authority 
55. It should be noted that if track costs could be related to some 
technical characteristics, such as vehicle weight and distance 
travelled, then the joint cost problem would be relatively 
unimportant. Every ton mile would impose as much road cost as 
any other. Thus from the road supplier's point of view, tons 
carried and distance travelled would be all the information 
required to ascertain prices for road use. 
56. See,for example. Little, I.M,D, and McLeod, K,M., "The New Pricing 
Policy of the British Airports Authority", Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy. May 1972, p. 110. 
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Suppose, for example, that roads are constructed initially 
for private and light commercial vehicles only If, at a later stage, 
additional expenditure is incurred to meet the requirements of, say, 
10 ton vehicles, then the additional expenditure incurred can be 
directly attributed to that vehicle class, and so on, as further 
increments to capacity for successive classes of vehicles are made. 
All other capital costs, however,'are joint to all classes of vehicles. 
Alternatively, if roads are constructed in the first instance for 
vehicles up to 25 ton weight, then separable capital costs can only 
be determined for classes of vehicles weighing more than 25 tons, assuming 
that additions to capacity are made on a step-by-step basis for each 
additional weight class. As we approach the homogeneous road case, 
the proportion of capital costs which are joint become greater. 
Conversely, the nearer road supply policy approximates the other end of 
the policy spectrum, the less important is the joint cost element. 
Since these limits are merely theoretical, it is possible to provide 
some examples of road track costs which cannot be separated. The most 
obvious of these are the right-of-way costs, those maintenance costs 
which are not a function of use, signalling costs and the capital 
costs of the minimum quality of road necessary before any traffic is 
able to use it. 
Despite the importance of the existence of joint costs in the 
supply of road space,discussion of the implications for optimal road 
price and investment policy is far from satisfactory Some writers 
have concentrated their attention on the peak/off-peak problem and 
ignored the fact that jointness also arises because roads provide 
services for variety of vehicle classes. The explanation for this 
neglect stems largely from the assumption that the right pricing 
policy is that which equates price to short-run marginal costs. 
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In other studies where the central issue is how to allocate the track 
costs among various user classes, the joint cost problem is treated either by 
invoking some form of equity or technical criteria, with the latter usually 
involving calculations based on vehicle weights and/or axle loads. 
As noted, one of the most popular of the variety of cost-based methods 
is the incremental cost method. This method can be criticized on at least 
two main grounds. First, it is essentially arbitrary in nature. Apart from 
differences in opinion as to what constitutes a "basic" road, and hence what 
proportion of capital costs is to be allocated among all vehicle classes, 
the allocation of the remaining components of track costs depends on: (a) the 
choice of technical cost assignment criteria, such as vehicle miles of travel, 
ton miles of travel, axle miles of travel, axle loads, and so on, and 
(b) the manner in which the chosen criteria are assigned to the various 
57 
cost categories. For instance, in Haritos' study, pavement and shoulder 
costs are allocated incrementally on the basis of axle loads with adjustments 
for vehicle width; earthworks and drainage costs are allocated in the first 
instance, equally among all vehicle classes irrespective of vehicle dimensions, 
with upward adjustments for vehicles having a vehicle load in excess of 
10,000 lbs.; bridges are allocated incrementally on the basis of vehicle 
load; while right-of-way costs are allocated equally among all vehicles 
with an adjustment for vehicles having a weight in excess of 10,000 lbs. 
58 
In contrast, in the Australian study, pavement and shoulder costs, 
for constant width as required by cars, are allocated incrementally on 
the basis of average loaded weight ton miles; earthwork and drainage, land 
acquisition, and right-of-way costs are allocated on the basis of passenger car 
unit miles with no increment; while bridges are allocated incrementally on 
57 Haritos, Z., op.cit. 
58. Review of Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Victorian Land Transport 
System (Government Printers, Melbourne, 1971) 
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the basis of vehicle miles of travel. It is thus possible to use this 
method to produce a number of different, but equally reasonable 
(on technical grounds ) set of charges for different vehicle classes 
for a given road system. 
The second major criticism of the incremental cost method is 
59 that it is entirely backward looking in approach. What it does is 
assign, among vehicle classes, costs of assets which have already 
been created or are already in the process of creation, without reference 
to their benefit producing properties. The method asks the wrong 
question. What we need to know is whether the costs incurred in 
producing road space with different weight-carrying dimensions and 
other quality characteristics can be shown to be justified in terms 
of benefits. The incremental cost method offers no guidance to the 
resolution of this issue. 
Granted the inappropriateness of the incremental and many 
other cost-based methods for dealing with the problem of joint supply, 
it now remains to consider what might be done instead. 
Historically, the solution to the problem of joint supply 
dates to Mill's Principles of Political Economy published in 1865, 
and later refined in terms of diagrammatic exposition by Marshall in his 
Principles of Economics. °-^ »°^  in the traditional Mill-Marshall model, 
59. Kolsen,H.M., "The Victorian Land Transport Inquiry", The Economic 
Record, September 1973, p. 475. 
60. Mill, J.S., Principles of Political Economy (Longman, 1865, 6th 
edition. Vol. II), pp. 108-110. 
61. See, for example, Marshall, A., Principles of Economics (Macmillan, 
and Co. Ltd., 1946), 8th edition, pp. 388-389. 
62. See also: Taussig, F.W., "A Contribution to the Theory of Railway 
Rates", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 5, July 1891; Taussig, 
F.W., "Railway Rates and Joint Costs Once More", Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 27(2), February 1913; Pigou , A.C., "Railway 
Rates and Joint Costs", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 27(3), 
May 1913; Pigou, A.C., "Railway Rates and Joint Costs", Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol, 27(4), August 1913; Pigou, A.C., The Economics 
of Welfare (London: Macmillan and Co.Ltd., 4th edition, 1960), 
Chapter XVII; Carlson, Sune, A Study of the Pure Theory of 
Production, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1956), Chapter V; Kolsen, H.M., 
The Economics and Control of Road Rail Competition, op.cit., Chapter 3. 
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it is demonstrated that the slaughtering of cattle provides at least 
two joint products (beef and hide) and that under competitive conditions, 
relative and absolute prices of the joint products are determined by 
both supply and demand conditions. In the short run, each product 
(beef and hide) will be sold at a price equal to or greater than its 
short-run marginal separable cost. In Marshall's terminology, the 
separable costs are referred to as prime or immediate costs of 
production, and, as noted previously, represent those costs which can 
be unambiguously assigned to each of the joint products. If the 
demandprice for a particular joint product is less than this, then it 
will not be marketed and, instead, will be treated as waste. In the 
long run, the equilibrium price for each product must be equal to or 
greater than its long-run marginal separable cost, and, further, the 
sum of the prices of all of the joint products must be equal to the 
sum of the long-run separable and non-separable (joint) marginal 
costs. It is only at the lower limit that costs of production are 
relevant to the determination of price for each of the joint products. 
Beyond that the contribution made by each product to the total (long-
run) costs of supply is determined by market demand. In the beef and 
hide example, if the demand for hide is such that consumers of hide are 
not prepared to pay more than the long-run separable costs of hide, 
then for the production of both beef and hide to be worthwhile, consumers 
of beef will be required to pay not only the separable costs of beef 
production, but also meet the joint costs of beef and hide. 
The same argument applies if joint products are produced under conditions 
of pure monopoly Relative prices are again determined by demand, 
although in this case the monopolist has greater discretion, 
63. See also Mishan, E,J , Cost-Benefit Analysis (London: George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971), Chapter 15, p. 109, 
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Under monopoly the output level of each of the joint products will be 
determined by marginal revenue considerations, i.e. for the monopolist 
it is possible to treat some proportion of some of the joint products 
as waste if demand elasticities indicate that this is a more profitable 
strategy than to regard each of the outputs as products. 
The above argument may now be applied to the road track. 
Consider first the case of homogeneous roads. In this situation, 
separable costs refer only to congestion costs and those maintenance 
costs which can be directly attributed to particular vehicle types. 
Capital costs and invariant maintenance costs are joint to all classes 
of users. Once capacity is provided, the lower limit to price for 
any particular vehicle is given by the maintenance costs which could 
be avoided by not allowing that vehicle to use the road. All other 
costs would then be allocated among vehicle types or classes according 
to demand considerations i.e. on the basis of demand elasticities. If 
joint costs are allocated on an arbitrary basis (e.g. according to some 
technically derived formula), then the possibility arises that some 
users will be excluded from using the roads even though they are 
prepared to meet current opportunity costs. Indeed they might also be 
willing to make some contribution to capital costs. By dealing with 
joint costs on a demand basis,the road authority is able to ensure that 
users are charged no more than what they are willing to bear. This 
also means that the road authority is able to achieve optimal' use 
of existing capacity and to determine 'optimal' capacity adjustments. 
Since we are assuming that the supplier of road space is 
required to behave competitively i.e. to act as if it were a member 
of a perfectly competitive market, optimal capacity for each part of the 
road network is provided when revenues from the sale of road space is 
equal to capacity plus maintenance costs (both variable and invariant), 
and when any addition to capacity would result in marginal revenues 
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being less than marginal costs. This situation establishes the optimal 
level of congestion for the competitive road supplier Further, 
additions to capacity will only be provided if present scarcity value 
as reflected in current earnings indicates this to be worthwhile. 
Looked at from the standpoint of the economy as a whole, this can be 
interpreted to mean that new capacity will only be provided if the rate 
of return fromecisting capacity plus new capacity is at least equal to 
the minimum acceptable rate of return on capital elsewhere in the 
economy. In situations where too much capacity exists, the quality 
of the road would only be retained if the sum of the revenues from 
the set of revenue-maximizing charges is at least equal to total 
maintenance costs. If revenues are less than this, then the road would 
either be abandoned or downgraded. 
Once we move from the extreme case of the homogeneous road 
to the heterogeneous road case, it is clear, as already stated, that 
the importance of the non peak/off-peak joint cost element in the 
supply of road track capacity depends on the supply policy adopted 
by the road authority From an ex ante point of view, the problem 
is reduced to limits - the extreme case being where different roads 
are provided for each vehicle class. Between these extremes, it is 
possible to identify at the planning stage, costs which we have 
described as.long-run separable costs. These refer to those costs, 
which at the planning stage, could be avoided by not providing 
capacity requirements for the classes of users for whom they would be 
specifically incurred. Thus, if a road from X to Y meets the needs 
of all vehicles having a maximum weight capacity of 8 tons,then any 
additional costs incurred to meet the requirements of vehicles having a 
weight capacity in excess of that level, represents a separable cost 
clement attributable to those vehicles. In ex ante terms, it is to be 
seen as the lower limit to the amount, which, in the long run, needs 
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to be collected from such vehicle classes if the additional capacity 
is to be judged as worthwhile. 
Thus there are those costs, both maintenance and capital, which 
can be unambiguously attributed to various user classes. These 
separable costs provide, respectively, the lower limits to price 
in the short run and long run to be collected from the various user 
classes. The remaining costs (maintenance and capital) are the non-
separable or joint costs. On efficiency grounds, the allocation of 
these costs among the various user classes needs to be determined on 
the basis of demand considerations, as demonstrated by the Mill-Marshall 
model, rather than by resort to the usual cost-based procedures referred 
to in the literature. 
5.2 Indivisibilities, Economies of Scale and Non-Renewable and 
Specific Assets 
Other aspects of the supply of road space which require comment, 
from the point of view of price cost relationships and optimal investment 
policy, concern the existence of indivisibilities, economies of scale 
and non-renewable and specific assets. 
Earlier, we drew attention to the view expressed by Walters 
and others that in the case of the road supply industry, indivisibilities 
are so large that it is not possible to rely on the price system to 
provide an appropriate basis for determining investment decisions. It 
is for this reason that Walters and the Allais Report invoke the 
consumers' surplus criterion. In our view, the argument concerning 
the special nature of large indivisibilities in the road supply 
sector is open to some criticism. 
When discussing the importance of indivisibilities, it is 
necessary to distinguish between those indivisibilities which 
arc a result of technical necessity, by which is meant that it is 
impossible to build a plant having smaller output levels, and 
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indivisibilities which arise because larger size plants result in lower 
64 
average total costs than smaller ones. 
For the road supply industry, indivisibilities of the first 
kind simply refer to the lowest grade road which must be constructed, 
before any road service can be provided. Beyond that, the economic 
options for variations in the quantity/quality of road supply are 
in principle far greater than Walters suggests. Thus, we may begin 
with a road that is simply a one-lane set of tracks with no passing 
points. Capacity may then be increased by having a one-lane set of 
tracks with occasional passing points, to a dirt road without passing 
points, to one with passing points, to one with passing points and 
lanes, and so on. Similarly, the possibilities for variation in 
surface quality are far greater than is usually implied. For example, 
the quality of a road from A to B does not necessarily have to be of 
uniform standard. It may be of bituminous standard over those sections 
where traffic volumes are very high, while for other sections a gravel 
standard may be justified. 
As far as the second form of indivisibility is concerned, it 
is clear that there are economies of scale in road construction and 
that 'large' additions to capacity, justified on economic grounds may, 
as Walters argues, result in spare capacity. But the fact that it is 
64^ ! See Kolsen, H.M., The Economics and Control of Road Rail Competition, 
op.cit., p. 50 
65, The costs incurred in providing such a road are joint to all users. 
See, for example, Piguo, A.C, The Economics of Welfare, op.cit,, 
pp. 229-300, footnote 1. 
66. Part of the problem is that we have an indivisibility with respect 
to time,i.e. it may be cheaper to build a larger plant now (given 
correct demand forecasting) than to make a number of 'smaller' 
adjustments over time. 
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necessary to utilise the consumers' surplus criterion to evaluate 
the need for additions to capacity is more likely to be a consequence 
of the lack of appropriate pricing mechanisms than simply the result 
of the existence of economies of scale or indivisibilities in road 
supply If we could devise a practical and sophisticated method of 
charging for road space, such that prices could be systematically 
related to costs, both short run and long run, for each part of the 
network, then revenue/cost relationship could be used (as they are in 
many other public enterprises) as a basis for investment decisions. 
In addition to these considerations, the claim that 
indivisibilities are of a special nature in the road sector has also 
been questioned by Starkie. The point is made that for many parts 
of the road system, we are dealing with interrelated and often 
competing links, and that additions to capacity on any one part of 
the system will often lead to adjustments in the network as a whole, 
with consequent changes in the level of service. Specifically, it is 
contended that if elasticities with respect to the generalized costs of 
transport (i.e. elasticities with respect to time and cash outlays) are 
fairly high, then additions to capacity might be absorbed fairly 
quickly, especially in situations of secular growth in traffic. Starkie 
concludes: 
"Thus, because of such network effects, implicit or explicit 
on the models of the transport analyst, indivisibilities 
might be considered a transient, rather than, as Walters sees 
them, as a permanent phenomenon." ^ ^ 
67 Starkie, D.N.M., "Road User Charges: A Comparative Analysis", 
Report to the Australian Road Research Board, Victoria, September 
1978. 
68, Ibid., p. 8. 
99. 
Another matter which is sometimes referred to in discussions 
of optimal price and investment policy for public enterprises concerns 
the existence of non-renewable and specific assets (nrs) Briefly, these 
assets are represented by those expenditure items " which, having 
once been undertaken, need not be incurred again, so long as output 
capacity does not have to be increased beyond the level for which such 
69 
outlays are undertaken" Usual examples of such expenditure items 
include the purchase of land and right-of-way, part of the outlays 
incurred in the construction of tunnels; the excavation of cuttings, and 
so on. Other assets which may, for analytical reasons, be 
conveniently included in this category, though technically dissimilar, 
are those assets which even though they eventually need to be renewed, 
nonetheless have a life period greater than the time period which would 
normally be considered relevant for planning purposes. In essence, 
such assets represent an indivisibility with respect to time. 
What are the implications of nrs assets for price and investment 
policy? To begin with, it is clear from the examples cited that some nrs 
assets are jointly incurred for all groups of consumers, or, in the case 
of roads, for all classes of vehicles. In other instances, it is possible 
to relate them to specific groups of users, in which case they represent 
a separable cost item. From an ex ante point of view, such expenditures 
are obviously incurred in the expectation that the assets created will 
least, earn a competitive rate of return. From an ex post stance, 
however, the lower limit to the return on such assets is zero, since, by 
definition, once created they cannot be used elsewhere, i.e. they have 
a zero opportunity cost. 
69. Kolsen, H.M., The Economics and Control of Road Rail Competition, 
op.cit,, p, 40. 
70, Ibid. 
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The earnings on such assets are viewed as a surplus or 
residual and are to be contrasted with those which are required for 
renewable and non-specific assets. For the latter, revenues earned must 
be sufficient to meet replacement costs, whereas for nrs assets, it is 
not necessary that the rate of return be greater than zero for the 
retention of existing plant to be justified in the long run. The above 
is clearly illustrated by Ponsonby with reference to railway track 
capacity: 
"...whereas two kinds of surplus reflect real or 'opportunity' 
costs [i.e., rent on land and property and interest on wasting 
assets], the earning of which is indispensable to the sustained 
and profitable operation of any railway undertaking, another 
kind, however much it was expected to be earned by past lenders 
and investors, is a surplus earned rather than an economic 
cost incurred, the realisation of which is by no means a 
requirement of that sustained and profitable operation referred 
to, even in the long run," '^ 
And again, 
"[The earnings on nrs assets] are surpluses earned over and 
above short- and long-run costs, expected and hoped for by 
investors, but manifestly not a sine qua non to the continued 
and profitable use of the assets concerned. For as long as 
the revenue earned from the services rendered are sufficient 
to cover the full costs of maintenance and operation, together 
with the rent and interest [on land, etc, and renewable 
assets], it is more profitable to continue to operate and earn 
some surplus oithe class of capital in question, however small, 
rather than close down and earn no surplus whatever. Indeed, 
even if no surplus whatever was earned upon it, it would still 
be worth reinvesting in wasting assets and incurring operating 
costs, so long as revenue earning prospects justified such 
reinvestment and operation."'2 
While the lower limit to earnings on nrs assets is equal 
to zero, there is also an upper limit to their earnings beyond which 
additional investment would be justified. What the limit is depends 
on the financial objectives pursued. For some enterprises the upper 
limit will be set by the profit maximizing goal; for others, such as 
public enterprises, it will at least be equal to a competitive rate of 
TV. Ponsonby,G,J., "Earnings on Railway Capital", The Economic Journal, 
Vol. LXX, December 1960, p. 797. 
72. Ibid., p. 802. 
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return. In either case, new investment in nrs assets would not take 
place until the surplus (or quasi rent) on existing assets exceeded 
the rate of return required on new construction. Thus, for example, 
if more than one road supplier provides track capacity between points 
A and B, a failure on the part of each supplier to meet the costs of nrs 
assets would ensure that no additional nrs assets would be created. Given 
that any one supplier can purchase the capacity of any other supplier 
at a price based on the capitalized quasi rents of existing capacity, 
no supplier would invest in new nrs assets until the price exceeds the 
cost of additional capacity It is between the zero earnings limit and 
the upper limit that earnings on nrs assets are referred to as a residual 
or surplus 
Compared with rail track capacity, the existence of nrs 
assets in the road supply industry is of less importance as a cost-
complexity The reason for this is not so much a consequence of 
differences in the degree of specificity and durability of investment, 
but of the fact that the road supply industry is a growing one while 
74 
rail is not. What is important is to recognise that where nrs 
assets exist, the cost function relevant for price^ output and investment 
decisions is not the same for expansion as for contraction, i.e. the 
requirements which must be satisfied to warrant new investment in nrs 
assets are quite different from those which must be met in order to 
warrant continued use of such assets. 
75. See Kolsen, H.M., The Economics and Control of Road Rail Competition, 
op.cit., pp. 42-43. 
74. Ibid., p.52. 
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6. Price Discrimination and Joint Supply 
At this stage of our discussion it is appropriate that 
reference be made to the issue of whether charging different prices for 
jointly produced outputs necessarily constitutes price discrimination. 
75 
This issue, which has been the subject of some debate in the literature 
is worthy of comment since, as a general rule, price discrimination is 
unlikely to be condoned by economists as an appropriate pricing policy 
for public enterprises. This, of course, is not meant to imply that 
discriminatory charges are more likely to be accepted in the private 
sector. What is intended by the above statement is simply this: to 
the extent that price discrimination can be shown to be contrary to 
the public interest the adoption of such a policy by public 
enterprises would generally be considered as inconsistent with the 
7fi 
public enterprise concept. 
To the economist the term, price disofi((mination refers "... to 
the sale of the same product to different individuals or groups of 
individuals at different prices when no underlying cost differences are 
77 involved". Where the term, joint supply is used to describe what we 
have called a common cost situation, it is possible to determine the 
75. See, for example, (1) Steiner, P.O., "Peak Loads and Efficient 
Pricing", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 71, No. 285 
(August 1957); (2) Steiner, P.O., "Peak Loads and Efficient 
Pricing: Reply", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 72, No. 
288 (August 1958); (3) Hirshleifer, J., op.cit.'; (4) Williamson, 
O.E., "Peak Load Pricing: Some Further Remarks", The Bell Journal 
of Economics and Management Science, Spring 1974, Vol. 5, No. 1; 
(5) Kolsen, H.M,, The Economics and'Control'of Road Rail Competition, 
op.cit., Appendix 2 to Chapter 4. 
76. An exception, as noted by Kahn, Alfred E., (op.cit., p. 133), is 
that: "Price discrimination is an often essential way of dealing with 
the pervasive phenomenon of marginal cost below average cost. 
Price discrimination then becomes the means by which public 
utility companies can (1) cover (or come closer to covering) average 
total costs, while (2) making fuller use of existing capacity and/ 
or (3) taking fuller advantages of long run decreasing costs, by (4) 
permitting as many purchases as possible to be made as long as 
buyers are willing to pay the incremental costs of supplying them." 
77. Snow, Marcellus S., "Price Discrimination and Economies of Scale in 
International Satellite Communications", Economic and Policy Problems 
•in Satcllito Communications. Edited by Pelton, Joseph N., and Snow, 
Marcellus S. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), Chapter 1, p. 5. 
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marginal costs of producing each output and thus whether or not prices 
are discriminatory In contrast, if the problem we are dealing with 
is one where the jointly produced outputs are a result of technical 
necessity, there are obvious difficulties in defining price discrimination 
since it is not possible to refer to price/LRMC relationships for each 
of the jointly produced outputs. 
An argument that the correct solution to the efficient pricing 
of true joint products may involve discriminatory pricing is to be 
78 found in Steiner's analysis of the peak/off-peak problem. Briefly, 
Steiner distinguishes between two situations: (i) the so-called 
"firm peak" case,and (ii) the "shifting peak" case. As we have already 
7Q 
seen, in the former case, the amount of capacity provided is justified 
by the demand by peak demand users alone, i.e. demand for capacity by 
peak users equals the marginal costs of providing and operating capacity. 
All other (off-peak) users are permitted to purchase the output or 
service, provided that the amount they are prepared to pay is sufficient 
to cover marginal operating or separable costs. While prices are 
different in each of the demand periods, they are regarded as non-
discriminatory, ", .being based wholly on differences in costs" ^ 
It is in the shifting peak case that Steiner argues that the price 
differences for the joint products (peak and off-peak) are discriminatory. 
More specifically: 
"If the demand curves are different at the optimal output 
level, the prices are unequal, and since this is truly a 
case of joint costs, unequal prices in the face of equal 
outputs and joint costs mean discriminatory prices." 81 
82 
This situation is depicted by Steiner in Figure 4.3(b) 
78, Steiner,P.0., op.cit., p, 1, 
79, Refer to Chapter 2. 
80, Steiner, P-, op.cit., p 589. 
81, Ibid.,p. 590. 
82, Ibid,, p. 588. 
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FIGURE 4.3 Steiner's Model 
Output 
(a) Steiner's Firm Peak Case 
'^l 2 
(b) Steiner's Shifting Peak Case 
Output 
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Curves D^^ and D2 represent the demand functions. Since, in Steiner's 
model, these curves are drawn net of operating costs, shown as b, 
they represent effective demands for capacity The function D , on the 
other hand, represents the total demand for capacity function and as 
indicated earlier is derived by the vertical addition of D, and D2-
Marginal capacity costs are assumed constant and are shown by B. The 
optimal amount of capacity is given by the intersection of B and D 
Optimal capacity is sold in each market at prices P2 and P,, which 
as already explained, are regarded by Steiner as being discriminatory. 
Criticism of this argument was first expressed by Hirshleifer 
who reinterpreted Steiner's model in the manner shown in Figure 4.4. 
83 
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FIGURE 4.4 Short-Run and Long-Run Solutions, Discontinuous Cost Functions 
Output 
SRMC, 
LRMC (Joint) 
LRMC 
(Separable) 
83. Hirshleifer, J., op.cit., 
84. The cost functions shown in Figure 4,4 are of the same form as those 
shown in Figure 2.2, Chapter 2, 
106. 
Briefly, Hirshleifer argued that it is possible to show, by invoking 
85 
the " more ultimate opportunity cost formulation", that the optimal 
prices (P and P„ in Figure 4.3(b) and P and S, and/or T and V in 
Figure 4.4) are not discriminatory The explanation for this approach 
is that given the form of the cost functions shown in Figure 4.4, it 
is " impossible to define SRMC in the usual cash flow sense" 
In Hirshleifer's analysis, marginal cost is interpreted as the most 
valuable alternative forgone in each market. Thus, in the market 
depicted by demand function D (Figure 4.4) opportunity cost is measured 
by the amount which the consumer, who is just excluded from purchasing 
the output (or services) at the price P, would be prepared to pay, i.e. 
opportunity cost in this market is given by P-?. Similarly, in the 
market depicted by demand function D^, opportunity cost is equal to 
S-?, Since, given this interpretation, the different prices P and S 
are based on differences in opportunity costs, they cannot be viewed as 
discriminatory Related to this is the important matter of whether or 
not the markets for the outputs (or services) in question are 
artifically separated. Where markets, for the same product, are 
artifically separated, the real marginal opportunity cost of serving 
each market - according to Hirshleifer's approach - is given by the 
price which the first unsatisfied consumer in the higher priced market 
would be prepared to pay Differences in price thus constitute genuine 
price discrimination. In the peak/off-peak model, it is quite clear 
that the demands for peak and off-peak outputs represent demands for 
different products. The markets are not artifically separated since 
off-peak outputs cannot be made available to peak customers. Thus in 
85, Hirshleifer, J , ibid., p. 458, 
86 Ibid. 
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this case, the higher value placed on peak use "... is not the relevant 
87 
alternative social opportunity for the off-peak service". 
While Hirshleifer's analysis provides a formal basis for 
explaining the non-discriminatory nature of differential prices for 
true joint products where relative prices correspond to those obtained 
under competitive conditions, no attempt is made to pursue the argument 
to the case where relative prices for jointly produced outputs are 
discriminatory. This is a simple matter since the competitive solution 
may be used as a benchmark. Granted that price discrimination is 
incompatible with perfect competition, relative prices which depart from 
the competitive solution can be viewed as discriminatory. Following 
the argument adopted by Kolsen,°° the distinction between relative prices 
which are discriminatory and those which are not can be seen in terms 
•of the quantities of the various jointly produced outputs which are 
treated as products and those which are treated as waste . As shown 
earlier, all jointly produced outputs produced under competitive 
conditions will be treated as products if their demand price is equal 
to or greater than separable costs. In contrast, under conditions of 
monopoly it may be in the interests of the monopolist to treat some part 
of some of the jointly produced outputs as waste even though the entire, 
or a larger portion of the relevant outputs, could be sold at lower 
prices,subject to the constraint that prices are not less than separable 
costs. That is to say, whereas under competitive conditions any jointly 
produced output is treated as waste "... if it does not contribute to 
revenue an amount at least equal to the difference in costs between 
on 
treating it as waste or treating it as a product", under monopoly conditions 
87. Ibid., p.459. 
88. Kolsen, H,M., The Economics and Control of Road Rail Competition, 
op.cit,. Chapter 3, ~ 
89. Kolsen, H,M,, ibid., p. 48. 
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some jointly produced outputs may be treated as waste if demand 
elasticities indicate this to be a more profitable alternative to 
selling more of the outputs as products. 
Let us now consider the above argument in the context of the 
supply of road space. Assume. (i) that in a given region there is 
one road linking population centres A and B; (ii) that the road is 
used by only one class of vehicle, say 8 ton trucks; (iii) that the 
owners of the vehicles are involved in different transport operations; 
and (iv) that there are two distinct demand periods, peak and off-
peak, and that during the latter period the road is uncongested. 
From what has been said, the setting of different prices for 
the different products , peak and off-peak services, is not discriminatory 
provided that in each period, prices are based on opportunity costs. In 
the former this means that price is equal to marginal social costs, which 
includes the costs of congestion, while in the latter no vehicle is 
90 
charged more than separable maintenance costs. In this case the 
only vehicles excluded from using the road in either period are 
those whose owners are not prepared to pay the opportunity costs 
associated with their use of the road. If, on the other hand, relative 
prices are discriminatory, this means that the monopolist pursues a 
pricing policy which results in the exclusion of some vehicles in 
either period whose owners would, in fact, have been prepared to pay a 
price at least equal to opportunity costs. Since we have assumed 
that the vehicles are identical but carry different commodities which 
have different values in their final markets, this provides the 
monopolist road supplier with an obvious basis for pursuing a 
discriminatory pricing policy 
90, For convenience we also assume that there are no invariant 
maintenance costs. 
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The argument can be developed further by relaxing the 
assumption of one vehicle type and supposing instead that the road from 
A to B is now used by a variety of vehicle types. Again, if the 
monopolist road supplier behaves competitively , no vehicle type will 
be excluded from using the road at any time provided that the owners/ 
operators are prepared to pay the social costs which their use of the 
road causes. Some road services will only be treated as waste to the 
extent that vehicle owners are not willing to meet these costs. Further, 
the point needs to be made that, since the vehicles using the road have 
different weight/size dimensions, their effects on variable maintenance 
and congestion costs will also differ This means that not only will 
the competitive pricing solution result in differences in relative 
prices between demand periods, but also within each demand period. Thus, 
for example, if a 8 ton vehicle causes approximately four times as much 
in congestion costs as a 2 ton vehicle, then it will be required to pay 
four times the amount required of the latter And finally, if a 
discriminatory pricing policy is adopted by the road authority, this 
will be manifest in terms of the quantity of road services which are 
treated as waste as compared with the competitive solution. Not 
only will the volume of traffic in either one, or each demand period, 
differ from that which corresponds to the competitive solution, there 
will also be a difference in terms of the composition of traffic. 
7. The Treatment of Capital 
Let us now return, albeit briefly, to the problem of the 
treatment of capital. In the previous chapter, two approaches, the PAYG 
and the public enterprise approach, were mentioned. It was also noted 
that some writers have suggested that the PAYG approach is to be 
preferred to the public enterprise approach, not only because of its 
convenience, but also because it treats bygones as bygones and it 
represents a reasonable approximation to LRMC pricing. The latter 
110. 
91 
argument was advanced by the U.K. Road Track Cost Report on the basis 
of the following reasons: (i) that for all practical purposes, capital 
investment in roads has an infinite life "... so that in practice it 
is not necessary to replace capital, only to add to it or modify it to meet 
additional demands", (ii) that for practical reasons it is not possible 
to calculate the LRMC associated with each part of the road track; however 
(iii) that if it is reasonable to assiame that for the roads capital 
expenditure and traffic will continue to rise in the foreseeable future, 
then the current expenditure method may be regarded as an appropriate 
(practical) method of defining LRMC for roads. 
93 
The above reasoning was challenged by Munby largely on the 
ground that the PAYG definition of LRMC was arbitrary and required an 
extremely rigid set of assumptions about asset life and the pattern 
94 
of past and future investment. Munby proposed two alternatives. 
Alternative A which treats bygones as bygones and then charges for 
investment from one year to the next on a normal capital accounting 
basis; Alternative B, on the other hand, is to treat capital in much 
the same way as the U.K. railways by writing off capital before 1956, 
assuming that the "new look" policy is stated in that year. Munby 
considered these alternatives as having "... as good a justification as 
95 
approximations to LRMC ... and would make more sense". 
Unfortunately, this writer is unable to add any clarity to the 
debate.96One can accept Munby's implicit assumption that bygones are 
91. U.K. Ministry of Transport, op.cit.. Annex 17 and p. 21. 
92. Ibid., p.21. 
93. Munby, D.L., "Mrs. Castle's Transport Policy", Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy. Vol. 11, No. 2, May 1968. 
9»- Ibid.,p. 169. 
95. Ibid. 
96. See also, (i) Foster, CD. and Harrison, A.J., "Mrs. Castle's Transport 
Policy: A Reply", Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, Vol. 11, 
No, 3, September 1968; (ii) Munby, D.L., "Mrs. Castle's Transport 
Policy: A Rejoinder", Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 
Vol.11, No. 3, September 1968$ (iii) Harrison, A.J., "The Track Cost 
Issue", Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, (Essays in Honour 
of Denys Munby) Vol. XIII, No. 1, January 1979. 
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bygones only if a mistake has been made, and that there is a case (for 
reasons we have already outlined) for treating roads like any other 
public enterprise. On the other hand, in terms of a practical 
definition of LRMC of the roads, there is some sense to the RTCR's 
argument if the assumptions about traffic growth and investment are 
correct, and further, if it is reasonable to assiime that users of 
roads on which relatively little investment takes place,also use 
those roads for which investment is far greater Preferably, charges 
should be spatially specific, but it is an assumption made by the RTCR 
that such improvements are not possible. 
Finally, it should be noted that in addition to the 
implications of the treatment of capital for optimal pricing strategies, 
the structure of charges will also be affected, as recently noted by 
97 Beesley and Gwilliam, by the nature of decisions taken with respect 
to capital and maintenance and that " the allocation basis only 
makes sense in the context of a positive effort to optimize the 
98 
expenditures being allocated" Obviously, it is important to get 
investment decisions right; but if they are wrong, it is still a matter 
of importance that the funds allocated be collected in the most efficient 
manner possible. Improvements in the flexibility and sensitivity of the 
charging system will obviously provide better information for investment 
decisions. 
97 Beesley,M,E. and Gwilliam, K.M,, "Transport Policy in the United 
Kingdom", Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, Vol. XI, 
No,3, September 1977 
98. Ibid,, p, 222. ' 
P A R T Ii 
THE ROAD SUPPLY SECTOR IN AUSTRALIA: 
THE ROLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH 1922 TO 1980 
112. 
CHAPTER 5 
AN INTRODUCTION TO PART II: THE ROLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT 
1922-1980 
Responsibility for decisions relating to the financing, 
construction and maintenance of road space in Australia is shared by 
Commonwealth, State and Local Government Authorities. While the 
Australian Constitution does not give the Commonwealth specific powers for 
the construction and maintenance of roads, a function which belongs to 
the States, it does however grant the Commonwealth wide powers under 
Section 96 to provide financial grants to the States. In addition 
Section 122 allows the Commonwealth to make laws with respect to any 
of its territories. Accordingly the Commonwealth is responsible for 
road works in the Northern Territory, the Australian Capital Territory 
and for road works in any Commonwealth property within a State. 
This sharing of responsibility also applies to the regulation 
of road transport operations. The States have exercised the sole power 
to regulate the activities of road transport within their borders, while 
the Commonwealth is responsible for regulation within the Territories. 
However, Section 92 relating to the freedom of inter-state trade does 
impose a constraint on the nature of fees and charges which the States 
and the Commonwealth may levy on interstate transport operations. The 
implications of this for road pricing possibilities in Australia are 
examined in Part IV 
Part II, however, is mainly concerned with tracing out the main feature 
of the history of Commonwealth Government roads policy for the period 
1922 to 1980. Chapter 6 deals with the period from 1922 to 1969, which, 
with some qualification can be accurately described as one in which the 
Commonwealth viewed its role in this area as restricted largely to 
providing providing financial assistance to the States, 
Chapter 7 deals with the remaining years during which successive 
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Commonwealth Governments have, in varying degrees, attempted to make 
greater use of their powers under Section 96 of the Constitution for 
the purpose of controlling the manner in which Commonwealth road funds are 
spent by the States. This shift in Commonwealth policy generated 
considerable adverse reaction on the part of the States, especially 
during the period of the Whitlam Labor Government, from 1972 to 1975. 
The States' criticism was expressed in terms of States' rights rhetoric, 
political accoiintability arguments, and on administrative efficiency 
grounds. The opposition to the Whitlam Government legislation was 
also aided and abetted by the Federal Liberal^ational Country Party 
coalition. The coalition had control of the Senate and was able to 
force the government to accept a number of amendments to the 1973 
Roads Bill. However, most of the features of the Labor Government's 
amended roads legislation were retained by the coalition after its 
return to power in 1975. 
In short. Commonwealth roads policy in this period resulted 
in the categorisation of Commonwealth aid funds by road types, and a 
change in the basis on which road funds were apportioned among the 
States. The 1969 Act is to be noted for the emphasis given to the 
provision of funds for urban roads, while subsequent legislation has 
seen the Commonwealth give less emphasis to this area and more to the 
development of a national highways system. 
The basis for the new directions taken by the Commonwealth 
i.e., the categorisation of road grants and the change in procedure 
for determining Commonwealth allocations to the States, is to be 
found in a number of Reports prepared for the Commonwealth Government 
by the now extinct Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, a statutory authority 
which was created in 1964 for the main purpose of providing economic 
advice to the Commonwealth on the nation's road needs, and on matters 
relating to the role of the Commonwealth in assisting the States to 
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meet those needs. 
In essence,this Chapter provides a detailed account of the 
Bureau of Roads' recommendations as contained in its 1969. 1973 and 1975 
Reports> and of subsequent policy measures adopted by the Commonwealth. 
A short discussion of the Bureau of Transport Economics 1979 Report 
on Australia's road needs, and subsequent Commonwealth legislation is 
also included. 
Of particular interest is the question of the effect these 
policies have had on State roads policy Some general comments are 
made in this Chapter with further discussion taken up in Chapter 10 where 
a detailed analysis of road expenditure in the State of Queensland is 
undertaken. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE ROLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH 1922-1969 
1. Commonwealth Aid Road Grants 1922-1930 
Commonwealth involvement in matters relating to the supply of 
road space commenced in 1922 when a grant of $500,000 was made available 
to the States under the provisions of the Loan Act (No. 7) of 1922. The 
Commonwealth's objective was to assist the States in providing work for the 
unemployed. The grant was allocated among the States on a per capita 
basis and various conditions relating to the use of the grant were 
provided for in the legislation. First, it was required that the 
States match the Commonwealth grant dollar for dollar from their own 
revenue base, second, that the States confine expenditure to the 
maintenance of existing roads outside urban areas, and third, that the 
Commonwealth approve all expenditure of such funds. 
In the following year the Commonwealth made its first specific 
purpose grant for road construction by enactment of the Main Roads 
Development Act of 1923. The Act provided for a grant of $lm. 
In introducing the 1923 Main Roads Development Bill to the 
House of Representatives, the Prime Minister, Mr. Bruce, stated that 
the time had arrived for serious consideration to be given to the part 
the Commonwealth Government should play in the development of road 
construction. The principal objective of the 1923 Act was to assist 
the States in developing their rural areas. In the words of Mr. Bruce, 
the Act was designed: 
". not to relieve the State Government from their ordinary 
obligations with regard to roads. It is intended to extend 
and promote the development of the country by the provision of 
new roads and the improvement of main roads as arteries of 
communication."1 
1- Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (C.P.D.), [House of Representatives], 
22nd June, 1923, p, 311 
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The Act departed from previous practice by providing that five percent 
of the grant should be allocated to the State of Tasmania and the 
remainder distributed among the other States on the basis of three-fifths 
according to population and two-fifths according to area. What the 
Commonwealth intended by the change in formula was that the grant 
received by the States having the largest geographical areas, but 
2 
smaller populations, should be brought" into line" with the 
amounts received by States having larger populations but smaller 
geographical areas. Since Tasmania fitted neither of these categories, 
being the smallest State both in terms of area and population and for 
3 
other reasons, the Commonwealth determined that " equitable 
4 
treatment" would be achieved by providing Tasmania five percent of the 
total grant instead of the lesser amount which would result if the area/ 
population formula was applied. 
The grant was conditional on the States matching the Commonwealth's 
contribution on a $1 for $1 basis Moreover, the Act provided [under 
Clause 8] that before Commonwealth funds could be spent by the States, 
the latter would have to submit an outline of proposed programmes of 
expenditure for the approval of the Commonwealth Minister for Works and 
Railways. The criteria adopted by the Commonwealth as to the kind of road 
programmes it was prepared to provide assistance for had been outlined 
at the 1923 Premiers' Conference and agreed to by the States. The 
Commonwealth was prepared to provide assistance for: 
2. Ibid,, p, 312, 
3. It was stated by the Prime Minister that: "The reasons why, in my 
view, Tasmania, apart from the circumstances of smallness of 
population and area is entitled to some special assistance are these: 
up to the present Tasmania has spent over £5,000,000 upon roads. It 
has 1,300 m.iles of metalled main roads and 6,000 miles of metalled 
roads within its area. It is necessary in Tasmania, owing to 
climatic conditions to have m.etalled roads and they involve 
considerable expenditure" Ibid. 
4. Ibid, 
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"(a) Main roads which open up and develop new country for 
agricultural, pastoral, or mining purposes, and which 
are necessary to convey the products of such to the 
nearest railway; or alternatively, to give access from 
the railway to such country for supply of plant, 
merchandise, food, fodder, goods, §c. 
(b) Main roads between important towns, either within a 
State or between States, where no railway communication 
exists to assist in the interchange of products and 
increased range of markets. 
(c) Existing arterial roads where, by the nature of the 
country and lack of suitable local materials for road 
making, cost of construction is beyond the ordinary 
resources of the districts through which they pass and 
which are required for transport of products to railways, 
river or port."5 
Further grants of $lm and $1.5m were made in 1924/5 and 
1925/6; the former were provided for on the basis of the same 
conditions as set down in the 1923 Act, while in the case of the latter 
it was required that $500,000 should be spent on the reconditioning 
of existing main roads rather than having the entire grant spent on the 
construction of new main roads. 
In presenting the 1925 amendments to the Main Roads 
Development Act to the Parliament, the Minister for Works and Railways, 
Mr. Hill, foreshadowed the intention of the Bruce/Page Government to 
introduce at a later stage a " more comprehensive" scheme of 
Commonwealth assistance for road works. Such a scheme was introduced to 
the Parliament less than a year later in the form of the 1926 
Federal Aid Roads Bill. This Bill, which was to become the subject 
of considerable controversy both within and outside the Federal 
Parliament was seen by the government as representing the " first 
instalment" in the development of a national roads scheme. 
5. Ibid., 13th July, 1923, p. 1108. 
6. Ibid., 9th September, 1925, p. 2326. 
"^ IMl-' 8th July, 1926, p. 3950, 
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While there had been general support for previous Commonwealth 
legislation,the debate on the 1925 Main Roads Development Bill brought 
forward the criticism that the Commonwealth had yet to establish a 
clearly defined roads policy For example, it was argued that: 
"The system of Commonwealth assistance in the construction of 
main roads must be permanent if it is to do lasting good. At 
the present time there is no assurance of continuity and the 
very fact that the two previous grants, and the one now proposed, 
[i.e. the 1925 amendments to the Main Roads Development Act] are 
chargeable to surpluses already realised instead of being made 
from ordinary revenue, in accordance with the settled policy 
of the Government emphasised that necessity. Although the 
Minister has told the State Governments that they may continue 
expenditure upon main roads in anticipation of Commonwealth 
assistance on the basis of last year's expenditure, it is 
difficult for any authority to undertake large works involving 
the expenditure of many thousands of pounds and extending over 
months, and perhaps years, unless it is asstimed that the help 
which is available when the work is commenced will be forthcoming 
for its continuance and completion."8 
It was partly in response to criticism of this kind that the 1926 legislation 
was formulated. But more than that it also gave formal recognition to 
other views expressed by members of the Parliament, especially by 
members of the Bruce-Page Government, that the Commonwealth should 
substantially increase its involvement in the road sector both in terms 
of financial assistance and in the administration of that assistance. 
Drawing on the experience since 1916 of U.S.A. Federal Government 
assistance for road works, the Bruce-Page Government contended that 
unless Australia adopted a similar programme (although obviously on a 
much smaller scale) the " States could not be expected to meet the 
g 
ever increasing demand" for road space, and that without such aid 
economic development would be seriously impeded. 
The main features of the 1926 Federal Aid Roads Act are as 
follows. To begin with, the Government proposed that the Conmionwealth 
and States embark on a co-operative program.rae of road construction 
involving a total expenditure over a ten year period of $70,000,000 of 
which $40,000,000 would be provided by the Com.monwealth and the remainder 
8. Ibid., 9th September, 1925, p. 2343. 
9' 11:1^'> 27th July, 1926, p. 4591. 
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by the States. In detail, the Commonwealth increased the annual grant 
from $1.5m per annum (as under the terms of the 1925 legislation) to 
$4m per annum over a ten year period,subject, as according to previous 
policy, to matching conditions, although in this case reducing the 
States' contribution to $1.50 for every $2.00 provided by the Commonwealth. 
The previously determined formula for distributing the grant among the 
States was retained. As to the matter of how the Commonwealth was to 
raise its contributions, the Act provided for the imposition of a special 
customs duty of 1.66 cents per gallon on petrol and shale oil as well 
as an increase of 5.00 cents per lb in duties on the heavier varieties 
of pneimiatic tyres, an increase of fifteen percent on all other tyres 
and tubes and an increase in duties of Hh percent on unassembled and 
assembled motor vehicle chassis. Of the total grant of $40,000,000 the 
Government estimated that $30,000,000 would be collected from the above 
duties while the remaining $10,000,000 would be derived from existing 
sources of revenue. 
The decision to finance the larger part of the Commonwealth's 
contribution by means of the above tax instrtmients was in accord with 
road funding policies in many other countries and based on the view that 
road users as beneficiaries " should specially contribute in some 
measure for these [i.e. road] facilities" ' Further, in line 
with previous legislation the Government intended that Commonwealth 
road funds should continue, during the period, to be directed to road 
construction and reconstruction in sparsely populated areas. The 
12 
continuation of this policy was justified in the following terms: 
To; Ibid., Budget, 1926/72, p. 3950. 
11. In the Budget Speech Dr. Earle Page also stated that: "The imposition 
of these duties at the source will ultimately result in the road users 
paying this special tax proportionately to their use of the roads" 
Ibid. 
12. Ibid., 27th July, 1926, p, 4595, 
120. 
(i) increased expenditure on roads in rural areas would not only benefit 
country residents and the development of agricultural production, but 
also those who lived in the cities, the argument being that the benefits 
derived from improved roads in rural areas would be reflected in lower 
prices (in the cities) for agricultural produce and raw materials; (ii) 
rural roads " that are good enough to carry motor traffic are largely 
13 
used by motorists from the cities", [no evidence was produced to 
support this claim.]; (iii) since the urban areas derived considerable 
benefit from Commonwealth tariff policy in the form of industrial 
development it was only fair that the cities should contribute (via, in this 
case,a transfer of petrol tax revenue) to the welfare of the residents of 
sparsely populated areas; and (iv) tliat "[it] is impracticable 
and absurd to expect that in a country like Australia, each area or 
each section of the community shall look after its own needs and its own 
needs only " 
The Act provided for the classification of Federal Aid Roads 
and required that all funds granted by the Commonwealth to the States, 
under the terms of the agreement, be directed to the construction and 
reconstruction of such roads (Clause 6(1)) Moreover, power was granted 
to the Commonwealth Minister for Works and Railways to determine how 
the balance of Commonwealth and State contributions (i.e., matching 
grants) should be apportioned between construction and reconstruction. 
Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Clause 6 state, respectively, that: 
13, Ibid, 
14, Ibid. 
15, The Act stated: "For the purpose of this Agreement the following 
Classes of Roads shall be deemed to be Federal Aid Roads:-
(i) Main Roads which open up and develop new country; 
(ii) Trunk Roads between important towns; and 
(iii) Arterial Roads to carry the concentrated traffic from 
developmental, main, trunk and other roads." 
Federal Aid Roads, No, 46 of 1926, (Clause 5 of Schedule) 
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"One-fourth of the money paid to the State under this Agreement 
and one-fourth of the moneys to be provided by the State under 
this Agreement shall be expended solely on the construction of 
Federal Aid Roads." 
"The Minister shall have the power to decide from time to time 
how the balance of the moneys paid to the State under this 
Agreement and the balance of the moneys to be provided by the 
State under this Agreement shall be expended but so that such 
moneys shall be expended solely in the construction of Federal 
Aid Roads and/or the reconstruction of Federal Aid Roads." 
In addition, provision was made for the establishment of a Federal Aid 
Roads Board (Clause 12) consisting of the Commonwealth and State 
MiTiiistersconcerned with road works. It was the function of the Board to 
discuss "... any matter in connection with the carrying out of works" 
as specified by the Commonwealth. Moreover, it was obligatory for the 
States to submit, for Commonwealth approval, full details of all proposed 
road works involving the use of Commonwealth funds and State matching grants, 
which were to be constructed during the period July, 1926 to July, 1931 
and at the end of that period, of proposed road works for the remaining 
five years of the Act. In addition,it was also required that after 
approval of the five year scheme was obtained, details of yearly 
17 programmes should be.submitted for Commonwealth approval. 
Apart from the above, the Act provided for the establishment 
of a Trust Account and specified a minimxim requirement regarding the 
proportion of a State's contribution which was required to be raised 
from revenue as distinct from loans. Coiranonwealth funds were not to 
be used for expenditure in towns having a population in excess of 5,000 
16. Ibid., Clause 12. 
17. Ibid., Clause 9 (1) and (2). 
18. "Of the amount to be provided by the State under this clause the 
sum of [(d)] shall be provided from Revenue. The balance of the 
amount to be provided by the State may T^ ^ at the option of the 
State be provided out of current roads expenditure or from Revenue 
or loan moneys". £ 
[(d)] states: "N.S.W 517,500 
Victoria 337,500 
Queensland 352,500 
South Australia 213,750 
Western Australia 360,000 
Tasmania 93,750 " 
Ibid., Clause 3, (3). 
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and could only be used for road construction and/or reconstruction in 
towns having a population less than 5,000 where the road concerned 
19 
actually passed through such towns. Further, the Act required that 
the Commonwealth's control over the use of road funds also extended to 
road maintenance policy and decisions relating to the means by which 
road works were to be undertaken. With respect to the latter the Act 
required: 
"The method of construction shall be by contract except where 
the Minister for the State considers that tenders received 
from the execution of the work are unsatisfactory or that 
execution by day labour would be more economical and/or 
expeditious and so informs the Minister The Minister may, 
if he is satisfied that action has been taken by the State to 
ensure that the work will be carried out according to approved 
methods of construction in which modem plant is utilised to 
the fullest extent, approve the execution of the work in whole 
or in part by day labour "20 
In so far as maintenance policy is concerned the Act stipulated that the 
States be required to make provision for the adequate and continuous 
maintenance of all road works undertaken in accordance with the Act, 
and that the cost of such works be funded from State sources of 
revenue. In the event of a State not providing adequate maintenance for 
a Federal Aid road, the Act empowered the Minister to prevent payments 
being made from the Trust Account to the State until such time that: 
". the road has been put in good repair and condition to the 
satisfaction of the Minister and until proper provision to the 
satisfaction of the Minister has been made by the State for the 
road being adequately and continuously maintained in good 
repair and condition,"21 
While previous Commonwealth Aid Road legislation had enjoyed 
almost unanimous support both within and outside the Parliament, the 
1926 Act was strongly opposed by the Australian Labor Party (A,L.P„) 
as well as by some members of the government parties, three of the States 
19. Ibid., Clause 7(1) This clause also specified that: " the width 
of any road constructed or reconstructed through a town pursuant to 
this clause shall not except with the approval in writing of the 
Minister exceed twenty feet" 
20. Ibid,, Clause 9(4) 
21. Ibid,, Clause 8(2) 
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New South Wales (N.S.W.), Victoria (Vic.) and South Australia (S.A.) ^  
motor vehicle owner associations,and the oil importing companies who, 
in turn, were largely responsible for the financing of an "... extensive 
22 
press and political campaign against the proposals". The oil 
importing companies were opposed to the scheme largely for the reason 
that the tax on fuel did not apply to fuel supplied by the Commonwealth 
23 Oil Refineries and the motoring associations because, in their view, 
the motorist was already contributing more than a fair share towards the 
funding of road programmes. It was contended by the President of the 
National Roads and Motorists Association (N.R.M.A.), Mr, Watson,that: 
22. Sawer, G., Australian Federal Politics and Law, 1901-1929, (Melbourne 
University Press, 1972), p. 273, 
23, In a letter written to the Prime Minister by representatives of the 
British Imperial Oil Company Ltd., Harrison's Ramsay Pty, Ltd,, 
James Hexty and Co., Neptune Oil Company Ltd., H.C. Pannifex and Co., 
H.C. Sleigh, Texas Company (Australasia) Ltd., United Oil Products 
Company, the Universal Oil Company Ltd., and Vacuum Oil Company 
it was stated: 
"It is felt that the imposition of the tariff in the glaring form 
proposed is a gross injustice and a glaring example of sectional 
legislation ... The incidence of this taxation is objected to (a) 
because it does not include the contribution by all road users and 
in this we specially refer to the exclusion of locally-produced motor 
spirits from shale alcohol or locally-refined petroleum from imported 
crudesj (b) because it imposes a contribution by non users of roads 
i,e, those engaged in (1) primary industries ... (2) secondary 
industries such as dyers, cleaners, rubber manufacturers, and factories 
using stationary petrol engines; (3) aviation, motor boat, transport 
railway motors. 
In justice to the importers of petroleum spirit ... your Government 
in fairness must recognise our claim that any excise duty of 2" 
a gallon should be imposed on all motor spirit locally produced, but 
not already included in the Budget proposals, thus ensuring that the 
new taxation be borne proportionately by all concerned, and that all 
road users contribute their due share. 
We direct your attention to the omission in the Budget proposals of 
the creation of a road trust fund into which all taxation for road 
purposes should be paid, thus ensuring that such funds should be 
exclusively used for the construction and maintenance of national 
roads, and could never be drawn upon by the Treasurer for other 
purposes ...". 
Quoted in the Sydney Morning Herald, Tuesday, July 13th, 1926, p. 11. 
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" there cannot be the least justice in throwing on to the 
motor owners of Australia an additional burden of £1,500,000 
a year through customs duties while they are already paying 
£3,500,000 annually through the same channels Federal road 
money should be paid out of the funds already derived from 
motor import duties, and we also contend that money intended 
for roads - purely developmental roads - for which motorists 
as such will have no general use should be paid out of 
consolidated revenue, particularly in view of the large Federal 
surpluses yearly in any case the motorist should not be 
singled out for taxation for road making, when he is only one 
of the several parties directly benefiting from road betterment 
all who reap an advantage by the creation of better roads 
such as the owners of contiguous land should be brought into the 
scheme".24 
The opposition to the scheme by the above mentioned States 
25 
and the Labor Party was based on arguments regarding States' rights ; 
the Labor Party's philosophy with regard to customs duties and indirect 
taxation; and also, as far as New South Wales and Victoria were concerned, 
on the ground that the Commonwealth's proposals treated them unfairly 
vis-a-vis the other less populous States. 
The Labor Party argued that while it was willing to support a 
policy of co-operation with the States for the purpose of road development, 
it was the Party's view that Commonwealth Government aid for roads should 
24 Ibid., August 5th, 1929, p. 9. 
25. The Premier of South Australia, Mr Gunn stated that: 
"The great weakness in the proposals in comparison with our own 
is that we must spend the money on new construction or reconstruct-
ion. We will have £120,000 less for maintenance of our main roads. 
The State has to subsidize each Commonwealth £l to the extent of 
15s. Although we pay 15s, we have not the power they have. 
It may be that they want to construct an interstate road or roads 
that we would not want to spend the money on because we want to 
spend it on roads which will develop our own State. The move of 
the Commonwealth Government is unwarranted. There was no need for 
it. I hope that Mr Bruce will see the wisdom of withdrawing the 
tax, and leaving the States alone " 
and again, 
"That this House (i.e. The South Australian House of Assembly) is 
of the opinion that roads construction is an encroachment on the 
State Government activities, and beyond the power of the Commonwealth 
Constitution, and, therefore, emphatically protests against the road 
proposals of the Federal Ministry, and urges members of the Federal 
Parliament not to give effect to them" 
Both statements quoted by Mr Charlton (A.L.P ) , C.P.D., 
21st July and 29th July, 1926, p. 4655 and p. 4688 respectively 
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be limited to what the Commonwealth could afford from " whatever surplus 
26 
is in hand", and that if special taxation is considered necessary to 
27 finance road development then it should be imposed by the States. 
In addition, it was Labor's view that the Commonwealth did not possess 
the power to legislate for the regulation and control of the use of road 
funds. 
As stated by one eminent Party member, Mr Scullin: 
"I have not the slighest objection to this Parliament making a 
grant to assist the State Governments in any direction it 
considers necessary; but there is a marked distinction between 
a gift to the States of £250,000 or £500,000, from an over-
flowing Treasury, to assist them in developmental work, whether 
it be for road-making or railway construction, and introducing 
a permanent and continuous policy over a period of ten years. 
Honourable members can draw a distinction between the gift of 
a sum of money for constructing a few main roads or building a 
railway, which is a State function, and introducing a policy 
under which new taxation is to be imposed in order to enter the 
field of road construction in State Territories. We are exceed-
ing our constitutional rights when we invade in this way territory 
under the control of State authorities. The Commonwealth 
should co-operate with the States as it has done in the past 
when there has been a surplus to distribute, but it should not 
interfere with the functions that rightly belong to the States,^ o 
by competing with them in a way in which they do not approve," 
The Attorney General, Mr Latham, who previously had expressed doubts 
concerning the constitutional validity of earlier Commonwealth legislation 
26, Ibid., 28th July, 1926, p. 4656. 
27 It was contended that: "The State authorities alone have the 
constitutional power to equitably impose a tax on road users. I 
refuse to believe that a tax on petrol alone, or a Customs duty 
on chassis or tyres is an equitable means of raising the money 
required. If it is proposed to tax those who use petrol driven 
vehicles on the roads we must take into consideration more than 
petrol consumption. The weight of the vehicle and the engine 
power employed plus the petrol consumption should be considered in 
arriving at the formula on which to base the tax" Mr. Scullin (A.L,P 
ibid,, p, 4669, 
28, Ibid. , p. 4667, 
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29 in this area, defended the Government's position on the following grounds. 
First, that in contrast to previous legislation,the 1926 legislation gave 
explicit recognition to the fact that it was based on section 96 of the 
Constitution which states: 
",., the (Commonwealth) Parliament may grant financial 
assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as 
it thinks fit." 
Second, the legislation was a co-operative enterprise between the 
Commonwealth and the States. This, it was argued, was made clear by the 
first paragraph to the Schedule to the Act: 
"This agreement shall have no force or effect and shall not 
be binding on either party unless and until it is approved 
adopted authorised or satisfied by the Parliaments of the 
Commonwealth and of the State," 
Third, with regard to the objection'that the Commonwealth should not 
interfere with the States in their use of Commonwealth road funds (i.e. 
with regard to choice of road projects), Latham stated that it was the 
Government's view that: 
"It is proper that in a joint enterprise of this character 
the Commonwealth should have the right to agree with the ^Q 
States as to whether a particular work should be carried out." 
29. In speaking to the 1925 Main Roads Development Bill Latham stated: 
"I am sorry that I am unable to join in the general chorus in praise 
of this Bill. Of course, everybody agrees as to the necessity and 
desirability of making good roads in Australia. We want more roads 
and better roads. The question is, who should make them? Should it 
be the Commonwealth Government or the State Governments? In proposing, 
year by year legislation of this character the Commonwealth Parliament 
is placing itself in a difficult position. It is merely granting 
financial subventions instead of devoting its revenue to the work 
which should properly concern it. Although the Commonwealth 
Parliament has no power to legislate for main roads as such, we are 
discussing a Bill the object of which ... is to make possible the 
construction of main roads, without considering at all whether this 
admittedly desirable object is one of the objects with which the 
Commonwealth legislation ought to concern itself. I venture to 
assert ... that in passing legislation of this description we are 
not acting constitutionally. This Parliament has no power to 
legislate for main roads. It has power, of course, to grant financial 
assistance to States which need it. I suppose this Bill would be 
defended on that ground it it were attacked". 
Ibid., 9th September, 1925, p. 2331. 
30. Ibid,, 28th July, 1926, pp. 4685 and 4686. 
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Finally, Latham argued that it was the Commonwealth and not 
the States who possessed the power of indirect taxation through customs 
and excise and that: 
"To leave the whole expenditure on roads which is very heavy 
today to be found by the States, would necessarily mean that 
it would have to be found out of direct taxation or from loan 
moneys ... which would cause serious difficulties of political 
and other kinds."51 
The legality of the Commonwealth Government's stand was tested 
in the High Court towards the end of 1926 in litigation involving the 
Commonwealth Government and Commonwealth Oil Refineries against the 
South Australian Government, and the Commonwealth Government against the 
Governments of South Australia and Victoria. 
32 In the first mentioned case the Commonwealth Government and 
Commonwealth Oil Refineries issued writs against the Government of 
South Australia and the South Australian Commissioner for Taxation, 
challenging the validity of the 1925 Taxation (Motor Spirit Vendors) Act 
(No. 1681) and the Taxation (Motor Spirit Vendors) Suspension Act 1925 
(No, 1712), The former Act provided, inter alia, for the Commissioner 
of Taxation to collect from vendors of motor spirit a tax of 2.5 cents 
(3 ) per gallon on motor spirit sold within the State, and on petrol 
(in excess of ten gallons) purchased or obtained outside the boundaries 
of the State. The revenues received by this means were designated for 
payment to the State's Main Roads Fund which was established by the 
Highways Act, 1925. The tax was levied by the South Australian Government 
for the purpose of meeting the matching grant requirements imposed by 
Commonwealth Government roads legislation. 
The second mentioned Act was designed to provide for the 
suspension or reduction of the tax imposed by the first mentioned Act, 
if in the opinion of the Governor in Council, satisfactory arrangements 
32. Ibid,, p. 4686. 
33. High Court of Australia, The Commonwealth and Another against the 
State of South Australia and Another. The Commonwealth Oil 
Refineries Limited against the State of South Australia and Another. 
(1926) 38 C.L.R., p. 408. 
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were made between the South Australian Government and the Commonwealth 
with regard to the payment to the former of moneys raised by the latter, 
by duties of customs and excise on motor spirit, where such moneys 
were to be used by the State for the construction and maintenance of 
roads, 
While the South Australian Government conceded that the 
Constitution did not enable the States to impose import or excise 
duties on petrol, this being the exclusive right of the Commonwealth, 
it contended that the revenues collected under the 1925 Taxation Act 
(No. 1681) were a tax on the users of roads and not on petrol sales per 
se. In disputing that claim the Commonwealth argued that the Acts 
34 
were contrary to both section 90 and 92 of the Constitution. This 
35 
view was upheld by the High Court. 
•Zfi 
In the other case mentioned the Governments of Victoria and 
South Australia sought a declaration from the High Court that the 1926 
Federal Aid Roads Act was unconstitutional. Briefly, the plaintiffs' 
37 
case rested on the following: (i) that the 1926 Act was invalid because 
34. Section 90 of the Australian Constitution states: 
"On the imposition of uniform duties of customs the power of the 
Parliament to impose duties of customs and of excise, and to grant 
bounties on the production or export of goods, shall become exclusive. 
On the imposition of uniform duties of customs all laws of the several 
States imposing duties of customs or of excise, or offering 
bounties on the production or export of goods, shall cease to have 
effect, but any grant of or agreement for any such bounty lawfully 
made by or under the authority of the Government of any State 
shall be taken to be good if made before the thirtieth day of June, 
one thousand eight hundred and ninety eight, and not otherwise"-
Section 92 of the Australian Constitution states: 
"On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and 
intercourse among the States, whether by means of internal carriage 
or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free ..." 
35. The Court held by a majority of 6 to 1 that the Taxation (Motor 
Spirits Vendors) Act 1925 (S.A.) was contrary to s90 of the 
Constitution, and by a majority of 6 to 1 that the Act was contrary 
to s92. 
36. The State of Victoria and Others against the Commonwealth, (1926), 
38 C.L.R,, p. 399. 
37. Ibid., pp, 404-406. 
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it represented a law relating to road making rather than a law for 
granting financial assistance to the States; (ii) that in providing 
for the construction and reconstruction of roads the legislation required 
the States to act as " contributors to the costs of construction and 
reconstruction and as agents of the Commonwealth for the purpose .of 
38 
carrying out the works" ; (iii) that the legislation could not be justified 
under the umbrella of the defence powers since the latter would allow 
only for the construction of roads for military purposes; (iv) that the 
legislation did not fall within the ambit of section 51 (XXXVIII) of the 
Constitution since the Imperial Parliament is not the only Parliament 
39 
which has the power to legislate for road making ; (v) that, if it is agreed 
that the intended legislation is to provide financial assistance to the 
States it is not consistent with the terms of section 96 of the 
Constitution -here it was argued that "[under] that section the 
Parliament cannot attach as conditions to its grant any conditions 
which amount in substance to the exercise of any legislative power 
which is not within section 51 of the Constitution" or alternatively, that, 
(vi) that " the terms and conditions referred to in section 96 
are financial terms and conditions unless they are terms and conditions 
falling within one of the legislative powers in section 51." An 
additional argument - offered by the State of N.S.W. (intervening) - was 
38, Ibid., p, 405. 
39, Section 51 (XXXVIII) states: 
"The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to 
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the 
Commonwealth with respect to: (XXXVIII): 
The exercise within.the Commonwealth, at the request or with the 
concurrence of the Parliaments of all the States directly concerned, 
of any power which can at the establishment of this Constitution be 
exercised only by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by the 
Federal Council of Australasia." 
40, The State of Victoria and Others against the Commonwealth, op.cit,, 
p^ 405, " 
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that if, for example, only one State accepted the Commonwealth's 
conditions, then the Act would be contrary to section 99 of the 
Constitution which prohibits the Commonwealth from discriminating between 
41 
the States. • 
Once again the High Court adjudicated in favour of the 
Commonwealth by simply declaring that the Act was: 
". plainly warranted by the provisions of section 96 of 
the Constitution, and not affected by those of section 99 
or any other provisions of the Constitution, .. so that 
exposition is unnecessary",42,43 
As a consequence New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia 
had no politically acceptable alternative to joining the other States in 
agreeing to the terms of the 1926 Commonwealth Roads Act. 
2. Commonwealth Aid Roads Policy 1931-1969 
The 1926 Act remained in force until July, 1931 when a recently 
elected Labor Government, after consultation with representatives of each 
of the States, in February and May of that year, decided to make a number 
of significant amendments to the legislation. These were: (i) that the 
Commonwealth make available to the States for the remainder of the period of 
the Act an amount equal to 2.08 cents (2^ d) per gallon on all imported petrol 
and 1.25 cents (II5 d) per gallon on all petrol refined in Australia; 
41. Section 99 states: 
"The Commonwealth shall not, by any law of regulation of trade, 
commerce, or revenue, give preference to one State or any part 
thereof over another State or any part thereof." 
42. The State of Victoria and Others against the Commonwealth, op.cit., p.406, 
43. This judgement led a distinguished Australian constitutional lawyer 
to remark: "In view of the extensive debates which had taken place 
both within and without Parliament, and the number of opinions given 
by senior constitutional counsel that the legislation was of doubtful 
validity, this was very cavalier treatment of the problem, and left 
many problems concerning the application of sec. 96 unsolved, as to 
which a little more judicial reasoning could have been helpful", 
Sawer, G., op.cit., p. 229. See also Rae Else-Mitchell, "The 
Australian Federal Grants Systems and its Impact on Fiscal Reslations 
of the Federal Government with State and Local Governments", The 
Australian Law Journal, Vol 54, No, 8, August 1980, p. 482, 
44. The A,L,P under Mr Scullin's leadership was returned to power on the 
12th October, 1929. 
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(ii) that the matching grants provisions be removed; (iii) that the 
Federal Aid Roads Board be abolished and (iv) that all conditions relating 
to the classes of roads on which Commonwealth funds should be spent, and 
the methods of construction to be employed, be rescinded. Thus under the 
proposed amendments the use of Commonwealth road aid funds was left to 
the discretion of the States, the only requirements being that: 
"All moneys paid to the State under this agreement or under 
the principal agreement as varied by this agreement will be 
expended upon the construction, reconstruction, maintenance 
and repair of roads."45 
Finally, the formula for determining the distribution of 
Commonwealth road funds among the States was retained, and indeed, was 
not subject to alteration until 1959, 
By introducing the 1931 amendments the Labor Government was 
acting in accord with the views it held during the debates on the 1926 
Federal Aid Roads Bill, namely, that the States were in a better 
position than the Commonwealth to determine their road needs, and that 
the conditions imposed by the Act were an infringement of States' 
rights. Apart from that, however, other factors were also important. 
First, most of the States had complained that the conditions relating to 
Commonwealth approval of proposed schemes and methods of construction had 
46 inhibited the efficient implementation of the roads programme. Second, both the 
45. Federal Aid Roads Act No. 22 of 1931, The Schedule, Clause 5. 
46. See for example, the Sixth Annual Report of the Queensland Commissioner 
for Main Roads, for the year ended 30th June, 1927, p. 5. 
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Commonwealth and the States were, because of the economic circumstances 
of the time, experiencing considerable difficulties in meeting their 
financial commitments, 
While the opposition parties agreed with Labor's contention that 
it was not feasible to maintain Commonwealth aid for roads at the level 
intended by the 1926 Act and that the matching grant requirements should 
be rescinded, that was, not surprisingly, as far as their support went. 
The thrust of the opposition's criticism was that the Bill^ in contrast 
47 
to the 1926 Act, was ". not a roads Bill but a State grants Bill" 
The opposition feared that given Clause 5 of the Bill (see p.131) , 
that Commonwealth road funds would be used on road work in relief of 
48 
unemployment, and that the objective of the 1926 Act of allocating 
funds to particular classes of country roads would be under serious 
threat. What the opposition proposed, in the form of an amendment, was 
that Commonwealth roads policy should, during the period of the Act, 
49 50 have as its main objective the " continuous and adequate maintenance" ' 
of the existing system of completed Federa.1 Aid Roads. Following that. 
Commonwealth road funds should then, at the discretion of the Minister, 
be directed to the completion of sections of roads.the " construction 
47 C.P.D. , 5th August, 1931, p, 4995. 
48, Ibid, 
49, Ibid, 
50, In debating this issue it was stated by the former Attorney General 
that the purpose of the 1926 Act " was to provide certain permanent 
assets of a capital nature in the form of roads, those roads being 
designed upon a system which had the approval of the Commonwealth 
and the particular States concerned. In that way it was hoped to 
get rid of one of the difficulties which is almost inevitably 
associated with the making of roads by the Government of a State, 
namely the insistence upon local demands which is so readily and 
urgently pressed by a local parliamentary representative It 
appears to mo that there is a great deal to be said for introducing 
the Coiranonwealth as a relatively disinterested party, into any 
scheme of layout of general main roads" Ibid,, p. 4993. 
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or reconstruction of which commenced under the principal agreement", 
and finally, that Commonwealth funds should be spent only on the "... 
52 
construction, reconstruction and repair of roads in country districts". 
However, the Bill was passed without amendment and operated imtil 1937 
when a new agreement entitled the Federal Aid Roads and Works Act, 
1937 was enacted. 
Despite the fact that the non Labor parties had, by this time, 
53 been returned to power, no attempt was made to shift Commonwealth roads 
polity in the direction established in 1926. In essence the 1937 
Act retained the principles embodied in the previous legislation with the 
addition of some minor changes. The Act established that the Commonwealth 
would grant to the States, over a ten year period, an amount determined 
by the same rate of tax on petrol as applied under the previous Act, and 
that an additional grant determined on the basis of 0.42 cents (l/2d) per 
gallon on petrol in relation to customs duty, and 0.42 cents (•^'''2d) per 
gallon in relation to excise duty, be provided and used at the 
discretion of the States either on roads or on "... other works connected 
54 
with transport". Of this additional grant the Act also provided that 
the Commonwealth, could, if it desired, require that an amount not 
exceeding 1/12 of the grant be spent on roads giving access to Commonwealth 
properties. Finally, provision was made to reduce the amount the 
States were required to contribute to the Sinking Fund from 3 percent to 
2.5 percent of loan funds. 
The 1937 Act operated, without amendment, until 1947, when new 
legislation was introduced in March of that year by the Chifley Labor 
Government for the period 1947 to 1950, Apart from providing increased 
allocations to the States, determined at the rate of 2.5 cents (3 ) per 
51. Ibid., p. 4995. 
52. Ibid., p. 4996. 
53. The Lyons Ministry was formed on the 6th January, 1932. 
54. Federal Aid Roads and Works Act, No. 5 of 1937, Clause 4(2). 
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gallon on imported petrol and 1.66 cents (2 ) per gallon on locally 
refined petrol, and allowing the States to spend up to 1/6 on works 
connected with transport, grants of $lm and $2m were also made, 
respectively, for the maintenance of certain strategic roads and for the 
"... special purpose of building and maintaining roads through sparsely 
settled areas, timber country and rural areas for which other transport 
55 facilities are not available." 
As far as the latter grant is concerned it was the Commonwealth's 
intention that this should not be used for the maintenance and construction 
of state highways or main Eoads, but for the development of Local 
Authority roads. Moreover, it was also provided that money paid to the 
States under this grant could be used, if a State deemed appropriate, 
to purchase road making plant "... for use in areas where this is beyond 
57 
the resources of local authorities". 
The Act also required that the States present each year, to the 
Commonwealth Minister for Transport, a general statement indicating 
proposed plans for the use of Commonwealth road funds, and that these 
proposals should be subject to agreement by the Commonwealth after 
consultation with the recently established Australian Transport Advisory 
Council, a body whose membership included each Staters Minister 
58 
for Transport. The purpose of this condition was, as expressed by the 
then Commonwealth Minister for Transport, Mr. Ward: 
"... to secure the co-ordination of road construction policies 
throughout the Commonwealth on a national basis and to integrate 
road construction with the development of other forms of 
transport."59 
55. C.P.D., 19th March 1947, p. 847. See also Coimnonwealth Aid 
Roads and Works Act No. 17 of 1947, Clause 4 (a). 
56. This grant was allocated to the States on the same basis as the 
principal grant. 
57. Commonwealth Aid Roads and Works Act, op.cit., Clause 4(a). 
58. The Transport Advisory Council was established in April, 1946. 
59. C.P.D., 19th March,1947, p. 847. 
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What the Minister had in mind is not really clear - the terms 
co-ordination and integrate were not defined. However, what is clear 
is that under Chifley's leadership the Labor Party had come to accept the 
view that the Commonwealth had a responsibility to play a greater part in 
the formulation of transport policy in general and roads policy in 
particular. 
This aspect of the legislation was opposed by the opposition 
parties on the ground that the States and Local Authorities were in a 
better position to adnMLnister a "... sound roads policy" by virtue of 
their better knowledge of local conditions, and it was removed by them 
after their return to power in 1949. The legislation was also 
criticised on the ground that it covered too short a time period for 
effective road planning to take place, and that the size of the grants 
should bear a closer relationship to petrol tax revenues than had been 
the case during the War years and was implicit in the 1947 legislation. 
In particular the Country Party contended that the size of the grant to 
Local Authorities should be substantially, increased to compensate 
for damage caused to roads during the War years by heavy military 
vehicles; to take account of the increase in the price of labour and 
road building materials which had occurred since 1939; and to facilitate 
greater improvements to the secondary road system than would be possible 
under Labor's proposal. 
60. Ibid., 21st May, 1947, p. 2672. 
61. In 1938/39 the proportion of motor fuel tax collections returned to 
the States for road works amounted to approximately 36 percent. 
During the war years the proportion fell to about 27 percent. For 
the years 1946/47 and 1947/48 the proportions were respectively, 
29 percent and 39 percent. (Source: Queensland Main Roads 
Department) 
62. As stated by one member of the Country Party: 
"This Bill is intimately linked with country life and perhaps, apart 
from the provision of educational and recreational facilities, the 
Government could not improve living conditions in the country more 
greatly other than by improvements to the roads. For many years 
shire councils have struggled greatly and have had to contend with 
numerous financial problems, in order to give service to their rate 
payers. Under existing conditions there is no prospect of relief 
being provided in the form of country roads, unless finance can be 
provided by such means as a better allocation of the proceeds of the 
petrol tax." C,P,D., 21st May 1947, p. 2693. 
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However, it was not long before the Labor government demonstrated 
its concern for the significance (political or otherwise) of the Local 
Authority roads issue. In 1948 and 1949 the Labor government enacted 
amendments to the 1947 Roads Act which, respectively, increased the 
grants for expenditure on minor rural roads and/or for the purchase by 
Local Authorities of road building equipment, to $4m and $6m. In 
percentage terms this meant that the minor rural roads grant rose from 
approximately 16 percent of the total grant in 1947 to 29 percent in 1948 and 
fi'Z , 
34 percent in 1949. 
The 1947 Act expired on the 30th June, 1950 and new legislation 
was introduced in November by the recently elected Menzies-Fadden 
Liberal/Country Party Government. The main features of the Act 
were as follows: (i) it extended the period of the Act to five years 
in order "[to] provide for continuity in road programmes ..." ; (ii) and 
as already noted, it deleted the requirement of the previous Act that 
the States should submit for Commonwealth approval plans of intended use 
of grant money; (iii) it allowed for a substantial increase in the size 
of grants by increasing the rate of petrol tax at which payment would 
be determined, to 5 cents (6 ) a gallon of customs duty on imported petrol, 
and 2.9 cents (3 /2d) a gallon excise on locally produced petrol; 
(iv) it continued the principle introduced by the previous Government of 
providing special assistance for rural Local Authority roads and required that 
35 percent of the total grant be set aside for such purposes, (related to 
this, the Act widened the category of roads on which the special grant 
could be spent "... to comprehend all roads in rural areas, other than 
main roads, trunk roads and highways"); and (v) the legislation provided, 
that moneys made available to the States for general road purposes 
63, Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Australian Road Systems, 1968, 
p. 2u. 
64, CP.D., 21st November, 1950, p. 2700. 
65, Ibid,, p. 2702. 
137, 
could be used for the purchase of road making equipment and that "[the] 
States will be able to use these funds as they think necessary in either 
urban or rural areas". 
In elaborating on this part of the legislation the Treasurer, 
(^7 
(Mr. Fadden) indicated that while "[many] urgent representations ..." 
had been made to the Commonwealth by Local Authorities concerning the 
allocation of Commonwealth funds by the States for Local Authority roads, 
it was the view of his government that this was not a matter for 
Commonwealth intervention. It was a matter for the States to determine 
how road funds under each of the grants should be spent, and that it was 
"... for the local authorities to deal with the State Governments 
themselves and not with the Australian Government". 
From the Opposition's point of view the major weakness of the 
Act was that it represented a return to a situation of almost complete 
discretion to the States in the determination of the use of Commonwealth 
road funds. The 1950 Act operated for four years. It was then 
replaced by the Commonwealth Aid Roads Act 1954, The new Act increased the 
size of the road grant component of the petrol tax to 5,83 cents (7 d) 
a gallon on all petrol. It also increased the minimum proportion 
earmarked for expenditure on minor rural roads to 40 percent of the total 
grant. 
The government's decision to equalise the road grant tax on 
domestically refined and imported petrol was partly a consequence of the 
change, since 1950, in the relative importance of the two sources of fuel 
for the Australian market. It was stated: 
".,,that unless some action were taken, the increase in the 
local refining of petrol would adversely affect the grants 
to the States in the current financial year".69 
66. Ibid., pp. 2702-2703. 
67. Ibid., p. 2703. 
68, Ibid, 
69, Ibid,, 14th October, 1954, p. 1995. 
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As well as this the decision to increase the level of assistance to the 
States was probably influenced by the Labor Party's pledge during the 1951 
Federal election campaign to return all petrol tax revenues to the States 
for road purposes. 
The new Act also reduced the amount which could be spent at the 
discretion of the States for transport purposes other than roads, to a 
70 fixed amount of $2m per annum. Further, steps were taken to tighten 
the wording of Clause 9 of the previous Act which required the States 
to furnish to the Commonwealth audited statements of the expenditure of 
71 Commonwealth aid road funds. The reason for the change in wording was 
that some of the States, notably Queensland and Western Australia, had 
apparently not complied with the spirit of previous Commonwealth 
72 legislation, by either shifting part of their own funds into consolidated 
revenue, and/or incurring substantial surpluses in their accounts, part 
of which, it was alleged, in the case of Queensland, had been used to 
70. Commonwealth Aid Roads Act, No. 57 of 1954, Clause (4) 
71 The new Clause (Clause 11) of the Act states: 
"Payment of an amount to a State under section nine of this Act is 
subject to the condition that the State will, as soon as practicable 
after the thirtieth day of June in each year, submit to the Minister -
(a) a statement, in accordance with a form a.pproved by the Minister 
of the expenditure by the State out of that amount in that year; and 
(b) a certificate by the Auditor-General for the State that amounts 
shown by the statement as expended have been expended by the State 
and that the expenditure has been in accordance with this Act." 
72. The Prime Minister, [Mr Menzies] in introducing the 1954 Commonwealth 
Aid Roads Bill stated that: 
" the aim of the Government in introducing this new legislation 
is to help provide Australia with better roads. To do this, we 
propose to pay these higher grants to the States ., [and that] the 
purpose of the additional grants is to facilitate the improvement of 
Australia's roads not to relieve the States of the need to make the 
maximum contribution to roads out of their own resources. In other 
words, the Bill is designed to increase the amount spent on roads, 
not merely to redistribute the cost of roads between the Commonwealth 
and the States" 
CP.D. . 14th October, 1954, p. 2000. 
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73 74 
purchase Commonwealth Bonds. * 
The 1954 Act was amended in 1956 to provide for an increase 
in the basic road grant by raising the earmarked roads component of the 
petrol tax to 6.6 cents (8 ) per gallon. A year later, following a 
decision by the Commonwealth to impose a tax of 0.83 cents (12 ) per gallon 
on automobile diesel fuel, the Commonwealth brought down an interim 
measure entitled the Commonwealth Aid Roads (Special Assistance) Act; 
1457 for the purpose of making available to the States further financial 
assistance for road works and for other purposes such as the purchase 
of road making plant. It was anticipated that this measure would enable 
the Commonwealth to provide an additional $6m. for each of the remaining 
years of the 1954 Roads Act. Last, it should also be noted that the 
determination of the distribution of the grant among the States was not 
.arrived at by applying the existing formula. Instead, the apportionment 
75 
was made on some other, but unspecified, arbitrary basis. 
73. See for example, ibid.. pp. 2093 and 2097 and p. 2111. In reference 
to the case of Queensland, it was also claimed by one member of the 
Government, (Mr. .Adermann), that only part of the 35 percent grant 
for minor rural roads had been used for such purposes (estimated 
by Aldermann at less than 20 percent) and that the remainder had 
been used to meet Local Authority indebtedness to the State Treasury. 
Ibid., 19th October, 1954, p. 2094. 
74. Some members of the Government suggested that Clause 11 should be 
strengthened by requiring that a State not be allowed to show an un-
expended balance in excess of a specified amount. Specifically, it 
was argued that provision be made " for a carrying forward of a 
b^aaice of 5 or 10 percent, and that any unexpended balance in excess 
of that amount should be considered to be the property of the 
Australian Government". Ibid., p. 2112. 
75. The following table shows the distribution (estimated) of the grant 
among the States for the year 1957-58. 
$'000 
New South Wales 1,600 
Victoria 1,400 
Queensland 1,000 
South Australia 650 
Western Australia 950 
Tasmania 300 
Commonwealth Purposes 100 
6,000 
Source; Ibid., 6th November, 1957, p. 1871. 
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In 1959 the Menzies Government introduced a new five year 
Commonwealth Aid Roads Act which, in addition to providing for a 
substantial increase in Commonwealth road grants, altered in three 
important respects the existing basis of Commonwealth financial assistance 
for roads. First, the Act discontinued the practice adopted since 1931 
of relating the size of the Commonwealth road grants to petrol tax 
revenues. In place of this, provision was made for the allocation of 
specified annual sums to be paid to the States - a practice, which as 
already observed, the Commonwealth had adopted during the early 1920's. 
Second, the formula used for the determination of the distribution of 
Commonwealth road grants among the States was amended to include motor 
vehicle registrations as a third and equally weighted element. After 
allocating Tasmania 5 percent of the grant, the remainder was to be 
apportioned on the basis of 1/3 according to area, 1/3 according to 
population and 1/3 according to motor vehicles registered. Third, the 
Act provided for the re-introduction of a matching grant requirement -
a principle, which it will again be recalled, was a feature of the 1922, 
1925 and 1926 Commonwealth Road Acts, and rescinded by the Scullin Labor 
Government in 1931, However, in contrast to this earlier legislation the 
matching requirements in the 1959 Act did not, for obvious reasons, 
apply to the entire Commonwealth Grant. The 1959 Act provided that the 
Commonwealth make available to the States over the five year period 
1959-1964 a basic grant of $440m and an additional grant of $60m to be 
made available: 
" on the basis of £1 for every £1 allocated by the State 
governments from their own resources for expenditure on roads 
over and above the amounts allocated by them for roads 
expenditure in the current financial year, 1958-59."76 
76. Ibid., 28th April, 1959. p. 1623, 
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No change was made to the 40 percent rural roads provision of the previous 
Act, while separate provision was made for expenditure on roads 
serving Commonwealth purposes and for expenditure on road safety 
The explanation offered by the Government for the breaking 
of the formal link between petrol tax revenues and Commonwealth, road 
grants was that: (a) no Commonwealth Government had ever accepted the 
claim that " since petrol taxation is paid by motorists the whole 
77 proceeds of petrol tax should be spent on roads" ; (b) the above claim 
was, in any case, defective, because a large proportion of petrol tax is 
generated from petrol consumed by commercial and industrial transportation, 
78 
and that as a consequence, the " public at large" is likely to meet 
a sizeable part of the tax in the form of higher prices for transportation 
and commodities; (c) to hypothecate the proceeds of any one tax for a 
79 particular type of expenditure is contrary to good budgetary practice ; 
(d) from a road planning point of view it is far better that the grants 
be made available to the States on the basis of specific amounts rather 
than having them fluctuate year by year according to variations in petrol 
consumption. 
As far as the reintroduction of a matching grant provision is 
concerned, this reflected the Commonwealth's view that the States were 
capable of making a greater contribution to the total road budget from 
their own sources of revenue. The matching grant provision was thus 
intended to provide the States with an incentive to increase their 
financial effort. Moreover, it was in line with the principle expressed 
previously by the Menzies Government that the major responsibility for 
77 Ibid.. p. 1626. 
78, Ibid, 
79. As stated by the Treasurer, Mr. H, Holt: 
"To do so cuts across the fundamental budgetary principle that all 
government receipts should be paid into a common account from 
which particular expenditure can be met only with the approval of 
the Parliament under annual votes or special appropriations". Ibid. 
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the funding of roads rested with the States and Local Authorities and 
that the Commonwealth's role was one of co-operating with the States 
by providing supplementary finance. 
The change in the formula for determining the distribution of 
Commonwealth road grants among the States came as no surprise. For a 
number of years the Victorian and New South Wales Governments, especially 
the former, and Commonwealth Parliament representatives from those 
States, irrespective of political allegiance, had contended that the 
reasons advanced in favour of the population/area formula were by no 
means as cogent as they might have been in earlier days - in particular 
that post-war developments in manufacturing industry and consequent growth 
in private and commercial road transport had imposed exceptionally heavy 
demands on their respective road systems, It was for this reason that 
the Commonwealth conceded that some indicator of motor vehicle usage 
namely, motor vehicle registrations should be incorporated in the 
formula. No reasons were given for the weighting system adopted: one . 
can only suppose that its appeal to the Commonwealth was based on what it 
thought was "reasonable" and "just" and acceptable to the majority of 
the States, 
The 1959 Act was replaced in 1964 by a similar Act which 
operated from July of that year to July, 1969. Total payments to the 
States were increased by fifty percent to $750m of which $660m was 
designated as the basic grant and $90m as the additional grant subject 
to matching conditions. The States were required to make a $1 for $1 
contribution over and above the sums, which in 1963-64, they were 
required to raise from their own resources, in order to qualify for the 
total additional grants available in that year The not-less-than 
forty percent rural road provision was also retained. 
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3. Other Commonwealth .Assistance for Roads 
The Commonwealth had also provided grants to the States 
for special road purposes. Thus, for example, part of the financial 
assistance provided under the State Grants (Encouragement of Meat 
Production) Act 1949-54 was used for road purposes to facilitate the 
movement of cattle. Further, between 1961 and 1977 the Commonwealth 
provided, under the terms of the Beef Cattle Grants Acts, substantial 
funding for the construction of beef cattle roads, mainly in Queensland 
and Western Australia. During the period of the first Beef Roads 
Act (1961-1967) Queensland and Western Australia received $29m. The 
grant was increased to $50m for the period 1967-1974. Queensland was 
the only State to be allocated funds for beef roads under the terms of 
the 1974 Beef Roads Act, which provided a grant of $24m. 
4. Commonwealth Roads Policy - Labor's Attitude 1947-1969 
As already mentioned. Labor's attitude to the role the 
Commonwealth should play in the financing and the planning of road works 
first showed signs of shifting from the stance adopted before the Second 
World War Period when, in 1947, the Chifley Government decided 
that State road programmes involving the use of Commonwealth funds should 
be submitted to the Commonwealth for approval after consultation with 
the Transport Advisory Council. By 1957 Labor had adopted a strong 
stand in favour of increasing Commonwealth responsibility with 
regard to the determination of the use of Commonwealth road funds. It 
also argued for the need for the Commonwealth to put into effect a 
national roads plan, and stressed the importance of establishing a national 
transport authority which would have responsibility for co-ordinating 
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80 transport planning in general. In addition (and as already observed) 
Labor was also advocating that all petrol tax receipts should be directed 
to the roads budget. 
The case for earmarking the entire proceeds of the petrol tax 
for road purposes - apart from its likely political appeal - was presented 
by Labor on two main grounds: (i) that as a method of funding road 
budgets the petrol tax represented ".... the best means available of 
apportioning charges for road use to the actual benefits received by 
81 
each road user" and (ii) that the ability of the States to impose 
road user charges had been reduced considerably as a result of the High 
82 
Court's ruling in 1954 and 1955 in the Hughes and Vale case, and in a 
83 
number of subsequent cases. Briefly, the litigation involved a change 
80. The initial response by the Liberal/Country Party Government to 
Labor's claim that the Commonwealth should establish both a national 
roads plan and a national roads authority is illustrated by the 
following extract from a letter dated 19th November, 1957 and 
addressed to the member for Batman, Mr. Bird (ALP) by Senator 
Paltridge, Minister for Shipping and Transport. 
"Such a development of a national roads plan could only be successful 
if a wide measure of agreement between States is forthcoming. However, 
with States anxious to preserve their rights to determine how they 
shall spend finance available to them on roads within their States, 
it is considered that the establishment of a national roads authority 
widely respresentative of roads construction authorities and road 
users is not a practical concept". 
Ibid., 29th November, 1957, p. 2362. 
And again, in introducing the 1959 Commonwealth Aid Roads Bill -to the 
Parliament, the Treasurer, Mr. Holt, commented: 
"Much has been said about the need for national planning of roads, 
but that conception can of course be taken to mean many different 
things. We [i.e. the Federal/Liberal Country Party Government] 
understand, in any case, that there do exist the essentials of a 
national roads scheme in the sense that each State has a formal 
programme of road construction. Moreover, the competent authorities 
of the States consult from time to time on matters requiring inter-; 
state co-operation, and roads policy is also dealt with by the 
Australian Transport Advisory Council, which meets under Common-
wealth Chairmanship". 
Ibid., 28th April, 1959, p. 1627. 
81. Ibid., 29th April, p. 1645. 
82. (i) Hughes and Vale Pty.Ltd. v. New South Wales (1954), 93, C.L.R. 1. 
(ii) Hughes and Vale Pty.Ltd. v. New South Wales (No. 2) (1955) 93 
C.L.R., 127. 
83. A detailed review of s92 litigation and the "Transport Cases" is 
provided in Chapter 11. 
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in the High Court's interpretation of the nature of the charges which a 
State could impose on road hauliers engaged in inter-state transactions. 
The upshot of the Court's deliberations was that the States were only 
allowed to impose a roads maintenance tax. 
The argument that the Commonwealth should have a greater 
influence in the formulation and implementation of roads policy was 
predicated on the following: (i) that governments responsible for raising 
taxes should be responsible for the manner in which those taxes are 
84 
spent and (ii) that it was the Commonwealth's responsibility to 
overcome the problem of co-ordinating the road construction and 
maintenance decisions of the separate and entirely independent road 
authorities. In the words of E.G. Whitlam, the then Deputy Leader of 
the Labor Party: 
"No State Government has the power to make a recalcitrant 
neighbour link up its highways in an acceptable manner or 
maintain that link acceptable once it had been established. 
Similarly, local government authorities cannot compel each 
other to harmonise their road making activity- In some 
instances roads are terminanted by shire boundaries; in 
others the shire boundary can be identified by a complete 
change in road surface. 
The Commonwealth must insist on co-ordination between the road 
systems which it finances. The Commonwealth is the only 
authority in Australia which is equipped to impose patterns 
of rational conduct and co-ordination upon the nation's 
disparate and desperate road makers."^5 
What the Labor Party had in mind was that the Commonwealth 
should at least assume responsibility - using its powers under section 
96 and placitum (1) of section 51 of the Constitution - for the funding 
and planning of the major inter-urban and interstate road system in 
84. See for example, C.P.D,, (House of Representatives) 1964, pp. 1410-1411, 
Also, Whitlam, E.G., "Planning National Transport", The Australian 
Quarterly, September 1968, p, 49. 
85. Whitlam, E,G,, ibid., p, 48, 
86. Section 51 (i) of the Constitution states: "The Parliament shall, 
subject to the Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, 
order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:-
(i) Trade and Commerce with other countries and among the States" 
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much the same way that its counterpart in other federal systems, such 
87 88 
as the U.S.A. and Canada, had done. ' 
Finally, as to the wider issue of Commonwealth intervention 
in the planning and regulation of transport as a whole it was 
Labor's view that the Commonwealth should invoke its powers under 
89 Section 101 of the Constitution and resurrect the Inter-State 
Commission, a body which had been established in 1912 but allowed to 
expire in 1920. With this powerj (and those mentioned earlier) together 
with those granted to the Commonwealth under Section 98 of the 
Constitution which extends the Commonwealth's trade and commerce powers 
to include the making of laws with respect to "... navigation and 
shipping and railways", and Section 104 which specifies the criteria to 
be adopted by the Inter-State Commission with regard to railway rate 
87. For example, it was suggested by Mr. Whitlam in 1957 that: 
"... the constitutional and responsible attitude to take is that, 
in the interests of trade and commerce between the states, the 
Commonwealth should, firstly allocate the whole of the petrol 
tax ... to the construction of roads, and secondly, earmark the 
balance of that tax, which the States do not get at present, for 
the construction of interstate highways and inter capital highways..." 
C.P.D. [House of Representatives], 20th November, 1957, p. 2367. 
And again, in 1968: 
"The rate at which fuel taxes are levied should represent an economic 
charge on road users for their use of the permanent way. Providing 
no additional levy is imposed for general revenue purposes, taxation 
on this basis will serve to correct distortions in the current 
structure of road charges arising from a relative immunity from 
permanent way charges", Whitlam, E.G., "Planning National Transport", 
op.cit., p. 48. 
88. That the States were not always anxious to develop important inter-
urban roads is illustrated by the New South Wales Government's 
neglect of the Hume Highway, the major road link between the capital 
cities of Sydney and Melbourne. Upgrading the standard of this road 
[especially after the High Court's decision in the Hughes and Vales 
case (see Chapter 11)] would have further reduced the competitive 
position of the State's railway authority. 
89. Section 101 states: 
"There shall be an InteisState Commission, with such powers of 
adjudication and administration as the Parliament deems necessary for 
the execution and maintenance, within the Commonwealth of this 
Constitution relating to trade and commerce, and of all laws thereunder." 
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90 
regulation. Labor contended that the Commonwealth was clearly in a 
position "... to bring about the effective co-ordination of Australian 
transport services along lines dictated by economic efficiency and 
91 
social advantage". 
5, Stmimary 
TTie history of Comjnonwealth Government involvement in the 
Australian road supply sector during the period from 1922 to the 
late 'sixties indicates that, by and large, the Commonwealth saw its 
role in this area as a provider of road funds to the States, with the 
latter making the major decisions as to how those funds would be spent. 
The Chapter draws attention to the policy decisions taken with 
respect to: (i) the determination of the size of Commonwealth road grants 
(ii) the rules-of-thumb used to apportion grants among the States, and 
(iii) the use of matching grant arrangements. 
Attention is also focused on the roads policy advocated by 
the Federal Labor Party during the post Second World War period. 
90. Section 104 allows that: 
"Nothing in this Constitution shall render unlawful any rate for 
the carriage of goods upon a railway, the property of a State, if 
the rate is deemed by the Inter-State Commission to be necessary 
for the development of the territory of the State and, if the rate 
applies equally to all goods within the State and to goods passing 
into the State from other States." 
91. Whitlam, E.G., "Planning National Transport", op.cit., p. 46. See 
also C.P.D., [House of Representatives] on Commonwealth Aid Roads 
Legislation from 1957 to 1969. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE ROLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH 1969 TO 1980 
1. Introduction 
One of the problems faced by the Commonwealth Government during 
the period just considered was that it had very little information to 
assist it in determining the extent of the nation's need for road space 
and the contribution it should make towards meeting that need. The 
desire for better quality information assumed greater importance as the 
Commonwealth's financial commitment increased substantially during the 
late 'fifties. As a consequence the Liberal/Country Party Government 
enacted legislation in 1964 for the establishment of the Commonwealth 
Bureau of Roads as a statutory authority which, inter alia,was given 
the task: 
"To investigate, and from time to time report to the minister 
on matters relating to roads or road transport for the purpose 
of assisting the Government of the Commonwealth in consideration 
by the Government of the grant of financial assistance by the 
Parliament to the states in connection with roads or road 
transport."2 
The Bureau of Roads was constituted in February 1966 and 
presented its first Report to the Commonwealth Government prior to the 
expiration of the 1964 Commonwealth Aid Roads Act. Other Reports were 
1. As stated by a former Minister for Shipping and Transport, Mr. Freeth: 
" the Com.monwealth has great and growing responsibilities for the 
financing of roads. Up to the present, however, the Commonwealth 
Government has found itself in the position of having to discharge 
these responsibilities without having available to it data which 
is fully adequate for its purposes. We do receive a great deal of 
information and advice from authorities and organisations concerned 
with roads and road transport. We have official statistics and we 
obtain the views and assessments of the States. Inevitably, however, 
this falls short of what we require. Necessarily, the views and 
representations put to us stress particular - and, in the nature of 
the case sectional - aspects of the problem. But the Commonwealth 
must be in a position to make a competent and reliable appraisal of 
its own," 
C.P.D. [House of Representatives] 20th May, 1964, p, 2137 
2. Section 14(a) of the Commonwealth Bureau of Roads Act, 1964, 
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made in 1973 and 1975. A Report was also produced by the Bureau of 
Transport Economics in 1979. We now turn to a consideration of the 
advice tended to the Commonwealth Government by the above advisory 
bodies and the subsequent Commonwealth roads legislation. 
2. The 1969 Commonwealth Bureau of Roads Report and the 1969 C.A.R. Act 
The significance of the Commonwealth Bureau of Roads 1969 
Report is that the recommendations contained therein were the outcome 
of an attempt (indeed, the first attempt in Australia) to apply economic 
criteria to an analysis of Australia's road needs, and in particular, to 
Commonwealth financial policy in this area. The main features of the 
Bureau's approach are outlined below. 
During 1967/68 the Bureau conducted a survey of Australian 
road conditions in co-operation with the National Association of 
3 
Australian State Road Authorities (N.A.A.S.R.A,) The survey had three 
objectives; first, to provide an inventory (as at June 1969) of bridges, 
roads and road systems throughout Australia; second, to assess the 
3. The results of earlier surveys, carried out by N.A.A.S.R.A., of 
Australia's road needs for the period 1960-1970 and 1964-1974 were 
not accepted by the Commonwealth Government. The estimates of road 
needs were criticised mainly on the grounds that: 
"(a) Uniform standards and specifications were not used 
in the survey in each State and mainland territory. 
(b) No account was taken of the physical problems of 
undertaking the amoxmt of work involved in meeting 
the postulated needs. 
(c) Various methods were used to distribute the backlog 
of work over the period in different States and main-
land territories. 
(d) The Commonwealth was not provided with sufficient 
information to analyse the basis on which the estimates 
had been made. 
In addition the Commonwealth did not accept the estimates of 
N.A.A.S.R.A. as to the revenue which might be devoted by the 
States to road purposes during this period [and hence] the 
magnitude of the necessary Commonwealth road grants." 
Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, "Conduct of the Australian Roads Survey, 
1967-68", Associated Bureau Papers, No. 12, p. 11. 
4. Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, "Results of the Australian Road Survey, 
1967-1968", Associated Bureau Papers, No. 13, p. 15, 
150, 
physical characteristics of roads, bridges and road systems and to 
compare them with selected technical standards (referred to as 
tolerability standards) based on operational, safety and structural 
criteria; third, to record and estimate the cost of road construction 
and maintenance projects which would be needed in order to meet the 
designated levels of service for the above mentioned years. The 
overall survey was divided into three separate surveys: (i) a rural 
and provincial urban survey; (ii) a capital cities survey; and 
(iii) a major provincial city survey. 
2A Rural and Provincial Urban Survey 
The main aspects of the rural and provincial urban survey 
were: 
(a) classification of each road by functional class. Five 
functional classes were identified: (i) inter-regional 
(ii) through (iii) connecting and distributing (iv) land 
access, and (v) special purpose; 
(b) sub-division of each road into sections having uniform 
physical and traffic conditions; 
(c) compilation of a road inventory; 
(d) determination of the structural condition of each section of 
road and bridge within the survey period; 
(e) provision of estimates of current traffic volumes for each 
section of road, and forecasting, using a traffic growth index 
of the volume of traffic from June, 1969 to June, 1979; 
See for example 
(a) Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, "Conduct of the Australian Roads 
Survey, 1969-68", op,cit., p, 13, 
(b) Fisher, N,W,F. et al., "The Application and Development of the 
Rural Roads Evaluation Model Merri", A.R.R.B., Vol, 5, Part I, 
Fifth Conference, Canberra, 1970. 
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(f) determination of the nature of the improvements and the costs 
of introducing the improvements for sections of roads and for 
bridges deemed to be deficient; and finally, 
(f) the recording of cost and improvement data for deficient 
road sections and bridges. 
The principal criteria used in the survey for identifying 
deficiencies were: (i) width of road or bridge (ii) nature of road 
surface (iii) safe travel speed (iv) traffic volume and (v) structural 
adequacy of bridge or road. To enable application of these criteria the 
7 
survey employed a set of tolerability standards Tables 7.0 and 7.1 
below summarise those standards respectively, for rural roads, for 
safe travel speed by class of road and type of terrain;, and for road 
and bridge width by class of road and current year traffic volimes. 
TABLE 7.0 Tolerability Standards for Safe Travel Speed, 
Roads in Rural and Provincial Urban Areas 
Area Class 
Rural 
Provincial 
Urban 
Functional 
Class of 
Roads 
1,2 
3 
4 
6,7 
8 
9 
2 
Tolerable Safe Travel Speed in Miles Per Hour . 
Flat 
Terrain 
50 
45 
35 
Undulating 
Terrain 
45 
35 
25 
Hilly or 
Mountainous 
Terrain 
35 
25 
20 
20 for all terrain types 
Not applicable 
15 for all terrain types 
Notes; 1. Safe travel speed was defined as that speed which would be 
adopted in the prevailing traffic conditions by a 
conscientious, experienced, law abiding driver, unfamiliar 
with the locality, so that he could travel the road concerned 
correctly positioned on the roadway and in confidence that 
traffic situations likely to arise could be handled calmly, 
2. These standards did not apply where speed limits were imposed. 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, "Tolerability Standards and Level 
of Service", Associated Bureau Papers, No. 11, p. 22. 
6. Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, "Conduct of the Australian Roads Survey 
1967-68", op.cit,, p. 13. 
7 Sec N,A.A,S,R.A,, Road Needs Survey 1969-1979, Rural and Provincial 
Urban Areas, General Specification, or Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, 
"Tolerability Standards and Level of Service", Associated Bureau 
Papers, No. 11. 
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TABLE 7.1 Tolerability Standards for Pavement and Bridge Widths 
for Rural Roads 
Functional 
Class of 
Road 
1-5 
Current Year 
Traffic Volume 
(A.A.D.TJ 
10-25 
25-100 
100-140 
140-300 
300-1100 
1100-2200 
2200-4000 
4000-8000 
Above 800 
Tolerable Width^ 
of Pavement2 
Formation only 
16 ft. gravel 
12 ft. seal 
16 ft. seal 
18 ft. seal 
20 ft. seal 
22 ft. seal 
24 ft. seal 
Multi-lane 
Tolerable Width 
of Bridge 
12 ft. 
12 ft. 
18 ft. 
18 ft. 
20 ft. 
22 ft. 
24 ft. 
26 ft. 
Multi-lane 
Notes: 1. Widths excluded any provision for parking, 
2. The minimum tolerable shoulder width was 4 ft. except 
for the 4000-8000 traffic volume range which was 6 ft. width. 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, "Tolerability Standards and Level 
of Service", Associated Bureau Papers, No. 11, p. 22. 
In addition to the above standards a number of general rules 
were also specified for the purpose of determining whether or not the 
condition of a road or bridge was intolerable. These rules related to 
such matters as drainage conditions; geometric design speeds; design 
widths; surface conditions and so on. Thus, for example, sealing of a 
road surface was deemed to be warranted (i) if average annual daily 
traffic (A.A.D,T.) exceed 100 vehicles per day (v.p,d.) or, (ii) because 
of shortages of materials, or for other reasons the maintenance of an 
unsealed road having an A.A.D.T of less than 100 v.p.d. was judged to 
8 be excessive, or (iii) because of the nature of dust conditions. 
Finally, with regard to structural conditions, the survey relied on the 
experience of the engineers inspecting the roads as the basis for 
determining whether or not such conditions were tolerable. 
8, Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, "Conduct of the Australian Roads Survey, 
1967-68", op,cit,, p. 48. 
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2.2 Capital Cities Survey 
While the objectives of the capital cities survey were broadly 
the same as those for the rural and provincial urban survey the 
tolerability standards applied in each case were, as a general rule, 
based on different criteria. Tolerability conditions were defined as: 
" c those under which a road or bridge, or a system of roads, 
would be useable without reconstruction, provided that its 
continued use would not result in:-
(a) undue delay or inconvenience to road users - an 
operational criterion; 
(b) unacceptable safety conditions - a safety criterion; 
9 
(c) uneconomical maintenance - a structural criterion". 
A road was deemed to be below the acceptable standard if any one of the 
above conditions was not satisfied. 
As in the case of the rural roads survey a number of standards 
were adopted for the purpose of identifying deficiencies. These included 
such factors as the ability of vehicles to move at a "reasonable 
speed"; delays incurred at a particular location; the frequency with 
which vehicles were required to stop; the regularity of travel time; 
exposure to accidents; and the structural conditions of pavements. 
The majority of these factors relate to operation deficiencies, 
and as a consequence, the bulk of the survey effort was directed to 
identifying such deficiencies as they occurred during the peak demand 
travel periods. The survey was confined to arterial and sub-arterial 
roads and a 30 minute peak period was chosen as ". the shortest period 
likely to give consistent and reliable results from field studies". 
Criteria for identifying operational deficiencies were as follows: 
9. Ibid., p. 18. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid., p, 19. 
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First, a saturation ratio of 0.80 was chosen for the purpose 
of specifying a limit of tolerable conditions at intersections. The 
degree of saturation was measured by the ratio of traffic volume to 
capacity This measure was chosen as a criterion for identifying 
11a 
operational deficiencies because research findings show 
that it encompasses a number of operational criteria such as queue 
lengths, maximum delay, and frequency of stopping. Likewise the 0.80 
limit was chosen for the reason that: 
"when the degree of saturation of an approach road to an 
intersection is in the range of 80 to 85 percent of its 
capacity the length of delays for such further increase 
of volume increase rapidly, and the instability of the 
delay increases even more markedly. For traffic volumes 
above 80 percent capacity, the effects of relatively 
minor breakdowns or disturbances to traffic flows can also 
produce extended delays."12 
Second, a tolerable standard for overall travel speeds during 
the peak was specified at 20 m.p.h. This was arrived at by utilising 
data on the average spacing of major urban intersections and employing 
the above mentioned criterion for acceptable intersection operations. 
Third, traffic density (i.e. vehicles per lane mile) was used as a 
criterion for identifying roads with high traffic volumes on which 
operational deficiencies might exist. The identification of such roads 
was facilitated by means of aerial photography 
In addition to the above, criteria were also adopted for 
identifying environmental deficiencies, as well as those relating to 
safety and structural characteristics. With regard to the former it 
was contended: (i) that " [in] areas bounded by arterial and sub-
arterial roads, streets (other than arterial and sub-arterial roads) 
13 
which carried significant amounts of through traffic" were environmentally 
deficient, and (ii) that in medium to low density residential areas, 
11a. Ibid^ ~~ 
12. Ibid. 
13, Ibid, 
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streets which carried 1,500 v.p.d. were also environmentally deficient. 
Once a street was identified as being environmentally deficient, no 
14 
additional operational studies were carried out for that street. 
As far as structural deficiencies were concerned the survey 
employed a similar approach to that used in the rural and provincial 
city survey. In this case a panel of engineers (including an engineer 
from the Bureau of Roads) was established for each city. The task 
of the panel was to make a group assessment, based on the experience of 
each member, of the appropriateness of the structural characteristics 
of the roads examined with respect to present, and estimated future 
traffic conditions. 
Safety deficiencies were based on data relating to casualty 
accidents for each of the capital cities for the period 1964-1966. 
Accidents were classified as follows: (i) pedestrian accidents (ii) single 
vehicle accidents (iii) multi-vehicle accidents, (iv) other types. The 
data were analysed and the number of accidents and accident rates compared 
with tolerability standards. 
Once deficiencies for each of the categories - operational and 
environmental, safety and structural were identified, "solutions" were 
proposed and estimates of the cost of their implementation 
17 determined. 
A comparison of the criteria employed in each of the surveys 
considered is provided in Table 7.2 below. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, "Tolerability Standards and Level of 
Service", op.cit., p. 16. 
17. For a statement of the nature of the surve>-, design and details 
of the separate studies which were included in the survey the reader 
is referred to: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, "Conduct of the 
Australian Roads Survey, 1967-68", op.cit., pp. 21-51. 
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TABLE 7.2 Comparison of Criteria for Identifying Deficiencies for Rural 
and Provincial Urban Survey with those for the Capital Cities 
Survey 
( " 
Determinant 
Operations 
Structural 
Safety 
Environment 
Special 
Problems 
Rural and Provincial 
Urban Survey Criteria 
Routes 
. Safe travel speed 
. Tolerable widths and 
A.A.D.T, 
Intersections 
No specific provisions 
Roads and Bridges 
. Judgment of Relevant 
Authority 
Routes and Intersections 
No specific provisions 
No specific provisions 
No specific provisions 
1 
Capital Cities 1 
Survey Criteria [ 
i 
Routes ! 
. Peak period traffic j 
density 
. Peak period travel speed 
Intersections 
. Peak period traffic 
density 
. Peak period delay 
. Peak period load factor 
. Peak period volume/ 
capacity ratio 
Roads and Bridges 
. Judgment of Structural 
Panel 
Routes and Intersections 
. Casualty accident rates 
ResidentialJ CBD Areas^ etc. 
. Through traffic 
Rail Level Crossings 
. Peak period volume/ 
period capacity ratio 
Central City Area 
. Through traffic 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, "Conduct of the Australian Roads 
Survey, 1967-68", Associated Bureau Papers, No. 12, Appendix 3, 
p. 67. 
2. 3 Major Provincial Cities Survey 
As indicated, surveys of road deficiencies were also carried 
out for the major provincial cities. These were defined as those 
provincial cities having populations of 40,000 persons or more as at 
June 1966. For two cities, Wollongong and Newcastle whose populations 
exceeded 150,000 and were increasing at a fairly rapid rate the Capital 
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Cities Survey procedures were adopted with minor modifications. 
However, since the traffic problems of the remaining cities were" 
not of the same order of severity other survey procedures were 
developed . These procedures were derived from the Capital Cities 
Survey. 
2.4 Evaluation Procedures and Recommendations 
As a result of the Survey it was estimated that something like 
80,000 road projects at a cost of $7,852m (1967 prices) would be required 
if the Australian road system was to be raised to the specified 
tolerability standards during the period 1969-74. Since there was no 
guarantee that each of the projects selected according to the above 
criteria would generate economic benefits >^  economic costs, and since 
it was also clear that such a programme of expenditure would not be 
feasible in political terms,the next stage in the Bureau's analysis 
was to formulate an economically warranted and feasible programme of 
road expenditure. This involved two major steps: 
(i) an assessment of the economic worth of each of the 
identified road projects ; ajid 
(ii) the simulation of financial, technical and other constraints. 
Because of the large number of projects and the need for 
flexibility, the evaluation process involved the use of a computer 
based programme referred to as the Scheduling Programme: Given the 
data obtained by the Survey, together with information concerning the 
above mentioned constraints, the Scheduling Programme enabled the Bureau 
to determine an optimum programme of expenditure by States and 
Territories; by geographif-al areas within a State; and by different 
classes of roads. The details of the Scheduling Programme are discussed 
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18 19 2n 
in papers by Fisher, et al., Thompson, et al,, and elsewhere. 
According to the Bureau's investigations a major factor in 
determining a feasible programme of road expenditure during the period 
1969-74 was the " >,, availability of professional, technical and 
21 
supervisory personnel" Data supplied by each of the State main 
22 
roads authorities led to the conclusion that an upper limit to road 
expenditure during the period considered would be of the order of 
$3,300m - $3,800m (1967 prices) ^ ^ 
Projects were ranked according to benefit cost ratios 
using discount rates within the range of 7 to 11 percent. Allowance 
was also made for expenditure on maintenance and administration 
(estimated at $l,100m at 1967 prices), and for existing and likely 
Commonwealth commitments, such as grants for beef cattle roads. 
Commonwealth access roads and for sub divisional roads on Crown lands in 
Commonwealth territories (estimated at $83m in 1967 prices) The 
results of the economic evaluations, together with the above commitments, 
indicated that the bundle of road projects generated using a discount 
rate of 10 percent approximated the lower limit of the previously 
18. Fisher, H.W. et al., "The Application and Development of the Rural 
Roads Evaluation Model - Merri", Australian Road Research Bulletin, 
Vol 5, Part I, Fifth Conference, Canberra, 1970. 
19 Thomson, K.E. et al ,"A Model for the Economic Evaluation of Urban 
Road Projects", Australian Road Research Bulletin, Vol. 5, Part 2, 
Fifth Conference, Canberra, 1970 
20. Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, "Economic Evaluation of Road Improve-
ments - Principles and Procedures", Associated Bureau Papers, No. 20. 
21. Commonwealth Bureau of Roads Report, 20th January 1969, para 1.8. 
22. The State Main Roads Departments indicated that it would be possible 
to increase their expenditure at about 6-10 percent per annum without 
seriously affecting their rates of pay or contract rates. These 
rates were then applied by the Bureau to proposed road works to 
determine a feasible upper limit to total road expenditure. 
Ibid. 
23. The Bureau also made an assessment of the likely level of a feasible 
road expenditure programme using the scheduling programme "... and 
based on the estimated availability and optimum utilisations of 
professional and technical personnel". Ibid. 
This assessment resulted in a figure of $4,20um as a maximum feasible 
level of road expenditure for the period. 
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determined feasible level of road expenditure. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 
indicate respectively: (i) warranted expenditure (i.e. on economic 
grounds) on construction and reconstruction for rural and urban roads 
at various discount rates, given maintenance and administration and 
other Commonwealth commitments, and (ii) the distribution of warranted 
and feasible expenditure (using a 10 percent discount rate) among the 
States and Territories. 
TABLE 7.3 Warranted Expenditure by Road Categories 
Discount 
Rate 
7% 
8% 
10% 
11% 
$ million (1967 prices 
Expenditure Economically 
Warranted on Construction 
and Reconstruction of 
Roads 
Rural 
1262 
1156 
943 
837 
Urban 
1704 
1559 
1268 
1133 
Maintenance 
and 
Administration 
1100 
1100 
1100 
1100 
) 
Other 
Commonwealth 
Commitments 
83 
83 
83 
83 
Total 
4149 
3898 
3394 
3153 
Source; Commonwealth Bureau of Roads Report, 1969, Para. 1.17 
TABLE 7.4 Distribution of Warranted and Feasible Expenditure by 
States and Territories 
State and Territories 
New South Wales 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Western Australia 
Tasmania 
Sub Totals 
Northern Territory 
Australian Capital Territory 
Other Coiranonwealth Commitments 
Totals 
Amount 
$m 
1,264 
758 
612 
236 
257 
132 
3,259 
33 
19 
83 
3,394 
Percentage 
37.2 
22.3 
18.0 
7.0 
7.6 
3,9 
96,0 
1,0 
0.6 
2.4 
100.0 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads Report, 20 January, 1969, Para. 1.20, 
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To determine the extent of Commonwealth aid required, estimates 
were made of the amount of revenue which the States and Local Government 
Authorities would be able to contribute from their own sources (i.e. 
from motor vehicle registration fees, road maintenance taxes, licence 
fees, rate revenues and loans), for the five year period 1969-74, Various 
assumptions were made regarding rates of charges and patterns of 
24 
allocation. For State sources of revenue it was estimated that 
$l,220m (at 1967 prices) would be available for road purposes, while 
for Local Government sources the projected sums amounted to $870m (at 
1967 prices)giving a total of $2,090m, Thus, the Commonwealth's 
contribution to the feasible programme was estimated at $l,300m. This 
in turn represented an increase of 1.8 percentage points of the average of tl;e 
percentage contribution of Commonwealth payments for roads to total 
25 public expenditure on roads for the period 1964/65 to 1967/68. 
Making allowances for future cost rises (assumed to be 2.5 
percent per annum) the $1,300m was adjusted to $1,430m. Of this amount 
it was estimated that $110m would be needed to meet commitments for 
roads in the Australian Capital Territory (A.C.T ) and the Northern 
Territory J $40m to provide for special road grants such as beef 
cattle roads, leaving $l,280m as the recommended grant to the States 
under the Commonwealth Aid Roads (C.A.R.) legislation. This represented 
an increase of 71 percent above the level of grant ($750m) provided 
during the period 1964 to 1969 
24. Specifically: "In the case of road user taxes, charges and fees, the 
continuation of existing rates and patterns of allocation has been 
assumed, but in the case of motor vehicle registration taxes, 
increases of approximately 9 percent in existing rates without 
allowance for possible cost rises have been imputed over the five 
year period", ibid., para 1,32 
25. The average percentage contribution of Commonwealth payments for roads 
(excluding transfer pavments associated with propertv acquisition) to 
total public expenditure on roads for the period 1964/65 to 1967/68, 
is equal to 36.5 percent. Ibid., .Appendix III 
161 
To determine the optimal distribution of the C.A.R. grant 
among the States the Bureau made use of the scheduling programme which, 
as noted earlier, not only ranked projects by benefit/cost ratios but 
also gave explicit recognition to a number of constraints In particular 
the scheduling was designed to simulate: (i) geographical restrictions 
on the use of State and Local Government road finance (ii) the current 
administrative and legislative practices pertaining to the sharing of 
road project costs between the various branches of government (iii) 
the likely time factor involved for the acquisition of property, design 
of projects and construction period and (iv) the availability of technical 
and other resources required for road design and construction. 
Given the feasible level of total road expenditure of $3,390m 
(1967 prices) the scheduling programme generated a schedule of road 
projects: 
" which represented, from the information available the 
best economic patterns of investment in roads, taking into 
account the constraints imposed by the limitations on 
construction and on physical and financial resources in each j - , 
state and in areas within states during the five year period." 
The results of the scheduling programme were classified 
according to four main classes of road expenditure, namely: principal 
rural roads (Group A); other rural roads (Group B); capital and major 
provincial city roads (Group C) and a category of road expenditure 
vvhich included all' expenditure on roads not included under the other 
three groups (Group D) 
The "optimal" distribution of total expenditure among the States, 
by classes of road expenditure, as indicated by the scheduling programme 
is shown in Table 7.5 below. 
26, Ibid., para. 4.12, 
27, Ibid., para. 4 13, 
28, Ibid., para. 4.9. 
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TABLE 7.5 Distribution of Total Road Expenditure (as indicated by the 
Scheduling Programme) for the period 1969-1974 by State and 
Road Expenditure Categories 
Group of Road Expendi ture 
Const ruct ion and Recons t ruc t ion : 
P r i n c i p a l Rural Roads 
Other Rural Roads 
Capi ta l and Major P r o v i n c i a l 
City Roads 
Other Expendi ture : 
Maintenance and Admin i s t r a t ion 
Total 
Percentage 
N.S.W. 
7.2 
4 .6 
13.0 
10.8 
35.6 : 
VIC. 
2 .3 
2.6 
10.0 
8 . o ; 
2 2 . 9 
QLD. 
5.0 
4 .5 
4 .7 
6.0 
2 0 . 2 
S.A. 
1.1 
0 .7 i 
1 ! 
, 3 . 1 1 
i 
5 . 7 : 
8 .6 1 
W.A. 
• 
1.2 
1.6 
1.8 
4 . 0 I 
1 
8 . 6 l 
i TAS. 
0.8 
1.4 
0 . 7 
j j 
1.2 ; 
4 .1 
TOTAL 
17.6 
15.4 
33,3 
33.7 
100.0 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads Report, 1969, para 4.14. 
In formulating its recommendations for the division of the C.A.R. 
grant into road categories,the Bureau adopted the view that the proportions 
indicated in the above Table should only be used as a guide. Two reasons 
were advanced for this approach. It was claimed first, that it would 
seem to be in the national interest for the Commonwealth Government 
to assume a major role with regard to capital road projects "... because 
these works will largely determine the nature and quality of the future 
29 
Australian road systems" and second, that expenditure decisions regarding 
maintenance and minor road projects "... which require day to day local 
30 
attention and local knowledge" should be left to State and Local 
Governments. What the Bureau proposed was that 80 percent of the 
C.A.R. grant should be allocated to expenditure on construction and 
reconstruction (rather than 66.3 percent as indicated by the scheduling 
programme) and further, that the States should be allowed some freedom 
29. Ibid., Para. 4.21. 
30. Ibid., Para. 4.21. 
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as to how the balance of 20 percent should be used in order to " cover 
31 
contingencies and requirements unforeseen in the Australian Roads Survey" 
Of the 20 percent it was suggested that 1.2 percent should be made 
available for research and planning and the remaining 18.8 percent used, 
at the discretion of the States, either on reconstruction, maintenance, 
administration or new works. 
Overall, the Bureau recommended that the C.A.R. grant be 
32 
apportioned in the following manner into five road categories: 
Category A: Expenditure on the construction and reconstruction of 
principal rural roads - 20 percent. 
Category B: Expenditure on the construction and reconstruction of 
other rural roads - 20 percent. 
Category C: Expenditure on the construction and reconstruction of 
roads in capital cities and major provincial cities - 40 
percent. 
Category D: Expenditure on new construction, reconstruction, 
maintenance, administration and works and services related 
to roads - 18.8 percent. 
Category E: Expenditure on planning and research related to roads and 
road transport including public transport - 1.2 percent. 
As far as the Bureau's recommendations regarding the distribution 
of the C.A.R. grant among the States is concerned it was again considered 
necessary to depart from the proportions indicated by the scheduling 
programme. The reasons given for this were: (i) that the adoption of 
the scheduling programme results would have meant accepting a substantial 
decline in the level of assistance to South Australia 
31 Ibid,, Para 4.24. 
32. Ibid.. Para. 4.25 and 4,26, 
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during the first two years of the period when compared with, the level 
of assistance granted in 1968/69, and for Western Australia, a substantial 
decline in assistance over the five year period when compared with the 
33 1968/69 level of assistance ; (ii) that "[the] scheduling programme reflects 
the results of past decisions made by the State and Local Governments concemin 
34 both road expenditure and the provision of road finance" and (iii) that 
while data analysed in the scheduling programme had been". closely 
35 
specified and supervised. " in the urban areas, this had not been 
done to the same degree for rural areas. 
Two alternative distributions were proposed. The first 
alternative (the so-called majority view) recommended that formulae 
be derived which would provide for some averaging of the results 
produced by the scheduling programme and which would, also, provide additional 
finance to those States which would be adversely affected by the 
scheduling programme. Statistical analysis of the correlation between 
the level of road expenditure in each State for each category of roads 
as indicated by the scheduling programme and ", the many factors 
•Zfi 
which could affect the distribution of road needs" led to the following 
37 
recommendations : that 5 percent of the amount allocated to Category A 
roads by the scheduling programme should be made available to Tasmania, 
and the remainder divided among the other States in proportion to their 
length of Category A roads. For Category B roads, it was recomended that 
5 percent be allocated to Tasmania and the remainder divided among the 
other States on the basis of one-half in proportion to area and one-half 
in px-oportion to total population. For Category C roads, it was recommended 
33. Over the five year period it was estimated that South Australia 
would average the same annual roads programme as for 1968/69 while 
Western .Australia would only achieve a programme level of about 60 
percent of its 1968/69 level. Ibid,, para, 4,28(a) 
34. Ibid., para. 4.28(b) 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid., para 4,32, 
37 Ibid,, para. 4.35 to 4.39. 
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that the grant should be apportioned among the States in proportion to 
their respective populations, while for Category D roads it was 
suggested that 5 percent of the grant be made available to Tasmania, 
the remainder to be divided among the other States on the basis of 
four-fifths in proportion to population and one-fifth in proportion to 
area. Finally, it was also proposed that the amount allocated for 
research and planning should be apportioned among the States on the 
basis of four-fifths in proportion to population and one-fifth in 
proportion to area. 
The second alternative proposed by the Bureau (the so-called 
minority view) argued in favour of apportioning the C.A.R. grant among 
the States on the basis of the mean between the 1968/69 C.A.R. percentage 
distributions (thus in affect taking cognizance of existing constraints), 
and the percentage distribution indicated by the scheduling programme. 
The difference between the two proposals is shown in Table 7,6 (p,168) 
One remaining important issue to which the Bureau drew attention 
was whether or not conditions other than those already mentioned should be 
imposed on the use of the CA.R, grant in order to ensure that Commonwealth 
funds would be directed towards projects indicated by the scheduling 
programme. In particular, reference was made to the following: (i) whether 
or not the Commonwealth should insist that the States submit programmes 
of expenditure for Commonwealth approval (ii) the earmarking of a part 
of the grant for the financing of specific (major) projects and (iii) matching 
grant provisions. 
As to the first mentioned issue the Bureau contended that such 
a requirement " would provide only partial control over the development 
of the desired total road system ,.," and was open to the criticism that 
it might encourage the States to submit ". programmmes of work with 
high capital investment" "^  It was the Bureau's view that better results 
JQ-^ Ibid., Para. 5 4. ' 
39. Ibid., Para. 5.4. 
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were likely to be achieved if a voluntary and co-operative approach were 
pursued by all levels of government: 
"This alternative approach would minimise the duplication of 
work at the Commonwealth, State and Local Government levels 
and also, should result in more consideration being given to 
improvements of low capital cost such as traffic management, 
stage construction and road network improvements. Low cost 
improvements, for example, minor works to improve road safety, 
in most cases yield high economic returns."40 
Interestingly this line of argiunent was not adopted by the Bureau (as 
we shall see later) in its 1973 Report to the Whitlam Labor Government. 
With regard to the issue of whether or not the Commonwealth should 
earmark road grants by road projects (as distinct from road categories), 
41 
the Bureau noted the advantages and disadvantages of such a policy 
but preferred not to make a judgement until further study had been 
undertaken. One suspects that another reason for the Bureau's 
reticence on this matter was that it probably thought it desirable for 
the Commonwealth to adopt a "wait and see" strategy This would be 
consistent with the Bureau's emphasis on the need for the Commonwealth 
and the States to develop a co-operative approach. 
Finally, as far as the matter of matching grants is concerned 
the Bureau recommended that these should be retained,and related to 
State motor vehicle registrations - the main source of State derived 
road finance. 
In order to arrive at a base figure the Bureau divided the 
total amount of road finance from State sources for the year 1966/67 for 
each State by the number of vehicles registered in each State. The 
results varied from $36 - $40 per vehicle. Since data for later years 
40, Ibid., Para. 5,4, 
41 Specifically, it was stated that: "[such earmarking] would encourage 
better planning and evaluation of major projects, but has the 
disadvantage that these projects might be considered in isolation 
and apart from the total road system", ibid., para. 5,5, 
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were not available at the time the analysis was undertaken, and further, 
since it was known that a niomber of States had not varied motor vehicle 
registration charges since 1966/67, the amount of $36 per registered 
vehicle was judged to be an acceptable amount to apply to the first year 
of the period of the new legislation. Assuming a rate of increase of 2l/2 
percent per annum in road construction costs over the five year period 
the Bureau recommended that the matching grant be increased by $1 per 
annum per registered vehicle, giving an amount of $40 per registered 
42 
vehicle in the year 1973/74, 
2.5 The 1969 C.A.R. Act 
While the 1969 Act resulted in the Commonwealth Government 
agreeing to provide the States with a total grant of $l,252m over the 
five year period 1969-1974 - an amount which was fairly close to that 
recommended by the Bureau - most of the other recommendations contained 
in the Report were subject to amendment. In the words of one commentator 
the 1969 Commonwealth Road.'^  Agreement represents " a rich mixture 
of Gorton centralism, enlightened generosity, political sleight of hand 
43 
with a bit of economic realism". 
The grant of $l,252m was divided into two parts: (a) a principal 
grant of $l,200m which was distributed among the six States and (b) a 
supplementary grant of $52.05m which was shared by Western Australia, 
South Australia and Tasmania. As shown in Table 7,6 the allocation of 
the principal grant followed almost exactly the distribution recommended 
by the Bureau's minority proposal. 
42"] The intention of this method was to relate matching grants to taxable 
capacity See for example. Jay, W.R.C., "Implications of Specific 
Purpose Grants for Equalisation Policies" in Mathews (ed.). Fiscal 
Equalisation in a Federal System, Centre for Research on Federal 
Financial Relations The Australian National University, Canberra, 
Research Monograph No. 4. p. 97 
43. Maximilian Walsh, "Stronger Federal Control, with a Richer Road Mix", 
Australian Financial Review, 24.3,69, pp. 1 and 10. 
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TABLE 7,6 Alternative Distributions of Principal Grants 
State 
New South Wales 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Western 
Australia 
Tasmania 
1 
Actual 
% 
31,66 
21.20 
19,30 
10,00 
13.07 
4.50 
2 
Scheduling 
Programme 
% 
35.6 
22.9 
20.2 
8.6 
8.5 
4.1 
3 
Majority 
Proposal 
% 
31.7 
21.3 
18.3 
10.7 
13.7 
4.3 
4 
Minority 
Proposal 
% 
31.7 
21.2 
19.3 
10.0 
13.3 
4.5 
5 
1964 
C.A.R. Act 
% 
27.8 
19.5 
18.3 
11.4 
19.0 
5.0 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads Report 1969, and Section 3, First 
Schedule, Commonwealth Roads Act 1969. 
By providing for supplementary grants the Commonwealth Government 
took the view that acceptance of the Bureau's recommendations would 
result in too abrupt a change in the flow of assistance to Western 
Australia, South Auslralia and Tasmania. In effect the Commonwealth 
decided that the level of assistance granted to each State during the 
period 1969-74 should not be less than fifty percent of the level of 
44 45 
assistance provided during the previous five years. ' The supplementary 
grants were divided as follows: South Australia, $9.0m (17.29 percent); 
Western Australia, $40.8m (78,39 percent) and Tasmania $2,25m (4.32 percent) 
44. See Prime Minister's Statement on New Roads Agreement (P.M. No. 23/1969 
(H)) 
45. It was also claimed by the Prime Minister, Mr Gorton that the 
financial arrangements adopted by the government were to be viewed 
as "transitional arrangements" See for example Prime Minister's 
statement made to the State Premiers in March 1969, part of which is 
reported in the Australian Financial Review, op.cit., p. 10 and 
C.P.D., 14th May, 1969, p. 1782. 
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Of the total grants Queensland received 18.50 percent; South Australia 
10.30 percent; Western Australia 16.01 percent and Tasmania 4.49 percent. 
Table 7.7 compares the distribution of Commonwealth Aid for roads 
(including the supplementary grants) among the States under the 1969 
Act with that under the previous (1964) Act. 
TABLE 7.7 Alternative Distributions of Total (Including Supplementary) 
Grants 
State 
New South Wales 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Western Australia 
Tasmania 
Total 
1964 Act 
($m) 
209.1 
146.9 
137.0 
86.0 
133.6 
37.5 
750.10 
1969 Act 
($m) 
380,4 
254.4 
231.6 
129.0 
200.4 
56.25 
1252.05 
Increase 
($ni) 
171.30 
107.50 
94.60 
43.00 
66.80 
18.75 
501.95 
1 
t 
% 
Distribution 
30.38 
20.32 
18.50 
10.30 
16.01 
4.49 
100.00 
i 
Source: Prime Minister's Statement on New Roads Agreement (P.M. No. 28/1969 
(H)), p. 1. 
Had the total grant of $1,252.05m been distributed according 
to the proportions indicated by the Bureau's majority proposals this would 
have meant that N.S.W. would have received $396.89m (an increase of 
$16.49m); Victoria $266.68m (an increase of $12.28m); Queensland 
$229.12m ($2.48m less); South Australia $133.96m (an increase of $4.96m); 
Western Australia $171,53m ($28.87m less) and Tasmania $53.83m ($2.42m less) 
As to the issue of the distribution of the C.A.R, grant by road 
categories, the government again found it necessary to depart from the 
Bureau's proposals. In broad terms, the notion that Commonwealth road 
funds should be channelled into particular areas of expenditure designated 
by the Commonwealth was accepted by the Cabinet. Wliat was at issue, however. 
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were the proportions proposed by the Bureau, On the one hand it appears 
that the Prime Minister, Mr- Gorton, was opposed to giving the States 
discretionary power regarding use of the 18,8 percent of the total grant 
46 
which the Bureau had recommended for Category D, while the Country 
Party members of the coalition were not prepared to accept the 
Bureau's recommendation that 20 percent of the grant be allocated to 
"minor rural roads", i.e. Category B roads, which more or less correspond 
to those parts of the road system, which under previous legislation, 
had been allocated 40 percent of the C.A.R, grant, A compromise 
solution resulted in the elimination of Category D, The urban road grant 
was increased from 40 percent as recommended by the Bureau, to 50,05 
percent of the principal grant; the proportion allocated to main trunk 
and arterial roads i,e. Category A roads was reduced from 20 percent to 
15.56 percent of the principal grant, while the proportion of the principal 
grant allocated to Category B roads was increased from 20 percent to 
47 32.08 percent. The remaining 1 percent of the principal grant was 
set aside for ekpehditure by the States on road planning and research. 
The distribution'of the principal grant between the three major road 
groups (i,e, excluding Category E) is shown for each State in Table 7.8 
46, See for example,Maximilian Walsh, op.cit., p. 1, 
47 It should also be noted that Section 5 of the 1969 Act provided an 
"escape clause" which enabled funds allocated to a State in any 
given year (on the basis of these categories) to be transferred 
from one category of road type to another, provided the State 
could satisfy the Minister for Shipping and Transport that there 
were good grounds for the transfer. Such a provision could also 
be viewed as adding weight to the argument that the 1969 Act was 
influenced at least as much by politics as economics. 
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TABLE 7 .8 Principal Grant Distribution by Major Road Groups 
States 
New South Wales 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Western Australia 
Tasmania 
Total 
Urban 
$m 
201.01 
156.10 
99.24 
59.43 
62.41 
22.59 
Roads 
% 
53 
61 
43 
50 
37 
42 
600.00 
Main Trunk and 
Arterial Roads 
$m 
63.87 
17 72 
56.72 
13.67 
23.91 
10.87 
% 
17 
7 
24 
11 
15 
20 
186.76 
Other Rural 
Roads 
$m % 
109.82 29 
76.85 30 
72.17 31 
45.10 38 
70.88 44 
19.73 37 
394.55 
Source: Commonwealth Aid Roads Act, No. 41 of 1969, Schedules 2, 3 and 4. 
Finally, as far as matching grant requirements are concerned 
the 1969 Act departed from the principle adopted in previous legislation 
by requiring that each State increase its expenditure on roads 
from its own source of revenue at a rate no less than the rate of increase 
in the number of vehicles on register in the State. This differed from 
the Bureau's recommendation which was designed to relate State 
48 
contributions to taxable capacity 
While it is clear that the 1969 legislation provided for a 
greater measure of control over the use of C.A.R. funds than had been the 
case in the past, with the exception of the 1926 Commonwealth Roads Act, 
the States continued to retain the major role in determining the use of 
total road funds. Policy decisions with respect to something like two-
thirds of the total road budget remained the prerogative of the States and 
48. The effect of the Government's decision was to maintain the existing 
pattern of contributions rather than to achieve one more in accord 
with taxable capacity See Jay, W.R.C, op,cit., p. 98. 
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Local Government Authorities, free of constraints imposed by the 
Commonwealth. Because of this, there could be no guarantee that the 
pattern of road fund allocation within the States would turn out to 
49 be significantly different from what it had been hitherto. An 
attempt to examine the impact of Commonwealth roads policy since 1969 
with respect to one State, namely Queensland, is made later in this 
study (see Chapter 10) 
3. The 1973 Commonwealth Bureau of Roads Report 
During the life of the 1969 C.A.R. Act the Commonwealth 
Bureau of Roads in co-operation with N.A.A.S.R.A. conducted a second 
nation wide survey of Australian roads, known as the Australian Road 
Survey 1969-74. The objective of the survey was again to provide an 
inventory of road conditions, but this time for the purpose of determining 
"deficiencies" as at June 1972, and to enable the generation of road 
and road structure projects (e.g. bridges) designed to remove such 
deficiencies. These projects were in turn subject to economic evaluation, 
although in contrast to the procedures used previously, the scope of the 
analysis was widened to give explicit evaluations of indirect costs and 
49. See for example, Docwra, G.E, and Kolsen, H,M,, "Road Expenditure 
Policy in Australia", Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 
Vol, V. No, 3, September 1971, 
See also, Maclean, J,D, and Hickman, J.M., "A More Critical Look at 
Some of the Assumptions Used in Allocating Commonwealth Government 
Assistance for Land Transport Investment", Australian Transport 
Research Forum, Second Annual Meeting, .A.delaide 13, 14 April 1976, 
p. 588. 
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benefits, and to examine the impact of road improvement programmes in 
urban areas on other modes of transport. 
The results of the Bureau's findings together with policy 
recommendations were presented in November 1973 to the Whitlam Labor 
Government which had achieved office in December of the previous year. 
In view of Labor's well established philosophy concerning the 
role the Commonwealth Government should adopt in the formulation of roads 
policy, and in the regulation and supervision of transport planning as 
a whole, it would not have been unreasonable to have expected that the 
Bureau's 1973 policy recommendations would reflect that philosophy. 
50, For rural roads an attempt was made to value: 
(i) benefits resulting from reductions of dust effects on safety 
and vehicle operating costs; 
(ii) benefits associated with reductions in delays due to flooding; 
(iii) benefits in the form of reductions in the loss of perishable 
commodities, such as milk and cream; 
(iv) benefits in the form of reduced stock losses and; 
(v) benefits in the form of improved reliability of school bus 
routes, 
For urban roads the benefit-cost evaluations were expanded to 
encompass 
(i) community disruption costs by: 
1.1 making adjustments to the ".., compensation price paid 
for land and property to reflect disruption costs ..." 
1.2 imputing a value for recreational land "... acquired for 
major road works in inner urban areas where neither the 
State nor SRA (i.e. State Road Authority') pays financial 
compensation or replaces land acquired..." and 
(ii) the effects of traffic noise and motor vehicle air pollution. 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, unpublished document entitled 
Evaluation of Australian Roads Survey, 1969-74, 16.12.71, 
pp. 10-17. 
51, The Labor Government's approach to all areas of expenditure involving 
Commonwealth financial aid was made clear by the Prime Minister, Mr. 
Whitlam in an address to the Premiers' Conference of June 1973. Part 
of that address states: , 
"From now on, we will expect to be involved in the planning of the 
functions in which we are financially involved. We believe that it 
would be irresponsible for the National Government to content itself 
with simply providing funds without being involved in the process by 
which priorities are set, and by which expenditures are planned and by 
which standards are set. We believe that the Government Which is 
responsible for gathering and dispensing huge amounts of public money is 
obliged to see ftat the money is properly spent. We believe that most of the 
problems with which allocations from the National budget are meant to 
deal cannot be confined to or defined by individual states ..." 
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And indeed that turned out to be the case. The objectives which the 
Bureau set for itself in its 1973 Report were essentially the same as 
52 
those adopted in its First Report in 1969. 
Like the 1969 study the 1973 Report was directed to providing 
53 
recommendations regarding the following : 
52. The 1973 Report provides a broad statement of what are considered as 
desirable goals. Specifically: 
"(a) a safe, efficient and convenient road transportation system 
to meet the present and changing needs, requirements and 
preferences of the nation; and 
(b) a road transportation system which assists as far as possible, 
overall developments to achieve better systems for living and 
working and for trade and commerce" 
The Report then goes on to state: 
".. In order to produce consistent programmes for roads and road 
transport, and to identify the targets towards which the Government 
should aim for the improvement of the road and road transport systems 
as part of its overall national programme, our investigation had the 
under-mentioned objectives:-
(a) The satisfaction of demands 
(b) Economic efficiency - the development of policies to promote 
economic efficiency through the reduction of unit transport 
costs, and to promote optimal patterns of development. 
(c) Safety -
(d) The preservation of the environment 
(e) Equity - the development of policies directed towards ensuring 
that benefits and costs of road transportation fall equitably 
on all sections of the community 
(f) Integrated systems 
(g) Urban and regional development - the development of policies to 
ensure that improvements to the road transportation system will 
support the overall regional development policies being pursued 
by governments and to meet the wider needs and preferences of 
the community 
(h) Co-ordinated transport development - the development of policies 
to ensure that road transportation improvements assist in the 
development of an efficient local transport system incorporating 
all modes " 
Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia 1973, 
pp. 22-24. 
53. See for example. Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Evaluation of Australian 
Roads Survey, 1969-1974, op.cit., p. 1 
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1. The level of road expenditure which, over a given time period -
in this case the five year period 1974/75 - 1978/79 - would be 
(a) economically warranted, and (b) economically warranted and 
feasible. 
2. The level of Commonwealth aid which would be justified over the 
specified time period, given various assumptions concerning the 
ability of the States and Local Authorities to contribute to the 
total road budget. 
3. The distribution of Commonwealth aid among the States. 
4. The distribution of Commonwealth aid among the States by road 
classes; and 
5. Whether or not conditions (in addition to 4 above) should be 
imposed on the States regarding the use of Commonwealth aid, and 
if so, the form such conditions might take. 
The Bureau's estimate of an economically warranted road programme for the 
six States, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory 
for the period 1974/75 - 1978/79 amounted to $5,828m (1971/72 prices), 
using a discount rate of 10 percent. Total benefits from the programme 
were estimated at $14,000m (1971/72 prices), giving an average rate of 
return of 15 percent. Compared with the programme estimated as being 
economically warranted in the 1969 Report, for the period 1969/1974, the 
warranted programme for the 1974/75 - 1978/79 period represented a 
34 percent increase in expenditure, or in absolute terms, an increase 
of $l,500m (1971/72 prices) This was attributed to four factors : 
54. Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973, 
p. 267 
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(1) the rate of increase in~input prices during the period of 
the 1969 Act had been much faster than anticipated (the Bureau estimated 
that the actual programme of road works undertaken during the 1969/1974 
period was 15 percent less than the intended programme); (2) it was 
contended by the Bureau that the State Road Authorities had included in 
their works programmes road projects having lower rates of return than 
projects identified by the Bureau; (3) traffic growth had increased 
by about 40 percent from the time the Bureau presented its first Report, 
and (4) the 1969/74 survey had adopted higher design standards for 
some roads than those used in the previous survey 
The determination of an economic and feasible programme was 
resolved, as in the 1969 study, by the use of the scheduling programme. 
It was estimated that such a programme for the period under consideration 
would cost $4,580m in 1971/72 prices or $6,401m in current prices. 
The same approach, together with an examination of the taxable capacity 
of each of the states, as indicated by State motor vehicle population 
and per capita income, resulted in the Bureau recommending that the 
Commonwealth provide a grant of $2,607m (current prices), to be 
distributed among the states as shown in Table 7,9 below. 
55. Excluding estimates for the Australian Capital Territory and the 
Northern Territory, 
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TABLE 7.9 Australian Road Grants by State 1974/75 to 1978/79 
($ mi11ion:current prices) 
Item 
Warranted and Feasible 
Road Programme 
Projects Road Finance 
State Government 
Local Government 
Total 
Indicated Grant 
Supplementary Provision 
Equalization Provision 
Total 
Proposed Australian 
Road Grants 
- 1974/75 
- 1975/76 
- 1976/77 
- 1977/78 
- 1978/79 
Total 
Proportion 
N.S.W. 
2,297 
767 
684 
1,451 
846 
-
-
846 
119 
147 
167 
194 
219 
846 
32.5% 
VIC. 
1,660 
596 
474 
1,070 
590 
-
-
590 
78 
95 
120 
140 
157 
590 
22.6% 
QLD. 
1,108 
317 
221 
538 
570 
-
-
570 
74 
91 
117 
134 
154 
570 
21.9% 
S.A. 
536 
203 
123 
331 
205 
-
-
205 
36 
39 
41 
43 
56 
205 
7.9% 
W.A. 
566 
210 
109 
319 
247 
20 
-
267 
51 
(6) 
52 
(5) 
53 
(4) 
55 
(3) 
56 
(2) 
267 
(20) 
10.2% 
TAS. 
234! 
68 
41 
109 
125 
-
4 
129 
17 
(1) 
21 
(1) 
27 
(1) 
30 
34 
(1) 
129 
(4) 
4.9% 
All 
States 
6,401 
2,161 
1,657 
3,818 
2,583 
20 
4 
2,607 
375 
445 
525 
596 
666 
2,607 
100% 
... — 
Notes: Amounts in parenthesis are Supplementary Grants for W.A. and 
Equalisation Grants for Tasmania and are included in the State 
Grants. 
The recommended grants can be compared with actual Australian 
road grants in 1973/74 of: N.S.W, $99.3, Vic. $66.6, Qld, $64,7, 
S.A, $31.9, W.A. $49.3, Tas. $14,0 million 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973, 
p. 322. 
As can be seen from the Table the recommended grants to the 
States included a supplementary provision of $20m for Western Australia and 
an equalisation provision of $4m for Tasmania. The former grant was 
justified on the same grounds as advanced in regard to the supplementary 
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provision recommended in the 1969 Report, while the latter was justified 
on the groundjthat of all the States Tasmania ranked lowest on a per 
capita income scale, and highest in terms of road construction and 
maintenance costs. The equalisation grant was seen as " appropriate 
to bring road standards in that State closer to national levels" 
Overall the recommended distribution of the grant represented a slight 
shift in favour of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland when compared 
with the distribution under the 1969 Act. 
With regard to the matter of the distribution of Commonwealth 
Aid byroad categories,the Bureau's 1973 Report proposed a number of changes 
to the classification adopted in its earlier study In particular it 
recommended that special provisions be made for national highways; 
urban local roads; expenditure on maintenance, administration and 
property acquisition; expenditure on minor traffic engineering and road 
safety improvements (M,I,T.E.R,S,), and finally; that developmental roads, 
which previously had been treated under separate legislation in the form 
of the Beef Cattle Grants Acts, be included in the rural arterial category, 
and as such be subject to economic evaluation. 
3.1 National Highways 
While the concept of a national highways system had been 
discussed by State Main Roads Authorities as early as 1956 and adopted by 
the Labor Party as part of its transport policy, it was not until the 
submission of a Report^^^ in February 1972, by the Bureau of Roads to the 
Minister for Shipping and Transport, that the Commonwealth Government deemed 
56. Coimnonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973, 
p. 321. — 
56a. Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Arterial Roads of National 
Importance - 1972. 
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that the matter was worthy of Commonwealth action. In the Augtist 1972 Budget 
the McMahon Liberal/Country Party government allocated $250,000 for the 
investigation of national highways, and in November of that year a 
National Highways Study Team made up of representatives of the Bureau 
of Roads and of the State Main Roads Departments was formed to undertake 
such an investigation - the results of which were reported in September, 
57 1973 and were to influence, to some extent, the recommendations made 
58 by the Bureau of Roads. 
In stating its case for the establishment of a national highways 
system,the Bureau argued that there were parts of the major arterial road 
network which could clearly be identified as being of national importance 
but which, because of the nature of State road expenditure policies, did 
59 
not receive a share of resources which that importance warranted. 
Roads which fell into this category were identified by the Bureau as 
satisfying the following criteria: those which 
"(a) encourage and contribute to a major extent, to trade 
and commerce, overseas and among the states; 
(b) assist industry located in major centres of population 
to be complementary to industry located in neighbouring 
major centres 
57 Department of Transport Australia, National Highways Study: Study 
Team Final Report, September, 1973. 
58. See Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973, 
p. 153. 
59. In economic terms the argument is that the extension and upgrading of 
parts of the nation's road system result in significant inter-
jurisdictional (State) externalities. Because of this, these roads 
receive a lower ranking in States'priorities than is justified by the 
net gains to the nation. Given such a situation there is clearly a 
case for considerable involvement by the Federal government in the 
financing and planning of a national highways system. However, as 
noted in Chapter 4, the positive spillover effects of highway 
investment may be of less significance than is often supposed. There 
are reasons other than inter-jurisdictional externalities why some 
parts of the road network (now designated as national highways) 
do not receive adequate funding. See Chapter 6, p, 146, footnote 88, 
Sec also Chapter 9. 
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(c) reduce significantly, transport costs of the products 
of rural and/or secondary industry between points of 
production and points of export or consumption; 
(d) provide for long distance movement associated with 
recreation and tourism; and which 
(e) improve movements between defence production centres, 
defence supply and storage locations, and defence 
establishments generally" °^ 
What the Bureau proposed was that a limited number of inter-
city corridors representing about 9,800 miles of highway should be 
designated as forming " the nucleus of National Highways Systems" ; 
that these roads should be upgraded to design standards which, in general, 
were higher than those adopted in the Australian Road Survey; and that 
the Commonwealth Government should assume responsibility for 80 percent 
of the funding of the development of the system. It was also estimated 
by.the Bureau that the designated system could be upgraded to the 
specified standards over a period of nine years ". without distorting the 
general pattern of road development" 
As to the actual programme of expenditure, the Bureau's economic 
analysis suggested a warranted and feasible programme of $518m 
(1971/72 prices) over the period 1974/75 - 1978/79 of which $416m related 
to expenditure on national highways in the States and the remainder to 
national highway expenditure in the Territories, In addition to this, 
estimates were also made for expenditure on maintenance. A total of 
$55.6m (1971/72 prices)) was recommended for the period. The suggested 
distribution of expenditure for each category by States and Territories 
is shown in Tables 7.10 and 7,11 below: 
60. Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973, p. 154, 
61. Ibid., p. 153. 
62. Ibid,, p, 161. 
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TABLE 7.10 Warranted and Feasible Expenditure on National Highway 
Improvements 1974/75 to 1978/79 ($million: 1971/72 prices) 
State and Territory 
New South Wales 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Western Australia 
Tasmania 
All States 
Australian Capital Territory 
Northern Territory 
Total 
Amount 
170 
97 
85 
47 
34 
28 
461 
1 
56 
518 
Proportion 
% 
32.8 
18.7 
16.4 
9.1 
6.6 
5.4 
89.0 
0.2 
10.8 
100.0 
1 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973, 
p. 166. 
TABLE 7.11 National Highways System Maintenance Expenditure 1974/75 to 
1978/80 ($million: 1971/72 prices) 
State and Territory 
New South Wales 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Western Australia 
Tasmania 
All States 
Northern Territory 
Australian Capital Territory 
Total 
Amount 
12.6 
6.4 
15.1 
5.1 
8.8 
1.8 
49.8 
5.8 
< 1 
55.6 
Proportion 
% 
22.7 
11.5 
27.2 
9.2 
15.8 
3.2 
89.6 
10.4 
• 1 
100.0 
p.—, ..,••. ,, , , 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of 
p, 170. 
Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973, 
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3.2 Other Categories of Expenditure: Urban Roads 
In contrast to the Bureau's 1969 assessment of urban road 
needs, its 1973 analysis involved an examination, albeit limited, of a 
number of strategies aimed at increasing public transport patronage 
and an assessment of indirect benefits and costs associated with increased 
urban road expenditure. As far as the former is concerned the results of 
the Bureau's analysis suggested that there was little prospect that such 
Strategies would significantly affect its forecasts of road traffic. 
Overall the Bureau concluded that considerable improvements would be 
required to bring urban road systems to the standards adopted in the 
Australian Roads Survey and to meet the needs of the estimated future 
64 
traffic growth. 
The Bureau estimated that over this period warranted expenditure 
on urban road improvements (confined to road classes 6, 7, 8 and 9) 
would amount to $l,874m in terms of 1971/72 prices (including an 
expenditure of $19m in the A.CTJ of which 82.9 percent and 17.1 percent 
would be required, respectively, for road classes 6 and 7,and 8 and 9. On 
a State basis this expenditure was distributed as follows: New South 
Wales: 34.8 percent; Victoria: 34.2 percent; Queensland: 12.6 percent; 
South Australia: 4.3 percent; Western Australia: 10.8 percent and 
Tasmania: 2.3 percent. Application of the scheduling programme produced 
a warranted and feasible programme valued at $1448m in 1971/72 prices. 
63. Ibid., p. 123. 
64. See Table 6.12, Ibid., p. 129. 
As stated by the Bureau: "These forecasts indicate that whilst the 
urban population will increase by about 70 percent from 1971 to the 
year 2000 road travel in the cities will increase by about 300 percent 
over the same period," Ibid. 
65. See Appendix A for definitions of functional classes. 
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The recommended distribution of that amount by class of road and by States 
is shown in Table 7.12, while details of the breakdown of estimated benefits 
and costs are depicted in Table 7.13. 
TABLE 7.12 Warranted and Feasible Expenditure on Urban Road Improvements 
1974/75 to 1978/79 ($million: 1971/72 prices) 
Road Class 
6 and 7^ 
8 and 9 
Total Urban 
Proportion 
N.S.W. 
402 
92 
494 
34.1% 
VIC. 
449 
113 
562 
38,9% 
QLD. 
112 
24 
136 
9.4% 
S.A. 
67 
13 
80 
5.5% 
W.A. 
104 
25 
129 
8.9% 
TAS. 
25 
3 
28 
2.0% 
All 
States 
1,159 
270 
1,429 
98.7% 
A.CT. 
17 
2 
19 
.1.3% 
Total 
1,176 
272 
1,448 
100% 
1 
Proportion 
% 
81.2 
18.8 
100.0 
Notes: 1. Excluding National Highways 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973, p. 132, 
TABLE 7.13 Benefits Estimated and Costs of Warranted and Feasible Urban Road 
Improvements 1974/75 to 1978/79 (Excluding National Highways) 
Item 
Construction and Expenditure 
2 
Monetary Benefits 
Savings in:-
Vehicle Operating Costs 
Accident Costs 
Occupant Travel Time: 
- Private 
- Commercial 
Road Maintenance 
Total Direct Benefits 
Indirect Benefits^ 
Indirect Disbenefits^ 
Net Indirect Benefits 
Total Not Benefits 
Ratio of Total Net Benefits to Construction 
Expenditure 
Notes: 1. 1971/72 prices 
Amount 
$ million 
1,448 
1,868 
491 
510 
1,928 
35 
4,832 
175 
136 
39 
4,871 
3.4 
2. Discounted at 10% to 1971/72 present values, 
3. Mainly due to trips generated by improved roads in out urban areas. 
4. Disruption costs. 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, nnnnt-t xm Rnndg In Austnalia^ 1973. p. 133. 
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As can be seen from the above Table, 40 percent of direct 
benefits are attributed to savings in commercial travel time; 37 percent 
to reductions in vehicle operating costs; 11 percent to savings in private 
travel time and 10 percent to reductions in accidents, with savings in road 
maintenance being of little importance. 
Indirect benefits refer to benefits arising from estimates of 
traffic generated in outer urban areas while indirect disbenefits refer 
to community disruption effects. The explanation for the relatively 
small magnitude of this cost item is that the Bureau's evaluation 
procedures rejected most projects which caused these effects to be 
66 
serious. 
Since the Bureau's analysis of urban road requirements gave 
major priority to the need to develop the urban arterial and sub-arterial 
road system, the part to be played by urban freeway development was 
the subject of special examination. The outcome of this examination led 
the Bureau to recommend the following strategy: ' 
(i) for outer suburbs the general form of development should be a 
grid pattern, with major emphasis, however, placed on the need 
to direct traffic around the built up area of the existing city 
(ii) in middle and outer suburbs the principal aim should be to 
provide freeway capacity which facilitates to a large extent 
the separation of intersuburban and local traffic,and allows 
the former to by-pass the inner suburbs and the Central Business 
District (C.B.D,) at relatively high speeds, and 
66^ Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973, p. 134, 
67 Ibid,, pp, 148-149, 
68. As noted by one commentator "- this recommendativ^n represented quite 
a cliangc from the general direction followed by the capital city 
transportation studies " , Gilmour, Peter, Moving Goods and People: 
Transport in Australia (Penguin Books, Australia Ltd,, 1978), p. 31, 
185. 
(iii) for inner suburbs, radial freeway capacity should not be 
undertaken, especially if the rationale for such, capacity is 
to facilitate the journey to work. On the other hand it was 
suggested that the construction of by-pass roads to freeway 
standards might be warranted in such areas if it were found 
that large volumes of traffic, especially heavy commercial 
traffic, had no alternative but to pass through the C.B.D. 
and adjacent suburbs. 
The Bureau also recommended that financial assistance for 
urban roads should be extended to include urban local roads In short, 
the Bureau argued, that while it was likely that estimated total 
Local Authority revenues would be sufficient to enable the achievement 
of the warranted and feasible programme, a number of Local Authorities 
would face difficulties in undertaking desirable road works, either 
because of their tax base situation, and/or because of financial 
conditions imposed on them by State Road Authorities with regard to the 
69 funding of arterial works programmes. The recommended level of 
assistance for urban local roads is shown in Table 7.16 
3.3 Rural Roads 
For rural roads, which comprise functional classes 1 to 5, and 
excluding roads designated as national highways, the Bureau's estimate 
of expenditure warranted on economic and social grounds amounted to 
$l,772m at 1971/72 prices. Adjustments for financial and other constraints 
produced a warranted and feasible programme of expenditure for the States 
and Territories amounting to $l,357m at 1971/72 prices. The recommended 
distribution of that expenditure by States and by functional class are 
shown in Table 7.14 Estimates of benefits and costs associated with 
the programme are depicted in Table 7,15 
69. Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973,p,149, 
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TABLE 7.15 Benefits and Costs of Warranted and Feasible Rural Road 
Improvements Excluding National Highways, 1974/75 to 1975/79 
• 
Item 
Construction Expenditure 
2 
Monetary Benefits 
Savings in:-
Vehicle Operating Costs 
Accident Costs 
Occupant Travel Time 
- Private 
- Commercial 
Road Maintenance 
Total Direct Benefits 
3 
Indirect Benefits 
Total Benefits 
Ratio of Total Benefits to Construction 
Expenditure 
Physical Benefits 
Road Safety 
- Reduction in Casualty Accidents Annually 
- Lives saved annually 
- -
Amount 
$ million 
1,357 
3,290 
141 
282 
846 
141 
4,700 
1,000 
5,700 
4.2 
number 
1,000 
120 
Notes; 
Source; 
1. 1971/72 prices. 
2. Discounted at 10% to 1971/72 present value. 
3. Includes reduction in dust, delays, reduced losses in production 
and benefits attributable to increased number of trips generated 
by improved roads. 
Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973, 
p, 194. 
In recommending that the Commonwealth continue to provide 
assistance for the development of the rural roads system (i.e. in 
addition to assistance provided for national highways), the Bureau 
proposed that the Commonwealth should depart from the 1969 system 
of grant categorisation by removing class 3 roads from the 
188. 
70 
"rural roads other than arterial roads category" and include such roads 
in the major arterial roads category, which, under the terms of the 1969 
Act, comprised functional class 1 and 2 roads. According to the Bureau 
the inclusion of functional Class 3 roads in the same category as functional 
class 4 roads had resulted in conflict between the State Main Roads 
Authorities and Local Government Authorities as to the propei allocation 
of the grant between the two classes of roads. This conflict occurred because 
functional class 3 roads are essentially a State responsibility while 
functional class 4 roads are largely the responsibility of Local Government 
Authorities. 
By altering the grouping of roads in the manner proposed the 
Bureau suggested that the following advantages would be obtained: 
(1) that the above mentioned conflict would be avoided by providing for 
a closer relationship between road fimding and the level of government 
responsibility for class 3 roads (2) that it might encourage the States 
to alter present legal classifications of roads in line with the Bureau's 
functional classification: the suggested advantage of such a change being 
that it ".. would contribute to simpler accounting and more efficient 
71 
expenditure of road moneys" and (3) given that the Bureau proposed a 
substantially greater degree of Commonwealth involvement in the road 
expenditure decision making process than existed under the 1969 Act 
(the details of which are outlined later), this involvement would be 
facilitated by the adoption of the proposed grouping. 
The Bureau's analysis of rural road needs also involved consider-
ations of the matter of special grants provided by the Commonwealth for 
developmental roads, in particular beef cattle roads. In addition, examination 
of assistance provided for roads of strategic importance and those serving 
70. Sec Commonwealth Aid Roads, No. 41 of 1969, Clause 4(3) 
71, Coimnonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973, p. 197 
189. 
Commonwealth Government properties was also undertaken. Regarding the 
former, the Bureau concluded that ". proposed improvements to existing 
72 beef roads do not appear to have any special merit", and that as 
observed previously, any future assistance for such roads should be 
included in the same legislation for other roads. However, some assistance 
was recommended for particular road projects whose justification could be 
established on " industry assistance policy grounds and/or as compensation 
73 to local authorities and the commvmities they serve" Specifically, the 
Bureau recommended that 10 percent of the rural arterial roads grant 
should be set aside for expenditure on developmental road works deemed by 
the Commonwealth to be in the national interest; that if any portion of 
this amount is not used in any year then it should be made available for 
expenditure on State road works ; and further, that the determination of 
developmental road programmes should be undertaken in consultation with 
74 
the States. 
As far as Commonwealth contributions to roads of strategic 
importance, and roads serving Commonwealth properties are concerned, the 
Bureau recommended that the former be discontinued since the sums involved 
represented a negligible proportion of total Commonwealth assistance and 
were of little consequence to the recipient States. However, for the 
latter class of roads it was recommended that assistance should be 
continued since this could be viewed as equivalent to contributions made 
to Local Government by private property owners. 
Recommendations were also made by the Bureau concerning the 
provision of grants for the purpose of assisting with maintenance, 
administration and property acquisition, planning and research, and minor 
traffic engineering and road safety improvements. In the case of maintenance, 
72, Ibid,, p. 207 
73, Ibid., p, 208, 
74, Ibid., pp. 208-209. 
190. 
administration and property acquisition, it was recommended that a total 
of $145.5m (current prices) be provided while for the other categories the 
recommended grants were respectively, $40m and $72m at current prices. 
The distribution of recommended road grants by category of 
expenditure and by State is shown in Table 7.16 below. 
TABLE 7.16 Australian Road Grants by Road Categories 1974/75 to 1978/79 
($million: current prices) 
Category 
National Highways 
Urban Arterial Roads 
Rural Arterial Develop-
mental Roads 
Urban Local Roads 
Rural Local Roads 
M.I.T.E.R.S, 
Road Maintenance 
Planning and Research 
Supplementary 
Equalization 
Total 
Special allocation 
included in above grant 
Developmental Roads 
Maintenance of National 
Highways 
N,S.W. 
191.0 
306.0 
152.0 
13.0 
98.0 
19.3 
52.4 
14.3 
-
-
846.0 
17.3 
14.0 
VIC. 
108.0 
295.0 
56.0 
15.0 
56.0 
16.2 
33.4 
10.4 
-
-
590.0 
5.6 
7.1 
QLD. 
95.0 
122.0 
165.0 
3.0 
138.0 
15.2 
24.9 
6.9 
-
-
570.0 
16.5 
16.8 
S.A. 
50.0 
60.0 
35.0 
2.0 
32.0 
8.4 
14.2 
3.4 
-
-
205.0 
3.5 
5.7 
W.A. 
37.0 
100.0 
48.0 
3.0 
35.0 
8.4 
12.1 
3.5 
20.0 
-
267.0 
4.6 
9.8 
TAS. 
32.0 
29.0 
23.0 
0.5 
26.0 
4.5 
8.5 
1.5 
-
4.0 
129.0 
2.3 
2.0 
Total 
513.0 
912.0 
479.0 
36.5 
385.0 
72.0 
145.5 
40.0 
20.0 
4.0 
2607.0 
49.8 
55.4 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973, 
p. 341. 
191. 
3.4 Recommended Matching Grant Requirements and Other Conditions 
It will be recalled that in its 1969 Report the Bureau suggested 
that the Commonwealth should not exercise control over the use of Commonwealth 
aid beyond that of specifying the distribution of aid by road categories, 
and providing for general matching grant conditions. This philosophy was 
not adhered to in the 1973 Report. Instead, the Bureau argued for an 
extension of controls over the use of Commonwealth funds and for a tougher 
75 
approach to matching grant requirements. 
With regard to the former the Bureau contended: (a) apart from 
national highways it was possible to identify parts of the road system as 
being of national importance, and as such, to justify the Commonwealth taking 
a major role in the actual planning of expenditure decisions relating to 
these roads, and (b) that investigations by the Bureau since the implementation 
of the 1969 C,A,R. Act had indicated that while the States had allocated 
75. It is not our intention to review the literature concerning the theory 
of government grants. However, some important references on this 
subject are: 
Scott, A,D,, "The evaluation of Federal grants", Economica, Vol 76, 
November 1952, Breton, A,"A theory of Government grants", Canadian 
Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 31, No. 2, May 1965. 
Wilde, J,A,, "The expenditure effect of Grant-in-Aid Programmes", 
National Tax Journal, Vol, 21, No. 3, September 1968, 
Wilde, J.A,, "Grants-in-Aid: The analytics of design and response". 
National Tax Journal, Vol, 24, No. 2, 1971. 
Smith, D.L., "The response of State and Local Governments to Federal 
Grants", National Tax Journal, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1968, 
Gates, W.E., Fiscal Federalism (Hardcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.. 1972), 
Chapter 3. 
Break, G,F,, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United States, 
(Brookings, Washington, 1967), Chapters III and IV 
For a broader coverage of issues concerning intergovernmental financial 
relations see Mathews, R.L. (ed.). Responsibility Sharing in a Federal 
System.(Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, The 
Australian National University, Canberra. Research Monograph No. 8, 
1975) 
192. 
Commonwealth aid according to the conditions of the Act, they had not 
always directed funds to projects within the various categories in a 
manner consistent with the efficiency in resource allocation objective. 
Accordingly, it was proposed by the Bureau that the Commonwealth should 
extend its involvement to the planning and approval of expenditure 
prograjmmes relating to the following categories: urban arterial and sub-
arterial roads; rural arterial; minor traffic engineering and road 
safety improvements, and planning and research. For example, in the case 
of the urban arterial and sub-arterial category it was recommended that: 
"(i) the Australian Government be involved in the planning 
of the urban road systems; 
(ii) the States submit annual programmes of proposed urban 
road improvements through the Bureau of Roads for the 
approval of the Australian Government; 
(iii) the Australian Government select, from the plan of the 
urban road system or from the programme of urban road 
improvements, specific major projects which shall be 
submitted with an environmental impact statement, 
through the Bureau of Roads for individual approval by 
the Australian Government; 
(iv) grants be expended in accordance with such proposals; 
and that 
(v) financial assistance for urban local roads be expended 
in areas and/or on the projects approved by the 
Australian Government upon application by the States 
through the Bureau of Roads" '7 
Similar conditions relating to Commonwealth approval of 
proposed projects were also recommended for the other mentioned categories 
of expenditure. 
As far as the matching grant provisions are concerned the Bureau 
proposed that these should also be subject to change in order to facilitate 
the achievement of the warranted and feasible programme. The Bureau 
contended that while existing matching grant provisions had implicit 
efficiency and equity objectives neither had been adequately satisfied. 
76. Sec for example. Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in 
Australia, 1973. p. 150. 
77 Ibid., p, 152, 
78, Ibid,, pp. 344-346. 
193. 
First, while matching grant quota arrangements had resulted in an increase 
in State contributions to road finance they had failed to ensure, that in 
real terms, the contribution was sufficient to enable the achievement of 
the warranted and feasible programme. Second, that over the years there 
existed differences in tax effort between the States which could not be 
justified on per capita income grounds, and that the existing arrangements 
perpetuated such differences. Third, by limiting matching grant arrangements 
to total State road funds, the States, as noted earlier, were left with 
discretionary power as to how those funds should be used. Although the 
Bureau's Report did not give specific examples it claimed that: 
"In several cases the application of State funds differed 
significantly from expectations. Grants became the maximum 
expenditure rather than the minimum anticipated thus preventing 
the achievement of the programme which was envisaged and intended 
by the C.A.R, ActV79 
In view of the above the Bureau proposed that matching grant 
conditions should be changed in two ways: (i) with respect to the 
determination of the total contribution to be made by each State during the 
five year period, and (ii) by requiring matching grants by road categories. 
As far as the former is concerned it was proposed that 1971/72 road 
expenditure by States from their own resources should be chosen as a 
base period; that an implicit amount of $82 per vehicle registered should 
be set as the 1978/79 level of tax effort for State road funds, and that the 
distribution of quotas during the period 1974/75-1978/79 should be so 
determined as to more or less equalise the yearly growth in quotas after 
80 81 
taking cognizance of the motor vehicle forecast for each State. ' 
79. Ibid., p. 346. 
80, Ibid,, p. 374. 
81 It was also stated that: 
"e) in those States where, by inspection, progress towards the 
1979/80 target level of tax effort suggests too rapid a growth 
rate in effort during the five year period, reduce the 1978/79 
quota level to provide more attainable levels of state finance" 
Ibid., p, 348, 
194. 
82 
Finally, the recommended matching conditions by road categories 
involved the States making a twenty percent contribution to the cost of the 
National Highways programme as well as a contribution from the specified 
total matching grant,to the construction of urban arterials and to 
expenditure on M.I.T.E.R.S. Recommended matching grants for each State 
by urban arterials and M.I.T.E.R.S. categories are shown respectively, in 
Tables 7.17 and 7.18 below: 
82. The purpose of the requirement of matching grants by road categories 
(as well as for the aggregate grant), is to ensure that Commonwealth 
preferences are not frustrated by State expenditure decisions (e.g. by 
fund switching) However, it should be noted that if a State's 
expenditure preferences differ significantly from Commonwealth 
preferences, the imposition of matching grants by categories could 
lead to an increase in the likelihood of the State deciding not to 
meet its aggregate matching quota. The theory of matching grants 
(see references p.191) indicates that grants or preferences will have 
their maximum effectiveness on grantee governments if matching 
conditions are directed at the marginal expenditure of the grantee. 
In other words, any tendency for the States not to meet their road 
category quota requirement could be countered (to some extent) by 
imposing marginal matching ratios for each category These, presumably, 
would also be varied by State. If the objective of matching by 
categories is to improve efficiency in resource use, then some 
additional controls by the Commonwealth might be necessary. Matching 
by projects is one possibility. However, there are a number of cogent 
arguments against making extensive use of this technique. These include: 
"(i) the duplication, cost and difficulty of administration; 
(ii) the fact that many of the warranted projects would be 
undertaken by the States of their own volition; 
(iii) the need for consideration of specific local factors when 
examining which individual projects to undertake, and 
(iv) the argument that the States take prime responsibility for 
spending money that they raise together with the need to use 
existing administrative and financial structures developed 
in State authorities for making such decisions"-
Manion, V and Stevens, S., "Matching Conditions on Road Grants", 
Australian Road Research Board Proceedings, Vol, 7, Part 3, 1974, p,170. 
In view of the above, the approach suggested by the Bureau, namely, 
establishing project approval arrangements, is more sensible. 
Finally, it should be mentioned, that apart from the inter-jurisdictional 
externality argument, the question of whether the Commonwealth (the 
grantor) should impose its expenditure preferences on the States 
(the grantees) is one which generates a great deal of debate. We 
do not pursue this issue here. 
195. 
TABLE 7.17 Recommended Matching Quotas 
Expenditure on Construction of Urban Arterials from State Funds 
($million: current prices) 
Year 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
N,S.W. 
18.3 
19.4 
23.6 
27.3 
34.4 
VIC. 
22.7 
24.5 
25.3 
28.3 
34.2 
QLD. 
3.4 
3.4 
3.4 
3.4 
3.4 
S.A. 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
W.A. 
1.1 
2.3 
3.5 
4.3 
5.8 
TAS. 
1.2 
1.2 
1.2 
1.2 
1.2. 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973, 
p. 351. 
TABLE 7.18 Recommended Matching Quotas 
Expenditure on Construction of Minor Improvements Traffic 
Engineering and Road Safety from State Funds 
($million: current prices) 
Year 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
N.S.W. 
0.7 
1.2 
1.4 
2.2 
2.7 
VIC. 
0.7 
1.0 
1.3 
1.9 
2.3 
QLD. 
0.8 
1.1 
1.4 
1.7 
1.9 
S.A. 
0.4 
0.5 
0,6 
0.7 
0,8 
. 1 
W,A, 
0.4 
0.5 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
TAS. 
0.3 
0,4 
0,5 
0,5 
0.7 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973, 
p. 351. 
3.5 The 1974 Conmionwealth Aid Roads Legislation 
The roads aid legislation introduced into the Parliament in 1974 
by the Whitlam Labor Government did not amount to a complete endorsement 
of the Bureau of Roads' 1973 recommendations. However, it did live up 
to expectations in giving effect to the proposal that the Commonwealth 
Government should adopt a f?r greater role in the road expenditure 
decision making area than had hitherto been the case. 
196. 
Labor roads policy proposals were contained in three Bills: 
(i) A Transport Planning and Research Bill Cii) A National Roads Bill 
and (iii) A Roads Grants Bill which provided for financial assistance to 
the States for roads other than those declared as national roads. 
To a very large extent the legislation reflected the Bureau of 
Roads' 1973 recommendation regarding the detailed categorisation of 
Commonwealth road aid, differing in this.regard only with respect to the 
matter of beef cattle road grants and road maintenance. Whereas the 
Bureau had proposed that beef roads should be considered for evaluation 
in the rural arterial category, the Government saw fit to reject this 
advice and include a separate schedule for beef cattle roads, and in 
addition, not to include a road maintenance category-
There were, however, other differences between the legislation 
and the Bureau's recommendations. The government decided to assume full 
responsibility for the funding of national roads rather than provide 
eighty percent of the finance as recommended by the Bureau and the 
legislation was for a three rather than five year period. 
Of greater importance are the differences with respect to 
the size of the Commonwealth grant and the distribution of that grant 
among the States by the various road categories. The legislation provided 
for an amount of $l,126m (current prices) over the three year period, of 
which $700m was allocated under the Roads Act, including $24m for beef 
roads in Queensland, and $400m under the terms of the National Roads Act, 
which included a category of roads defined as export roads and major 
commercial roads - a category which was not identified in the Bureau of 
Roads 1973 Report, These roads were allocated $40m. And finally, an amount 
of $26m for planning and research. 
197 
Examination of the Bureau's recommended distribution of 
Commonwealth aid for all categories of expenditure over the first three 
years of its five year proposal show this to amount to $1,327m (current 
prices) or $201m greater than the amount provided for under the Labor 
Government's legislation. A comparison of the distribution of this aid 
by States and by road categories with the Bureau's recommendations (for 
both the three year period and recommended five year period) is shown 
respectively, in Tables 7.19 and 7.20 
As far as Table 7.19 is concerned it is clear that the 
distribution of Commonwealth aid among the States,and embodied in the 
1974 legislation, followed fairly closely the percentage distribution 
pattern recommended by the Bureau. The greatest difference is the share 
of the grant apportioned to Western Australia whose relative share was 
increased from 10.63 percent to 13.41 percent. 
Table 7.20 on the other hand indicates a marked difference between 
the Labor Government's priorities by road category and the Bureau's 
recommendations. Under the Labor Government's programme, national 
highways were allocated $400m thereby exceeding by $126.Im the recommended 
amount allocated to this category for the first three years of the 
Bureau's five year programme. In relative terms the national highways 
category received approximately 35 percent of the grant - an increase.of 
approximately 15 percent when compared with the Bureau's proposals. 
The relative shares of the other categories were altered as 
follows: the rural arterial share was reduced from nearly 18 percent to 
approximately 9 percent; urban arterials from about 35 percent to 31.5 
percent; rural locals from approximately 15 percent to about 14 percent 
and the road maintenance category from about 6 percent to zero, 
83, Note, the percentage differences relate to different levels of total 
grants i.e , Labor's three year reconmiendations are based on a total 
grant of $1126m vv/hile the Bureau's three year period allocation 
relates to a grant of $1327m. 
198. 
P 
o 
<: 
rt 
,3 
P 
a) 
, 3 P 
O 
P 
3 
•H 
13 
P 
o 
o 
u 
< 
in 
o 
p 
rt 
p 
cn 
>»" 
rP 
tn 
- 3 
O 
OS 
p 
o 
VH 
p 
rH 
rt 
> 
3 O 
O 
u 
«p 
o 
3 O 
•ri 
P 
3 
-3 
6 
t ^ 
CM 
to 
6e-
«p 
o 
in 
Ck 
QQ 
<D 
O 
3 
rt p 
tn 
H 
tn 
tn 
< 
i p 
o 
r-i 
O 
> 
<D 
• J 
a 
3 (U 
> 
•p 
u 
^ p 
P 
o 
p^ 
<u Oi 
to 
r^ 
cn 
rH 
. Oi 
O 
. CQ 
4) 
X 
P 
~^\ 
•H 
•H 
v—/ 
cn 
r-H 
^^ 00 
r^  
en 
r-i 
o p 
i n 
r^  
r t 
t^ 
cn 
rH 
- 3 
O 
•H 
P 
0) 
DH 
4) 
x: p 
P 
o 
vp 
tn 
3 
O 
•H 
P 
OJ 
13 
3 
0) 
p o 
o (U 
Di 
• Di 
• 
o 
• CQ 
o» t ^ 
+-> "^ p 00 
o r» 
P<cn 
O r-i 
Pi o to +J 
t-«. 
o> i n 
rH r^ 
•>^ 
• r t 
OS r^ 
• en 
O rH 
OQ - 3 
O 
O -H 
Xi P 
EH 0) 
Ou 
r^  
r-~ 
•p ^>. 
p vO 
O I ^ 
Pncn 
O rH 
ai 
o 
t o 4J 
r-~ 
en in 
r-i r -
• r t 
OS t ^ 
• en 
O >-i 
00 - 3 
o 
<0 -H 
x: P 
a. 
r^  
r--
• ^ 
vO 
t~^  
cn 
rH 
o 
tn p 
+-> t ) UO 
< r -
^^ 
r f r t 
t ^ r-^  
cn cn 
r-i r—i 
O - 3 
^ : 2 
p 
o 
a, 
4-> 
3 
O 
o p 
o 
Pu. 
-p 
3 
3 a O -bo-
g 
<2 
(i> 
o 
»P 3 
O rt 
•P S 
rH in r -
O -r l O 
> en \ 0 
a> tn CM 
r J < -feo-
en
t 
o 
p (U 
a, 
u
n
t 
m
 
o -se-
B 
< 
0) 
o 
^ 3 a 
o rt c~> 
+J CM 
rH in t o 
a> -H rH 
> in * 9 -
<ti tn 
i J < n 
•p 
3 
<U 
o p 
0) 
p . 
•p 
3 
3 e O -w-
s 
^ 
<u 
o 
t p 3 H 
O rt vO 
4-> CM 
rH tn rH 
<D -H rH 
> tn «>e-
<u in 
J < n 
i n 
r t 
CM 
t o 
o 
VO 
r t 
00 
. 
& 
CO 
• 
z 
t o 
vO 
CM 
to 
t o 
t o 
r t 
. 
^ 
CO 
» 
z 
/—\ 
vO 
r t 
r-i 
to 
\ < 
i n 
CM 
r f 
LO 
t o 
, 3; 
CO 
z 
t o 
vO 
CM 
Cvl 
O 
o 
en i n 
u IH 
> 
00 
o 
CM 
CM 
t o 
cn CM 
u 
HH 
> 
r~\ 
vO 
00 
o CM 
\—j 
t o 
00 
r t 
to 
CM 
u hH 
> 
VO 
00 
O 
CM 
. 
O 
o 
r^  i n 
Q 
1-3 
cy 
i n 
CM 
rH 
CM 
CM 
oo 
CM 
a 
1-3 
cy 
t--
i n 
o CM 
vO 
vO 
rH 
to 
CM 
Q 
• J 
cy 
vO 
00 
r^  
o 
m 
o CM 
< 
• CO 
r t 
c-^  
00 
vO 
rH 
rH 
< 
, CO 
<—^ 
i n 
en 
00 
^^—' 
rH 
00 
O 
O 
rH 
< 
CO 
• < * 
CM 
o 
r-i 
O 
t ^ 
vO 
CM 
< 
• 
s= 
t o 
vO 
O 
rH 
rH 
r t 
rH 
< 
• 
^ 
r-i 
r t 
to 
rH 
to 
o 
r-i 
i n 
rH 
< 
• 3 : 
en 
• ^ 
r t 
O 
cn CM 
r^ 
CO 
<: EH 
r^  
vO 
r t 
CM 
vO 
CO 
< E-" 
to 
r--
r t 
CT> 
CM 
t o 
LO 
CO 
< 
EH 
t ^ 
O 
vO 
CM 
t ^ 
CM 
t o 
rH 
VD 
CM 
rH 
rH 
• J 
< 
E-
O 
EH 
X! 
rH 
rt 
I 
o 
o 
u 
r t 
cn 
.3 
•3 
to 
cn 
•H 
rH 
rt 
p 
+J 
CO 
tn 
- 3 
O 
OS 
3 O 
+J 
P 
o 
oT 
OS 
«n 
- 3 
rt 
o 
OS 
CH 
o 
O 
P 
3 
OQ 
P> 
^ 
(1> 
^ 
3 
O 
1 o 
u 
4-> 
O 
< 
tn 
-3 
rt 
o OS 
CD 
tJ 
P 
3 
o 
CO 
199. 
rt 
en 
.3 
p 
o 
4-> 
bO 3 
.H 
p 
O 
O 
O 
< 
a> 
• H 
P 
o 
bO 
(U 
p 
rt 
u 
na 
rt 
o 
OS 
,o 
•3 
•H 
< 
,3 
P 
rH 
rt 
0) 
3 
O 
o 
u 
tp 
o 
3 
o 
•H 
P 3 
XI 
•H 
P 
P 
W 
• H 
Q 
lU 
OO 
a 
p 
3 
fl) 
o p 
o 
a, 
o 
CM 
r j 
CQ 
• 3 
t ^ 
CM 
to 
r-i 
«P 
o 
o 
• p 
in 
•H 
to 
to 
< 
t p 
o 
r-i 
O 
> 
o J 
a 
3 
o 
> 
•H 
^ 
9K 
P 
P 
O 
PH 
ov OS 
to 
t ^ 
en 
rH 
. OS 
o 
. CO 
<D 
X 
P 
/—\ 
•H 
•H 
V / 
P 
o 
< 
tn 
TJ 
rt 
O 
OS 
cn 
t ^ 
*">.. 00 
t ^ 
cn 
r-i 
o p> 
i n 
t ^ 
^ s ^ 
r t 
r--
a> 
r-i 
T l 
o 
•H 
P 
O 
&, 
d) 
x: p 
p 
o <4H 
V) 
3 
O 
•H 
P 
rt 
- 3 
3 
<U 
E 
g 
O 
O 
0) 
OS 
DS 
, 
o 
, OQ 
•P 
P 
O 
9i CD 
OS r--
tn 00 
•xJ t ^ 
d cn 
O rH 
o; 
o 
«p + j 
o i n 
3 t--
rt -^ 
<D r t 
P r -
3 cn 
oa iH 
•p 
P 
o 
P^ 
<u t ^ 
OS t--
tn vo 
- 3 l~^ 
oi cn 
O rH 
OS 
o tP 4J 
o i n 
3 t - . 
vi -"v.. 
0 r t 
P t-« 
3 cn 
Ca rH 
C
ts
 
< 
r t 
cn 
rH 
0) 
Xi 
E-
>> P 
o bO 
O 
+J 
rt 
U 
"3 
cd 
O 
OS 
4-> 
O -e^-
^ 
+J 
3 
5 o P 
<i> 
a. 
•p 
§ s O -fe^ -
^ 
+ j 
3 4) 
t ) 
p 
di 
p. 
u
n
t 
m
 
O -fee-
^ 
+J 
3 (U 
t ) 
1 
Pe
r 
to 
r-i 
m 
oo 
vO 
<J> 
rH 
cn 
to 
CM 
r t 
vO 
O 
CM 
O 
o 
r t 
CM 
i n 
i n 
to 
tn 
X 
cH 
S 
Xi 
bo 
•H 
K 
'c3 3 O 
•H 
•P 
rt 
Z 
CM 
iH 
cn 
00 
cn 
r t 
t o 
r^ 
o 
vO 
r t 
CM 
r--
r t 
to 
i n 
i n 
t o 
to 
i n 
r-i 
t o 
rH 
Vi 
•H 
P 
<1> 
•P 
P 
< 
3 
vi 
X) 
P 
n 
en 
t ^ 
' ^ 
r^ 
to 
00 
rH 
rH 
r^ 
t o 
r^ 
CO 
r^ 
r-i 
i n 
o 
r-i 
t o 
to 
en 
1 
P I 
O 
rH 
<a 
> 
<D 
a 
.» 
rH 
Vi tn 
•H ns 
P vi 
<D o 
P OS 
P 
< -H 
vi 
rH +J 
rt 3 
p 0) 
3 S OS 
m 
vO 
t o 
o r t 
r-i 
O 
en 
iH 
t o 
r t 
r-i 
O 
t o 
VO 
vO 
CM 
in 
• 3 
rt 
o 
oi 
r-i 
ci 
o 
o 
. J 
3 
vi 
X ) 
P 
3 
o 
i n 
00 
t o 
t>^ 
r-N 
r t 
r-i 
t^ 
cn 
cn 
rH 
i n 
o 
i n 
rH 
vO 
i n 
r-i 
i n 
00 
t o 
rH 
in 
•XJ 
a 
o OS 
rH 
Vi 
o 
o 
.-J 
r-i 
ri 
p 
3 Ccl 
O 
CM 
r>« 
vO 
f -
CM 
r--
r t 
t o 
CM 
vO 
CM 
O 
t o 
vO 
vO 
CM 
. CO 
. OS 
• 
w 
* E-
t—i 
. S 
i n 
i n 
r t 
<—1 
00 
i n 
i n 
en 
o 
00 
o 
r-i 
vO 
p 
o bO 
0) 
•p 
vi 
o 
o 
3 
4) 
t> 
3 
rt 
3 
<o 
•p 
3 
•H 
Vi 
S 
' 3 
rt 
o OS 
o 
o 
•<a-
t o 
i n 
r-i 
o 
rH 
CM 
00 
i n 
rH 
vO 
CM 
r-i 
to 
CVI 
r 3 
o p 
rt 
© 
tn 
4) 
OS 
- 3 
3 
rt 
bO 
3 
•H 
3 
3 
rt 
r-i 
a. 
1 
1 
1 
r t 
CM 
t o 
rH 
CM 
tn 
• 3 
vi 
o OS 
UH 
o 4J 
CQ 
O 
CM 
t ^ 
r -
3 
•H 
• 3 
O 
- 3 
3 
rH 
O 
3 
•H 
. rt 
• 3 
> N 
P 
rt 
•p 
3 
4) 
6 
4> 
rH 
P H 
&• 3 
cr 
• < * 
i n 
r-i 
• 
•n 
4> 
P 
3 
bo 
«p 
4> 
> 
o XJ 
vi 
• 
rt 
• 3 
3 O 
•H 
•P 
rt 
*n 
•H 
rH 
rt 
3 
c r 
iU 
r>» 
o 
VO 
CM 
vO 
CM 
rH 
rH 
r-i 
Vi 
P 
O 
^ . . 
xi 
•p 
fH 
rt 
4> S 3 
O 
o 
u 
r t 
t ^ 
cn 
o 
xi 
to 
cn 
vi 
. H 
rH 
Vi 
P 
+J 
tn 
3 
•H 
to 
-3 
rt 
o 
OS 
3 
o 
p 
o 
PH 
4) 
OS 
• P 
P 
O 
P^ 
4> 
OS 
in 
-3 
vi 
O 
OS 
CH 
O 
^ 
4> 
P 
3 
CQ 
• P . 
4> O 
o w 
i '3 
g CO 
o o 
U OS 
4> 
o 
p 3 
o 
CO 
200. 
Further, the relative share of the grant to urban locals was increased 
from about 1.4 percent to about 2.7 percent; the planning and research 
category increased from approximately 1.5 percent to 2.3 percent; the 
percentage share to M.I.T.E.R.S. remained about the same (2.6 percent), 
while Beef Roads received 2.13 percent of the grant. 
The extent of the differences between the Bureau's proposals (i.e. 
over the first three years of the proposed five year programme), and the 
1974 legislation can also be seen from Table -'7.21 There it is shown 
how the Commonwealth grant of $1126m would have been distributed had the 
Bureau's proposed relative shares been adopted. 
TABLE 7.21 Differences Between Road Grants According to (i) the 1974 
Acts and (ii) Relative Shares Derived from B.O.R, 1973 Report 
Road Category 
National Highways 
Urban Arterial 
Rural Arterial 
Urban Local 
Rural Local 
M,I T,E,R.S, 
Road Maintenance 
Planning and Research 
Beef Roads 
Total Grant 
Actual Amount 
of Commonwealth 
Aid 
(1) 
$m 
400 
355 
105 
30 
156 
30 
-
26 
24 
1126m 
Amount of Aid Based 
on % Distribution 
Derived from B.O,R. 
for Three Year Period 
1974/75 to 1976/77 
(2) 
$m 
232.40 
390.95 
201.22 
16.10 
169.46 
29.50 
68.68 
17 79 
-
1126m 
(1) 
+ 
-
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
• + 
+ 
- (2) 
$m 
167.60 
35.95 
96.22 
13.90 
13.46 
0.5 
68.68 
8.21 
24.0 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973, 
and the 1974 Commonwealth Roads Acts. 
201, 
Further information about (a) the distribution of road aid 
to the States, by road category, according to the 1974 legislation and 
the Bureau's three and five year recommendations, and (b) the distribution 
of each State's road grant by road category according to the 1974 legislation 
and the Bureau's three and five year recommendation is shown, respectively, 
in Tables 7.22 and 7.23 
From Table 7.22 it can be seen that the percentage distribution 
of amounts allocated under the 1974 legislation to each of the States 
by road category was not too different^ in most cases, from the 
percentage distribution determined on either the basis of the Bureau's 
allocation over the same period or the five year period 1974/75 to 1978/79, 
The greatest discrepancies generally occur when the comparison is made 
with the five year period or within the urban local and rural local 
categories. The main differences in percentages are as follows: 
National Highways: +3,73 percent for South Australia and 
- 3,05 percent for New South Wales 
Urban Arterials: +4,78 percent for Western Australia 
Rural Arterials: 2.83 percent for New South Wales; 
5,12 percent for Queensland and 
+12.46 percent for Western Australia 
Urban Local: - 8.43 percent Victoria; 
+ 8.11 percent for Queensland. 
Rural Local: - 10.39 percent for Queensland and 
+ 8.41 percent for Western Australia 
M.I.T.E.R.S.: + 3 percent for South Australia 
As far as Table 7,23 is concerned the following observations are 
made. First, for each of the States the percentage distribution of the total 
grant by road categories as derived from the Bureau's Report for both 
the three and five year periods tend not to differ all that much: the 
202. 
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maximum differences occurring in the case of South Australia and Tasmania, 
and then only within the range of about 3 percent to 8 percent. Second, 
the main percentage differences occur when a comparison is made between 
the percentage distribution according to the 1974 Acts and the Bureau's 
three and five year recommendations. As already indicated the major 
shift in the allocation of funds was towards the national highways category, 
largely at the expense of the rural arterials category, although the extent 
to which this occurs varies from State to State. 
Finally, some of the data contained in Table 7.23 are rearranged 
in Table 7.24 to show the absolute and percentage differences between the 
size of the grants allocated to each State by road category under the 
terms of the 1974 Acts, and the Bureau's recommendations for the same 
period. At the global level the Table reveals a gain of $126.Im for 
national highways when compared with the Bureau's results; a reduction 
of $132.Im for rural arterials; a reduction of $105.7m for urban arterials; 
an increase of $llm for urban locals; a reduction of $43.7m for rural 
locals; and reductions of $4.7m and $5m respectively, for M.I.T.E.R.S. and 
planning and research. As observed earlier no provision was made under the 
1974 Act for road maintenance, which according to the Bureau's calculations, 
warranted a grant of $80.9m, while the retention of a beef cattle road 
grant, for which $24m were allocated, was also at variance with the 
Bureau's proposals. 
It is clear from the above description of the quantitative 
aspects of the Labor Government's road legislation that while it broadly 
reflected the pattern of distribution of road grants among the States, 
and by road categories among the States, as recommended by the Bureau's 
Report, it departed a great deal from those recommendations in so far as 
the total size of the grant is concerned and the priority given to each 
of the road categories. In addition the government rejected the Bureau's 
advice regarding matching grants by road categories, and further, because 
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of the difference between the recommended grant and the actual grant, reduced 
the size of the general matching grant requirement. The adjustment, however, 
resulted in a ratio of quotas to Commonwealth- aid of about 87 percent 
which was 5 percent more than the corresponding ratio derived from the 
Bureau's Report. A comparison of the Bureau's recommended quota requirements 
and those introduced by the government is shown in Table 7.25 
The Labor Government's decision to reduce the period of the 
roads legislation to three years instead of accepting the Bureau's 
advice for a continuation of what had been the practice for many years, 
namely, a five year period, and to substantially reduce the size of the 
grant by $201m over the three year period, and thus to depart from its 
commitment, when in opposition, to a refunding of the entire proceeds of 
the petrol tax to the States, was explained as follows. It was 
claimed that the shorter time period was adopted for the reason that the 
government was " working towards rationalising our separate road and 
urban transport assistant measures into a clearly co-ordinated set of 
84 
arrangements", and that legislation designed to give effect to such 
arrangements would be introduced by the government within the period of 
the 1974 roads legislation. 
As to the matter of the size of the differences in the level 
of Commonwealth roads aid (compared with the Bureau's recommendations)', the 
government explained this in terms of its commitment to other areas of 
expenditure, in particular to its initiatives in the health, education, 
welfare and urban and regional development sectors; to the state of the 
economy; to new commitments in other parts of the transport sector, namely, 
84. Australian Parliamentary Debates (A.P.D.) (House of Representatives), 
18th July, 1974, p. 379. 
208. 
LO 
o> 
o 
•H 
fH 
0 
a, 
o 
Xi 
•p 
fH 
o 
«4-l 
W 
•H 
•P 
rt 
•O 
C 
0 
P 
P 
o 
o 0 
OS 
• 
oi 
• 
o 
n 
0 
Xi 
p 
/^•N 
•H 
t—/ 
o p 
DO 
c 
•H 
•o fH 
o 
o o 
< 
vt 
p 
c 0 
e 0 
fH 
•H 
D 
cr 0 
OS 
rt 
p 
o 3 
cy 
c 
o 
•H 
P 
rt 
4- t 
WJ 
•H 
bO 
0 
>-J 
(A 
T3 
rt 
o 
oi 
.n 
p 
r H 
rt 0 
S 
c o 
e B O 
CJ 
"* 
r-N 
o> 
r-i 
0 
.c p 
r-N 
•H 
•H 
V ' 
T3 
C 
rt 
t^ 
r^  
^^  vO 
t^ 
C7> 
i-H 
o p 
in 
CQ 
p 
o 
< 
rt fH 
r^ rt 
o> 0 o 
r^ >^ O 
DO 
•H >s 
O rH 
0 "D 
vO 
P t>-
(rt 0% 
bO 
OS 
oa 
fH 
vi 
0 
3 
•-3 
vO 
• P C^ 
tn 
p 
o 
< 
I 
0> 0 o 
fH 
rt 
bO 
O rH 
0 "-5 
tn 
P r^ (rt cn 
OS 
oa 
fH 
vi 
0 
DO 
• H 
O 
0 
3 
P r--
p 
o 
< 
•^  
r-Cft 
r H 
U B 
Vi B 
0 O 
>N O 
DO 
• H 
O . 
C 3 
0 *-i 
p r-
bo 
OS 
oa 
vi 
0 
o 
0 3 •-3 
P r~^  
B 
•ee-
\ o c s VO 
o 
at I-H 
B 
•ee- CM 
0 0 
LO 
in a> 
LO t o 
B 
•ee-
vO t o 
CM 
t o CN 0 0 
CNl 
B 
•ee-
vo CM 
t o o 
t ^ 
"^  
r H 
t o 
6 
•ee-
\ o to to 
CM 
t o 
0 0 
vO 
t o 
tn 
CM 
B 
• ee 
\ 0 i n t o CM 
^ CM 
CM 0 > 
o 0 0 
CN 
0 
P 
Vi 
P 
CO 
tfl 
0 
r-i 
Vi 
& 
Xi 
•p 3 
O 
CO 
3: 
0 
vi 
•ri 
U 
O 
P 
o 
7 3 
I-H 
Irt 
0 
0 
rt 
•H 
I-H 
Vi 
fH 
p 
(rt 
3 
O 
CO 
t o 
t o 
t o vO 
t o 
0 0 
CN 
t n 
o> 
vo tn 
r H O 
t o r H 
0 0 
t o 
CM 
in 
0 0 
t o 
vi 
• H 
I-H 
C Vi 
u u 
0 p 
• P (rt (rt 3 
0 < : 
vi 
•H C 
rt 
B (rt 
rt 
E-
t o 
t o 
tn 
t o 
\ 0 
o 
CN 
t o 
vO 
CM 
SO 
t o 
cn 
o 
t o 
CM 
l O 
p 
o 
E-
o 
• p 
fH 
o 
P4 
0 
OS 
10 
•n 
vi 
o 
o:: 
<4H 
o 
0 
3 
OQ 
Xi 
+ j 
rH 
Vi 
0 
o 
o 
u 
tn 
<* 
cn 
r H • 
0 0 
o to 
t o • 
in PL, 
o 
z N — ' 
r f 
r-
cn 
r-i 
P 
o 
<: 
(rt 
p 
c 
rt fH 
CJ 
- 3 
rt O 
oi 
to 
r-. CT> 
I-H 
.. 
rt 
•H 
I-H 
rt 
fH 
• P 
(rt 
3 
< 
fi 
•H 
(rt 
-o 
rt 
o Oi 
0 
o 
fH 
3 
O 
CO 
209, 
the provision of financial assistance to the States for urban public 
transport projects; and to its agreement with the South Australian 
Government to construct new railways joining Adelaide to the standard 
gauge railway and Tarcoola to Alice Springs, 
Further, there is also the question of why the Commonwealth 
decided not to accept the pattern of road grant priorities recommended 
by the Bureau. Given the difference between the size of the Commonwealth 
road programme and the programme recommended by the Bureau, it is of 
course possible that on efficiency grounds the priority pattern would also 
have differed. But by how much and in which direction one cannot tell 
since no economic calculations were made. 
The most plausible explanation is that political considerations 
were of paramount importance. On the one hand the decision to make 
explicit provision for beef cattle roads would seem to have been motivated 
largely by a desire to strengthen the government's hold on the Queensland 
85 
electorate of Dawson, while the decision to give greater emphasis to 
national highways was partly an outcome of the political pressures exerted 
by the anti-freeway movement which had gathered momentum during 1973 
and 1974, and especially, of the government's assessment of the political 
85. The Queensland seat of Dawson was then held by the then Minister for 
Northern Development, Dr. Rex Patterson. 
86. The views held by the then Minister for Urban and Regional Development, 
Mr. T. Uren , are worth noting: 
"For many years I have been depicted as an anti-freeway man. Because 
I have expressed doubts about freeways at times when the popular belief 
was that freeways would cure all our traffic ills I was depicted as an 
anti-car man. I want to stress that I have never condemned freeways and 
cars as such. What I have condemned is the short sighted attitude that 
freeways will solve all our transport problems. It is a common belief 
that because car travel is increasing we need greater road space to 
absorb the extra cars. It is my belief that this approach is founded 
on a fallacy. Car travel increases so we build more and bigger roads. 
This leads to more travel, more cars and calls for still more road 
space. This means that we are trapped on a tread mill off which we 
cannot jvrnip. Encouraging an ever-increasing use of the car can only end 
in social and economic chaos. I believe that the basic fault has been 
to give too much attention to the supply side; ..." [Author's emphasis] 
A.P.D., 1st August, 1974, p. 1009. 
210. 
benefits to be gained by giving substantially more weight (than recommended 
by the Bureau of Roads) to national highways, largely at the expense of 
the rural arterial category/ Thus^ it was the government's intention to 
force the States to assume greater responsibility for roads other than 
national highways. As expressed by the Commonwealth Minister for 
Transport, Mr Jones: 
"The Government, however has decided that the task (i.e. of 
developing the national highways system) is of such importance to 
justify the Australian Government taking full responsibility for 
the cost, thus freeing the states to use their own sources of 
finance for the construction of other roads covered by the 
Roads Grants Bill"87 
and again, 
" I want to make the particular point that previously local 
government authorities relied on Commonwealth Aid Roads Grants. 
Whilst local government is still eligible for assistance under 
this legislation these authorities will now have to turn more 
to state governments for assistance with the Australian 
Government meeting the full cost of national roads, state 
governments will be able to meet this increased demand for 
financial assistance from their local authorities."88 
As events transpired a significant part of Labor's road programme 
proved unacceptable to the Liberal/Country party opposition and a majority 
89 
of the States. Indeed it gave rise to political conflict reminiscent of 
the controversy which surrounded the Bruce/Page Government's 1926 C.A.R. Act, 
While objections were voiced against a number of aspects of 
the quantitative side of the programme the major political conflict 
centred on other issues. Taking the Road Grants Bill first, the most 
contentious sections were Clause 4 subsection (1) especially, and Clause 11 
subsections (1) and (2) Specifically, the former states: 
87 Ibid., 18th July, 1974, p. 380 
88. Ibid., p. 385, 
89. These were the then non-Labor States of N.S.W.; Qld.; Vic; and W.A. 
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"(1) A Minister may notify a State the date before which 
a program of projects in respect of a specified kind, 
is to be submitted to him for approval, and may, in 
the notice, inform the State that the program should 
include all the projects of that kind that are to be 
carried out by the State and by municipal shire and 
other local authorities in that period." 
while Clause 11 states: 
"(1) This section applies to and in relation to a program 
of projects of a particular kind if a Minister informed 
the State, in the notice given under sub section 4(1) in 
relation to the program, that the program should include 
all the projects carried out by the State and by municipal 
shire and other local authorities in the period to which 
the programme relates; 
(2) Where this section applies to and in relation to a program 
of projects of a particular kind approved in respect of a 
State, payment of an amount to the State under this Act 
is subject to the condition that the State will repay that 
amount, or such lesser amount as the Minister, with the 
concurrence of the Treasurer determines, to Australia if 
the Minister notifies the State that he is satisfied that 
the State or a municipal shire or other local authority has 
in the year to which the program applies, expended any 
moneys on the carrying out of projects of that kind that 
were not included in the program of projects of that 
kind approved in respect of the State." 
Some other sections of the Roads Bill which were also subject to 
attack were: (i) Clause 4 subsections (3), (4) and (7) which provided for the 
granting of urban road expenditure approval powers to the Commonwealth Minister for 
Transport; (ii) Clause 4 subsection (5) which granted road approval 
powers to the Minister of State for Northern Development; and (iii) Clause 
12 subsections (b) and (c) which laid down conditions concerning Australian 
Government representation on State organisations responsible for road planning 
and/or furnishing advice on road matters. In addition objections were also 
90 
levelled at Clause (4) subsections (3) and (4) of the National Roads Bill 
90. See page 214. 
92 
212. 
The Roads Bill was also attacked on the grounds that it was an 
91 
attempt to "... subvert the Constitution" ,. that it "... cut right across 
the democratic process of taxation with representation and responsibility., 
93 
and that it would prove to be administratively highly inefficient. 
In considering the first claim it is doubtful whether it can be 
given much credence. As Professor G. Sawer has argued, the High Court's 
decision of 1957 in re-affirming the constitutional validity of the uniform 
tax scheme "... settled beyond doubt that there are virtually no limits 
94 
to the conditions which the Commonwealth may specify" in providing grants 
to the States under section 96 of the Constitution. 
Apart from the administrative efficiency argument which was 
concerned with the legislation's "... potential for delay, procrastination and 
95 
argument before any road project can be put under way" the major source 
of dispute was a philosophical one concerning centralism versus States' 
rights. 
Clearly, there can be little doubt that the 1974 Roads Bill was 
by far the most centralist roads legislation introduced by an Australian 
Government since the 1926 C.A.R. Act. As can be seen from Clause (4) 
subsection (1) and Clause (11) subsections (1) and (2), what the Labor 
Government required was not simply approval powers regarding the use of 
Australian Government road grants, but in addition, powers of approval over 
the use of road funds derived from State and Local Government sources of 
revenue. This proposed extension of power was justified by the government 
in terms of its desire to achieve a more rational (efficient) use of resources 
91. A.P.O., 2nd August, 1974, p. 1072. 
92. Ibid., 1st August, 1974, p. 989. 
93. Ibid. 
94. G. Sawer, "The Whitlam revolution in Australian federalism - promise, 
possibilities and performance". Centre for Research on Federal Financial 
Relations. The Australian National University. Reprint Series No. 12, 
p. 320. ~ 
^^ - A I L L E " 1st August, 1974, p. 989. 
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96 in the road sector. To the non Labor States, however, and the coalition 
parties who, at the time were involved in formulating what was to become 
97 known as "The New Federalism Policy", such an extension of power was 
viewed as an infringement of States' rights - in this case the right of the 
States to determine their own road expenditure priorities from revenues 
derived from State taxes and charges. As expressed by the then shadow 
Minister for Transport, Mr Nixon: 
96. "The underlying philosophy of our approach to transport is to recongise 
the inter connection of the various modes and to promote the development 
of a more rational approach to transport overall. It is therefore 
illogical to provide large sioms of money in a number of important 
areas „ without recognising that roads built by States and municipal 
authorities form just as much a part of the transport system as do 
roads and other means of transport financed by means of Australian 
Government grants All in all the Australian Government has a 
responsibility to associate itself more closely with the States in 
making decisions involving the significant disbursement of Australian 
funds. Only in this way can we achieve the development of our major 
transport goals." Ibid., 18th July, 1974. p, 385, (Mr, Jones, 
Minister for Transport) 
Also: 
"The roads legislation enacted by the Australian Government in 1974 
is a genuine attempt to allocate available funds to roads in 
accordance with needs rather than in accordance with the amount of 
pressure brought to bear by interest groups" Ibid,, 30th October, 
1975, p. 2658. 
97 Regarding Section 96 grants the coalition parties Federalism policy 
states: 
"The coalition parties are convinced that national objectives can be 
fully asserted and social reforms achieved and maintained with a more 
selective use of such grants and without heavy handed interference 
and duplication of functions. Many of the existing Section 96 
grants are now part of well established and accepted programmes 
within the States. The money for such programmes could be transformed 
to general purpose revenue reimbursement and ultimately absorbed 
in the States' income tax revenue, 
, Indeed, Section 96 will be used as it was originally intended 
it should be used, namely to make grants to the States for special 
purposes and not to make inroads into the constitutional responsibilities 
of the States" 
Liberal and National Country Parties, Federalism Policy, Canberra, 
September 1975, 
214, 
"We object most strongly to the Australian Government having 
the right to oversee and control programs financed with 
money raised by the local governments through rates paid by 
rate payers and expended locally by the local government. A 
similar situation applies in relation to State taxes. There 
is no justification whatsoever for this Government to intrude 
so heavily into State administration unless the States agree 
to the oversight of moneys raised by State taxes for State 
programs. Indeed this principle strikes at a very important 
point. This Bill will prevent an elected State government which 
wants to go to the people with a policy of taxing motorists to 
raise money for roads from laying down its program,"98 
In contrast to the Roads Bill, the National Roads Bill was 
generally acceptable to the opposition parties and the States, Criticism 
was, as observed earlier, confined largely to Clause 4 subsection (3) 
and Clause 4 subsection (4), These respectively state: 
"(3) The Minister may declare a road in a State that 
facilitates, or a proposed road in a State that 
would, if constructed, facilitate trade and commerce, 
or the development of trade and commerce, with other 
countries to be an export road for the purposes of 
this Act and may revoke or vary such a declaration," 
"(4) The Minister may declare a road in a State that 
facilitates, or a proposed road in a state that would, 
if constructed, facilitate, trade and commerce or the 
development of trade and commerce, among the States 
to be a major commercial road for the purposes of this 
Act, and may revoke or vary such a declaration." 
Once again the main thrust of the opposition's criticism was 
directed at the extent of the power sought by the Labor Government. In 
99 brief, it was contended that by virtue of the "... open cheque" nature 
of the above provisions the Commonwealth Minister would be in a position 
to "... frustrate the planning of any of the States or local authorities.. 
Such a possibility was presented as a "... complete contradiction of the 
M 100 
Constitution ... and ... wrong in principle". Accordingly, it was proposed, 
in the form of two amendments, that instead of the Commonwealth having 
unilateral powers of declaration and revocation concerning export and 
98. A.P.P.,2nd August, 1974, p. 1071. 
99. Ibid., p. 1085. 
100, Ibid, 
101, Ibid. 
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commercial roads, this power should be replaced by the requirement that the 
102 
Minister may "enter into an agreement with a State" regarding such matters. 
Overall the coalition parties criticism of the Roads Billi" 
resulted, at the House of Representatives stage of the debates, in 
thirteen proposed amendments to the Roads Bill and five proposed amendments 
to the National Roads Bill. None of these was acceptable to the Labor Govern-
ment and both Bills were passed by the House of Representatives on the 2nd 
August, 1974. 
The outcome of the Senate's deliberation, however, was significantly 
different. The Labor party did not command a majority in the Senate. In 
an endeavour to force acceptance of its policy the government threatened 
to cease interim financing if the Bills were not passed in the current 
103 
session. Notwithstanding this threat the Senate passed both Bills in 
amended form on the 16th August, 1974. Confronted by this move the Labor 
Government altered its stance by agreeing to accept most of the amendments. 
With respect to the Roads Bill the government was not prepared 
to accept either the entire removal of sub clause (1) of Clause 4 or 
the entire removal of Clause (11), while with regard to the National Roads 
Bill it was unwilling to accept the amendments, as noted above, concerning 
Clause 4 subsections (3) and (4) 
As a salvage operation the government proposed that alternative 
amendments to the Roads Bill be agreed to, namely, that for Clause 4(1) 
powers of approval relate only to a programme of projects by.way of the 
102. Ibid., p. 1084. 
103. This threat was announced by the then Minister for Transport, Mr R. Jones 
in a "News Release" dated 8th August, 1974, Earlier, Mr. Jones had 
stated in the House of Representatives that: 
"I say to the Opposition now: 'If you, in another place, amend 
this Bill there will not be any money available because we are 
not prepared under any circumstances to accept an amendment to 
this Bill which destroys the policy of this Government' So I 
warn the Opposition that we will not accept amendments. If it 
wants to withhold $l,126m from the states and local governments 
over the next 3 years it can go ahead and use its numbers in 
another place". 
Ibid., 1st August, 1974, p. 1022. 
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construction of urban arterial roads, ' and for Clause (11) the 
requirement regarding repayments to the Commonwealth in cases where State 
funds were not spent on projects included in the approved programme, be 
amended to apply only to approved urban arterial roads. Finally, in 
rejecting the amendments to Clause 4 sub sections (3) and (4) of the 
National Roads Bill the Government advanced the following reasons: 
"1 The declaration of a road as an 'export' road or a 'major 
commercial' road is no different to declarations of 
National Highways, of the various categories of roads under 
the Roads Grants Bill 1974 and of the various categories 
or roads under the previous 1969 Commonwealth Aid Roads Act 
where the Minister had or is proposed to have the sole right 
of declaration. 
2. 'Export' and 'major commercial' roads being roads which would 
facilitate or would, if built, facilitate trade and commerce, 
or the development of trade and commerce, with other countries 
and among the States come within the constitutional power of 
Australia",106 
104. A.P.P., (Senate), 17th September, 1974, p. 1126. 
105. The first sign that the Labor Government was willing to accept a 
weaker version of Clause 4(1) of the Roads Bill appeared in a 
statement made by the Minister for Transport, Mr. Jones. The 
statement was tabled in the Senate on the 13th August, 1974. In 
part it reads: 
".. The States and local government will not be required to submit 
for approval the road works program financed from their own funds 
for the following categories: urban local roads, rural local roads, 
development roads, beef roads and minor traffic engineering and 
road safety improvements. The Australian Government will, however, 
require the submission for approval of road programs for all urban 
arterial roads, irrespective of whether financed from Australian 
Government sources. The Australian Government will also be 
looking for the States to submit for approval a partial program only 
of road work to be financed from its own resources in respect of 
rural arterial roads. ITiis partial program will cover only those 
arterial roads in which the Australian Government has a particular 
interest. There are road works on rural arterial roads forming part 
of an interstate road link and those which affect designated growth 
centres. Where a full program of road works to be financed from 
State or local government sources is not required to be submitted for 
approval the States will be asked to provide details of their works 
for information." Ibid., p. 801. 
106. Ibid., 17th September, 1974, p. 1128. 
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In each case the Labor Government's proposed amendments to the 
Senate proposals were accepted by the Senate and both Bills were passed by 
the Senate on the 17th September, 1974.1°'^  
3,6 Amendments to the 1974 Roads Act 
About a year later legislation to amend the 1974 Roads Act 
was introduced to the Parliament by the Labor Transport Minister, The 
purpose of the legislation was to provide additional financial assistance 
to the amount of $64m to assist the States in offsetting the effects of 
inflation, and to amend the Act to allow the States a ",,. slight but 
necessary additional measure of flexibility in transferring* funds between 
108 
road categories specified in the legislation". However, the Bill was 
not ratified by the Parliament, The government was dismissed by the 
Governor General, Sir John Kerr, on the 11th November, 1975 and defeated 
at the General election held a month later. 
In April 1976 the Coalition Government introduced a modified 
version of the previous government's Roads Acts Amendment Bill. The Amendment 
Act differed from Labor's Bill in the following respects. It removed 
the provision requiring Commonwealth approval for urban arterial and urban 
107. The willingness of the opposition to accept the government's reasons for 
not accepting the proposed amendments to Clause 4(3) and (4) of the 
National Roads Bill was explained by Senator Durack (Liberal) as follows:-
"The Opposition will ... forgo the amendments which the House of 
Representatives will not agree to. We will accept some satisfaction 
from the House of Representatives agreeing to others, ... the result 
seems to be 2 all and perhaps that is a fair compromise all round. 
I cannot say that the Opposition is happy about the extended powers of 
the Federal Minister in relation to the declaration of other than 
national highways, that is, the declaration of export or major 
commercial roads. We believe that these extend probably to what are 
more or less State functions. Nevertheless, the High Court will 
presumably keep the Minister in line if he transgresses the constitutional 
power in these matters". Ibid,, p, 1129. 
108, A,P.D,, (House of Representatives), 30th October, 1975, p. 2658. 
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freeway projects where these were financed entirely from State derived 
sources of revenue. It rescinded the requirement for Commonwealth approval 
of urban local and rural local road projects funded by Commonwealth grants. 
In place of this requirement, the Amendment Act provided for Commonwealth 
approval of a State's proposed distribution of such aid among its various 
Local Government Authorities. While the Amendment Act provided for the same 
amount of aid as Labor's Bill, and the same distribution of that aid among the 
States, it provided for a different distribution of that aid among the road 
categories. This is shown in Table 7.26. 
As can be seen from the Table the government gave much higher 
priority to rural arterial and development roads and rural local roads 
than that intended by Labor's 1975 Amendment Bill. Whereas the latter 
provided for approximately 24 percent of the additional grant to be allocated 
to rural roads (excluding national roads), approximately 36 percent to 
national roads and about 36 percent to urban roads, the 1976 Amendment Act 
(No. 36) allocated about 45 percent of the grant to rural roads; 23 percent 
to national roads, and 31 percent to the urban roads category In arriving 
at this pattern the government claimed that it had simply responded to the 
109 
".. views and wishes" of the States. 
Six months later another Amendment Act was introduced by the 
Coalition Government, once again in response to requests from the States 
and Local Government Authorities for additional financial assistance to 
ease the impact of the inflation rate on their roads programmes This 
time $35.8m was provided. The grant was distributed among the States 
according to the existing pattern and directed, as shown in Table 7.27, 
mainly to the rural roads categories. 
109. Ibid., 1st April, 1976, p. 1262, 
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TABLE 7,26 Additional Grant Allocation According to Labor's 1975 Roads 
Acts Amendment Bill, and the Coalition Government's Roads 
Acts Amendment Act (No. 36) of 1976 
Road Category 
Construction of National 
Highways 
Maintenance of National 
Highways 
Construction and 
Maintenance of Export 
Roads and Major 
Commercial Roads 
All National Roads 
Construction of Rural 
Arterial and 
Developmental Roads 
Construction and 
Maintenance of Rural 
Local Roads 
M.I.T.E,R,S, 
Urban Arterials 
Urban Locals 
Beef Roads 
Total 
Labor's 1975 
Amendment Bill 
$m 
13.94 
7.95 
1.11 
23.00 
6.31 
9.29 
0.66 
19.13 
4.0 
1.61 
64 
% 
21.78 
12.42 
1.73 
35.93 
9.85 
14.51 
1.03 
29.89 
6.25 
2.51 
100 
Coalition 
Government's 
Amendment Act 
(No. 36) 1976 
$m 
7.35 
7.28 
0.270 
14.90 
13.24 
15.56 
0.450 
18.54 
1.31 
Nil 
64 
% 
11.48 
11.37 
0.42 
23.28 
20.68 
24.31 
0.70 
28.96 
2.04 
100 
Source: (1) A Bill for an Act Relating to Financial Assistance to the 
"states in relation to Roads 1974/75, 
(2) Roads Acts Amendment Act 1976. 
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TABLE 7.27 Distribution of Commonwealth Aid by Road Categories as Required 
by Roads Acts Amendment Act (No, 2), 1976 
Road Category 
National Roads 
Rural Arterial and Pevelopment Roads 
Construction and Maintenance of Rural 
Local Roads 
Urban Arterials 
Amount 
$m 
2.0 
13.83 
16.37 
3.6 
35,80 
• » 
5.58 
38.63 
45.72 
10.05 
100 
Source; Roads Act Amendment Act (No, 2), 1976. 
4. The 1975 Commonwealth Bureau of Roads Report 
A third Report entitled "Roads in Australia 1975" was prepared 
by the Bureau of Roads during the period of-the Whitlam Government and 
submitted to the newly elected Fraser Government on the 15th Pecember, 
1975, This Report,HO based on an update of the previous Australian 
Roads Survey, was prepared for the purpose of assisting the Commonwealth 
Government in its formulation of legislation for the provision of financial 
assistance to the States in respect of roads and road transport for the 
period commencing 1977-78. In addition, and because of the dramatic 
increase in the inflation rate which had occurred since the submission 
of the 1973 Report, the 1975 Report also contained recommendations regarding 
amendments to the provisions pertaining to the last year of the 1974 Act. 
110. Because of limitations on time the Bureau was prevented from collecting 
"a great deal of new data relating to all aspects of the road system" 
Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1975, 
p. 9. 
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By and large the methodology adopted by the Bureau for its 1975 
Report was much the same as that employed previously. However, one major 
change in approach should be noted. Whereas for the 1969 and 1973 
studies, evaluations were carried out for projects considered for adoption 
at the beginning of the relevant planning period, the recommended expenditure 
levels in the 1975 Report were arrived at by making allowance for "... a 
program of projects any one of which might be commenced in any year ..." 
during the planning period, in this case, 1974/75 to 1980/81. The first 
year, 1974/75 was adopted because it represented the latest year for which 
inventory data were available, while the final year, 1980/81 was chosen 
because it was considered desirable (for planning purposes) to provide 
estimates of expenditure needs for at least one year beyond the expected 
period of the legislations, viz., 1977/78 to 1979/80. 
The Bureau's analysis generated a warranted total roads programme 
valued at $7,625.7m (1973/74 prices) for the period 1976/77 to 1980/81, 
and a recommended programme (for the same period) of $5,500m (1973.74 
112 
prices). Of the latter total it was recommended that the Comramonwealth's 
contribution should amount to $2,085.9m, while the States and Local 
Government Authorities should contribute, respectively, $1,781,1m and 
$1,480,2m, Details of the recommended pattern of financial contributions 
by level of government, over the period 1976/77 to 1980/81 are shown in 
Table 7.28. 
Significantly, the Table reveals that the Bureau's recommendations 
required a substantially faster rate of growth in real terms of Commonwealth 
contributions to the roads programme than, that required of the States and 
Local Government Authorities. The reasons for this disparity are as follows: 
TIT. Ibid,, p, 29^ ~'~ 
112. The Report indicated that the proportion of the nation's resources 
directed to road construction and maintenance had fallen dramatically 
during the period 1972/73 to 1975/76 - a fall from approximately 2,4% 
of G.N.E, to approximately 1,6% of G,N,E, It was estimated that 
adoption of the recommended programme would reverse this trend so that 
by 1980 1,9% of estimated G,N.E. would be absorbed by the road sector. 
Ibid., p. 221. 
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TABLE 7.28 Recommended Road Programme. Financial Contributions by Level of 
Government ($m 1975/74 prices) 
Year 
Ended 
30th June 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
Total 
Average 
Annual 
Growth Rate 
1977-1981 
Level of Government 
State 
317.5 
335.9 
355.2 
375.5 
397.0 
1,781.1 
5.7% 
Local 
280.1 
288.4 
295.7 
303.8 
312.2 
1,480.2 
2.7% 
Australia 
Territories 
27.1 
29.1 
31.5 
32.0 
33.1 
152.8 
5.1% 
Grants 
325.3 
371.6 
417.6 
463.7 
507.7 
2,085.9 
11.8% 
Total 
324.4 
400.7 
449.1 
495.1 
540.8 
2,238.7 
11.3% 
i 
Total 
950 
1,025 
1,100 
1,175 
1,250 
5,500 
7.1% 
i 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1975, 
p. 240. 
First, there was the matter of the Bureau's recognition of the 
principle that, by and large, the road system should be funded by charges 
imposed on road users, and further, that as far as possible charges 
should be related to use of the road. Accordingly, the Bureau argued 
that since the Commonwealth levied the fuels tax, and that this was by far 
the fastest growing source of revenue derived from taxes, charges and 
fees imposed on motor vehicle owners and users, the Commonwealth was 
far better placed to make a substantial increase in contributions to the 
roads budget, and to do this in a reasonably efficient and equitable manner. 
Second, it was also pointed out that an analysis of rates of 
growth (during the recent past) of government receipts, for each level of 
government, show that the Commonwealth Government has the greatest capacity 
to increase contributions to the roads budget. 
223. 
Third, the Bureau contended that the national roads programme 
"... should have the highest rate of growth of any of the road programmes 
as this area of expenditure has been relatively neglected in the past 
113 
and there is a substantial backlog of work to be overcome", and further, 
that Commonwealth contributions to other road categories were essential to 
the achievement of the national roads programme. 
Taking all of these factors iilto consideration the Bureau 
concluded that the Compmnwealth should be able to achieve average increases 
in road expenditure (in real terms) of approximately 12 percent to 14 percent 
per annum over the period 1975/76 to 1980/81, while State and Local 
Governments should be able to achieve respectively, average rates of growth 
in real terms, of between 5 percent to 7 percent and 2 percent to 4 percent 
114 
over the same period. Overall, the Bureau's recommended programme 
required Commonwealth contributions to the roads budget to increase from 
37.1 percent in 1976/77 to 43.2 percent in 1980/81, while the shares of 
the States and Local Government Authorities contributions should decline, 
respectively, from 33.4 percent to 31.8 percent, and from 29.5 percent to 
115 
26.9 percent. 
The distribution of the recommended Commonwealth contribution 
among the States, for the period 1976/77 to 1980/81, is shown in Table 
7.29. As might reasonably be expected the relative share of recommended 
Commonwealth aid assigned to each of the States is fairly similar to the 
distribution set down in the 1974 roads legislation. The 1975 
recommendations required New South Wales' share to increase from 31.6 
percent to 35.02 percent; Victoria's share to fall from 20.86 percent 
to 19.79 percent; Queensland's share to increase from 20.57 percent to 
21.42 percent; Western Australia's share to fall from 13.41 percent to 
11.59 percent; South Australia's share to fall from 8.95 percent to 7.98 
percent and Tasmania's share to fall from 4.73 percent to 4.18 percent. 
iTs": Ibid., p. 23sr; ~ 
114. l\n±., pp. 238-239. 
115. lb.id., p. 248. 
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TABLE 7.29 Recommended Annual Australian Government Road Grants by States 
for the Period 1976/77 to 1980/81 ($m 1973-74 prices) 
Year Ended 
30th June 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
Total 
% 
N.S.W. 
107.9 
128.6 
148.0 
165.3 
180.8 
730.6 
35.02 
VIC. 
65.7 
73.2 
82.1 
90.7 
101.1 
421,8 
19.79 
QLD. 
67.2 
77.4 
89.4 
101.0 
111.8 
446.8 
21.42 
S.A. 
28.4 
31.4 
32.7 
35.6 
38.5 
166.6 
7.98 
W.A. 
42.0 
45.7 
48.7 
51.6 
53.8 
241.8 
11.59 
TAS. 
14.1 
15.3 
16.7 
19.5 
21,7 
87.3 
4.18 
TOTAL 
325.3 
371.6 
417.6 
463.7 
507 7 
2,085.9 
100 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1975, 
p. 160. 
The distribution of recommended Commonwealth aid (at current 
prices) by road category for the year ended June 1977; for the period 
1977/78 to 1979/80, and for the year ended June 1981 is shown in Table 
7.30. The three periods correspond, respectively, to the last year of the 
1974 legislation, the recommended period for the 1977 legislation, and the 
year succeeding the expiration of the 1977 legislation. 
A comparison of the recommended distribution of grants in Table 
7,30 (i.e. by road categories) with the distribution of grants recommended 
by the Bureau in its 1973 Report indicate a significant change in the Bureau's 
assessment of the emphasis the Commonwealth Government should give to each 
116, The Bureau's recommended expenditure classification followed the 
categories incorporated in the 1974 legislation, with the following 
exceptions: First, the M,I.T,E,R.S. category was renamed M,I T,O.R.S. 
to allow for the inclusion of additional project types; second, it 
was recommended that Beef Cattle grants should be discontinued after 
the expiration of the 1974 Acts; and third, because of difficulties 
experienced in classifying road projects under the headings of either 
Major Export Roads or Major Commercial Roads, it was recommended that 
such road types be placed under the heading of National Commerce Roads. 
225. 
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of the road categories. In the 1973 Report the recommended distribution 
of Commonwealth grants to the major road categories were as follows: 
national highways 19.67 percent; urban arterials 34.98 percent; urban 
locals 1.40 percent (total urban 36.38 percent); rural arterial and 
developmental roads 18.37 percent and rural local roads 14.76 percent (total 
117 
rural roads 33.03 percent) 
Under the Bureau's 1975 proposals the national highways category 
was increased to approximately 38 percent of the recommended grant while 
the urban and rural roads categories fell, respectively, from about 36 percent 
and 33 percent to approximately 29 percent and 28 percent of the total 
recommended grant. For both the urban and rural roads categories the 
adjustment is at the expense of the arterial roads. 
In addition to the above observations examination of the recommended 
grant for the year 1976/77 with Tables 7.26 and 7,27 reveal that not only 
was the amount provided under the two amendments to the Roads Acts in 1976 
significantly less than the amount recommended by the Bureau, but also 
the Government's priorities were significantly different. Specifically, 
the amount provided under the amendments represented approximately 18 percent 
of the amount recommended by the Bureau, and of this amount, approximately 
59 percent was allocated to the rural roads category, approximately 17 
percent to national highways and approximately 23 percent to urban arterial 
and urban local roads. 
Finally, there is the matter of the Bureau's recommendations 
regarding matching grant conditions and other methods of Commonwealth control 
over State Government roads policy. Once again the Bureau recommended the 
continuation of the practice of having the Commonwealth impose a minimum 
quota on State contributions to the roads programme. This time, the recommended 
117 See Table 7.20 
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quota requirements for each State, shown in Table 7.34^ were arrived at 
118 
by taking account of other factors, in addition to the equalisation 
of tax effort objective, which was the principal consideration in the 1973 
Report's discussion of matching quotas. 
As far as the issue of matching grants by road categories is 
concerned, the 1975 recommendations departed from the approach taken in 
119 
the 1973 Report by arguing that such conditions should not be imposed. 
The explanation for this reversal was that the recommended programme was 
smaller than the programme recommended in the previous Report, and because 
of this, "- the States need greater flexibility in deciding where to 
120 
allocate their own funds" An alternative explanation is that the Bureau, 
by reversing its previous recommendations, was simply taking account of 
political constraints made clear by the controversy generated by the Whitlam 
Government's 1974 Roads Bill. 
It will also be recalled that the 1974 legislation required the 
State Road Authorities to submit intended programmes of road works relating 
to national highways, urban and rural arterial roads, and urban local 
roads to the Bureau of Roads, for Commonwealth approval. This procedure 
was vigorously criticised by the States (and the Liberal/National-Country 
Party opposition) on the ground that it resulted in a great deal of 
administrative work and costly delays. The Bureau apparently accepted som^ e 
of this criticism and recommended that, with the exception of national 
118. These factors were: (i) the relative size of the road progranmie in each 
State; (ii) the rate of growth in each programme in each State; (iii) 
the benefits accruing from the road programme in each State; and (iv) 
the relative capacities of States to increase road finance from their 
own sources. Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 
1975, p. 279. 
11^- It will be recalled that in the 1973 Report the Bureau had recommended 
that matching conditioiis should be applied to the construction of 
National Highways, the construction of urban arterial roads and on minor 
improvements for traffic engineering and road safety It will also be 
recalled that the Wliitlam Government rejected these recommendations, 
1^ 0. Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1975, p. 279. 
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highways, submission of programmes to the Bureau, for approval by the 
Commonwealth government, should not include detailed estimates of costs of 
individual projects, or of the amounts to be expended in any one financial 
year, but instead, provide a description of intended projects. In addition 
it was recommended that steps should be taken to establish a ", co-operative 
planning procedure in which the Bureau is a partner with both levels 
of Government to obviate the need for further consideration of projects by 
121 
the Bureau" 
5. The 1977 States Grants (Roads) Act 
The Coalition Government's roads legislation was introduced to the 
Parliament in September 1977 and ratified without amendment in the following 
November. 
The Government's policy was enshrined in two Acts: (1) the 
States Grants (Roads) Act 1977, and (2) the Transport Planning and 
Research (Financial Assistance) Act 1977 The former specified the amounts 
of financial assistance and the time profile of assistance to be provided 
to the States for the construction and maintenance of national highways and 
other road designations, for the period 1977/78 to 1979/80, as well as the 
conditions attached to that assistance. The latter specified similar 
details for programmes and projects of a research and planning nature 
122 
pertaining to land transport. 
The Roads (Grants) Act 1977 provided for a total grant to the 
States of $l,425m (current prices) thereby exceeding the amount provided 
during the previous triennium by approximately $200m, but representing, as 
shown, in Table 7.31 approximately 55 percent of the amount recommended by 
the Bureau of Roads. The reason for this difference is not too difficult to 
find: it is simply a consequence of the Coalition Government's response to 
the problem of inflation. 
1214 Ibid., p, 257 ~ 
1-2. "Land Transport" as defined in the Transport Planning and Research 
(Fint-incial Assistance) Act 1977. "means transport by land of persons or 
freight or persons and freight, and includes transport by means of a 
passenger or vehicular ferry, but does not include transport by sea"-
229. 
The total grant was allocated to the States at the rate of $475m 
per annum with a qualified commitment by the Government to maintain the real 
value to each State, at an amount equivalent in real terms to 1977/78, using 
123 
the National Accounts implicit price deflator The percentage distribution 
of the grant among the States followed fairly closely the pattern recommended 
by the Bureau. The distribution among the States of the recommended level 
of assistance and the actual level of assistance are shown in Table '7.31 below. 
TABLE 7.31 Distribution of Commonwealth Road Grants by States for the 
Period 1977/78 to 1979/80 According to (1) the Bureau of 
Roads 1975 Recommendations and (2) the States Grants (Roads) 
Act 1977 ($m current prices) 
State 
New South Wales 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Western Australia 
Tasmania 
Commonwealth Bureau of 
Roads Recomendations 
1977/78 to 1979/80 
Level of Assistance 
= $2,638m 
$m 
931.60 
517.90 
564.50 
209.40 
306.60 
108.60 
2,638.60 
% 
35.30 
19.62 
•21.39 
7.93 
11.61 
4.11 
100.00 
The 1977 States Grants 
(Roads) Act 
Level of Assistance 
= $l,425m 
$m 
461.40 
296.70 
300.00 
121.20 
180.60 
65.10 
1,425.00 
% 
32.38 
20.82 
21.05 
8.51 
12.67 
4.57 
100.00 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads Report, Report on Roads in Australia, 
1975, p, 275 and Schedule 1 of States Grants (Roads) Act 1977. 
The 1977 legislation provided for the distribution of the grant 
among the States according to the categories recommended by the Bureau. 
Table 7.32 shows the amounts and percentage distributions of the Commonwealth 
Government Grant by road category, and the corresponding amounts and percentage 
distribution as recommended by the Bureau. 
12J! As stated by the then Transport Minister, Mr Nixon: 
"This adjustment may be varied on account of special factors which 
cannot presently be foreseen and which may not be adequately reflect-
ed in the proposed index [and that] the actual increase each year 
will need to be finalised in the light of the overall budgetary and 
economic situation". 
AJU)., (House of Representatives), 15th September, 1977, p. 1189, 
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Apart from the significant differences between the level of aid 
provided by the 1977 Act and the amount recommended by the Bureau the 
Table indicates that the Government's legislation did not follow the 
priority pattern established by the Bureau. While each road category, 
with the exception of urban local roads, was allocated an amount significantly 
less than the amount recommended by the Bureau (see Colvmin 6 of Table 7 32) 
the priority pattern was shifted in favour of rural arterial roads and 
national highways, largely at the expense of the urban arterial category, 
which in relative terms, received 10 percent less of the actual grant 
than it would have, had the Bureau's priorities been accepted. .Application 
of the Bureau's priorities to the actual grant would have meant that 
allocations to national highways; rural arterial roads; rural local roads; 
and urban local roads would have fallen respectively by $30.95m; $66.60m; 
$20.6m and $42.20m while allocations to urban arterial roads and the 
M.I.T.O.R.S. category would have experienced, respectively, increases 
of $147.46m and $13.40m. 
No detailed explanation was offered by the Government for this 
redirection of Commonwealth aid apart from an announcement by the 
Minister, Mr Nixon, that the Commonwealth Government was committed to: 
" continue funding for the national highways network and 
the main rural arterial network [and] that support for 
urban arterial roads in the legislation just ended had, in 
our view, taken an excessive part of the total available 
Commonwealth funds." 124 
Given the reduced size of the Commonwealth's commitment i.e., 
compared to the Bureau's recommendations and the fact that the Transport 
Portfolio was held by the Country Party it is, perhaps, not at all 
surprising that a reduction in the weight attached to the urban arterials 
category occurred. 
124. A.P.P., (House of Representatives), 18th September, 1977, p. 1189. 
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An examination of the distribution of Commonwealth aid by road 
category by States as determined by the 1977 Act and as recommended by 
the Bureau also reveals some differences in priorities. These are shown 
in Table 7.33 
It is clear that the most significant differences in priorities 
occur within Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia, and mainly with 
respect to the rural arterial and rural local road categories. Given that 
such differences are not the result of economic considerations (i.e., based 
on a smaller roads budget) one can only assume that they were the outcome 
of discussion between the respective States and the Commonwealth and/or 
motivated by political factors. 
One other point relating to the quantitative aspects of the 1977 
legislation concerns matching grant provisions. Overall, the Act required 
the States' minimum contribution to amount to $l,254,30m(current prices) 
i.e. an amount equal to about 88 percent of the Commonwealth grant. This 
exceeded the proportion recommended by the Bureau i.e., for the recommended 
Commonwealth grant, but is almost identical to the proportion required by 
the 1974 Act. Relative contributions by the States followed the Bureau's 
recommendations fairly closely with the largest variation, about 3 percent, 
occurring for Victoria and New South Wales. A comparison of the 1977 
Act's quota requirements with those recommended by the Bureau is shown in 
Table 7 .34 
While the Liberal/National Country Party Coalitioi was, as we have 
seen, successful in bringing about a number of amendments to the Whitlam 
Goverimient's intended roads policy, the effect of which was to lessen the 
influence the Labor Government could exert on the States' roads programmes, 
it was not entirely opposed to the view that the Commonwealth should exercise 
its powers under S96 of the Constitution to monitor the expenditure of 
Commonwealth road grants by the States. In this regard the Liberal/National 
242. 
The upshot is that the Report takes the view that these considerations might 
provide a case for analysing local roads separately from arterial roads. 
Obviously, there could be substance to the above claims. However, it is 
also possible that "community benefits" are also associated with investment 
in other road categories. In view of this the argument for analysing 
local roads separately should be treated with caution, 
6.2 The Roads Grants Act (1980) 
The Liberal/National-Country Party Government's 1980 Roads 
Grants Act (assented to on the 6th June) provided for a grant to the 
States and the Northern Territory, for the construction and maintenance 
1 'iQ 
of roads, of $628m for the period 1980/81. The Government intends 
to continue with triennial funding arrangements. However, at the time of 
writing this section the additional amounts to be provided had not been 
resolved and ratified. 
The 1980/81 allocation represents an increase of 11 percent over 
the level of Commonwealth road aid provided in the last year of the previous 
Act, and according to the Minister for Transport, Mr Hunt, " is 
directed towards at least maintaining the value of the grants at the 
1979/80 level in real terms" The distribution of the grant among 
the States (excluding the Northern Territory) is shown in Table 7.35 
138. Ibid,, p, 231. See also, Taplin, J.H.E., "An Economists View of the 
Multiple Objectives of Government in Road Funding and the Setting of 
Design Standards", Bureau of Transport Economics, Proceedings of the 
Workshop on Economics of Design Standards, Vol. I, A.G.P.S., Canberra, 
1980. 
139. Road Grants Act 1980, (Schedule 1 and 2) 
140. A.P.D., (House of Representatives), 15 May 1980, p. 2846, 
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Country Party Government's 1977 State Grants Roads Act provided for the 
continuation of road programme and project approval arrangements of a kind 
similar to those contained in the 1974 Road Acts and as amended in 1976. 
TABLE 7.34 State Quota Requirements According to (1) the 1977 State 
Grants (Roads) Act and (2) the B.O.R. Recommendations* 
($m; current prices) 
State 
New South Wales 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Western Australia 
Tasmania 
Total 
The 1977 Act 
Amount -
441.00 
370.80 
174.60 
111.60 
119.40 
36.90 
1,254.30 
% 
35.16 
29.56 
13.92 
8.90 
9.54 
2.94 
100.00 
The B.O.R. 
Recommendations 
Amount 
810.10 
553.10 
288.00 
181.60 
191.50 
64.00 
2,088.30 
% 
38.79 
26.49 
15.79 
8.70 
9.17 
3.06 
100.00 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1975, 
p. 280 and Schedule II of the States Grants. (Roads) Act 1977o 
Note: * Quota recommendations based on a recommended level of Commonwealth 
Government Assistance equal to $2,638.6m. 
Under Clauses 5, 6 and 7 of Part II of the Act which deals with 
National Roads, the Commonwealth Minister is given power to declare roads 
as National Highways or National Commerce Roads; to specify the technical 
standards to be adopted for national roads; to require a State to provide 
information relating to the use, or likely use of such roads, including the 
impact of construction and maintenance works on other roads, on the likely 
use of national highways; to approve programmes of projects;and to notify 
a State of the order in which such projects should be carried out, and to 
revoke or modify notifications and approvals. 
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For roads other than national roads (Part III of the Act) 
programme approval arrangements are outlined imder Clauses 11, 12 and 18. 
Clause 11 empowers the Commonwealth Minister to approve, after discussion 
with the appropriate State Minister, programmes of projects as well as 
subsequent variations to an approved programme as requested by a 
State. Clause 12 deals with approval arrangements pertaining to the 
allocation of road funds by a State to Local Governments for local road works. 
In this case approval of programmes of projects is not required. 
Under Clause 18 provision is made for an alternative approval 
procedure. This section of the Act allows the Minister and the appropriate 
Minister of a State to enter into an arrangement to provide for the creation 
of a representative planning committee whose task is to advise the Ministers 
on matters relating to road construction and maintenance in the State, and 
to submit for joint approval by both Ministers, statements concerning the 
proposed development of the State's road system. 
Finally, the Act also allows,under Clauses 19 and 20,for the 
continuation of approval arrangements introduced in the 1976 Roads Acts 
Amendment Act concerning the transfer of Commonwealth funds betxveen the 
various schedules; a necessary condition for approval being that a State 
is unable to spend the funds allocated to a particular road category, or 
that it is able to show that a transfer from one category to another is 
justified on the ground of relative priorities. 
6. The Bureau of Transport Economics Report on Roads and the 1980 
Commonwealth Road Grants Act 
6.1 The Bureau of Transport Economics Report 
In March, 1977 the Liberal/National Country Party Government took 
steps to amalgamate the Bureau of Roads with the Bureau of Transport 
Economics. In September, 1978 the Bureau of Transport Economics (B.T.E.) 
was directed by the then Minister for Transport, Mr, P Nixon, to make an 
assessment of, and report on, the following matters: 
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"(a) Total road needs for Australia for the period 1979/80 
to 1982/83; 
(b) The conditions of the Australian road network and 
changes to it over the past five years in the light 
of expenditure undertaken by all levels of Government 
in Australia; 
(c) Trends in the levels and patterns of funding of road 
programmes by the different levels of Government in 
Australia; and 
(d) The effects of alternative levels of total future road 
funding from all sources."125 
It is not our intention to provide a detailed svimmary of the 
B.T.E, findings. Only the salient points will be mentioned. 
Regarding (a) above, the B.T.E. utilised the methodology 
developed by the B.O.R, and data generated by earlier road need surveys. 
The outcome of this analysis was an estimated warranted road programme of 
$13,316,5m (1976/77 prices) for the period 1979/80 to 1983/84. However, 
in contrast to previous B.O.R, Reports the B,T.E, Report does not contain 
specific total funding recommendations, nor recommendations with regard 
to future contributions by the three levels of government. 
As far as (c) is concerned the B.T.E. study yielded the following 
126 
results. First, total estimated expenditure on roads from all sources 
increased from $l,363m in 1974/75 to $2,139m in 1978/79. This represents 
an average annual rate of growth of 11.9 percent. In real terms the rate 
of growth was much lower at 2.7 percent per annum. Within this real 
rate of growth,expenditure incurred in the national highway and rural 
arterial systems increased, respectively, at rates of growth of 7.8 and 
6.9 per annum, or approximately three times the average. Maintenance 
expenditure increased in real terms at a rate of 3.4 percent per annum, 
exceeding the national rate by about 26 percent. In contrast, real 
expenditure on rural local and urban local roads increased, respectively. 
125. Bureau of Transport Economics, An Assessment of the Australian Road 
System: 1979. Part I, p. 2. 
126. Ibid., Tables 6.14, 6.6 and 6.12. 
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by 2.4 and 1.8 percent per annum, while for urban arterial roads the real 
rate of growth was estimated at 3.4 percent per annum. 
Second, the B.T.E. study indicates that while estimated road 
expenditure (for the three levels of government) fell short of the B.O.R. 
warranted programme by about 15 percent, expenditure actually exceeded the 
127 
recommended programme by about 4 percent. In effect the B.T.E. analysis 
reveals a change in the relative contributions of the three levels of 
government to the road sector The Report estimated that, in real terms, 
Commonwealth contributions fell by 6 percent. State contributions rose 
significantly, by about 39 percent and Local Government's share increased 
128 by 7.3 percent. As already observed, the thrust of the Commonwealth's 
reduced real contribution was directed to achieving a high rate of growth 
in the funding of national highways and to a lesser extent urban/local 
roads, largely at the expense of the urban arterial category Predictably, 
the increased financial effort of the States was directed to offsetting 
the Commonwealth's pattern of expenditure priorities. Some switching of 
funds also took place. As shown in Table 6,12 of the B.T.E. Report the 
States achieved high rates of growth in real terms in the allocation of 
State funds to rural arterial, rural local and urban arterial roads. 
Respectively, the real rate of growth of State contributions to these 
categories was: 9.4 percent; 9.5 percent and 13.5 percent. For urban 
local roads, however. State funding declined in real terms by 1.9 percent. 
In contrast, the Commonwealth's contribution (in real terms) to the above 
mentioned categories was, respectively: 2,3 percent; -1,8 percent; -19,9 
129 
percent, and 7.8 percent. 
127. Ibid., Table 6.16. p. 142. 
128. Ibid., p. 223. 
129. Ibid., Table 6.12, p. 142. 
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Earlier we indicated that there is unlikely to be a unique 
optimal pattern (i.e. constant proportion), of road expenditure by State 
and by road category for variations in road budgets. This is also recognised 
by the B.T.E. Report which not only provides an examination of the 
economic implications of variations in the estimated warranted roads 
programme for the period 1979/80 to 1983/84 ((d) above), but also provides 
an assessment of the economic merit of the distribution of actual road 
130 
expenditure over the period 1974/75 to 1978/79. 
The results for the latter period were obtained by adjusting 
the warranted expenditures by State and by road category, until the 
marginal benefit cost ratios of expenditure in each sub-category were 
equal, and total road expenditure for all categories equalled the road 
budget. This analysis revealed misallocation in the use of road funds 
at both the State and road category level Across States, expenditure 
levels (1971/72 prices) for New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, 
Western Australia and Tasmania were estimated to exceed efficient levels 
by $22m (3 percent), $75m (18 percent), $27m (23 percent), $16m (7 percent), 
and $73m (365 percent) The expenditure incurred in Queensland was 
estimated to be $213m less than the efficient level, or about 34 percent 
less than the efficient allocation. Granted that the B,T,E. calculations 
recognised the institutional constraints on the use of State and Local 
Government Authority revenues, these results indicate a significant 
distortion in the allocation of Commonwealth grants to the States. 
Interestingly, the B.T.E. Report makes no attempt to highlight the significance 
of this point. 
150. Ibid., pp. 149-158. 
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At the road category level the B.T.E. analysis indicates that 
expenditure on rural local roads was approximately $700m, or twice the 
estimated economically efficient level. Expenditure on the other road 
categories was below the estimated efficient allocations. For these 
categories the absolute and percentage deviations were reported as: 
national highways ($220m, 38 percent), rural arterials ($68m, 13 percent), 
and urban arterials ($53m, 8 percent). There were, of course, differences 
in the extent of the deviations from efficient levels of expenditure by 
road category, by State. In brief, expenditure on National Highways 
exceeded the efficient level in Tasmania, and South Australia but in all 
other States was less. For Queensland expenditure ($66m) was about one-
third the estimated efficient level, 
Queensland also showed the greatest discrepancy for rural 
arterial roads, with expenditure ($115m) falling short of the efficient 
level by about one-half. South Australia also spent less than the 
efficient amount on this category. The estimated difference being $8m, 
or 25 percent. For Western Australia, however, expenditure equalled the 
efficient level with New South Wales and Victoria exceeding the efficient 
levels by $14m (9 percent) and $23m (42 percent) respectively. 
For rural local roads,expenditure in all States exceeded the 
efficient allocation. The greatest differences occurred in New South 
Wales and Victoria with expenditures exceeding the efficient level by 
$-159m (166 percent) and $97m (220 percent). In relative terms Queensland 
recorded the lowest difference of about 11 percent. 
Finally, for urban arterials, it was estimated that expenditure 
in Victoria, Western Australia and (^eensland approximated the efficient 
allocation, with expenditure in South Australia and Tasmania exceeding 
the efficient allocation by $16m (84 percent) and $16m (400 percent) 
respectively. For New South Wales expenditure was estimated to fall short 
of the efficient level by $81m, or approximately 29 percent. 
240. 
As noted by the B.T.E. Report these results need to be seen in 
131 their appropriate context. One point to be noted is that the analysis 
only considers four categories of expenditure; urban locals, maintenance 
and M.I.T.E.R.S. were excluded. More importantly the analysis (adopting the 
B.O.R. approach) evaluates projects according to predetermined technical 
standards. No attempt is made to evaluate "trade-offs" between different 
132 design standards for various projects or between construction and 
maintenance. Apart from these technical considerations the above results 
are not all that surprising. If the distribution of the budget among 
States is wrong (i.e., in terms of the economic efficiency criterion), then 
this obviously implies distortion in expenditure by road categories. The 
B.T.E. Report has confirmed what theory (or common sense) would suggest. 
Of course, even if it were supposed that the distribution of Commonwealth 
aid among the States was "right" this, as mentioned previously, would not 
necessarily ensure that patterns of expenditure would match the economic 
"ideal". A great deal depends on the extent to which Commonwealth and 
State road expenditure preferences are in conflict. Where significant 
conflict exists, then it is clear that the Commonwealth would need to 
exercise some control over the use of State sources of road funds if 
Commonwealth preferences are to prevail. We will have more to say on this 
issue in another chapter 
The other evaluative section of the B.T.E. study concerns its 
assessment of the effects of future road funding programmes. Apart from 
determining a warranted programme the B.T.E. Report examined the effects of 
131. Ibid., p. 153. 
132. In this regard it has been suggested to the author by some officers of 
the Queensland Main Roads Department, that much higher economic returns 
would be generated from urban arterial evaluations if lower design 
standard projects were considered. Part of the problem is that the 
conventional wisdom enshrined in the planning manuals, is often viewed 
as immutable. See, for example Kain, John F-, "A Re-appraisal of 
Metropolitan Transport Planning", The Economics of Roads and Road 
Transport, Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, Occasional Paper 1, 1968. 
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four levels of deviation of expenditure from the warranted programme. 
These ranged from 0.95 to 0.80 of the warranted expenditure level. The 
purpose of the B.T.E. evaluations was to assess the impact of variations 
in expenditure levels on the optimal distribution of road funds by road 
category by each State. The analysis indicated that the principal effect 
of reducing the size of the construction budget (over the above range) is 
to increase the proportion of warranted expenditure to rural arterial 
and national highways,at the expense of rural local roads. For national 
highways the proportion increases from 13.9 to 15.6 percent; for TUTSLI 
arterials there is an increase from 34.7 to 37.2 percent, while the rural 
local category experiences a fall from 14.2 to 9.8 percent. Because of the 
relationship between budget size (i.e., over the specified range) and 
the return from the arterial roads group, the B.T.E. Report also examined 
the effects of variations in the size of the budget for the three 
arterial roads categories. The results indicated very little change in 
relative shares. 
With regard to the local roads category the B.T.E. Report also 
observes that it is doubtful "... that economic efficiency considerations 
based largely on traffic flows are the major determinant of decisions leading 
to investment in local or access roads". The Report then goes on to 
suggest that it may be argued that the conventional benefit cost approach adopted 
by the B.T.E. "... is inadequate because it does not quantify other benefits 
135 
which impinge on the social well-being of the rural population". Thus, 
the Report considers that "... regional development objectives and social 
1 '711 
interaction may be furthered by improved accessibility at a local level" , 
and that expenditure on roads "... provides local employment which has 
significant flow-on benefits within local communities and regions." 
133. Bureau of Transport Economics, op.cit., pp. 167-169. 
154. Ibid., p. 165. 
135. Ibid., p. 167. 
136. Ibid. 
137. Ibid. 
($m) 
196. 
126. 
127 
51 , 
76. 
27. 
606. 
.501 
,359 
764 
,67 
,914 
,726 
,881 
32, 
20, 
21, 
8. 
12. 
4. 
100. 
.37 
.82 
.05 
,51 
.67 
,56 
,00 
243. 
TABLE 7.35 Distribution of CcJiiimonWealth Road Grants by States for the 
"- Period 1980/1981 
State Amount of Aid Percientage Share 
New South WAles 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Western Australia 
Tasmania 
Total 
Source: Roads Grants Act 1980. 
A comparison of the relative distribution, as shown in the above 
Table,with the relative distribution determined by the 1977 Roads Act 
(see Table 7.31, p.229) reveals an identical pattern. In addition the 
pattern is almost identical to that determined by the 1974 Roads Acts 
(see Table 7.19, p, 198 ) 
Another matter of interest concerns the apportionment of the 
Commonwealth grant by road categories. The 1980 Act reduced the number 
of categories from eight to four, namely: national highways; rural 
arterial roads; urban arterial roads; and local roads. Table 7.36 shows 
the distribution of the grant by these categories by State. 
The relative distribution described in Table 7.36 is also 
very similar to the corresponding distribution of the 1977 Roads Act 
(see Table 7.33, p. 232) ^^^ 
141. The relative distribution of Commonwealth aid for local roads as a 
single category is not shown in Table 7,33, This is calculated as 
follows: New South Wales (29.56 percent); Victoria (22.20 percent); 
Queensland (20,12 percent); South Australia (7.92 percent); 
Western Australia (14.93 percent); and Tasmania (5.25 percent) 
Source: States Grants (Roads) Act 1977, Schedules 7 and 10, 
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Once again the point needs to be made that there is no obvious 
economic basis for the relative distribution of Commonwealth road grants 
among the States and by road categories. If the B.T.E. assessment of 
road funding policies (across States and by road categories) for the 1974/75 
to 1978/79 period is credible,then the policy decisions taken by the 
Commonwealth Government, as described in Tables 7.35 and 7,36, can hardly 
be viewed as an attempt by the Commonwealth to improve efficiency in road 
142 
fund allocation. Essentially, from the Commonwealth's point of view, 
143 
the 1980 Roads Act preserves the status quo. 
However, the 1980 Roads Act does foreshadow possible alterations 
to the current procedures concerning the allocation of local roads 
funds. Thus Section 16(1) of Part IV of the Roads Act 1980 states: 
"The Minister may enter into consultations with the appropriate 
Minister of State for the purpose of formulating principles 
relating to the making of allocations for local roads in respect 
of the State, insofar as such allocations relate to Commonwealth 
moneys, and may enter into an agreement with the appropriate 
Minister of the State setting out the principles so formulated." 
The rationale for the Commonwealth's interest in a formula 
approach to the allocation of Commonwealth contributions to Local Authority 
roads is as follows: First, the adoption of a formula approach would 
enable the Commonwealth to make clear to Local Authorities the extent of 
142, Of course the decisions taken by the Commonwealth during the post 1969 
period may have led to a more efficient use of resources than would have 
been the case had the pre-1969 policies been continued, (This issue 
receives some attention in Chapter 10,) Even so, it is obviously a 
matter of importance to know what additional improvements might be 
achieved, and to what extent Commonwealth policies are aimed at 
pursuing the efficiency goal, 
143. It should be noted that while the 1980 Roads Act provides for the 
amalgamation of rural, local and urban local roads categories the 
Minister for Transport, Mr Hunt, indicated that the Commonwealth 
Government "o will expect the State Governments to maintain the 
existing ratio of expenditure on rural and urban local government 
roads"- A.P,D.,(House of Representatives), 15th May, 1980, p. 2846. 
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the Commonwealth's effort in this area. Apparently the Commonwealth has 
been concerned that its contribution to the Local Authority roads sector 
has sometimes " been obscured largely as a result of administrative 
arrangements for handling Commonwealth grants at the State level" •^'^'^  
Second, a formula approach is seen as a better means of assisting Local 
Authorities with their road planning arrangements and of ensuring " that 
145 
councils receive an equitable share of available funds." What is 
meant by an equitable distribution of road funds is not indicated. However, 
it would be reasonable to suppose that should a formula approach be adopted, 
that equity is not likely to be synonymous with economic efficiency. 
It is the author's view that the Commonwealth's concern to change the 
basis on which Commonwealth grants for Local Authority roads are apportioned 
among Local Government is based largely on political considerations. The 
Local Authorities can make life uncomfortable for both State and Commonwealth 
Governments. By seeking a formula which results in an equitable 
allocation of Commonwealth grants for local roads, the Commonwealth is 
attempting to ensure that it maximises, for itself, the political benefits 
from such grants. The aim is to prevent the States from appropriating some 
of those benefits by claiming credit for decisions taken at the Commonwealth 
level. 146 
The 1980 Roads Grant Act also provides for the continuation of 
tlve 1977 requirements covering the approval of road programmes involving 
Commonwealth funds, and arrangements concerning the operation of joint 
Commonwealth-State planning committees. The matching grants policy of 
recent years is also retained. The total quota for 1980/81 was increased 
144, Ibid,, p. 2847 (Minister for Transport, Mr Hunt) 
145, Tbid 
146, The significance of this point is highlighted by recent criticism 
of some State governments by the Commonwealth for claiming credit 
(via road side advertisements) for the upgrading of roads funded 
largely by Commonwealth grants (e,g, improvements to the National 
highway system) 
247 
by eleven percent to $537.5m in harmony with the increase in the 
Commonwealth grant. However, there are slight variations in the adjustments 
required for each of the States - these variations reflecting the 
Commonwealth's intention of evening out the differences in State funding 
efforts. 
147 7 Summary 
It is clear from our discussion in this Chapter that Commonwealth 
roads policy during the period 1969 to 1980 differs significantly from 
the stance adopted in earlier years. Whereas previously, the Commonwealth 
had more or less taken the view that the States were to be free to determine 
how Commonwealth road funds would be apportioned among different road 
classes and road projects, the approach adopted during the 'seventies was 
clearly of a more centralist nature. This shift in approach was not 
solely a consequence of the Labor Party's return to power in 1972; it 
was also facilitated by the economic advice provided by the Commonwealth 
Bureau of Roads. 
Since the Bureau's assessment of Australia's road needs were 
based on economic analysis it is obviously not surprising that it should 
have recommended to the Commonwealth Governm.ent that road grants should be 
earmarked by road categories, and that the amounts apportioned to each 
category should reflect the economic priorities as determined by the 
scheduling models. However, our analysis shows significant differences 
between the Bureau's advice and the policy decisions taken by the Commonwealth 
Government, 
147 .\ppendix C provides details of: (i) Payments to States for Roads Under 
Aid Road Acts and Comparable Legislation, 1923-24 to 1978-79 and (ii) 
Allocations for Roads Under Aid Roads Acts and Comparable Legislation, 
1923-24 to 1958-59, 
P A R T III 
THE ROAD SUPPLY SECTOR IN AUSTRALIA: 
THE ROLE OF THE STATES^ WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
QUEENSLAND • 
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CHAPTER 8 
AN INTRODUCTION TO PART III : THE ROLE OF THE STATES 
1, The State Roads Acts 
At the time of the formation of the Australian federal system 
of government in 1901, road construction was a Local Government 
responsibility. State involvement in this activity was largely confined 
to the granting of financial assistance to the Local Government 
Authorities - the terms of which were laid down in the Local Government 
Acts. 
The development of the motor vehicle was to change this 
division of responsibilities. In 1913 the Victorian Government enacted 
legislation to establish a State Road Authority, By 1926 the remaining 
States had followed the Victorian example. 
The various State Road Acts provided for the creation of a 
roads fund or funds into which Commonwealth aid moneys and revenue 
derived from State sources were placed. The State Road Authority was 
given the power to determine which roads in the State should receive 
declared road status (initially main roads status) and to determine, 
subject to Ministerial approval, the manner in which road funds should be 
spent. As the years have gone by various amendments have been made to 
the Statutes, the most important of which have been concerned with the 
extension of the classification of declared roads, and the financial 
obligations of Local Authorities to the maintenance and construction of 
these roads. 
2. State Sources of Revenue 
Because of the Commonwealth Government's power over customs and 
excise, and in particular, taxes on motor vehicle fuel, revenues for road 
funding from State sources are derived mainly from vehicle registration 
fees. Local Government contributions, and government loans. From about 
249. 
the mid 'fifties the States also derived revenue from a road maintenance 
tax imposed on heavy vehicle operators. However, this charge was abolished 
by the States in 1979 in response to pressure from the road haulage industry 
Of these sources of revenue the vehicle registration charge is the most 
important contributor to the States' road budgets. 
From an economic point of view the funding of the States' road 
programmes raises at least two important issues. The first concerns the 
matter of the optimal size of each State's road budget while the second 
concerns the question of how well the sources of revenue meet the 
economists' test of efficiency in resource allocation. In the economists' 
'first best' world these two issues are of course inseparable. 
As we have seen in Chapter 7 the work of the Commonwealth 
Bureau of Roads was largely concerned with the problem of determining an 
economically warranted and feasible roads programme (over specified time 
periods) for each of the States, accepting as a constraint the existing 
methods (both State and Commonwealth), of funding roads programm.es. Given 
this approach the road funding issue from the Bureau's point of view 
centred on the subject of the differences in fiscal capacity of the 
Commonwealth and the States. At the State level, proposals in the form 
of matching grant arrangements were made for the purpose of encouraging 
relatively low fiscal effort States to bring their motor vehicle 
registration fees in line with those imposed by relatively high fiscal 
effort States. 
From the discussion in Part I, it is clear that the existing 
methods of funding State road programmes fall a long way short of the 
theoretical ideal. Motor vehicle registration charges have no relation-
ship to the use of the roads nor is it clear that they bear any relation-
ship to elasticities of demand - a factor which, as noted earlier, 
is clearly of importance to the issue of the allocation of non separable 
road costs among user classes. 
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Consideration of the problems and possibilities concerning the 
issue of improved methods of changing for roads in Australia by both 
State and Commonwealth Government will be dealt with in Part IV 
of this study 
3. The Allocation of Road Funds: Criteria and Constraints 
Since it is the State Road Authorities who bear the major 
responsibility for the construction and maintenance of the declared 
roads system throughout Australia it is important that we attempt to 
explain in broad terms the nature of the process by which those decisions 
are reached. 
The first and most obvious point to note is that the road 
authorities do not operate in a political vacuum: they are creatures of 
government and are required to pursue policy objectives dictated by 
government. For example, the division of road funds between urban and 
rural roads has been determined by governments either by making provision 
in the Statutes for a rural and urban roads fund and by specifying a 
formula for the division of revenues between those funds, and/or by 
specifying the criteria to be adopted by the road authority in determining 
those roads which warrant declared roads status, and thus eligibility 
for road authority expenditure. In other cases policy goals are translated 
1. For example, the N.S.W. Main Roads Department conducts its financial 
transactions through three separate funds - "the County of Cumberland 
Main Roads Fund, for main, secondary, and tourist roads and toll 
works in the County of Cumberland ; the County Main Roads Fund, 
for main and tourist roads and toll roads outside the County of 
Cumberland and the Commonwealth Aid for Roads Fund for transactions 
involving Commonwealth grants for roads including developmental 
roads The proceeds of the motor vehicle weight tax (except for 
amounts paid into the Public Vehicles Fund and the Traffic 
Facilities Fund), and of the charges under the Road Maintenance 
(Contribution) Act, 1958-1975, are distributed between the County of 
Cumberland and Country Main Roads Funds on the basis of 20 percent to 
the Cumberland Fund and 80 percent to the Coimtry Fund" 
Official Year Book: New South Wales, No. 65, 1979, p. 330. 
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directly by the Minister responsible for road works to the Commissioner ' 
for main roads, an example of which would be a decision by the 
government, as a result of an election promise, to upgrade a particular 
road within some specified time period. 
Other constraints on the use of road funds may, as we have 
already seen, be imposed by the Commonwealth Government in the form of 
conditions attached to the use of roads funds provided under the various 
Commonwealth Aid Roads Act. The forty percent rural roads requirement of 
the post Second World War to 1969 period, the beef cattle road grants, 
and the categorisation of Commonwealth road grants by the various functional 
classes established by the Bureau of Roads in the post 1969 period, are 
all examples of such constraints. In some cases these conditions might 
have little impact on the overall pattern of road funds allocation, A 
great deal depends on the extent to which State and Commonwealth Government 
objectives conflict, and on how much flexibility a State Road .Authority 
has for switching funds from its own sources of revenue to other areas 
of road expenditure. 
Given constraints and objectives of the above kind, the question 
remains as to how the road authority goes about the task of apportioning 
funds between road projects; between maintenance and capital works ; and 
between various regions of the State, The broad answer is that these 
decisions are the outcome of a mixture of political pressures from Local 
Government Authorities, engineering criteria, and rules-of-thumb. 
As the States' declared road systems have been extended over 
the past fifty years as a consequence of expanding road budgets and 
requests from Local Government Authorities for new declarations, each 
State Road Authority has gradually divided its State area into a number 
of planning divisions and/or districts which follow Local Government 
boundaries. District engineers are appointed to bear responsibility for 
the administration, and in some cases, the determination of the road 
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authority's roads programmes in these areas. 
Each road authority makes an estimate of its budget, usually 
over a five year period; undertakes a regular assessment of its road 
needs - based on technical standards,* and makes a decision regarding the 
apportionment of funds on an annual basis among the various planning 
regions. 
Since we know that this decision is not made on the basis of 
economic evaluation models (such as those used by the Commonwealth 
Bureau of Roads), it is reasonable to suppose that it is made on the 
basis of some rule-of-thumb. The rule-of-thumb maybe one which is 
similar to, or the same as, rules-of-thumb used by the Commonwealth 
Government in the past for the purpose of determining the allocation of 
Commonwealth road grants among the States, or to other known rules-of-thumb 
used by road authorities in other countries. On the other hand the rule-
of-thumb may simply be one based on a mixture of historical precedent 
and political pressures. In this regard the political pressure exerted 
by Local Government is clearly of some importance. Not only do the 
Local Authorities rely on road work activities as an important source 
of employment for their work-force, but they also provide a substantial 
part of the capital equipment for road building works, bulldozers, 
graders etc. For these reasons alone Local Government Authorities have 
a strong vested interest in continuity of works programmes, and accordingly 
exert pressure on State Governments (and the Commonwealth) to ensure 
that this objective is adequately met. In these circumstances one 
might reasonably expect to find some inertia or rigidity in the allocation 
of funds to State planning regions. This judgement would also be 
reinforced by the fact that labour is not particularly mobile, at least 
in the short run, thereby providing an additional constraint on the 
ability of a road authority to pursue a roads programme which in the short 
run would result in dramatic shifts in regional fund allocations. This 
is not to say that dramatic changes in relative shares of fund allocations 
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to planning regions are unlikely As we shall see later a dramatic shift 
in the pattern of fund allocation occurred in Queensland during the 
early 'seventies. But in this case the significance of the change is to 
be explained largely in terms of the earmarking by the Commonwealth 
Government of a substantial part of its 1969 road aid allocations to urban 
roads projects. 
The efficiency (from an economic point of view) of the regional 
distribution of road funds will obviously depend on the nature and 
significance of the parameters incorporated, either explicitly or 
implicitly, in the criteria employed for determining road fund allocations. 
Since the details of such criteria are not often found in the Statutes 
or in available public documents, the required information can be 
sought by interviewing those public servants who have been 
or are currently involved in the decision making process, and/or by 
statistical analysis of expenditure patterns, 
Finally, as far as the matter of project priority determination 
is concerned this is clearly influenced by a number of factors. These 
include: (i) the level of funding for projects in each of the planning 
regions of the States (ii) the technical criteria adopted by the road 
authorities for determining road deficiencies (iii) the nature of the 
constraints imposed by the Commonwealth Government on the use of Commonwealth 
road funds and (iv) the influence of local political pressures. 
In the following two chapters we undertake a case study of 
roads policy in the State of Queensland in order to examine in more 
detail some of the points we have raised in this introduction - in 
particular to try to identify the nature of the criteria used in determining 
regional fund allocation, and to see if it is possible to cast some light 
on the impact of Commonwealth roads policy since 1969 on road fund 
allocation in that State. 
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CHAPTER 9 
ROADS POLICY IN QUEENSLANP: THE MAIN ROAPS ACTS 1920-1977 
1. The Main Roads Acts 1920-1939 
During the first sixty years of self government in Queensland 
the major part of investment in transport facilities by the State 
Government was directed to the creation of an exteiisive rail network 
aimed at promoting rural land settlement by linking the State Capital, 
Brisbane, and the major provincial cities and ports to rural inland areas 
Road construction and maintenance were by and large the responsibility 
of Local Government, with State Government involvement confined, for 
most of the period, to the provision of financial assistance in the 
form of matching grants of $1 for $0.50. 
After the turn of the century, and as a consequence of the 
extensive development brought about by the railways, and because of 
improvements in the design of the motor vehicle and its mass production, 
it became widely accepted that the State Government would have to assume 
a greater role vis-a-vis the Local Authorities for the planning and 
funding of road programmes. In 1920 the Queensland Government enacted 
legislation for the purpose of providing for a system of Main Roads 
throughout the State. While the 1920 Roads Act was described as " 
2 
experimental " in nature it was intended that it should provide for 
3 
"continuity of policy" with regard to main roads construction, in 
contrast to the haphazard approach which had characterised the period 
of Local Government responsibility 
1. The Colony of Queensland was established in 1859 and consolidated in 
1867 
2. Queensland Parliamentary Pebatesi, [Q.P.P.], Vol. 133 [Assembly], 
4th November, 1919. p. 1810. 
3. Ibid., p. 1811. 
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Like its counterparts in the other States, the Queensland 1920 
Main Roads Act was, in essence, an Act aimed at improving road transport 
4 
facilities in rural areas. The essential features of the 1920 Main 
Roads Act are detailed as follows Under Section 3(ii) of the Act the 
Governor in Council was granted power to create a Main Roads Board 
consisting of three full time members, at least one of whom was to be a 
qualified road engineer. The Board in turn was required under Section 9(i) 
of the Act to undertake surveys and investigations throughout the 
Divisions of the State for the purpose of determining: (i) what roads 
should be declared as main roads, (ii) the availability of resources 
suitable for road construction and maintenance, and appropriate methods 
of utilising such resources, (iii) the methods to be employed in the 
construction and maintenance of roads and (iv) what deviation if any 
should be made to existing roads or what new roads should be constructed 
to promote '.' effective land settlement and communications and improve 
the conditions of traffic" 
The same section of the Act also provided that the Board 
" .. may prepare and make available a standard specification of materials, 
7 design and grade of roads for each Oivision of the State" Conditions 
were also laid down as to the criteria which the Board should adopt for 
the purpose of determining which roads should be recommended to the 
Governor in Council as worthy of main roads status. Specifically, 
4. As stated by the Secretary for Agriculture, the Minister responsible 
for the introduction of the 1920 Main Roads Bill: 
"This is a Main Roads Bill, but when passed it will be essentially 
a Country Roads Act in order to assist the people in the country, 
and to enable them to get better means of transit" Ibid., p. 1814. 
5. The State was divided (for planning purposes) into three main 
Divisions: Southern, Central and Northern. 
6. The Main Roads Act 1920. Section 9 (1) (d) 
7. Ibid., Section 9(2) 
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Section 11(2) of the Act required that the Board give consideration to: 
"(a) The funds available or likely to be available for the 
construction and the permanent maintenance of the road; 
(b) Whether the road is a main trunk route connecting any 
large producing district or district capable of becoming 
a large producing district, with its natural point of 
shipment by water or by rail; 
(c) Whether the road is a main trunk route of intercommuni-
cation between two or more large producing districts, or 
districts capable of becoming large producing districts, 
or between two or more large centres of population; 
(d) Whether the road is a main trunk route between the capital 
or principal city of a Division of the State and any large 
producing district or district capable of becoming a large 
producing district or any large centre of population; and 
(e) Whether the district through which the proposed main road 
passes is or is not already sufficiently served by railways" 
In essence it was the purpose of the Act to promote land settlement, 
to increase agricultural production and generally to improve the 
g 
economic and social conditions of those who worked on the land. Further, 
it was intended that in pursuing these objectives, that,by and large, 
main roads should not be constructed parallel to the existing rail 
routes. This objective was not enshrined in the Act, but was made 
clear by the Secretary for Agriculture during the presentation of the 
Main Roads Bill to the Parliament: 
"I cannot imagine anything which will do more to encourage 
production and at the same time reduce the cost of living 
than a proper system of highways as feeders to our 
railways . We can assist the railways to pay by building 
feeders, not by throwing out short lines of railway which 
8. On the matter of social objectives the Secretary for Agriculture stated: 
"I want to say one word with regard to the social aspect of this 
question. The economic aspect may be the most important, but 
the social aspect is also important. I speak feelingly as one 
who was bom on a selection and lived on one most of his life, 
thus knowing something of the hardships and difficulties which 
have to be borne by settlers. We are very fond of talking about 
railways and roads being built before settlement. We have 
never been able to do that. If we cannot do it, we should 
endeavour to follow after settlement and give the first settler 
the benefit of a decent road in order that he might get some 
enjoyment out of it during his lifetime" 
Q.P.D., op.cit., p. 1812. 
257. 
cannot be expected to pay. The better plan is to build 
properly graded, properly formed solid roads, ... to 
bring the people and the produce to the railways. I think 
that is one of the strong reasons why the Government 
should do something to carry out this policy."9 
The development and equity objectives were also made clear by other 
sections of the Act. Thus Section 19 gave the Minister power to 
authorise the Board to construct roads other than main roads for the 
purpose of linking new settlements or large areas of Crown land "... about 
to be opened for settlement with a centre of population or railway station 
seaport; ...". Further, under Section 24 of the Act the Board was 
instructed to ensure, subject to vague qualifications, that the annual 
budget was apportioned equally among the three Divisions of the State. 
In the words of the Secretary for Agriculture, funds were to be allocated: 
"... according to the necessities of the people. Population 
does not always count, There are rich areas in the North 
and because there are no people there these districts have 
been neglected,"1*^ 
And again, 
".., I might point out that, while the bulk of the population 
is in Southern Queensland, it should be borne in mind that 
in the good old days most of the endowment was spent in 
Southern Queensland and that is an additional argument why 
the money provided by the State should be spent as equally 
as possible in each Division of the State."H 
The remaining features of the Act which require mention are 
those concerning funding arrangements and the role of Local Government 
Authorities. 
On the funding side. Section 22 of the Act provided for the 
creation of a fund called The Main Roads Fund into which moneys 
appropriated by the Parliament in each year for expenditure on permanent 
works and maintenance of main roads, and for other purposes of the Act, 
were to be paid, together with moneys received by the Board from charges 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid,, 30th October, 1919, p. 1723. 
11. Ibid,, 4th November, 1919, p. 1813. 
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levied under the Act ". in respect of motor vehicles, traction engines 
12 
and wheels of vehicles" as well as revenues received from the Crown 
from the sale of timber, sand, gravel and other materials associated 
with land utilised for main roads construction and "[all] other monies 
13 
received or recovered by the Board under the Act" - for example, 
payments received from Local Government. 
Thus, three main groups of contributions to the Main Roads Fund 
were identified by the Act: (1) the motor vehicle owners, (2) the general 
taxpayer^ and (3) Local Government Authorities. Money appropriated by 
the Parliament to the Main Roads Fund was designated as loan money 
which was to be repaid by the owners of motor vehicles and by Local 
Government rate payers. Details regarding Local Government contributions 
were set down under Section 27 of the Act. This section required the Board 
to apportion, by the 30th June of each year, one half of the amount expended 
during the preceding year between those Local Government areas which 
had benefited from such expenditure. The amount apportioned was deemed 
to be a loan for a period of thirty years at a rate of interest to be 
determined by the Governor in Council, but not exceeding the then current 
rate of interest charged to Local Government Authorities for ordinary 
loans. 
While the above charge represented the total Local Authority 
commitment, the Act provided for variations in the rate of contributions 
to be made by individual Local Authorities. First, the Board was 
granted power to vary the rate of contribution according to the 
distribution of benefits generated by the various road projects. In 
modern economic jargon this is tantamount to the recognition of the 
existence of spillover effects. In the words of the Act: 
12. The Main Roads Act 1920, Section 22(b) 
13. Ibid., Section 22(b) 
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"An Area may be benefited by expenditure on permanent works 
and maintenance, although such permanent works and the main 
roads maintained are not situated within the Area, if 
substantial traffic to or from the Area passes over, or in the 
case of new main roads will in the opinion of the Board pass 
over a main road on which such expenditure has been made."14 
As well as the benefited area case, power was also vested with 
the Board to reduce the contributions of particular Local Authorities 
towards maintenance where it could be demonstrated to the satisfaction 
of the Board that such costs were excessive and "- due to motor traffic 
not of local origin or to timber traffic" In determining whether 
a reduction should be granted the Board was bound by the Act to 
consider such matters as the revenue, valuation and rating of the Local 
Authorities concerned, and existing financial obligations regarding loan 
expenditure in respect of permanent works on main roads. 
Provision was also made in the Act for the Local Authorities 
to object to decisions made by the Board with respect to: (a) declarations 
of main roads and related expenditure proposals and (b) individual 
Local Authority financial contributions. All appeals were 
to be made in the first instance to the Board. If agreement could 
not be reached the issue was to be resolved by the Minister responsible 
17 for main roads. Finally, Section 21 of the Act provided for the 
involvement of Local Authorities in the construction of main road. 
This was to be carried out on mutually agreed terms and subject to the 
proviso that the Governor in Council had authority to direct the 
Board to carry out particular works, 
14. Ibid,, Section 27(1) 
15. Ibid., Section 27(2) 
16. Ibid., Section 27(2) 
17 In fact all decisions made by the Board regarding the declarations 
of main roads and Local Government contributions required Ministerial 
approval. 
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A number of relatively minor changes were made to the Act in 
1922. The most important change ensured that funds appropriated by the 
Board in any one year were permanent appropriations, and that repayments 
by Local Authorities to the Board with regard to maintenance expenditure 
were to be made on a yearly basis rather than over the thirty year 
period as allowed for in the original Act. 
About a year later, on the 25th September 1923. further 
amendments to the Act were passed by the Parliament. The amendments 
provided for the declaration of developmental roads; new funding 
arrangements; and the extension of the benefited area principle to the 
developmental road type. Under the amended legislation a developmental 
road was defined as: 
"Any road route or means of access not already declared a 
main road, which in the opinion of the Board, will develop 
or further develop any area of land opened or proposed to be 
opened for settlement, ..."18 
The intention of this type of declaration was to enable the 
Board to extend its roads works programmes to include roads which, 
under the terms of the Principal Act would not meet the definition of 
a mains road, but which were considered to be important to the development 
of particular areas. 
A special Developmental Roads Fund was also created into 
which "... all moneys appropriated by the Parliament for the purpose 
19 
of developmental roads" were to be placed. Moreover, in contrast 
to the funding arrangements applicable to main roads construction. Local 
Authority contributions to developmental roads were designated at one 
iialf the interest cost associated with oermanent works expenditure, 
repayable over a period of twenty years, while financial responsibility 
-'O ""1 
for maintenance was left entirely to the Local Authorities concerned. ' 
iT! The Main Roads Acts .Amendment Act of 1925, Section 5. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid. 
21. The Act also gave the Board power to ensure that maintenance standard; 
were carried out to the Board'? satisfaction. Ibid. 
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Amendments to the benefited area provisions, however, allowed 
the Board to determine contributions for permanent works expenditure on 
developmental roads according to benefits conferred on various areas 
" - notwithstanding that no part of such improvement had been created 
22 23 in one or more of such areas" ' 
Additional institutional and financial changes were introduced 
two years later by the enactment of The Main Roads Acts Amendment Act 
of October 1925. The salient changes were as follows: First, the 
amending Act provided for the dissolution of the Main Roads Board and 
24 in its place created the position of Commissioner for Main Roads 
Second, Section 19 of the Principal Act was amended in order to provide 
for greater flexibility regarding the apportionment of Commonwealth 
Aid Road Funds by road type. Whereas under the amended Act of 1923 
Commonwealth aid road funds were directed to the Main Roads Fund, 
the 1925 amendments to Section 19 allowed such funds to he paid into 
the Main Roads Fund or the Developmental Roads Fund, or partly into 
each fund according to recommendations made by the Commissioner and 
2^ 26 
approved by the Minister responsible for roads. ' 
22. Ibid, 
23. For reasons unspecified, the benefited area concept in this case 
was applicable " where peimanent improvements have been created 
on a developmental road which lies within the areas of two or more 
Local Authorities", ibid. 
24. The Main Roads Acts Amendment Act of 1925. See Sections (2) to (4) 
25. Ibid., Section 6. 
26. The amendments to Section 19 also provided that: 
"Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, any monies granted by 
the Commonwealth of Australia pursuant to the Act of the Parliament 
of the Commonwealth intituled The Main Roads Development Act 1923-
1925 or any Act amending or in substitution of the same may be 
expended by the Commissioner, with the approval of the Minister and 
by agreement with the Local Authority concerned, upon any road, 
although the same is not a main road or developmental road under the 
provisions of this Act, and in such case the terms of repayment 
by the Local Authority concerned of its proportion of any such 
monies as used by way of loan under this Act shall be determined by 
the Commissioner with the approval of the Minister before the 
commencement of any such work" Ibid, 
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A third major amendment made provision for financial relief 
to Local Authorities towards the funding of the roads programme. 
The amendments were with respect to Section 33 of the Principal Act. 
Specifically, the Commissioner was empowered, subject to approval of the 
Governor in Council, to grant financial relief of prescribed permanent 
works commitments, in part or in full, to a Local Authority or Local 
Authorities deemed to benefit from main or developmental road works 
programmes, where such roads passed "... through underdeveloped country 
27 for the purpose of opening up communications ..." , provided that 
the Commissioner considered that the payment of prescribed contributions 
28 
"... would be unduly burdensome ...". 
Further, the Commissioner was granted power to extend the period 
for maintenance repayments (i.e. with regard to main roads) from one to 
five years in those cases where maintenance was of a special nature 
involving higher than normal costs, and to relieve a Local Authority of 
part of, or the whole of, contributions due on account of the construction 
of experimental road sections "... constructed for the purpose of 
determining the suitableness or otherwise of any particular class of 
29 
road construction". The ability of the Commissioner to provide some 
financial relief to Local Authorities in the above circumstances was 
partly an outcome of the financial assistance provided under the terms of 
the Commonwealth Roads Aid Acts 1923-1925 and partly a consequence of 
the growth in revenues derived from motor vehicle charges. 
The amending Act also altered the provisions relating to 
"benefited areas" by allowing the Minister to alter the boundaries of 
areas designated as benefited areas either previous to, or subsequent 
30 
to the passing of the 1925 amendments. Further, the Local Authorities 
27"! Ibid., Section 9(a). 
28. Ibid. 
29. Ibid., Section 9(b). The application of the benefit principle by 
the Main Road Department operated until 1962-63 when the New Roads 
Plan was introduced. See p. 272. 
30. Ibid,, Section 9(c). 
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were granted power to create divisional benefited areas with differential 
rating,^^'^^ This, as we shall see in a moment was later to be 
viewed by the Main Roads Commission as highly undesirable. 
In addition to the above changes to the Principal Act the 
Government also introduced legislation to assist the Local Authorities 
in meeting the costs of maintaining the declared roads system. Maintenance 
costs had risen substantially over the years as a consequence of the 
growth in use of the roads by heavy vehicle traffic. The new legislation 
was entitled. The Heavy Vehicles Act, 1925. The Act provided for the 
imposition of special fees on vehicles (including horse drawn vehicles, 
but excluding vehicles normally used for transporting primary produce), 
having a tare weight in excess of 25cwt. The fees collected (less 
administration costs) were to be allocated to the Local Authorities 
according to the revenues generated in each area and to be used solely 
for the purpose of maintenance and construction of declared roads. 
The 1925 Roads Amendment Act remained in force until the 27th 
October, 1928 when further amendments were assented to by the Parliament. 
33 
Apart from extending the declared roads system to include "tourist roads" 
the dominant thrust of the 1928 legislation was directed at providing 
additional financial relief to Local Authorities in respect of their 
commitments to works on declared roads, including the newly declared 
tourist roads More precisely, the relief was intended not only for 
its own sake, but also to encourage Local Authorities to agree to new 
declarations. 
31. Ibid. 
32. The authority to strike differential rates within a Local Government 
area is to be found under the terms of the Local Government Acts. 
33. An amendment of Section 2 of the Principal Act defined a Tourist road 
as: 
"Any road which is a means of access to a national park, a to\\m 
reserve, a seaside resort, or a national beauty spot, and which is 
declared to be a tourist road under this Act, or any part of such road" 
The Main Roads Acts Amendment Act of 1928, Section 2(i) 
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The financial assistance took a number of forms. Briefly, 
provision was made for the granting of reductions in the financial 
obligations of Local Authorities for permanent works on new main roads, 
developmental roads, and tourist roads in those cases where Local 
Authority annual contributions, on account of declared roads, were equal 
to 0.6 cents in the $1 on the unimproved value of land within the Local 
Authority area. Reductions in contributions, however, were only to 
be granted 
" if the Commissioner is satisfied that the valuation of the 
properties within the area of such land is a fair and reasonable 
one"34; 
and further, 
"Provided that annual payments of any such reduced contributions 
shall be made by means of a uniform rate imposed upon the whole 
area of such Local Authority "35 
Other qualifications were also imposed; in particular, that 
no part of the reduced contribution should be charged to a benefited 
area which was already liable for repayments for permanent works to 
the extent of 0.6 cents in the $1 on the unimproved value of properties 
in the area unless 
" , the permanent works in respect of which such reduced 
contribution is required have been declared to be a direct 
benefit to such area by resolution of the Local Authority 
in which case such area shall , in addition to its 
existing liability be also liable for the uniform rate 
herein mentioned in respect of such reduced contribution "^6 
Another amendment allowed the Commissioner to defer, for a 
period not exceeding ten years, the contributions of a Local .Authority 
in respect of main and developmental roads where it could be shown that 
the purpose of such roads was to encourage land settlement, and where 
it was unlikely for some time that sufficient rate revenue would be 
generated to enable the Local Authority to meet its financial commitments 57 
34. Ibid., Amendment of Section 55, Subsection (5A)(ii) 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid. 
57 Ibid. , Amendment of Section 22 
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In addition, an amendment to Section 23 of the Act empowered the 
Commissioner to undertake maintenance works on developmental roads for 
which relief of interest payments had been granted to particular Local 
Authorities, and subject to the approval of the Governor in Council, 
to relieve a Local Authority of either part of, or the whole of, the 
38 
expenditure on such maintenance works for a period up to ten years. 
The policy of extending the classification of declared roads 
and of providing financial relief to Local Authorities received further 
attention with the introduction of additional amendments to the Main 
Roads Acts in 1929 and 1934. 
The 1929 Act enabled the Main Roads Commission to establish 
and bear full responsibility for permanent works expenditure on roads, 
which in the opinion of the Commissioner, subject to the approval of the 
Governor in Council, warranted the status of State Highways. Local 
Authority contribution to the funding of State Highways was set at one-
half the cost of maintenance. According to the amended Act a road 
may be granted the status of a State Highway if it represented a 
39 
",.. principal avenue of road communication " and " notwithstanding 
that such a road may have already been declared to be a main, developmental 
• ^ J,. 40 or tourist road" 
While it is by no means entirely clear from the above definition 
what distinguished at that time a State Highway from a main road, 
the decision to fund the entire capital costs of such roads from the Main 
Roads Fund was a reflection of the Government's (and Main Roads Commission's) 
38. Ibid,, Section 2(viii) 
39. The Main Roads Acts Amendment Act of 1929, Clause 4(i) 
40. Ibid. 
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view of their importance to the community as a whole. Even so, the 
consensus view within the Parliament and the Commission was that the 
financial burden for funding the entire declared road system should 
41 
continue to be shifted towards the motor vehicle user And, as noted 
above, further changes in that direction (i.e. in addition to the 
funding arrangements for State Highways) were provided for in the 1929 
Amending Act. These involved: (1) a significant reduction in Local 
Authority contributions to the cost of permanent works construction on 
main roads from one half to three fourteenths of interest on construction 
costs, (2) a reduction from one half to three-fourteenths in the annual 
interest charges to Local Authorities in regard to developmental road 
construction costs, and (3) provision for the charging of tolls on 
certain roads, bridges and ferries. 
As mentioned earlier one aspect of funding arrangements for 
declared roads which received considerable criticism from the Main 
Roads Commission was the operation of certain aspects of the 
benefited area concept. In the 1928 Report of the Commission it was 
suggested that many Shires had continued to adopt a highly parochial 
approach to the funding of declared roads: 
"In the case of some of these Shires, the ability of the 
Shire as a whole to carry on main roads works is unquestioned; 
yet in many instances they have loaded one particular division 
with a great deal more than it should really be carrying, having 
in view the fact that today the benefits of roads cannot be said 
to be confined to any particular small area. The result is 
that local jealousies arise and the full resources of the Shire 
are unavailable because of the want of unanimity "42 
41. This, it will be recalled [Chapter 6, p. 119] was also the philosophy 
held by the Federal Government during this period, and manifest by 
its policy of legislating for special taxes on fuel for the purpose 
of funding road grants to the States. 
42. Annual Report of the Commission for Main Roads, 1927, p. 17 
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For this reason the Commissioner concluded that: 
" It is now, in my opinion, time to practically abolish 
the benefited area system in connection with anything 
except developmental works. Any roads which can be 
classed as 'main' so affect the whole community of the Shire., 
that the whole Shire should be treated as a benefited area." 
While the 1929 Act incorporated alterations to the benefited 
area provisions, no changes were made in response to the above criticism 
by the Commission. The amending provision re'defined the original 
provisions regarding benefited areas by including specific reference 
to each of the road types so far given declared road status, and in 
addition, altered parts of Subsection 5A of Section 33 of the Act 
so as to require that when the Commissioner exercised his power to grant 
financial relief to a Local Authority, such relief should be passed on 
by the Local Authority in the form of reduced ratings in any benefited 
area,where the rating in the latter, on account of permanent works 
44 improvements, was equal to or greater than 0.6 cents in the $1. 
Moreover, the amendments also provided that in cases where a Local 
Authority contained more than one benefited area and the same rating 
conditions applied, any relief granted by the Commissioner should be in 
45 proportion to the amounts of their respective annual contributions. 
The 1929 Act remained unaltered until 1934 when further 
amendments were introduced. These provided, inter alia, for the 
declaration of new roads and for additional financial assistance to 
Local Authorities. With regard to the latter, four changes were enacted. 
First, Local Authority liabilities in respect of permanent works repayments 
on main roads, and liabilities regarding the proportion of interest 
charges payable in respect of permanent works on development roads,, 
were reduced marginally from three-fourteenths of the commitment to one-fifth 
43. Ibid,, p. 17 • 
^^' The Main Roads Act. Amendment Act of 1924, Section 21(7) 
45. Ibid. 
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of the commitment.^^'^^^^^ Second, and notwithstanding the above, 
the Act also provided that the Commissioner could grant concessions to 
Local Authorities in respect of liabilities incurred on account of 
permanent works and maintenance where rates imposed to fund Local 
Authority contributions exceeded 0.6 cents in the $1 on unimproved property 
47 
values. 
Third, the Act provided for liberalisation of previous 
concessions granted with regard to the construction of main roads 
through underdeveloped areas. Whereas under the previous Act a Local 
Authority could have repayments on such roads deferred for a period 
up to ten years, at the expiration of which the thirty year loan period 
applied, the new Act provided that the deferred period should count 
as part of the loan period. 
Fourth, the Commissioner was empowered to grant financial 
assistance to Local Authorities on account of roads constructed under 
the Act, if in the opinion of the Commissioner: 
"(i) The industries in the district served by such a road 
have seriously declined; or 
(ii) Tourist traffic not of local origin derives consider-
able benefit from such roads."49 
One of the consequences of the liberalisation of Local Authority 
repayments to the Commission was that applications for gazettal of roads 
under one or other of the terms of the Main Roads .Acts increased sub-
stantially each year. Since many of the roads requested for gazettal 
could not, in the Commissioner's view, be given status under existing 
declarations " owing to the limited sphere of their usefulness..". 
46. Main Roads Acts Amendment Act of 1934, Clause 20. 
46(a) Note: The one-fifth liability represented a m.aximum liability-
^"^ iki^-» Section 20 [3(a)] 
48. Ibid., Section 20 [3(c)] 
49. Ibid., Section 20 [3(d)] 
^^ ' Annual Report of the Commissioner of Main Roads, 1934, p. 5. 
51. Ibid., p. 5. 
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provision was made in the 1934 Act for additional categories of 
declared roads. These road types were referred to as secondary roads, 
mining roads, and tourist tracks. Amendments to Section II of the 
Principal Act granted the Commissioner power to recommend to the 
Governor in Council that: 
"(i) Any road which acts as a feeder to a State Highway, 
main, developmental, or tourist road be declared a 
secondary road; 
(ii) Any road, route, or means of access to any mining 
area be declared a mining access road; and 
(iii) Any track within any Crown land or National Park 
declared to be a National Park in pursuance of 
'The State Forests and National Parks Act of 1906' 
(or any Act amending or in substitution for the same), 
or land reserved for or dedicated to public purposes 
or land taken for the purposes of this Act be declared 
a tourist track."^2 
As far as the financial arrangements were concerned,the Act 
provided that the charge to a Local Authority benefited by a secondary 
road should not exceed one half the total cost of construction. However, 
the entire financial responsibility for maintenance rested with the 
Local Authority 
For a mining access road,a Local Authority was free of 
liability for permanent works construction provided that the benefits 
from such a road were confined to mining interests. If benefits in 
addition to these were generated,the Commission was free to determine 
the amount to be imposed on the relevant Local Authority with regard 
to both permanent works and maintenance " as if such a road were a main 
53 
road under the Act"-
Finally, the Act provided that in the case of a tourist 
track,the burden of permanent works costs should be carried entirely 
by the Main Roads Commission. Other changes made to the Act included 
the insertion of a new section,(33B) dealing with the benefited area 
52. The Main Roads Acts Amendment Act of 1934, Section 5. 
53. Ibid., Section 20[2(e)] 
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concept and related financial matters. On the whole the changes 
made under this section represented a clarification of the status 
quo rather than a change in policy 
No further alterations were made to the Main Roads Acts 
until the enactment of the Main Roads Amendment Act of 1939. By and 
large the purpose of this legislation was to meet a number of 
difficulties experienced by the Commissioner in administering the 
Acts,and to ensure that all road works funded by the State would be 
constructed under the Main Roads Acts. Achievement of the latter 
involved the repeal and replacement of Section 19 of the Act. More 
precisely, under the new Section Local Authorities and Crown 
instrumentalities were allowed to apply to the Minister for the 
construction of access roads to new settlements or mining areas, or 
areas to be opened up for settlement, and/or for the construction of 
subsidiary roads in settlements still in the process of development. 
Applications for such roads were required to be referred to the Co-
ordinator General of Public Works who,in turn,was required to make 
recommendations regarding the suitability of each proposal to the 
Governor in Council. From here it was laid down that: 
". If the Co-ordinator General recommends the approval of 
the application and the Governor in Council adopts such a 
recommendation then the Minister may direct the Commissioner 
to construct such works or authorise a constructing authorityr. 
to construct same under the supervision of the Commissioner" 
On the funding side the new Section retained the original 
maintenance provision of total responsibility to the benefited Local 
Authority, and in addition brought the apportionment of the cost of 
construction in line with the principles established for main roads. 
Further, in determining the actual liability the Commission was 
required, inter alia, to consider such matters as: 
54. The Main Roads Act of 1959. Section 5 (3) 
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"(a) Whether or not the road is likely to become of 
sufficient importance to be declared a main or 
secondary road; 
(b) Whether or not the road is of special value to the 
Crown for the purpose of assisting forestry, land 
settlement, irrigation or mining, or for the benefit 
of Crown property in addition to its local value."55 
2. The Main Roads Acts 1940-1961 
Relatively few amendments, and then only fairly minor 
ones, were made to the Main Roads Acts during the period of the 
Second World War. These amendments were introduced in 1942 and 1943 
and covered a number of administrative and financial matters relevant 
to the war effort, as well as providing for the declaration of 
farmers' roads, and the granting of power to the Commissioner to 
construct roads in, or leading to, forestry reserves. 
The 1943 Act remained in force until 1953 when legislation 
was introduced for the purpose of granting the Commissioner power 
to declare certain roads (State highways and main roads) as limited 
access roads. No further changes to the Act were made until 1959. 
In essence the 1959 amendments: (i) widened the limited access 
provisions to include new roads as well as existing roads, and (ii) for 
administrative convenience, reduced the number of legal classes of 
roads from seven to four. Specifically, all roads hitherto classified 
as mining roads, farmers' roads or tourist roads were designated as 
secondary roads. 
In 1962 further amendments to the Act were passed by the 
Parliament, and these also were largely concerned with administrative 
refinements. 
55. Ibid., Section 5 (8) 
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3 The New Roads Plan 
As can be seen from Figure 9,1 below the length of road 
designated as declared road increased at a fairly steady rate from 
the inception of the Main Roads Board until 1954. 
In the following year the Commissioner decided that no new 
declarations should be made until the backlog of outstanding work* 
exacerbated by the post-war growth in motor vehicle ownership and use -
was substantially reduced. Further, it was also decided that 
consideration would be given to requests from Local Authorities that 
particular roads be returned to their control in order that roads of 
equal length and greater significance could be declared. This policy, 
however, was intended to be applied only in special circumstances. The 
Commissioner took the view that since a road could not have achieved 
declared road status without the approval of the relevant Local 
Authority it must have been judged by the latter as being of 
sufficient importance to warrant that status Thus good reasons 
would have to be advanced to warrant the return of a road to Local 
Authority control. These policies generated a great deal of 
adverse reaction from most of the Local Authorities, and; in 1957 
at a meeting of the Local Government Association it was resolved: 
" that the Government be requested to review all main 
roads gazetted as such with a view to degazetting those 
that cannot be justified and gazetting those new roads 
that can be justified."56 
56. Cited by S. Schubert in a paper entitled, "The Road Plan of 
Queensland"- Paper presented to Queensland Local Government 
Engineers' Conference, October 23rd to 25th, 1962, p. 3. 
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The initial response of the Government to this request was 
expressed by the Commissioner for Main Roads as follows: 
"There is merit in this idea in so far as the cancellation 
of some declarations is concerned. Many roads were 
brought under the Acts at a time when they were of sufficient 
importance to justify this action but, due to the changed 
circumstances of the area, to the removal of industries or 
to the growth in importance of other neighbouring centres, 
some such roads no longer qualify for inclusion under the 
Acts and it would be logical to cancel their declaration. 
But to replace them by equivalent lengths would merely 
perpetuate the existing state of affairs and so no real 
iiq)rovement would result. 
To enable the maximum amount of construction work to be 
carried out on the greatest length of declared road it 
would be necessary to reduce such roads to a length 
which would bear some relationship to the resources 
of the Department and the Local Authorities in money and 
manpower of all kinds."57 
Two years later, however, the Minister for Main Roads announced 
58 
that an investigation would be undertaken by the Main Roads Department 
to determine which declared roads should be returned to Local Authority 
control or varied in status, and which non declared roads would 
warrant declaration. The initial intention was that the study would 
focus on State Highways to be followed by further studies of main 
roads and secondary roads. However, it was subsequently decided that 
the investigations would deal with the entire declared road system 
at the one time. 
As part of the review of the roads system the Main Roads 
Department carried out a study of the distribution of roads in the 
various Local Authority areas in order to ascertain ". whether the 
basic need for road service in all areas could be expressed by a simple 
59 formula" While inclusion of a road in the Road Plan was determined 
57 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Main Roads, 30th June, 1958, 
p. 4. 
58. The Road Authority's title was changed to "Main Roads Department" 
in 1952. 
59. Clarke, N.F., "The Road Plan of Queensland", Queensland Roads, 
December 1963, p. 47 
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largely by the type of service provided by that road, the study of 
the "need for road service" was intended to provide an indication 
of the length of road in each Local Authority which could be 
sufficiently important to warrant declaration ixnder the Main Roads 
Acts. The procedure adopted by the Commission for determining a 
quota of road mileage for each Local Authority was based on a 
research paper by R.S. Scott. The fundamental assumption made is 
that the length of road mileage required to serve an area is directly 
related to the population of that area. In other words, all other 
things being equal, an area of 50 square miles with a population of 5000 
persons would require 10 times the length of road needed to 
service the same area with a population of 500 persons. 
More formally: if as shown by Figure 2 we have a unit of 
population "p" contained within a unit area having a side length 
equal to dx then dX. = kpdx for each unit of population, (see p. 275) 
61 
FIGURE 2 Required Road Length and Area Population 
dx = side length 
Roads 
dL = length of road 
60. Scott, R.S., "Factors Influencing Rural Road Mileage", Highway 
Research Board Bulletin, No. 158, pp. 43-56. 
61. Clarke, N.F., ibid., p. 48. 
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Summing this expression for the total population of the 
specified area gives the expression 
L = kPX 
where L = total length of road 
k = constant 
P = total population 
X = side length of area A 
However, since X = v^then, 
L = kP y^ 
Implicit in the above expression is the assumption that 
population is evenly distributed. Changing this assumption to take 
account of variations in population distribution produced the following 
modifications 
L = kj^  R A R + k2U/AU 
where k,= rural constant 
k^ = urban constant 
R = rural population of the area 
U = urban population of the area 
AR= rural component of area 
AU= urban component of area. 
As already indicated the results derived by application of 
the above formula were apparently " used only as a guide" for 
determining each Local Authority's need for road service - the major 
consideration being " the nature and importance of travel on each 
j„ 64 
road"-
Each road considered for inclusion in the plan was 
classified in terms of the legal definitions of the four types of 
declared road specified under the Main Roads Acts, This process was 
also affected by other newly established criteria. It was decided by 
the Department that: 
62. Clarke, ibid., 
63. Ibid., p. 49. 
64. Ibid. 
65.. Ibid., p. 50. 
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(i) every town or closely settled area with a 
population greater than 500 persons would be 
served by either a main road or a State Highway; 
(ii) as far as possible each main road should be 
interconnected either with another main road or 
with the State Highway system so that it would 
provide a continuous route of travel; 
(iii) a State Highway would be located through or near 
every urban area with a population in excess of 
5000 persons and; 
(iv) a State Highway or developmental road would serve 
each of the principal ports. 
Overall, the intended effect of the application of the above 
policies, together with the determination of road length quota 
guidelines for each Local Authority, and the matching of roads 
suggested for inclusion in the plan against the legal classes of 
declared road was to ensure: 
"- .that the system of roads designed for each Local 
Authority gave the area declared road service similar 
to that in every other area."66,67 
The results of the review - referred to as the Interim Plan -
were presented to the Local Government Association Conference held in 
August 1962. The plan proposed adjustments to the system of declared 
roads in all but three Local Authorities and recommended a number 
of significant changes in the total length of road assigned to each 
legal class as well as in the total length of declared road. A 
comparison of the length of declared road by legal class as at June 
1961 with that proposed as the Interim Plan is shown in Table 9.1. 
66. Ibid., p. 50. 
67 The author was informed by officers of the Queensland Main Roads 
Department that the development of the road system in Queensland 
had often resulted in the assignment of different declarations 
to roads which provided similar services. It was one of the 
objectives of the Roads Plan to remove such anomalies. 
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TABLE 9.1 Interim Plan 
Length of Each Type of Declared Road 
Type of Road 
State Highway 
Developmental Road 
a^in Road 
Secondary Road 
TOTAL 
Declared at 
June 1961 
8,251 
230 
10,110 
2,057 
20,648 
Proposed Interim 
Plan August 1962 
6,267 
3,979 
5,225 
8,114 
23,585 
Source: Clarke, N.F,, "The Road Plan of Queensland", Queensland Roads, 
June 1963, p. 31, 
Following examination of submissions made by ninety-six of 
the Local Authorities for alterations to the Interim Plan further 
changes were made to the total length of declared road and the length 
of road assigned to each class. As can be seen from Table 9,2 the 
principal adjustments made were to the mileage of road designated as 
developmental roads and secondary roads. 
TABLE 9.2 Road Plan of Queensland 
Changes in Length of Declared Roads 
Type of Road 
State Highway 
Developmental Road 
Main Road 
Secondary Road 
TOTAL 
Declared at 
30th June 1962 
8,251 
230 
10,110 
2,057 
20,648 
Interim Plan 
August 1962 
6,267 
3,974 
5,225 
8,114 
23,585 
Road Plan 
July 1963 
6,262 
4,263 
5,130 
8,465 
24,120 
Source: Clarke, N.F., "The Road Plan of Queensland", Queensland Roads, 
June 1963, p. 32. 
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The new proposals were accepted by the Government and 
came into effect under the terms of the Main Roads Act of 1963. 
These changes, however, were not the only initiatives introduced 
by the Government. The New Roads Plan also involved changes to 
existing Main Roads Department - Local Government financial arrangements. 
Until 1962 the Main Roads Acts specified maximum charges to 
be imposed on Local Authorities by the Main Roads Department for 
permanent works and maintenance expenditure according to road declaration. 
This system resulted in considerable variations in the contributions 
faced by Local Authorities for roads having the same declaration. 
While in some cases consideration of the capacity to pay criterion no 
doubt applied, it seems that non economic factors dominated. Specifically^ 
how favourably a Local Authority was treated depended, more often than 
not, on the political muscle it was willing and able to exert. 
Since the proposed Roads Plan involved a rationalisation of 
the existing road system on a functional basis with possible consequent 
variations in Local Government financial commitments (i.e. under the 
existing financial arrangements), and since the Main Roads Department 
and State Government wished to achieve the support of a great 
majority of the Local Authorities and to reduce the inequities 
that prevailed under the existing system, it was necessary to assure 
the Local Authorities that no authority would be made financially 
worse off as a result of the implementation of the Roads Plan. 
Accordingly, provision was made in the 1963 Act for a restructuring of 
the charges to be imposed by the Main Roads Department for declared 
roads works. 
Table 9.3 shows the charges applicable under the Main Roads 
Acts 1920 to 1962 while Table 9.4 shows the structure of charges 
set down in the 1963 Act. 
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TABLE 9,3 Maximum Charges for Works Under "The Main Roads Acts, 
1920-1962" 
Type of Road 
State Highway 
Developmental Road 
Main Road 
Secondary Road 
Permanent 
Maximum 
Charge 
Nil 
Interest on 
20% of Cost 
20% 
50% 
Works 
Period of 
Repayment 
-
20 years 
30 years 
30 years 
Maximum 
Maintenance 
Charge 
50% 
50% 
50% 
50% 
Source; 
Note: 
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Main Roads for year 
ended 30th June 1963, p. 5. 
In some cases, for example, roads providing access only 
to mining areas, the rate was reduced. 
TABLE 9.4 Charges for Road Works Under "The Main Roads Acts, 
1920-1963" 
Type of Road 
State Highway 
Developmental Road 
Main Road 
Secondary Road 
Permanent tWorks 
Charge 
Nil 
An amount equivalent to 5% 
of cost, repayable with 
interest over 30 years 
10% of cost, repayable with 
interest over 30 years 
25% of cost, repayable with 
interest over 30 years 
Maintenance 
Charge 
10% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
1 
Source: Annual Report of the Commissioner of Main Roads for year 
ended 30th June 1963, p. 5. 
As can be seen from the Tables,the charges imposed under the 
1963 legislation were substantially less than those applicable under 
the previous Act. Moreover, the 1963 charges were basic rates for 
each class of road, as distinct from maximum charges, to be applied 
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uniformly throughout the State. 
In addition to the above financial provisions, the New 
Roads Plan also provided for matching grants to be made by the Main 
Roads Department on a $1 for $1 basis with regard to the expenditure 
of Local Authority road aid funds. 
It will be recalled that imder Commonwealth Government road 
grants legislation from 1950 to 1964 a substantial portion of that aid 
was earmarked for non-arterial roads (including secondary and develop-
mental roads) In Queensland the practice developed of providing part 
of the State's grant for such roads directly to the Local Authorities. 
As a result of the investigation which led to the changes in 
road declarations contained in the Roads Plan, the Government (on 
the advice of the Main Roads Commissioner) decided that an effort 
should be made to encourage the Local Authorities to spend part of 
their grant on secondary roads. Thus the matching grants provision. 
The initial reaction of the majority of Local Authorities 
was to view the scheme with favour However, this attitude changed 
and by the late 1970's only about twenty of the State's 134 Local 
Authorities found it worth their while to participate in the scheme. 
68. A study of the allocation of road fimds in Australia, and no doubt 
elsewhere, highlights the paradoxes of decision making given the 
existence of institutional and political constraints. Thiis, 
in the above context the Main Roads Department argued (see Annual 
Report of the Commissioner for Main Roads, June 1969, p. 6) 
that the Commonwealth Government's 40% rural roads Clause had 
resulted, in some parts of the State, in a faster construction 
rate for secondary roads and minor rural local roads than for 
State Highways which served the major traffic needs of those 
areas. We have also observed that the M.R.D. allocated a part of 
the Commonwealth's non arterial rural road grant to the Local 
Authorities for expenditure on rural local roads. To rescind 
such a policy was judged to be unwise politically The matching 
grant provision could thus be seen as an attempt to modify the 
effects of that policy by shifting funds away from non-declared 
rural roads to secondary roads even though a shift of funds from 
both of these categories to the State Highways system was the 
Department's most preferred objective. 
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4. The Main Roads Acts 1963 to 1976 
Since the adoption of the 1963 Roads Plan the Main Roads 
Department has undertaken a regular review (usually on a triennial 
basis) of the State's road system and minor changes have been made to 
both the total number of miles of roads specified as declared 
roads as well as to the legal status of particular roads. In 
addition the system of road classification was expanded under the 
1968 Act to include an urban arterial and an urban sub-arterial 
category on account of the State's urban roads programme. 
The amounts chargeable to Local Authorities under Section 
33 of the Act have also been subject to a number of amendments. By 
July 1977 maintenance charges on declared roads had been reduced to 
zero for works commencing on or after July 1st, 1976, with the exception 
of secondary roads to which a reduced rate of 10 percent applied. For 
permanent works expenditure the developmental road rate had been reduced 
to 5 percent the secondary road rate to 15 percent, and urban sub-
arterial rate to 10 percent. 
Apart from these matters most of the changes to the Main 
Roads Act since 1962 have been of a regulatory and/or administrative 
nature. The most recent amendments are contained in the 1976 Act 
which was introduced to amend Section 27 of the Principal Act to extend 
the borrowing powers of the Department by allowing for the issue of 
debentures. 
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5, Summary and Conclusion 
Our broad survey of the Main Roads Acts of Queensland 
indicates that at the economic policy level most of the changes to the 
Acts since the creation of the Main Roads Board in 1922 have been 
concerned with financial relationships between the State's Roads 
Department and the Local Government Authorities. With the passage 
of time the Main Roads Department has been able to bring about 
substantial reductions in rates of Local Authority contributions to 
the construction and maintenance expenditure on the various parts 
of the declared roads system. This in turn has resulted from the 
growth in revenues derived from motor vehicle ownership fees and 
from the growth in Commonwealth Government contributions by way 
of Section 96 grants. 
Our survey also indicates that many of the changes to the 
Acts during the pre Second World War period were concerned with the 
declarations of road types for which the Main Roads Department was to 
assume responsibility. The New Roads Plan of 1963 was an attempt to 
rationalise that system and to bring about a more equitable system 
of charges imposed on the Local Authorities. 
It is also to be noted that as far as the important matter 
of expenditure of road funds is concerned no changes have been made 
to the prescription contained in Section 24 of the original Act. 
To determine how road funds in Queensland have been allocated, and on 
what basis, it is obviously necessary to pursue other sources of 
information. This is the task of the following Chapter 
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CHAPTER 10 
QUEENSLAND MAIN ROADS DEPARTMENT EXPENDITURE POLICY 
1. Introduction 
We now turn to the important issue of how the State road 
authority actually allocates its revenue among the various planning regions 
of the State. 
First, we provide a short outline of the organisational structure 
of the M.R.D. and the nature of theV planning and programming process. 
Second, we examine the pattern of fund allocation according to the various 
M.R.D. Divisions and Districts of the State, mainly for the period 1950/51 
to 1976/77 A discussion of the pattern of fund allocation at the City 
and Shire level is also provided. The next part of the Chapter considers 
the expenditure pattern more formally by testing some plausible models of the 
allocation process. The results are then interpreted. The final part 
attempts an assessment of the impact of Commonwealth Government policy, 
especially since 1969, on the regional pattern of fund allocation. 
2. The Planning and Programming of Road Works in Queensland 
For road planning and programming purposes the Queensland M.R.D. 
has, over the years, built up a highly decentralised organisational structure 
on a geographical basis following Local Government boundaries. The State is 
divided into four major Divisions: the Northern Division; the Central 
Division; the South Western Division;and the South Eastern Division. They 
make up respectively, 39.26 percent, 32.57 percent, 24.22 percent and 
3.94 percent of the total area of the State and respectively, 14.01 percent, 
10.92 percent, 10.14 percent and 64.91 percent of the State's population 
as at June, 1977 
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An Assistant Commissioner is responsible for the administration 
of the roads programmes of each Division and each Division is divided into a 
number of Districts. Responsibility for each District's road works is in 
turn delegated to a District Engineer Table 10.1 provides an indication of 
the area and road stocks of the Districts. The latter are subject to 
qualification since quality of road space is not shown. 
TABLE 10.1 Indicators of Road Stocks by M.R.D. Districts (30th June, 1970) 
M.R.D. ^ 
Districts 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Total 
Area 
(sq. miles) 
3,899 
7,884 
9,243 
125,091 
27,020 
52,016 
151,425 
14,941 
40,092 
119,905 
101,440 
13,022 
665,978 
Length of 
Declared Roads 
(miles) 
1,150.3 
1,703.3 
1,931.0 
2,874.7 
1,938.1 
2,433.7 
3,839.0 
1,285.0 
1,442.9 
2,555.4 
2,264.7 
1,395.3 
24,813.4 
Length of All 
Roads Habitually 
Used by Traffic^ 
(miles) 
6,413.2 
7,071.6 
8,597.9 
12,699.3 
6,443.7 
9,235.4 
9,966.1 
3,404.4 
5,742.8 
8,207.0 
6,693.3 
5,269.9 
89,714.6 
Source: Queensland Main Roads Department Planning Manual, 1970. 
The allocation of the Department's budget among the Divisions is 
determined by the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner in consultation with 
the Assistant Commissioners and is subject to Ministerial approval. 
1. There are thirteen Districts. However, since Districts 1 and 13 cover 
the Brisbane region they are here classified as District 1. 
2. Figures obtained from individual Local Authorities during the preparation 
of the National Association of Australian State Road Authorities' Roads 
Needs Survey 1969/70. 
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Budget estimates are made over a five year period with actual 
allocations taking place annually Once this decision is taken the 
Assistant Comm.issioners bear the responsibility for apportioning their 
share of the total budget among the Districts which make up their Division. 
In contrast, the major responsibility for the planning and programm-
ing of road works resides at the District level. It is the District 
Engineer's function to engage in regular and close consultation with the 
Local Authorities in his area for the purpose of assessing the availability 
of resources (e.g. labour and capital), and to prepare a programme of works 
over the five year planning period. The programmes are then submitted 
to the Assistant Commissioner for consideration and approval and are 
modified in the light of estimated and actual budget allocations. Programmes 
might also be subject to modification to meet State Government priorities. 
For example, during the 1960's the State Government made a political 
commitment to speed up the progress of the Flinders Highway project. In 
the 1970's the Landsborough Highway project assxjmed first place in the 
Government's listing of programme commitments. The programming of projects 
within each Division and District may also be affected by decisions taken 
by the Commonwealth Government concerning the manner in which Commonwealth 
road aid fimds are to be spent. 
Given these constraints the District Engineer makes the trade-off 
3 
between various projects on the basis of engineering criteria, his 
familiarity with the needs of the local area and pressures exerted by 
the Local Authorities. As indicated earlier, the Local Authority input is 
of considerable importance, especially in Queensland, given that a major 
3. See, for example, 
(a) National Association of Australian State Road Authorities, 
Policy for Geometric Design of Rural Roads, (1976) 
(b) Main Roads Department Queensland, Road Design Manual (various dates) 
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part of the Department's construction and maintenance work is carried out 
by Local Authority workforce using Local Authority capital equipment. 
Of particular interest is the matter of the basis on which 
Divisional and District allocations of road funds are made. Section 24 
of the original Act specified, inter alia, a principle of apportionment 
of road funds among the Northern, Central and Southern Divisions. This 
principle, as will be seen later^ has not been adhered to, and no attempt 
has been made to develop and employ economic modelling procedures. But 
some fairly consistently applied method or rule-of-thumb is presumably used. 
Questioning by the author of senior officers of the Department did not 
lead to the admission of a precise formula. What was revealed, however, 
was the importance of past decisions and present commitments. In addition, 
the point was made that, in terms of engineering criteria, road needs of 
each of the Divisions (and Districts) greatly exceeded available funds, 
so that once previous commitments are met there is no difficulty in generating 
new, and warranted projects. 
In essence, the four Assistant Commissioners attempt to maximise 
their share of the road budget. Each Assistant Commissioner attempts to 
ensure that the real value of funding to his area from one period to the 
next is maintained, and if extra funds are available (i.e. as the State 
road budget gets larger) to gain as large a share of that increment as 
possible. Thus, to a large extent the allocation process does not lend 
itself to a comparison of the relative merits of programmes between the 
Divisions. This doesn't mean that each Division is more or less assured 
of a constant share of the total road budget. Changes in Divisional 
allocation occur^ but more often than not tend to be gradual rather than of 
a dramatic nature. 
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I, The Pattern of Fund Allocation 
Our main concern in this section is to show what kind of 
relationship exists between expenditure in a given region (the M.R.D. 
Divisions, Districts and selected Shires and Cities) and the proportion 
of total road service performed by the road system in that region. 
Given existing methods of charging and other institutional and 
environmental conditions each road user will derive benefits from road use 
which he values at no less than the cost to him. The actual value of 
benefits will differ considerably for different users, but the assumption is 
made (and is hard to replace or disprove) that the value of the benefit 
of any particular piece or section of the road system is a direct fimction 
3a 
of the volume and type of traffic on it. 
Ideally we would like to have accurate data over a fairly long 
period of time of traffic composition and volumes by the various regions. 
Unfortunately such data are not available and it is necessary to rely 
largely on motor vehicle registrations in a region as a proxy for traffic 
volumes and composition. This is available for the years 1955/56 and 
1966/67 to 1976/77. Other indicators of vehicle use such as petrol 
consumption by region were sought, but could only be obtained for the 
years 1971 to 1975 while estimates of average annual daily traffic by 
region are only available for the years 1964 (for Shires), and 1974 (for 
Districts). 
3.1 The Four Main Divisions and the Main Roads Department Districts 
We begin by offering a brief description of the pattern of road 
fund allocation among the Divisions of the State during the period 1922/23 
to 1938/39 and for the post Second World War period of 1945/46 to 1976/77. 
Data for road expenditure on the Queensland declared road system are found 
in Appendix I of the M.R.D. Annual Reports and are recorded, on a Local 
3a. See for example, Harbeson, R.W., "Some Allocational Problems in 
Highway Finance", Transportation Economics (Columbia University Press, 
1965). ~~ 
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Authority basis, as permanent works and maintenance expenditure. In the 
Annual Reports for the first period the data are also classified by Northern, 
Central and Southern Divisions. This is not the case for the Reports for 
all years of the second period. Further, these divisions of the State are 
not the same in area as those which now exist, thus making it difficult, 
especiially since Local Government boundaries have also changed, to analyse 
road expenditure policy over the entire period on the basis of uniform 
regions. However, it is nonetheless of some interest to see what the data 
reveal for each of the two periods. 
Total M.R.D. expenditure for the period 1922/23 to 1938/39, by 
Divisions (as then defined) is shown in Table Bl.O in Appendix B.* Tables 
Bl.l and B1.2 show respectively, for present planning Divisions of the 
State, (i) the distribution of total M.R.D. expenditure (excluding urban 
freeway expenditure) for the period 1945/46 to 1976/77 and (ii) the 
distribution of M.R.D. expenditure (including urban freeway expenditure) for 
the period 1971/72 to 1976/77 The Tables indicate that in neither period 
has the M.R.D. pursued a policy in accordance with a strict interpretation 
of Section 24 of the original Act. 
In the period from 1922/23 to 1938/39 the Southern Division (as 
then defined) averaged 53.24 percent of total M.R.D. expenditure while the 
Central and Northern Divisions averaged respectively, 27.65 percent and 19.10 
percent of total expenditure. For the period from 1945/46 to 1976/77 the 
Southern, Central and Northern Divisions (as currently defined) 
averaged respectively, 54.50 percent, 22.89 percent and 22.57 percent 
of total M.R.D. expenditure. A breakdown of the data for the Southern 
Division for this period, on the basis of the South Eastern and South 
Western Divisions, reveals that these Divisions averaged respectively, 31.81 
percent and 22.69 percent of total expenditure, indicating that over 
the period the average percentage distribution for the South Western, 
* Tables bearing the prefix, B, are found in Appendix B, 
289, 
Central and Northern Divisions are very similar. 
While this is of interest, the annual variations in a Division's 
percentage share of expenditure are also of importance. What is observed 
is that the percentage distribution of fund allocation for the South 
Eastern and Central Divisions is fairly stable for most of the period, 
namely, from 1945/46 to 1970/71, after which the South Eastern Division 
experienced a dramatic upward shift in its percentage share revealing a 
peak of 47,30 percent in 1973/74 and declining to 37,80 percent in 1976/77, 
while the Central Division experienced a fall from about 23,16 percent in 
1970/71 to approximately 17 percent in 1972/73 and then increased to 23,15 
percent in 1976/77, The explanation for the dramatic shift, in such a short 
period of time, in the South Eastern Divisions share over the period is simply 
that Commonwealth Government roads policy as embodied in the 1969 and 1974 
Commonwealth Aid Roads Acts, especially the former, provided for the 
earmarking of a substantial part of that aid for the development of urban 
arterial roads. In Queensland's case the bulk of this aid was allocated 
to expenditure on urban arterial roads in the capital city of Brisbane. 
The pattern of expenditure shares for the South Western Division 
is somewhat different. As shown in Table Bl.l the Division's expenditure 
share is characterised by a high degree of stability around the 27 percent 
mark until about 1959/60 (the maximum value is 29,17 percent and the 
minimum value is 24,55 percent), after which a gradual decline occurs 
with relative minor percentage changes about the 20 percent level between 
the years 1961/62 to 1970/71, and then declines to 14,82 percent in 1974/75, 
increasing to approximately 16 percent in 1976/77, 
Likewise the pattern of expenditure for the Northern Division is 
fairly stable over the period from 1945/46 to 1958/59 having a mean annual 
value of 19,21 percent, a minimum value of 16,26 percent and a maximum value 
of 23,48 percent. From there on, however, until about the mid-sixties the 
percentage share gradually increases and from that point until 1970/71 
290. 
remains fairly stable about a mean of 28.31 percent, and then declines to 
20.50 percent in 1974/75, increasing to about 24 percent in 1976/77 
Data showing the distribution, by Divisions, of M.R.D. permanent 
works expenditure and maintenance expenditure are also generated for the 
period 1945/46 to 1976/77 and are shown respectively, in Tables Bl,3, B1.4 
and B1.5, B1.6 in Appendix B. As expected,Divisional permanent works and main-
tenance shares vary in much the same manner as described for total expenditure 
and have average values almost the same as those derived for total expenditure. 
For permanent works expenditure, the average percentage distribution of fund 
allocation over the period for the South Eastern, South Western, Southern, 
Central and Northern Divisions is respectively 31.11 percent, 22.32 
percent, 53.43 percent, 23.63 percent and 22.92 percent, while for 
maintenance expenditure the percentage distribution is respectively, 33.23 
percent, 23.74 percent, 56.97 percent, 20.60 percent and 21.40 percent. 
We now take our discussion a step further by examining the regional 
distribution of road funds in relation to available demand indicators. 
Tables B1.7 and B1.8 show respectively, for M.R.D. Divisions and Districts, 
the percentage distribution of M,R,D, expenditure and estimates of the 
percentage distribution of motor vehicle registrations for the years 
1955/56, 1962/63.and 1965/66 to 1976/77 
As can be seen from the first mentioned Table the South Eastern 
Division (which comprises Districts 1, 2 and 12) received for the years 
1955/56, 1965/66 and 1968/69, 31.60 percent, 26.25 percent and 29.20 
percent of M.R.D. expenditure and accounted for 56.99 percent, 59.48 percent 
and 60.46 percent of the State's motor vehicle registrations for the same 
years. The Central and Northern Divisions (which comprise respectively. 
Districts 6, 7 and 8 and Districts 9, 10 and 11) together accounted for 
approximately 25.51 percent, 26.58 percent and 26.49 percent of motor 
vehicle registrations and received respectively, 43.32 percent, 54.06 percent 
and 50.03 percent of M.R.D. expenditure. The relationship is altered 
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somewhat in the post 1969 period as a result of the Commonwealth Government's 
urban road grants. Thus, for example, for the years 1971/72, 1973/74 and 
1976/77 the South Eastern Division received respectively, 44.38 percent, 47.30 
percent and 37.80 percent of total M.R.D. expenditure while accounting for 
approximately 61.81 percent, 62.94 percent and 63.23 percent of motor vehicle 
registrations for the same years. For the Central and Northern Divisions 
combined, M.R.D. expenditure represented 43.51 percent, 37.87 percent and 
46.60 percent of the State's total expenditure while motor vehicle registration 
shares were respectively, 26.71 percent, 26.03 percent and 26.08 percent of 
the State's total for the same years. 
The differences in the relationship between M.R.D. expenditure and 
motor vehicle registrations are even more striking when a comparison is made, 
as in Table B1.8, at the District level For instance. District 1 (which 
comprises the State's Capital City area) received for the years 1955/56, 
1962/63, 1965/66 and 1967/68 13.59 percent, 11.62 percent, 12.86 percent and 
14.35 percent of M.R.D. expenditure and accounted for approximately 43.59 
percent, 46.94 percent, 47.47 percent and 48.03 percent of the State's motor 
vehicle registrations for the same years. For the same years. Districts 7 and 
10 together accounted for approximately 3.35 percent, 3.65 percent, 3.12 
percent and 3.12 percent of motor vehicle registrations and received 8.41 
percent, 14.14 percent, 17.98 percent and 13.45 percent of M.R.D. expenditure. 
The dramatic effect of the Commonwealth Government's earmarked urban road grant 
in the post 1969 period is also indicated. Thus in the years 1972/73 and 
1976/77 District 1 received 34.59 percent and 25.51 percent of total M.R.D. 
expenditure while accounting for 50.81 percent and 51.09 percent of total motor 
vehicle registrations. Likewise Districts 7 and 10 combined received 11.78 
percent and 11.27 percent of M.R.D. expenditure and accounted for 2.90 percent 
and 2.44 percent of the State's motor vehicle registrations. However, it is 
interesting to note that the share of fund allocation to District 1 starts to 
292. 
fall fairly sharply after about 1974/75, deflecting the decline in the 
significance of urban road grants under the 1974 Commonwealth Roads Acts. 
We pursue this matter in a later section. 
The Divisions and Districts are, of course, not only heterogeneous 
in numbers of vehicles registered but also in area. Table B1.9 shows 
total M.R.D. expenditure per motor vehicle registered by Divisions for a 
number of selected years between, and including, 1955/56 and 1976/77, 
the size of each Division, and the number of motor vehicles registered per 
square mile of Divisional area. Table B2.0 provides the same information 
for the same years at the District level. The conclusion to be drawn 
from an examination of these Tables is that, in general, the larger the 
area of a Division or District the greater the total expenditure per 
motor vehicle registered. In other words there is, in general, an inverse 
relationship between vehicle density (registered vehicles per square mile) 
and expenditure per registered vehicle. This can be seen more clearly in 
Table B2.1 which ranks the Districts for selected years in order of (a) M.R.D. 
expenditure per motor vehicle and (b) vehicles per square mile. For M.R.D. 
expenditure per motor vehicle, a higher number indicates greater expenditure 
per motor vehicle; for vehicles per square mile a higher number indicates 
a smaller number of vehicles per square mile. This relationship between 
area and motor vehicle registrations is also highlighted in Tables B2.2(a) 
and B2.2(b) In Table B2.2(a) columns (1) and (2) show the distribution 
of total expenditure for the period 1964/65 to 1966/67 among the Main 
Roads Districts in absolute and percentage terms, while columns (3) and (4) 
show the distribution of motor vehicle registrations for the year 
1965/66. Column (5) shows ^he relationship between the percentage of motor 
vehicles registered in each District and the percentage of total expenditure 
in that District. Table B2.2(b) shows the same information for the years 
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1974/75, 1975/76 and 1976/77 As we would expect District 1 records the 
lowest value in column (5), and Districts 4,7 and 10 the highest. 
An obvious objection to the use of motor vehicle registrations 
as an indicator of demand for road space is that it may significantly 
understate for some (or all) regions, relative levels of usage of the 
regional road networks. This would occur, for example, if vehicle usage 
were greater in some regions than in others or if a region's road network 
was used extensively by vehicles registered in other regions or in other 
States. Petrol consumption by region might thus be viewed as a better or 
4 
more acceptable indicator of demand for a region's road network. 
As indicated earlier estimates of petrol consumption by M.R.D. 
Districts were sought and were obtained from B.P- Australia Ltd. for the 
years 1971 to 1975. The data are shown in Table B2.3. Examination of the 
data indicate a very close relationship between motor vehicles registered 
by the Divisions and Districts and petrol sales in those areas. This is 
shown in Table B2.4. A further indicator of regional road use is provided 
in the form of an estimate of the average of "average annual daily traffic 
(AADT)" for all declared roads by Districts for the years 1964 and 1968. 
4. It is of course possible that petrol purchased in one region is consumed 
in another region so that even petrol sales data have some weakness 
as an indicator of road usage. Moreover, the data also fail to reflect 
accurately the composition of traffic. Unfortunately there is little 
one can do about these difficulties until the data collection 
activities of road authorities are improved. 
5. An attempt was made to obtain estimates of petrol sales (gallons) for 
each petrol company in Queensland. Only BP Australia Ltd., Esse 
Australia Ltd., and Shell Company of Australia Ltd. were able to co-
operate. BP Australia Ltd. made an estimate of its sales by the M.R.D. 
Districts, and on the basis of its knowledge of market shares, was able 
to provide an estimate of industry sales by Districts. 
6. The data were obtained from the Queensland Main Roads Department's 
Planning Manual (1970) and from a document compiled by the Department 
entitled, "Australian Roads Survey 1969/74: Traffic Growth Rates - Rural 
Queensland" 
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A ranking of regions according to these data, together with a ranking 
by motor vehicle registrations and petrol consumption for the years 
1971 and 1974, where a high niomber indicates a low ranking and a low 
number of high ranking, is shown in Table B2,5, By and large, the ranking 
of regions by AADT estimates are consistent with the rankings by motor 
vehicle registrations and petrol consumption. 
In addition, average annual daily traffic data by District, by 
length of rural arterial roads (functional class 1, 2 and 3) for 
the year 1974 were obtained from the 1975 Australian Roads Survey (Up 
Date) and the data are shown in modified form in Tables B2,6 and B2,7, 
Despite the fact that the mileage of road shown is less than the total 
declared road mileage for each District^ it is reasonable to assume that 
the data provide a fairly accurate indication of the order of usage of 
each District's declared rural roads network. Overall the data show that 
the larger regions i.e. in area, are also those which have a significant 
proportion of their rural arterial road mileage carrying relatively low 
traffic volumes. Districts 4, 7, 10 and 11 are once again the notable 
examples. Respectively, these Districts are shown to have 44,14 percent, 
58,57 percent, 55,42 percent and 51.53 percent of their rural arterial road 
mileage with an AADT rating of between 10 and 101 vehicles. If we examine 
the distribution for an AADT rating between 10 and 301 vehicles the same 
districts record respectively,79.25 percent, 88.12 percent, 80 percent 
and 67,31 percent of their rural arterial road mileage within this range. 
Looked at from the opposite end of the scale, namely, the AADT range of 
between 2201 and 5001 vehicles. Districts 7 and 10 record zero miles 
while Districts 4 and 11 record respectively 0,14 percent and approximately 
4,0 percent of their rural arterial mileage within this range. 
In contrast. Districts 1, 2, 3 and 12 record respectively, zero 
percent, 11.94 percent, 11,46 percent and 14,84 percent of their rural 
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road mileage within the AADT range of 10 and 101 vehicles and respectively, 
15.62 percent, 34.62 percent, 28.34 percent and 35.26 percent of rural 
arterial road mileage within the AADT range of 10 and 301 vehicles. 
It may be argued that the data relating expenditure per motor 
vehicle registered in the various regions should be adjtisted to take 
account of the specific grants for beef cattle roads provided by the 
Commonwealth Government since the early 1960's. Table B2.8 shows, for 
selected years, M.R.D. expenditure per motor vehicle registered by Districts, 
including and excluding beef road grants. It should be noted, however, 
that taking the beef cattle grant out of the M.R.D. expenditure for the 
region concerned assumes that the M.R.D. expenditure was not otherwise 
altered or affected in any way by the beef cattle grants. Otherwise, a 
beef cattle road grant can be matched by a low level of M.R.D. 
expenditure, thus enabling a tied grant to be untied. While the adjustments 
reduce the differences between the Districts in which expenditure per 
motor vehicle registered was highest and those in which it was lowest the 
differences are still very great. The important question is whether such 
differences can be justified on economic grounds. We return to this issue 
later in this Chapter. 
Additional information regarding District and Divisional fund 
allocation is shown in Table B2.9. Here we have recorded the relationship 
between motor vehicle registration revenue (MVRR) and Main Roads Department 
expenditure (MRDE) by Districts and Divisions for most of the period from 
1967 to 1975. Not surprisingly, the Table reveals that for the early part 
of the period MRDE in District 1 was considerably less than the amount of 
MVRR collected from vehicle owners whose vehicles were registered in that 
District. Thus, for example, in 1967 and 1971 MVRR exceeded MRDE respectively, 
by $3.73m and $5.25m. For all other Districts MVRR fell short of 
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MRDE. However, from 1972 to 1975 District 1 recorded an excess of 
MRDE over MVRR, reflecting the impact of the 1969 Commonwealth Roads Act. 
In 1972 this difference was approximately $7.6m and reached a maximum of 
$11.5m in 1974. 
3.2 Cities and Shires 
A more detailed view of the pattern of regional fund allocation 
can be obtained by examining the apportionment of M.R.D. funds at the 
Shire and City level. Table B3.0 provides some information regarding 
expenditure and demand indicators for a number of shires for the years 
1962/63, 1965/66, 1966/67, 1974/75 and 1976/77 Naturally, as the process 
of disaggregation is continued,eventually the size of the region may be 
so small that little faith can be placed on motor vehicle registrations 
as a reasonable indicator of demand for road space. However, we have been 
able to obtain from the 1964 Queensland Main Roads Department Roads 
Survey, estimates of the average of AADT for the shires and if it is 
reasonable to assume that there have been no significant relative changes 
in the demand for road space in these shires since 1964 then these AADT 
data serve a useful purpose. 
7. District 1 includes the major urban centre, Brisbane. Part of the 
problem lies in the definition of road categories, especially when 
such definitions determine whether the road expenditure comes from 
M.R.D. funds. As already noted, in Queensland the practice is to 
distinguish between roads which are part of the "declared road system", 
which are the responsibility of the M.R.D., and the remainder which are 
the responsibility of local Authorities, What characteristics a road 
must have before it is permitted "declared road" status is not clear. 
What is clear, however, is that cities and towns have a very small 
proportion of their roads in this category, while rural areas have 
a large proportion in it. Thus in 1977 Brisbane City boasted only 
93.2 miles of declared roads, while the Shire of Barcoo claimed 643.3 
miles. 
8. It was not possible to obtain AADT data at the Shire level from the 
more recent Australian Roads Surveys. 
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Predictably, expenditure per motor vehicle shows a much greater 
variation between cities and shires than between Main Roads Department 
Districts. Again the pattern is for the larger and more sparsely 
populated regions to record expenditures per motor vehicle registered 
many times the amounts recorded in the smaller but more densely populated 
regions. For example, the City of Brisbane comprising 0,058 percent of 
total State area recorded an average, for the first three years shown in Table 
B3,0, of $2.87 per motor vehicle registered and an average of $37.59 for 
the years 1974/75 and 1976/77. On the other hand the Shire of Etheridge, 
2.314 percent of total State area, records an average of $2,715 per 
motor vehicle registered for the five years if the Beef Cattle Grant is 
included, and an average of $604.32 per motor vehicle registered if the 
Beef Cattle Grant is excluded. 
It will also be seen from Table B3,0 that the larger regions 
which include the Shires of Etheridge, Carpentaria, Dalrymple and McKinlay 
all record relatively low estimates of AADT, but very high levels of 
expenditure per motor vehicle registered. In most cases a large 
part of the road mileage is classified as developmental road which has 
been constructed for the purpose of serving the beef cattle industry. 
By way of contrast, the smaller, but more densely populated regions, record 
relatively low expenditures per motor vehicle registered and relatively 
high estimates of AADT. However, of the smaller regions the outstanding 
feature is the increase in expenditure per motor vehicle registered in the 
City of Brisbane in the years shown for the nineteen seventies. 
Table B3,l emphasises the magnitude of the differences between 
the proportion of total motor vehicles registered in an area - in this 
case the twelve cities - and the proportion of Main Roads Department 
expenditure allocations in that area. As a group the cities recorded an 
average of 57,90 percent of motor vehicle registrations for the years 
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1955/56, 1962/63, 1966/67 and 1968/69, and an average of approximately 
7.50 percent of total Main Roads Department expenditure for the same years. 
The rest of Queensland accounted for approximately 42 percent of motor vehicle 
registrations and approximately 92 percent of Total Main Roads 
Department expenditure. 
In the years shown for the nineteen seventies, the Table B3.1 
indicates a substantial increase in the proportion of fund allocation to 
the cities. This increase reached a maximum in 1973/74 with the cities 
receiving approximately 31 percent of total Main Roads Department 
expenditure and accovinting for about 63 percent of total motor vehicle 
registrations. However, since then there has been a sharp decline in fund 
allocation to the cities, falling to approximately 15 percent in 1977/78, 
4. Road Fund Allocation Models 
In this section we take our analysis a step further by formulating 
and testing some plausible models of the road fund allocation process in 
Queensland. 
Earlier we suggested that this process is unlikely to be random: 
that some fairly simple rule-of-thumb, or set of principles will be 
applied. Since in Queensland there is no statutory rule-of-thumb, apart 
from the ambiguous directive contained in Section 24 of the original 
Main Roads Act, we are forced to formulate plausible models based on our 
knowledge of the pattern of fund allocation by regions; rules-of-thumb 
used by other levels of government (e.g. the Commonwealth); rules-of-thumb 
used by road authorities in other countries, and the constraints imposed 
by data availability. Consider these points further , First, it would 
appear from our description of road fund allocation in Queensland that the 
area of a region is relevant to an examination of the regional pattern 
of fund allocation. Second, we have indicated that at the Commonwealth 
Government level the distribution of road grants among the mainland 
States was, from 1922 to 1959, determined on the basis of an area/ 
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population formula, and from 1959 to 1969, on the basis of an area, 
population and motor vehicle registration formula. Third,the use of such 
formulae is by no means unique to Australia as shown, for example, in 
9 10 
a study by Burch ' of the practices of State road authorities in the U.S.A. 
Apart from the use of area, population and motor vehicle registrations in 
road fund apportionment formulae, Burch's study also pointed to the use 
by some States of formulae incorporating such factors as petrol 
consumption, road mileage and property valuations. 
On the basis of this knowledge (as well as the assumption of non 
random behaviour) it seems reasonable to argue that the State of Queensland 
might also apportion road funds on the basis of some of the above mentioned 
elements. This view is given further weight by the fact that M.R.D. 
revenue allocated to Local Government Authorities for expenditure on non 
declared roads is apportioned among the Local Authorities according to the 
area/population formula originally employed by the Commonwealth, subject to 
adjustment in cases where it is considered that the formula does not 
reflect a Local Authority's road needs. 
Our formulation of plausible decision making rules (or models) is 
hampered by data availability Specifically, it is not possible to test 
a model incorporating petrol constmiption or motor vehicle registrations 
since these data are not readily available, or in the case of motor vehicle 
registrations by regions, only available for part of the period we are 
9. Burch, P,H. (Jr.) , Highway Revenue and Expenditure Policy in the 
United States (New Brunswick, New York: Rutgers University Press, 
1962). especially Chapter VI, Table 10. 
10. See also. Burns, Robert E., "Decision Making Processes Governing 
Federal Expenditure in the Transportation Sector of the' United States", 
Transportation, 3 (1974), pp. 174-184. 
11. This rule is not embodied in the Queensland Main Roads Acts, Its 
existence was revealed to the author by an officer of the Queensland 
Main Roads Department. 
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concerned with. The upshot is that we are forced to test models which 
incorporate area and population as the independent variables. However, 
to re-iterate, it is far from unreasonable to suggest that such factors 
might be considered by the decision makers when apportioning funds among 
regions of the State. Further, it should also be noted that in an analysis 
of this kind that any model or rule-of-thumb which can be shown to "explain" 
behaviour does not necessarily imply that the components of the analyst's 
model are consciously taken into consideration by the decision makers. 
In these circumstances the model simply says that the decision makers 
12 behave in a manner consistent with the characteristics of the model. 
4.1 Model A 
For reasons given above it was decided to test the hypothesis 
that the Queensland M.R.D. uses a fund apportionment formula similar 
to the area/population formula adopted by the Commonwealth Government 
during the period 1922 to 1959. More formally, the hypothesised State 
version of the old Commonwealth formula can be expressed as: 
i P-' A-' 
EJ = a ^ . E + 3 j - . E (1) 
where: (i) E-' represents the amount of road funds apportioned to Queensland 
road Division j, where j = 1, 2, 3, and 4.'''^  (ii) A^ , P^  and A = S A^ 
and P = E P-' represent respectively. Divisional and State^area and population 
j 
estimates. To express (1) in a more useful form time subscripts, t, can be 
attached to E^, A"', A, P^, P and E so that: 
12, See for example, McFadden, D., "The revealed preferences of a government 
bureaucracy: theory". The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, No. 2, 
Autumn 1975. 
13. Note: j=l=South Eastern Division; j=2=South Western Division; 
j=3=Central Division and j=4=Northern Division. 
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P^  A^ 
EJ = a =^ E. + B ^  E. ; :;;... rj = 1,2,3 and 4 (2) 
^ ^t ^ ^t ^ t = 1,2,. ., n 
To determine whether the above rule is applied in Queensland, 
an attempt was made to exploit the apparent similarity between the 
structure of (2) and that of a linear regression model. The addition of 
a random term leads to 
p^ F A^ -f 
^ *^t \ 
where e^  is a random term having a zero mean and a common variance for 
all j and t. There are 4T observations in E^ , A^ and P;' and T 
observations in E , A and P The composite variables 
AJ.E PJ.E 
and — 5 — may be viewed as independent from the State decision 
makers' point of view, while the E^ values. Divisional expenditure over 
time, are under the control of the State Road Authorities. 
If the decision makers use (or have used) a formula of the above 
kind it is also possible that the a and 3 weights have varied slowly over 
time as administrative, political and economic factors have varied. 
Accordingly, it was decided that a and B be replaced by continuous 
functions a(t) and B(t) For this purpose a quadratic function was chosen. 
Thus (3) can be written as: 
P . E A"'. E 
EJ = a(t) - ^ + 6(t) -^j^ + 4 ' j = ^'2,3,4 (4) 
t t t = 1,2,. .n 
14. A quadratic function was chosen because it has few parameters; it can 
represent other smoothly varying functions; it has a turning point 
and is amenable to econometric estimation. 
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where a(t) and B(t) are quadratic functions: 
2 
If a(t) = m + nt + kt and 
2 
3(t) = r + St + vt , then (4) becomes: 
EJ = m ^ + n p + k p + r -j + s -^ 
^ *^t t t t^ \ 
+ V 
AJ E t^ 
^ ^ + ei (4.1) 
\ ^ 
To attempt the estimation of a(t) and 3(t), (4.1) was divided 
by E^ (t = 1, ,n) yielding (5): 
E I pj PJ t PJ t^ AJ AJ.t 
^ = m Tr=- + n - 4 — + k -^^r— + r -r^  + s ^ 
t^ ^ ^ t^ \ \ 
^^t^ ej A^.  ^
It can be seen that this model is not amenable to standard regression 
analysis. The dependent, or left hand side variables, are restricted. 
For any year the sum of the four dependent variables is one: this condition 
is not matched in the right hand side. A relationship between the 
right hand side variables and parameters and the error term would haVe 
to be established to guarantee the adding up property on the left, and 
such a restriction violates the requirements of usual regression analysis. 
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To amplify this, recall that from (3), where E^, P^ and A^ are 
defined as percentages, 
pj pJ AJ 
t t t i ^^, . - . , - . . I ..C6) 
eJ 
where e i = c" » ^ "^  ^ o 
^ ^t 
E^ P"' A^ j 
Z t ^ ^QQ ^ et? t ^ 2 t ^ E e 
1 E^ J Pt 3 A^ 3 
100 (a + 3) + ? ej - (7) 
or, EeJ = 100 [1 - (a + 3)] This shows that the eJ terms 
for any t are linearly dependent, and so the variance-covariance matrix 
E(e.^  ep is singular- This precludes the use of ordinary least squares 
in estimating the a and 3 parameters of (6) 
2 To elaborate on this, suppose that E(e eH = o V, where V is 
4x4, and singular The generalised least squares estimator 
EJ 
(X'V"-^ X)"-^  X V'-^ Y, where YJ = :=^ and xj = 
^ ^t ^ 
1 i 
P * A 
^t ^t 
is not applicable. Application of the generalised inverse of v, V* in the 
(l) - (xV formula  - J = (X' '^ X)"'^  X'V*Y is a possibility provided that certain 
conditions are met by the data. However, rather than pursue this 
complicated path, it is suggested that the problem of the linear dependence of 
the e^ 's be resolved by taking the expectation of both sides of (6) Thus, 
E^ pj A^ 
m~) = 100 = aE[Epi] + &l[-^] + E[Z ej] 
j t j *^t j \ J 
= a.100 + 3.100 + 0 .(8) 
or a + 3 = 1 
15. See Tlieil, Henri, Principles of Econometrics, (John Wiley: New York, 1971) 
pp. 274-293. 
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This result enables any one of the equations in (6), for all t, 
to be removed without changing the specification of the model. By adopting 
this procedure, each year is represented by three equations (j = 1, 2, 3), 
each of which contains an error term e., which is independent of the other 
e, terms. Hence, a + 3 = 1 implies that the model can be written as 
^t ^t \ 
+ e. 
4 -t 
+ e. (9) 
+ e. 
all t, and the , terms, (j 1, 2, 3) are independent. 
Alternatively, (9) can be written as 
^l iJ 
a 
A^  
+ £•". j = 1, 2, 3 and all t. .(10) 
Thus, an application of ordinary least squares will provide a 
best linear unbiased estimate of a, where the data is available over a 
number of years. 
As previously argued, it is believed that a is not constant 
with respect to time, and so it would be preferable to develop equation (6) 
by having a as a function of time. However, before taking this step, 
estimates of a [and hence 3=(l-a)] were derived on the basis of data 
from triplets of consecutive years: 1950-52, 1953-55, , 1974-76. 
The population and expenditure data are shown, respectively, in Table B3.2 
and Table Bl.l. It will be noticed that the expenditure data exclude;: 
the substantial sums earmarked by the Commonwealth Government during the 
'seventies for the construction of urban arterial roads To have included 
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these grants (especially those provided for by the 1969 Commonwealth 
Aid Roads Act) would have made statistical modelling very difficult. 
The estimates are presented in Table 10.2. 
TABLE 10.2 Estimate of a: Model A (Consecutive Years) 
A 
Years Estimates of a(a) 
1950-1952 0.414 
1953-1955 0.461 
1956-1958 0.439 
1959-1961 0.409 
1962-1964 0.419 
1965-1967 0.391 
1968-1970 0.416 
1971-1973 0.462 
1974-1976 0.494 
Detailed associated statistics are not presented with the above 
2 
estimates. It is sufficient to state that the R and t statistics indicate 
that the model provides an adequate explanation of the apportionment of 
road funds by M.R.D. Divisions. It is also noted that the values of the a 
estimates (a) tend to decline until the late 'sixties, after which they 
increase in value. This indicates variations in the importance attached 
by policy makers to population, and by implication, area, as determinants 
of regional road fund allocations. The results therefore suggest that it 
would be appropriate to let a be represented as a smoothly varying function 
of time, say a(t) 
16. It should be noted that: (a) while it is true that the non-urban 
arterial part of the post 1969 Commonwealth road grants is also 
categorised by road type, it can be reasonably argued that such 
grants are not as location specific as the urban arterial grant, 
most of which is allocated to metropolitan Brisbane, and (b) if the 
belief in the existence of a rule-of-thumb is reasonable, then the 
fact that a significant part of a State's road budget is "forced" 
by another level of government to be location specific does not 
preclude the State from apportioning remaining funds according to the 
allocation formual. 
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Specifically, let (t) be a quadratic function, 
2 
a(t) = a + bt + ct , where a, b and c are unknown constants, and t is time. 
Hence (10) can be written as 
A^  
- a 
+ ( t^ 
4- h 
AJ 
^ i 
A^  
t 
t 
.(11) 
j = 1, 2, 3 and all t. 
Data were available for twenty-seven years, and so eighty-one 
observations were available for the ordinary least squares estimation of 
a, b and c. The results derived from the application of ordinary least 
squares are shown in Table 10.3. 
TABLE 10.3 Regression Results: Model A (Quadratic Form), 1951-1977 
Variable Estimated Value 
0.46623 
-0.00942 
0.00039 
^2 ,78 
t-value 
78 d.f. 
14.418 
-1.800 
2.165 
= 1005.9 
a 
b 
c 
R = 0.963 
a(t) = 0.46623 - 0.00942t + .00039t'' 
The above results clearly indicate that a(t) can be adequately 
represented by a quadratic function. The residuals corresponding to model 
(11) are shown in Table B3.3. 
Table 10.4 shows the way a(t) = 0.46623 - 0.00942t + .00039t^, 
varies with time. The function reaches its minimum at t = 12.08, or the 
year 1962. This is slightly earlier than the year in which the a values 
previously shown was smallest. However, the discrepancy is not large 
enought to cast doubt upon the validity of the estimated form of a(t) 
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TABLE 10.4 Model 
1951 
Year 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
(a) (Quadratic Form): 
to 1977 
act) 
Population 
0.4572000 
0.4489500 
0.4414800 
0.4347900 
0.4288800 
0.4237500 
0.4194000 
0.4158300 
0.4130400 
0.4110300 
0.4098000 
0.4093500 
0.4096800 
0.4107900 
0.4126800 
0.4153500 
0.4188000 
0.4230300 
0.4280400 
0.4338300 
0.4404000 
0.4477500 
0.4558800 
0.4647900 
0.4744800 
0.4849500 
0.4962000 
Estimates of a(t) and 
[l-(at)J 
Area 
0.5428000 
0.5510500 
0.5585200 
0.5652100 
0.5711200 
0.5762500 
0.5806000 
0.5841700 
0.5869600 
0.5889700 
0.5902000 
0.5906500 
0.5903200 
0.5892100 
0.5873200 
0.5846500 
0.5812000 
0.5769700 
0.5719600 
0.5661700 
0.5596000 
0.E522500 
0.5441200 
0.5352100 
C.5255200 
0.5150500 
0.5038000 
[l-a(t)]. 
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4.2 An Alternative Formulation: Model B 
4.2.1 Model B^ : The Basic Model 
We now present another approach to an examination of the expenditure 
decisions of the Queensland Main Roads Department. This approach 
provides an economic-'formulation of the basis of road fimd 
allocation. 
It is supposed that the road authority (given a budget constraint) 
is not indifferent to alternative patterns of fund allocation. More 
formally, we assume that the road authority's preferences can be represented 
by a Utility Function whose components are the set of allocations correspond-
ing to each of the planning regions of the State. If S,, 82, S- and S. 
represent the proportions of fimds allocated to M.R.D. Divisions 1, .2, 
3 and 4, then we have: 
U = f(S^, S2, S3, S4) ...(1) 
4 
where E S, = 1 and S.'> 0. We also require that marginal utility is 
i=l 
declining, at least in the domain where decisions are usually made. 
°'l "2 °'3 °'4 
Let U = Y Sj^  S- S_ S. , where y is a positive constant and 
the a's are positive weights representing the significance the road 
authority attaches to each region. Since we believe that decisions are not 
made randomly we assume that the authority attempts to maximise U, subject 
4 
to E S. = 1 and S, > 0 i.e., the aim is to determine the S,'s such 
i=l ^ ^ ^ 
that maximisation of U takes place. 
To determine these S.'s define the Lagrangian function L, where 
4 a, 
L (Sj, S2, S3, S4, X) = Y TT S,^ + X(l - ES^). 
i=l ^ 
Then 3L 
as. 
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«^i s7 - ^  = 0 
3L U X =0 
— = 1 - S - S., - S„ - S. = 0 at the optimum. 3X 1 2 3 4 
ya^u 
Now, as S. = - T — , we have 
17 
1 = 
YU Ea, or X = yUEa. 
A 1 '*' 
u 
Hence, YCj^  g" ^ "^^^i ' °^ 
i 
...(2) 
...(3) 
...C4) 
Ea, 
at the optimum, for all i. ...(5) 
The expression has an appealing and simple interpretation: the allocations 
18 
are clearly seen to be in the line with the weights a. . 
17. Note: ^ = Yot^ S^ ^ . S2 • S3** . S^ - X 
«! «i «2 "3 °'4 
ST" ^1 • ^ 2 • ^ 3 * ^ 4 " ^  
a^ U 
- X = 0 
18. The argument developed so far can be given a brief graphical interpret-
ation. Suppose only two regions ar^ e of interest. Then the utility 
function can be represented by a two-dimensional indifference map as 
shown below. 
FIGURE 10.1 Regional Road Fund Shares 
Si+S2=l 
1 
The indifference curves should not be drawn outside the line Sj^ +S2 = 1. 
Unless the authority fails to use all of its budget for road expenditure, 
all observations of the authority's activity will be along the line 
^1*^2 ~ "*•• As Oj^  and a2 vary the indifference map is transformed, and 
the contour tangent to the S.+S2 = 1 line will shift so as to locate the 
tangcncy point towards the axis i where a. increases. 
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The estimation of the a,'s could be carried out, but for our 
purposes more information is required. Since we assume that the area and 
population of each region are of paramount importance to the road authority 
for the determination of regional fund allocation, the a, weights can 
be thought of as being functions of area and population. Interpretation 
is facilitated if these functions are increasing or decreasing functions 
for all values of area and population. A convenient form for these 
functions is 
19 
e-+e,x..+e-x.» e,, e.x., + 0-x._ 0 1 il 2 i2 0 1 il 2 i2 -^ 4. 
a, = e = e e ... (6) 
where (x.,, x._), (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) represents information regarding the 
population and area of region i. 
It must also be assiimed that the a, values include some random 
1 
component e., which is a continuous random variable taking values 
e. < ". The a.'s now appear as 
-00 < 
6 6 X.- + 6 x.^ + e. 
~ « 0 1 il 2 i2 1 f-,-\ 
a^ = e e , .. (7) 
which is still positive for all values of 8. x.,, x.^ and e. 
^ il i2 1 
Given this form for a., which of course is not unique, (5) becomes: 
6, X., + 9., x.^ + e, 1 il 2 i2 1 20 
^i = 4 e^x., . 6 v., . c . ' (1=1,2,3,4) (8) 
E e ^ ^^  2 j2 J 
j=l 
This can be divided through by S^, for i = 2, 3, 4 to yie Id 
19 The function need not be restricted to this form. We could, for 
example, have a logarithmic form in the exponent. 
20. It is noted that the adding up requirement of the S.'s does not imply 
any dependence between the error term e. '^ 
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0, X21 + 92 ^22 r"2 
e 
^11 * ^ 2 ^12 " "l 
^31 * ®2 ^ 32 * ^ 3 
^11 * ^ 2 ^12 " "l 
X41 + 62 X42 - €^ 
...(9) 
^ 1 " ^ 2 ^12 " "1 
or An(gi-) = QjCx^i-x^i) + ®2^^i2"^12^ * ^^i" ^1^ for i = 2, 3, 4. 
Now suppose that €(e.) = 0 for all i and that the variance of 
2 
e. is a^ for all i. Then the expected value of e,-e, is zero and variance 1 e '^ 1 1 
2 2 
(e^-e^^ = 2a^ and covariance (e^-e^) (e -e^ )^ = a^ , i ^ j 
That is, if e' = (e2-e,, ET-e-i 
• E(e) =• 0 and E(een = o^ 
e^-e^) , then 
2 1 1 
1 2 1 
1 1 2 
2 
= a fi 
21 
(10) 
S. 
Thus a regression model has been created with 2,n(^) being the dependent 
1 
variable, Cx.,-x,,) and (x,2-x^2) the independent variables, and (e.-e^), 
the error term. 
The generalised least squares methocT can be used to estimate 
0j and ©2. The procedure followed was to use the so-called orthogonal 
transformation by which the regression model is made amenable to the 
application of ordinary least squares. 
21. E(e.-ep2 ^ (e.2.2e.c^.c^2^ = 2o and 
ECe^-e,)(e.-e,) = E(e.e. - e.e. - e,e, - e, ) = a and it is assumed 
^ i j l ij 11 il 1 
that e^ and e. are independent, i?^j, and i is not equal to 1. 
*-2.. See Johnston, J , Econometric Methods (International Student Edition, 
McGraw-Hill: Kogakusha, Ltd., Tokyo 1972), Chapter 7, especially 
pp. 209-211. 
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Before describing this technique it should be noted that the 
small number of regions, four in all, means that the number of 
observations relative to the number of parameters to be estimated is too 
small. Because of this the estimation proceeded by using observations from 
two consecutive years. Such a procedure is permissible if it is believed 
that the road authority's behaviour is not subject to dramatic (and frequent) 
variations. Hence we have in full. 
^2 
"^Cg^ l^ = ^^^21-^11^ * ^2(^22-^2^ * ^ ^2-Ml 
iln(^)j = eiC^si-XiPi * e2(X32-x^2h * ^Vh^l 
S. 
iln(5-)^ = e^ Cx4i-x^ i)i + Q2^^42-^2^ " ^ V^lh *'' ^ "^ 
Jln(s^ )2 = ei(x2i-Xii)2 * ^2^^22-^2^x "^  ^ V^1^2 
^3 
^"^S7^2 = ^1 ^ ^31-^1^2 * ^2^^31-^2^ 2- * ^^2-^)2 
K 
^"^S7^2 = ^^^41-^11^2 ^  ®2^^42-^12^2 "^  ^ ^4-^)2 ' 
where the new subscripts denote time periods 1 and 2 for consecutive years. 
Equation (11) can be written in vector form and then multiplied 
by a 6x6 matrix, G , such that if S'te^ ^ using the notation following (9) 
and E(C V) = o^ ' Q, o l , 
-0 ^J 
then 
E[CG C)(G 5)'] = a^ I^^^ ...(12) 
23 
a model amenable to ordinary least squares is created. 
23. See Johnston, J., ibid., pp. 209-211. 
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Ordinary least squares were applied to the transformed variables, 
for the years 1951-52, 1953-54, , 1973-74, 1975-76. That is, thirteen 
24 
regressions were run, producing thirteen estimates for the (8^ ,^82) pair. 
25 
The results are presented in Table 10,5 below. 
TABLE 10.5 Regression Results: Model B,(Consecutive Years) 
Years 
1951 and 
1953 and 
1955 and 
1957 and 
1959 and 
1961 and 
1963 and 
1965 and 
1967 and 
1969 and 
1971 and 
1973 and 
1975 and 
1952 
1954 
1956 
1958 
1960 
1962 
1964 
1966 
1968 
1970 
1972 
1974 
1976 
Population 
(ep 
-0.0145 
-0.03176 
-0.00423 
-0.00921 
-0.00457 
0.00762 
0.01133 
0.01451 
0.01222 
0.01248 
0.01778 
0.01699 
0.01922 
t-value 
4 df. 
-3.15 
-1.93 
-1.23 
-4.60 
-1.38 
3.44 
3.48 
5.45 
5.54 
9.05 
39.29 
7.54 
6.79 
Area 
(62) 
-0.03343 
-0.06811 
-0.0196 
-0.02681 
-0.01347 
0.00587 
0.01179 
0.02111 
0.01766 
0.01449 
0.02657 
0.01635 
0.01895 
t-value 
4 df. 
-4.77** 
-2.70* 
-3.66** 
-8.47** 
-2.59* 
1.67 
2.25* 
4.92** 
4.90** 
6.39** 
35.14** 
4.29** 
3.93** 
1 
R2 
0.89 
0.69 
0.91 
0.97 
0.75 
0.85 
0.80 
0.88 
0.88 
0.96 
0.99 
0.95 
0.94 
F 
^1 and 4-
33.15 
9.17 
41.43 
133.19 
12.11 
23.50 
16.70 
29.78 
30.74 
96.65 
1544.39 
81.58 
64.36 
Notes: ** denotes regression coefficient significant at 5 percent or 
better 
* denotes regression coefficient significant at 10 percent or 
better 
24, It should be noted that the regressions were run without an intercept 
term. 
25.. The assumption is made that e. 'v N(0,o ) The error terms are 
independent across time. "^  ^ 
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4.2.2 Model B2: A Quadratic Form 
The results indicate that the 0^^ and Q^ weights have varied over 
time, suggesting a continually changing influence of population and area. 
However, it is possible that the varying, but somewhat erratic appearing 
movements, represent random fluctuations about a smooth trend. 
This hypothesis can be tested in the following manner. In 
equation (8), attach a subscript t to produce, 
g^t^ilt * ^2t ^ i2t • ^ it 
it ~ ""4 0~~ X +"0 x +~e ...(13) 
" Z °lt J It °2t j2t jt 
j=l 
where t represents time (in this case, t = 1, 2, ..., 27, corresponding 
to 1951, 1952, ..., 1977). Equation (9) is also assigned the subscript t. 
Next, on the assumption that 0^ and 0- vary smoothly with time. 
let 
2 2 
0-^ ^ = ^1 * b^t + Cjt and 02^ » a2 + b2t + C2t ...(14) 
As a result of these manipulations a set of equations similar to (11) can be 
derived, a typical member of which can be shown as: 
^it 2 
itn(s-) = ^h * h * * ^l^^^^lt - ^ llt^ " (^ 2 " \ ^ ' ^ 2 ^ ^ (^ i2t - ^ 2t> 
+ (e^^ - e^^) , i = 2, 3, 4 and ...(15) 
Alternatively, 
^n(gii) = a^(Xii,-x^,p . b^(t x.^^-t x^^p . c^(t2 x.^^-t^x^^^ 
* ^2(^2t-^2t^ ^ ^ 2^V^2t-^ ^ 12t^  ^  ^ 2^^^ ^ i2t-^S2t) 
+ (^ it"^ lt^  ' ...(16) 
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which contains six parameters a,, b^ ,^ ..., C2 . Equation (16) contains 81 
individual equations corresponding to the niMber of observations for each 
period, 3 times the number of years, 27 . Given the assumption that the 
errors in one year are unrelated to errors in any other year, the 
variance-covariance matrix of the error term in (16) is given by: 
n 0 
0 'fi 
, where n = 
-I 81x81 
I 2 1 1 
1 2 1 
L^ l 1 2 
...(17) 
If (16) is pre-multiplied by , where G is defined as 
LgixBl 
in (12), then ordindary least squares can be applied to (16) to estimate the 
a,, b-, ..., c- parameters. The results are shown in Table 10.6: 
TABLE 10.6 Regression Results: Model B (Quadratic Form) 1951-1977 
Variable 
1^ 
h 
1^ 
^2 
^2 
^2 
R\-. -- 0.84 
Estimated 
Value 
-0.02068 
0.00272 
-0.00005 
-0.04842 
0.00571 
-0.00012 
^5,75 ' 
t-value 
75 df. 
-6.41 
5.45 
-2.72 
-9.69 
7.23 
-4.37 
= 81.59 
The results show that the model explains eighty-four percent of Divisional 
expenditure over the 1951 to 1977 period. All of the variables are significant 
at the 1 percent level. 
Table 10.7 shows the 0^  and 0^ coefficients for each year of the 
period 1951 to 1977. It is noted that: (i) 0^ and Q^ ^^^ 
negative during the period 1951 to 1959 (ii) for the years 1960 and 1961 
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TABLE 10.7 Model ^2 '• Estimates of 0^ and 02, 1951 to 1977 
' 
Year 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
h 
Population 
-0.0180100 
-0.0154400 
-0.0129700 
-0.0106000 
-0.0083300 
-0.0061600 
-0.0040900 
-0.0021200 
-0.0002500 
0.0015200 
0.0031900 
0.0047600 
0.0062300 
0.0076000 
0.0088700 
0.0100400 
0.0111100 
0.0120800 
0.0129500 
0.0137200 
0.0143900 
0.0149600 
0.0154300 
0.0158000 
0.0160700 
0.0162400 
0.0163100 
'2 
Area 
-0.0428300 
-0.0374800 
-0.0323700 
-0.0275000 
-0.0228700 
-0.0184800 
-0.0143300 
-0.0104200 
-0.0067500 
-0.0033200 
-0.0001300 
0.0028200 
0.0055300 
0.0080000 
0.0102300 
0.0122200 
0.0139700 
0.0154800 
0.0167500 
0.0177800 
0.0185700 
0.0191200 
0.0194300 
0.0195000 
0.0193300 
0.0189200 
0.0182700 
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9- and 0« are respectively, positive and negative and (iii) for the period 
1962 to 1977 0, and 02 are positive. It will also be noted that the change 
in sign of the population and area coefficients generated by model B^ 
occur at almost the same time as for model B^ 
Equation (8) was used to calculate elasticities of expenditure 
with respect to (i) changes in population shares and (ii) changes in area 
shares. Elasticities for selected years and for Divisional pairs 
[Divisions (1) and (2); (2) and (1); (3) and (4) and (4) and (3)]^^ are 
shown in Table 10.8. 
4.3 Inte]T)retation of Results 
The relationship between a region's share of the road budget 
and its population and area proportions is of considerable interest. In 
the case of models B, and B2 the negative sign attached to the population 
coefficient during the early period would seem to indicate that a region's 
share of the road budget and its population share are inversely related. 
The same relationship appears to exist between a region's area and its 
road fund share. However, there are difficulties with this interpretation. 
Take the case of population: unless it is known how the change in a region's 
population share is compensated for by changes in the other regions' share, 
the above conclusion (i.e. that an inverse relationship exists between a 
region's expenditure share and its population share) cannot be sustained. 
Specifically, we know that S^ = f. (P , P2, P3, P., A^ ,^ A2, A3, A^) , and that 
26. Because of the adding up constraint any change in a Division's share 
of State population or State area must be accompanied by compensating 
adjustments elsewhere. To simplify the calculation of expenditure 
elasticities for a region we have assumed that changes in either the 
area or population of that region are compensated by changes in a 
contiguous region. Thus, if we wish to estimate expenditure elasticities 
for Division (1) we assume that compensating adjustments take place in 
Division (2): the area and population shares of Divisions (3) and (4) 
being held constant. It is therefore necessary to use a directional 
derivative to calculate the elasticities. 
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4 4 3S^ 
Z P. = S A. = 1. Also, to evaluate -r^ —• is not sufficient to 
i . i o"• 
i=l i=l "• 3 27 
detect the way S. changes in response to a change in P. A detailed 
•JL J 
study of expected population changes would be needed to determine how S, 
changed in response to a change in its own population. 
These remarks appear to reconcile the apparent inconsistency 
between Model A and Model B. The former model shows a positive 
relationship between regional expenditure shares and population and 
area for the entire period investigated, whereas the latter model appears 
to contradict this During the years in which the data were collected, 
population proportions and relative population densities which link 
the population and area shares over time, must have changed so as to generate 
the negative 0!s in the early period, and the positive later values. 
27, P,, P2> PT> ^A> refer respectively, to the percentage share of population 
in regions 1,2,3 and 4. A,, A2, A,, A., refer respectively to the 
percentage share of the State's area covered by regions 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
We need, for example: 
3Sj 
3Pj 
3Sj 3Sj 
3P, 
3Pj 
3P2 
3Pj 
J 
+ 
3Sj 
'^3 
3P^ 
to evaluate how S^  changes as P, changes. The derivatives 
8P2 3P3 3P4 
•gp— , -gp— and ^ p— therefore are crucial in determining the sign of 
9S2 
•gp— These values are not known. 
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It will also be noticed that the change in Divisional fund 
allocations during the period under review occurs fairly slowly This 
is consistent with our earlier remarks concerning the political and 
institutional constraints affecting alterations to regional shares. 
Political factors are also likely to account for a large part of the 
residuals associated with our regression models B^^ and B2: the rule-of-
thumb is sometimes subject to discretionary adjustments to meet particular 
needs or policy goals (e.g. to repair damage to the road system caused by 
severe and widespread flooding, or to meet a political commitment to speed 
28 
up the construction of sections of inter-regional roads). 
The results shown in Table 10.8 are also of interest. The 
Table indicates that the expenditure share is very inelastic with respect 
to changes in population and area shares. However, it is noted that, for 
each year, for each regional pair with the exception of the pair ordered 
(1) and (2), rip . is considerably greater than rip p, indicating that 
for the larger, but less populated regions, a one percent change in a 
Division's percentage share of State area would lead to a greater percentage 
change in expenditure share than would be brought about by a one percent 
change in that Division's share of State population. The elasticities 
have a negative sign during the 'fifties and a positive sign during the 
remaining period. 
28. Some political commitments can be "absorbed" by the rule-of-thumb. 
Thus, if a political commitment is made to upgrade part of a District's 
road network this can often be achieved by altering priorities within 
the District, or by shifting fimds from one District to another 
The later need not affect Divisional allocations 
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In contrast to models B. and B2 model A provides more direct 
evidence of the relative importance of area and population as detenninants 
of road fund shares. As shown in Table 10.4 the a(t) coefficient (the 
population weight) has a value of 0.456 at the commencement of the period 
and gradually declines, reaching a minimum value of 0.409 in 1962, and 
from there gradually increases to 0.496 in 1977 The corresponding values 
for the area coefficient [i.e. (1 - a(t)] are 0.542, 0.590 and 0.503. 
29 The average values for a(t) and [1 - a(t)] are respectively, 0.434 and 0.565. 
The relative importance of the area and population weights provide 
some indication of the nature of the policy objectives pursued by the 
M.R.D. decision makers. By and large one would expect that population 
has more relevance as an indicator of a region's economic need for road 
30 
space than area. It is suggested that the results of our analysis 
provide some evidence to support the hypothesis that non-economic 
considerations have played an important part in the State decision makers' 
preference function - a conclusion which is consistent with our findings 
in Section 3 of this Chapter There it will be recalled we were able to 
show: (i) that considerable differences exist between M.R.D. expenditure 
per motor vehicle registered by region (ii) that, as a general rule, 
expenditure per motor vehicle registered varies inversely with vehicle 
density and (iii) that in those areas where vehicle density is lowest, 
the demand for road space as measured by other indicators of demand (e.g. 
AADT, and petrol consumption) was lowest. 
29. An examination of Table 10.7 reveals that Q^ (^ ®^ ^ ^®^ coefficient) 
is greater (for most of the period) than 0^  (the population coefficient) 
30. See, for example, Munro, John M., "Highways in British Columbia: 
Economics and Politics", The Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. VIII, 
No. 2, May 1975. p. 195, 
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How to interpret the weight given to the area factor or to low 
population (vehicle or person) density regions is of particular interest. 
As observed in Chapter 9 one of the objectives of the early Main Roads 
Acts was that State Government road funding should be directed to promoting 
the economic development of the State. That objective - manifest by the 
3-1 
weight given to broad acres - still seems to be important, notwithstanding 
that development benefits are only vaguely defined and, of course, never 
measured. 
In addition to the developmental objective there is also the 
32 
matter of regional equity. It is a well known practice of State 
Governments to use public enterprises as vehicles for achieving income 
redistribution goals. This is clearly evident in the price and investment 
decisions of public enterprises such as railways and electricity, and there 
is no reason to suppose that the provision of road space would be seen by 
governments in a different light. Usually it is argued that those who live 
in sparsely populated rural areas have fewer transport alternatives than 
those who live in urban areas; that life is tougher in the country 
than in the cities; and that rural dwellers and producers suffer a loss in 
real income by virtue of Commonwealth Government tariff policies. All of 
these claims have been used at one time or another to justify income 
transfers by means of public enterprise price, output and investment 
policies. The manner in which road funds are apportioned among regions 
is one means by which equity and/or social goals can be achieved, and indeed 
31. The increase in the cx(t) value observed over the period 1962-1977 
suggests that demand factors have become more important in determining 
regional fund allocations. However, it is to be noted that the a(t) 
value is not too different from the a(t) value for 1950. It will also 
be noted that the incr^ a^se in a(t) commences before the 1969 C.A.R. Act, 
32, See, for example. Burns, Robert E., op,cit., p. 156. 
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are achieved.^^ However, we would suggest that these goals should be 
clearly defined, and where possible, their costs to the community in terms 
of efficiency benefits foregone, be identified. 
As a final comment to this part of our analysis we wish to 
re-assert that we are not suggesting that the Queensland Main Roads 
Department uses a formula of the kind examined above. The purpose of 
our econometric analysis is simply to examine what are considered to be 
plausible hypotheses (given available data) concerning the regional 
allocation of State road funds. Other hypotheses (not necessarily 
inconsistent with those examined here, may be formulated. And indeed 
we have suggested another explanation viz., that the allocation process 
is the outcome of a mixture of historical, institutional and political 
factors. While such an explanation is difficult to formalise it may be 
judged by some readers as the most plausible explanation of what actually 
happens. Even so, our econometric analysis is not inconsistent with this 
interpretation. In addition it enables us to gain some understanding of the 
effects of the fund allocation process and, in this regard, complements the 
analysis undertaken in Section 3 of this Chapter. 
33. As stated by a former Queensland Commissioner for Main Roads, " the 
most difficult and most contentious problem of road authorities is the 
determination of priorities for work Given the necessary basic 
information on such things as production, traffic, local costs and so 
on, it is possible to carry out cost benefit analyses and work out 
programmes on this basis. However if we do we will find numbers of 
areas where no road funds would be spent, thus creating feelings of 
injustice which will be expressed through political channels. We 
might find too that we are making no investment whatsoever in development, 
the economic effects of which are hard to assess. This method can be 
used only as one guide" 
Barton, C.N., The Technical and .Administrative Problems of a State 
Road Authority, p, 7 (University of Queensland Press, 1967) 
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5.0 The Impact of Commonwealth Policy Since 1969 
As shown in Section 3 of this Chapter a significant shift in the 
pattern of road fund allocations between rural and urban areas occurred 
during the period of the 1969 Commonwealth Aid Roads Act. Of the total grant 
provided by that Act Queensland received $231.6m of which $99.24m (approximately 
43 percent) was earmarked by the Commonwealth for expenditure on urban 
arterial roads. As a consequence the proportion of total M.R.D. fund allocated 
to urban roads rose, as we have seen, from approximately 9 percent in 
1968/69 to about 30 percent in 1973/74. Since then, however, the proportion 
of M.R.D. funds allocated to urban arterial and sub-arterial roads has 
fallen to about 15 percent in 1977/78. This decline in the urban sector's 
relative share is in line with the change in weight attached to urban 
arterial roads in the 1974 and 1977 Commonwealth legislation. With regard 
to the former legislation the Queensland Government received $147m under 
the terms of the 1974 Roads Act and $80m under the National Highways Act. 
Grants for urban arterials and urban local roads represented approximately 
20.54 percent of the total while rural arterial roads, rural locals, and 
national highways received respectively, 13.50 percent; 17.44 percent and 
32.54 percent of the total grant. 
Given that roads designated as national highways are essentially 
rural arterial roads (major interregional and intercity roads), the effect 
of the 1974 Commonwealth legislation was to reverse the change in priorities 
established by the 1969 legislation, increasing the major rural roads 
category (rural arterials plus national highways) from about 24.5 percent 
to approximately 45 percent of the Commonwealth grant. 
As mentioned, this shift in Commonwealth preferences away from the 
rural arterial category was continued in the 1977 Commonwealth road grants 
legislation. Under that legislation Queensland received a total grant of 
325. 
$300m. The distribution of the grant by road categories, in absolute and 
percentage terms, is as follows: national highways, $122.7m (40.90 percent); 
rural arterial roads $69.Om (23.0 percent); rural local roads $56.4m (18.80 
percent); urban arterial roads $32.7m (10.90 percent); urban local roads 
$11.4m (3.80 percent) and M.I.T.O.R.S. $7.8m (2.60 percent) Overall, 
national highways, rural arterials and rural local roads accounted for 82.70 
percent of Queensland's total grant while the urban arterial and urban 
local roads categories were apportioned 14.70 percent of the total grant. 
The conclusion that Commonwealth policy since 1969 has had an 
in^ jortant impact on the division of funds between rural and urban areas 
depends, assuming there is conflict between Commonwealth and State preferences, 
on the ability of the State to alter the balance of regional shares. This 
in turn is affected by: (i) the ratio of Commonwealth funds to total ftinds, 
(ii) the extent to which Commonwealth funds are earmarked by road categories, 
(iii) the willingness and ability of the State to decrease the ratio under 
(i) above by increasing contributions from State sources of revenue, and 
(iv) the extent of the commitment of State funds to maintenance expenditure. 
Since the bulk of Commonwealth funds can only be used for capital 
works projects, a large part of State sources of funds are used for maintenance 
purposes. Thus, given the extent of the earmarking of Commonwealth funds 
it is clear that the State has had relatively little flexibility (or 
discretionary power) to shift funds between rural and urban areas. Only 
if the State is prepared to increase vehicle registration fees or seek 
funds from other sources (e.g. by increasing loan funds) and/or by 
lowering maintenance standards in some regions would it be possible, in these 
circumstances, to significantly alter the balance of expenditure shares (as 
determined by Commonwealth preferences) between rural and urban areas. 
However, there is not likely to be a great deal of room for manoeuvre 
via adjustments to maintenance expenditure. And political and other 
considerations (e.g. competing expenditure requirements) are likely to 
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place fairly severe limitations on the extent to which revenue can be 
raised from other sources. 
In addition, we have already mentioned that as far as urban 
allocations are concerned, these are highly location specific since the 
bulk of Queensland's urban population is located in the Brisbane 
metropolitan area. Thus, if it were supposed that the Queensland Government 
had not wished to treat the Brisbane area as favourably as it was treated 
under the terms of the 1969 C.A.R. Act, it would have been difficult, 
for reasons given earlier (see Section ^2 and Chapter 8) to have compensated 
for the urban grant by substantial reductions in fund allocation to other 
parts of the South Eastern Division. Likewise if the Queensland Government 
had preferred to have a larger allocation of funds to the urban sector 
than has occurred since 1974, then our previous remarks concerning alterations 
to regional shares apply For these reasons it seems reasonable to conclude 
that the Commonwealth's policy since 1969 has had an important influence on 
the allocation of funds between Queensland's rural and urban areas. 
What else has the earmarking of Commonwealth funds achieved? 
First, if we consider the rural component of the Commonwealth grant it is 
clear that the earmarking of this portion of the grant need not have any 
noticeable effect on the distribution of funds among the planning Divisions 
of the State. Only if a large portion of the grant were earmarked by road 
classes for which there is a zero, or limited designation in some regions. 
34. It may well be that Commonwealth and State preferences are sometimes 
identical. If that is so then one would have to explain why earmarking 
of grants by road categories is thought necessary A plausible answer 
is that in some instances the Commonwealth Government may be in a better 
position, from a political point of view, to achieve objectives which 
another level of Government desires, but finds difficult to implement, 
or that the Commonwealth wishes to share in the political benefits 
that are associated with particular policy decisions which another 
level of government wishes to take. 
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could this occur. As far as Queensland is concerned it would appear that 
Commonwealth policy has had little impact on the regional distribution of 
the rural grant. State expenditure priorities, at least in relative 
terms, have prevailed. This can be confirmed by examining Table B3.4 
which shows the distribution of M.R.D. funds by Districts for the period 
1949/50 to 1977/78. 
Second, on the basis of the analysis in Section 3 it seems reasonable 
to argue that the earmarking of road grants under the terms of the 1969 
C.A.R. Act improved efficiency in resource use with regard to the allocation 
of road funds between the urban and rural sectors. However, since 1974 
a marked decline in the allocation of road funds to the urban sector has 
occurred. This is a consequence of the Commonwealth's loss of interest 
in this sector and the constraints on the State's ability and willingness 
to either shift funds from other regions and/or to raise additional funds 
from other sources. Given the traffic characteristics of the urban sector, 
together with the history of M,R.D. expenditure on urban roads, it is 
difficult to believe that such a decline can be justified on economic grounds. 
Finally, apart from the previous remarks regarding rural and 
urban allocations, it is difficult to determine whether the post 1969 
earmarking of road grants among the rural categories has resulted in the 
apportionment of relatively more funds to those functional classes (and 
road projects) which offer the highest economic returns. Unfortunately 
expenditure by road type in Queensland is not recorded by fimctional 
class: instead, the legal classification is used (see Chapter 9) In 
addition it is not possible to provide an inventory of traffic and quantity/ 
quality characteristics for each road type. However, Tables B3.5, B3.6, B3.7 
and B3.8 show respectively, M.R.D, expenditure for the South Eastern Division, 
South Western Division, Central Division and Northern Division by legal class of 
road for the period 1949/50 to 1977/78. From these Tables, Table B3.9 is 
constructed. The Table shows the average percentage distribution of M.R.D. 
328. 
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funds by legal class of road for the period 1963/64 to 1968/69 and 
from 1969/70 to 1977/78. 
An examination of Table B3,9 reveals that with the exception of 
the South Eastern Division, relatively minor changes have occurred in the 
expenditure by legal class during the two periods. This of course does 
not necessarily mean that from an economic point of view improvements in 
fund allocation within each class (or some classes) have not occurred. 
For example, it might be supposed that the emphasis given to the national 
highways category by the Commonwealth has brought about an improvement in 
fund allocation within the major rural arterial group. But as Tables B4,0 
and B4.1 show,there are more miles of rural arterial roads than national 
highways in the higher traffic voliome categories. Whether an improvement 
in fund allocation at this level has occurred will obviously depend on the 
extent to which the more important parts of the rural arterial network (including 
roads now classified as national highways) were neglected in the past, and 
on the proportion of those roads that now fall within the national highways 
category In discussing this issue with senior officers of the Queensland 
Main Roads Department the point was made that while some parts of the 
national highways system warrant increased expenditure, the emphasis given 
to this category by the Commonwealth has forced the State to reduce its 
commitment to other parts of the rural arterial roads category which are of 
equal, if not more, importance. In the absence of more detailed information 
it is difficult to make definitive judgements, but it would seem that there 
is a reasonable possibility that little improvement within the major rural 
37 
roads category (i.e. rural arterials and national highways) has taken place. 
"35^  The year 1963/64 is the beginning of the operation of the New Roads Plan 
referred to in Chapter 9 
36. It should also be noted that of the 2,406 miles of National Highways in 
Queensland 1,150 miles (47 79 percent) are located in Districts 4. 7, 10 
and 11 and that only 96 miles of road of National Highways in those 
Districts have traffic volumes equal to or greater than 1101 vehicles per 
day For all Districts there are 890 miles of National Highways correspond-
ing to that traffic level, or 36.99 percent of the total, 
37 The reader is reminded that the criteria chosen for the designation of 
roads as National Highways were not based solely on economic considerations. 
Location was a major consideration. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
1, Introduction 
Analysis of the economics of roads policy in the context of 
the Australian federal system of government would not be complete without 
an examination of the history of judicial interpretation given to Section 
92 of the Constitution. This section states that: 
"On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, 
commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether by 
means of internal carriage or ocean navigation shall be 
absolutely free. " 
It has given rise to a great deal of litigation. The problem, as stated 
by Lumb and Ryan is that Section 92 in reality " expresses a political 
slogan rather than a legal precept" The interpretation of Section 92 
is of paramount importance to any discussion of road charging policies 
which impinge on users of the road system engaged in 'trade, commerce, 
and intercourse among the States' 
While the lengthy catalogue of Section 92 cases extends well 
beyond the activity of interstate road transport operations our concern will 
be with the latter However it will be necessary at times to refer to 
judgements in other areas of litigation which have clearly had an influence 
on the various decisions taken in the road transport cases. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the history of the Transport 
cases commences in the early 1930's our discussion will make brief reference 
to Section 92 litigation in earlier years. This will be followed by a 
discussion of the Transport cases in the period 1933 to 1936 (the latter 
2 
year corresponding to the judgement in James v. The Commonwealth) 
1. Lumb, R.D, and Ryan, K.W., The Annotated Constitution, (Sydney: 
Butterworths 2nd ed., 1977), p. 304. 
2. (1936) 55 CLR 1. 
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Following this our review will consider the period from James v. The 
Commonwealth to the Bank Nationalisation case of 1949. This will involve 
further discussion of interstate road transport, namely, the case of R. v. 
Vizzard. From here attention is focussed on the Transport cases of the 
post Bank Nationalisation case era; in particular the cases of McCarter v. 
Brodie and Hughes and Vale v. The State of N.S.W.. Relevant cases subsequent 
to the latter are also mentioned. 
2. Federation to McArthur's Case 
The period commencing with the birth of the Australian federation 
in 1901 to McArthur's case in 1920 saw the High Court involved in five cases 
concerning the interpretation of Section 92 of the Constitution. Two of 
these cases occurred prior to the first World War and involved fairly 
simple issues while the remaining three occurred during the war years and 
were of a more complex nature. 
In the first case. Fox v. Robbins , a State law which required 
a higher licence fee to sell alcohol derived from fruit grown in another 
State, than the licence fee required for selling alcohol made from locally 
grown fruit, was held to contravene Section 92. In the second case, 
R.V. Smithers , a State law which made it an offence for a person to 
enter the State within a period of three years of conviction for an 
offence in another State was also held to be invalid. These two 
decisions established at the outset that Section 92 was not restricted to 
tariff barriers. 
The war time cases were as follows: 
(1) N.S.W. V. The Commonwealth (the Wheat Case) 
(2) Foggitt Jones § Co. Ltd. v. N.S.W.^ and; 
3. (1933) 50 CLR 30. 
4. Ibid., p. 305. 
5. (1909) 8 CLR 115. 
6. (1912) 16 CLR 99. 
7. (1915) 20 CLR 54. 
8. (1916) 21 CLR 357 
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9 (3) Duncan v. Queensland. 
In the Wheat case the matter at issue concerned the legality 
of a State Act (the Wheat Acquisition Act 1914 of N.S.W.) which gave the 
Crown power to expropriate wheat in the State and to compensate the owners. 
The High Court held, inter alia, that since the Act did not affect the owner's 
power of disposition, but rather the ownership of the wheat, it did not 
infringe Section 92. 
The cases of Foggitt Jones ^ Co. v. N.S.W. and Duncan v. Queensland 
were also concerned with laws aimed at ensuring availability of essential 
food commodities for war purposes. In each case the relevant Act was 
designed to prevent interstate sales of stock and meat without involving 
(as in the Wheat case) expropriation of property In Foggitt Jones § Co. v. 
N.S.W, the law was held to be inconsistent with Section 92. However^ in 
Duncan v. Queensland this decision was overruled as a result of a change 
in opinion by Griffith C J . While the argument by Griffith C.J 
amounted to the adoption of the principle he had used in the Wheat case, 
Duffy and Rich J.J placed emphasis on the purpose of the legislation arguing 
that the declaration that the stock and meat were to be left for disposal 
of the Imperial Government was not intended to limit interstate trade, 
commerce or intercourse, but instead to prevent activities that would 
weaken the option of the Crown to take what was required for the armies. 
This distinction between the intention or motive of a law and its effect was, 
as we shall see later, to play an important part in a number of subsequent 
Section 92 cases. 
In 1920, however^ in the case of McArthur v. Queensland 
the Court sought to establish a mechanical formula according to which the 
9T~(19l6j~ 22 CLR 556. 1 
10. (1920) 28 CLR 530. 
11. Nygh, P., "The Concept of Freedom in Interstate Trade", The University 
o£_gueensland Law Journal. August 1967, Vol. 5, No, 3, p. 335. 
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validity of State action could be tested irrespective of purpose. This 
approach reflected the views and influence of Isaacs J who, over the years, 
had gradually come to accept a nationalistic interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
The issue in McArthur's case was whether a price fixing law 
of the State of Queensland represented an infringement of Section 92 where 
the law was invoked for the purpose of establishing a maximum price on 
the sale of goods imported from other States. The argument for the 
State that Section 92 did not prohibit all State legislation which impinged 
on interstate trade, but only restrictions or impediments which were 
enforced because of the interstate character of that trade, was rejected by 
the Court. So too was the argument that "[a] transaction of sale is not 
12 
commerce; it is part of a contract" and as such is not affected by 
Section 92. The essence of the Court's approach was that it took a wide 
view of the terminology in Section 92. Tlius with regard to the meaning of 
the words "absolutely free" in Section 92 it was the Court's opinion that: 
" [such words] cannot, therefore, be confined to 
pecuniary exactions or customs laws, but in order to 
have any substantial effect must, unless some better 
reason be found, have their natural meaning of absolute 
freedom from every sort of impediment or control by States 
with respect to trade, commerce and intercourse between 
them, considered as trade, commerce and intercourse."13 
Notwithstanding that the legislation under examination in 
McArthur's case was a State Act,the Court deemed it appropriate to consider 
the implications of Section 92 for the meaning and significance of Section 
51 (i) of the Constitution which empowers the Commonwealth to make laws with 
respect to "[trade] and commerce with other countries, and among the 
States" The nationalistic solution was adopted: the Court pronounced 
12. (192"0) 28 CLR p, 537 '' 
13. Ibid., p. 554. 
14. See Sawer, G,, "The Constitution and Its Politics", Australian Politics: 
A Third Reader. edited by Mayer, H. and Nelson, H. (Cheshire, 1973), 
Chapter 28. 
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that Section 92 did not apply to the Commonwealth. In detail, the Court 
held that: 
"... [the meaning of Section 92] is that from the moment the 
Commonwealth assiomed legislative control on a national basis 
of the customs, all State interference with interstate 
trade and commerce should for ever cease, and for that 
purpose Australia should be one country. It would have 
been idle to say that from that time Commonwealth interference 
should cease, because, according to the contemplation of the 
Constitution it had never begtm; and not only would Section 92 
be useless for that purpose, but it would be mischievous ... 
Section 92, if applied to the Commonwealth, would, in our opinion, 
practically nullify Section 51(i) altogether ..."15 
3. The Transport Cases of the Early 1930's 
During the period from McArthur's case to James v. The Commonwealth 
in 1936, fifteen cases concerning Section 92 came before the High Court. 
While in a number of these cases, especially those relating to State 
16 
marketing laws, the formula adopted in McArthur's case was applied, in 
17 
a number of other cases such as Ex parte Nelson (No. 1) and the Transport 
cases, where State laws were also at issue, the majority of the High 
Court displayed a reluctance to give full effect to the decision in 
McArthur's case. In part this was a consequence of the ambiguity inherent 
18 in the Isaac Is formula as well as a reflection of the support for 
the views of Evatt J., who was appointed to the Court in 1931. 
Five cases involving State legislation pertaining to interstate 
transport came before the High Court in the period from 1933 to 1936. 
15. (1920) 28 CLR pp. 557 and 558. 
16. (a) James v. South Australia (1927) 40 CLR 1. 
(b) James v. Cowan (1932) AC 542 at p. 555; (1932) 47 CLR 386. 
(c) Peanut Board v. Rockhampton Harbour Board (1933) 48 CLR 266. 
17. (1928) 42 CLR 209. 
18. This was manifest in the case of Ex parte Nelson (No. 1). The question 
at issue was what acts constituted "acts of interstate trade"? It was 
held (the Court divided equally on this issue) that a State law which 
prevented the importation into N.S.W. of stock fodder and fittings 
from any other State in which there was reason to believe that an 
infectious or contagious disease existed, was contrary to Section 92. 
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These cases were: (i) Willard v. Rawson ; (ii) R. v. Vizzard ; 
21 (iii) 0. Gilpin Ltd. v. Commissioner of Road Transport ; (iv) Bessell v. 
22 23 
Dayman ; and (v) Duncan and Green Star Trading Co. v. Vizzard No 
attempt will be made to consider the details of each of these cases. 
Instead we will concentrate on the first three giving special attention 
to Vizzard's case and the case of 0. Gilpin Ltd. v. Commission of Road 
Transport. 
In the first mentioned case, Willard v. Rawson, an interstate 
carrier whose vehicle was registered in N.S.W. and employed for use 
in trade between N.S.W. and Victoria was convicted under a Victorian 
Act for non-payment of a Victorian registration fee. The issue before the 
Court concerned the validity of the State law with respect to interstate 
carriers. 
The Court upheld the conviction. The purposive or "pith and 
substance" test was invoked by Stark«J. who held that the main intention of 
the Act was to regulate motor vehicles, not restrict interstate trade. This 
argument was also supported by McTiernan J. Evatt J. on the other 
O A 
hand drew on the principle enunciated by Higgins J. in Roughley v. N.S.W. 
contending that for the Act to be invalid it had to be demonstrated that 
the legislation was aimed directly at the point of entry, in the 
course of commerce, into the State of Victoria. Rich 7. who, in 
McArthur's case, had argued that what was important was the legal effect 
of the law made a distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' interference 
with interstate commerce. Specifically, Rich J. contended that: 
19: (1933) 48 CLR 316. ' 
20. (1933) 50 CLR 30. 
21. (1935) 52 CLR 189. 
22. (1935) 52 CLR 215. 
23. (1935) 53 CLR 493. 
24. (1929) 42 CLR 199. 
25. This distinction was first adopted by Rich J in James v. Cowan (1930) 
43 CLR 425. 
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"... what is forbidden by Section 92 is State legislation in 
respect of trade and commerce when it operates to restrict, 
regulate, fetter or control it and do this immediately or 
directly as distinct from giving rise to some inconsequential 
impediment."26 
According to Rich J. the burden of the Victorian Act i.e. for 
interestate trade was of an indirect or consequential nature. The one 
dissentient to the majority view was Dixon J. 
The cases of R. v. Vizzard and 0. Gilpin Ltd. v. Commissioner of 
Road Transport are of special significance in that they highlight the 
development of two opposing views of the protection afforded by Section 
92. Here we refer to the opinions of Evatt J. and Dixon J. The former's 
views dominated the High Court's approach to Section 92 issues throughout 
the 1930's and into the early 1940's after which the Dixonian approach 
gradually came to be accepted and triumphed as 'received doctrine' 
in 1954 when given the blessing of the Privy Council. 
The issue before the High Court in the case of R. v. Vizzard 
related to the validity of the provisions of the State Transport 
(Co-ordination) Act 1931 of N.S.W. insofar as those provisions applied 
to persons engaged in interstate road transport operations. While the 
stated intention of the Act was expressed vaguely as "... to provide 
for the improvement and for the co-ordination of means and facilities 
27 for locomotion and transport;...'.' the real intention was to regulate competitioi 
between road and rail for the purpose of protecting the financial interests 
of the latter, which over the years came to mean minimising the railway 
deficit. 
26. (1933) 48 CLR 322. See also James v. Cowan (1930) 43 CLR, at p. 425. 
27. Here taken from R. v. Vizzard (1933) 50 CLR, p. 46. 
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Basically, the Act provided that all private persons who wished 
to engage in the transport of goods and persons by road would need to 
28 
obtain a licence from theBoard of Commissioners to undertake such 
activities. The licence, if granted, was subject to various conditions. 
It could be restricted to the carriage of passengers or goods or to particular 
29 kinds of goods. It could also be for restricted operations with respect 
30 
to routes and areas. In addition the licence was subject to conditions 
relating to taxes or charges for which maximum and minimum rates were 
specified. In the case of commercial passenger vehicles, the paym.ents 
were calculated on a passenger mile basis, at a maximum rate of one penny 
(1 ) per passenger mile, while in the case of freight transport the 
maximum charge was set at three pence (3 ) per ton mile. These rates 
were often prohibitive. The revenue from these taxes was paid into the 
State Transport (Co-ordination) Fund, from which the Board, with the 
approval of the Executive Government, made payments for administration, 
for subsidies to vehicles used to provide feeder services to railways, or 
32 
the Government Railway Fund. 
The majority decision of the High Court in R. v. Vizzard 
(Dixon and Starke J.J. dissenting) was that the N.S.W. Transport 
(Co-ordination) Act 1931 was not obnoxious to Section 92. 
The dominant view, as noted earlier, was expressed by Evatt J. In 
a lengthy judgement Evatt J attacked the philosophy laid down in McArthur's 
case contending that it was far too broad in scope. To Evatt: 
28. The Board consisted of a Chief Commissioner and three other Commissioners, 
Section 4 of the State Transport (Co-ordination) Act 1931 (N.S.W.) 
29. Ibid., Sections 176(1) and (2) and 48 [8(a)] 
30. Ibid., Section 15(1) 
31 Ibid., Sections 18(4), (5) and (6) 
32, Ibid., Section 26. 
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"The predominant object of Section 92 was to secure free 
trade and intercourse among what had formerly been self 
governing colonies and what were to become States which still 
possess very large powers of self government. To assert 
freedom of trade between such organised communities was to 
lay down in formal expression a well known economic doctrine 
and ideal ... Neither the words used, nor the underlying 
doctrine would seem to warrant an interpretation by which, 
first 'trade, commerce and intercourse' is resolved into the 
infinite number of Acts, transactions and operations which 
must occur in the course of it, secondly from this infinite 
aggregation there is subtracted that infinite number of acts, 
transactions and operations into which 'purely domestic' 
trade can similarly be resolved, and, thirdly, each and every 
one of the acts, transactions and operations, still infinite 
in number, which comprise the remainder, the States are 
rendered unable to touch or regulate in any way whatsoever. ,3 
Such a test seems to be incapable of satisfactory application." 
What Evatt J. contended was that Section 92 loses a great deal 
of its importance if its various parts are analysed separately and the 
results of that analysis are later welded together. Read as a whole. 
Section 92 was seen as stressing the importance of the free flow of 
goods interstate, so that goods produced in any state might be freely 
marketed in every other state, and so that nothing could lawfully be done 
34 to hinder or prevent such marketing. According to this (economic) 
interpretation of Section 92 absolute freedom was attributed to trade, to 
commerce and to intercourse, but not to traders or travellers considered 
35 Simply as individuals. This was not to say that Section 92 did not confer 
rights upon individuals. On the contrary Section 92 was seen as granting 
rights to individuals in the sense that "... any person may invoke its aid 
in an appropriate case; ..." . Such a right, however, did not mean that 
individuals engaged solely in interstate trade, or whilst so engaged were 
free to "... determine for themselves the manner in which and the means by 
37 
which, they will conduct their business or commerce in each state". 
33. (1933) 50 CLR 86. """""^ 
34. Hud., p. 87. 
35. Ibid., p. 94. 
36. Ibid., p. 93. 
37. Ibid. 
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The States were thus free to regulate, organise, or 'co-ordinate' 
the means of transport within their boundaries notwithstanding that their 
policies might impose substantial burdens on individual operators and 
indeed, prevent many from engaging in interstate trade; provided that the 
effect of such policies, in the aggregate, was not detrimental to that 
trade. To Evatt J. and his brethren supporters, the N.S.W. statute 
under consideration satisfied this formula. More fully: 
"In the present case, however, it is impossible to reach the 
conclusion that the New South Wales statute was designed 
for the purpose of preventing, hindering, limiting or 
obstructing trade, commerce or intercourse among the States. 
Further, there is no evidence that the Act has had the effect 
of reducing or restricting interstate commerce or intercourse. 
So far as appears, its effect is, by providing a more orderly 
system of land transport, to facilitate and increase the passage 
of persons and the flow of commodities to and from the State."38 
The question of whether the legislation was discriminatory or not 
39 
was also an important consideration. In this and other Transport cases 
the point was made that "[the] operation of the Act in no way depends upon 
the interstate character of [the operator's journey]: it applies 
uniformly and does not concern itself with the difference between 
40 inter-State and intra-State trade" However^ such a distinction was not 
necessarily viewed as decisive. What was important was whether the legislation 
was designed expressly for the purpose of restricting interstate trade, 
commerce and intercourse, or instead, to regulate transport in such a manner 
as to facilitate, rather than hinder, the movement of commercial goods 
throughout the State.'*'^  
38. Ibid., p. 77 
39. See for example, Q. Gilpin Ltd, v. Commissioner for Road Transport 
and Tramways (N.S.W.) (1935). 52 CLR 189. 
40. Statement by Rich J, (1933) 50 CLP 51, 
41. Ibid. 
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The dissent of Dixon J. involved a totally antithetical 
interpretation of the protection guaranteed by Section 92. While Mr. Justice 
42 43 
Evatt's approach required the Court, as Nygh and Sawer have noted, 
to reach a balance between State autonomy, including the right of a 
State to adopt new forms of social and economic arrangements and the 
free trade area created by the Constitution, Dixon J. sought the adoption of 
a logical or purely conceptual test. This test was given " .. its first 
44 
coherent and persuasive expression" in Dixon's judgement in 1935 in the 
Transport Case of 0. Gilpin Ltd. v. Commissioner for Road Transport and 
Tramways (N.S.W.). 
In contrast to Mr, Justice Evatt's "aggregative" concept of trade 
and commerce Dixon J. argued that "[any] act or transaction for which 
protection is claimed under Section 92 must be a part of trade, commerce 
45 
or intercourse among the States " By this he meant any act or 
transaction carried out preparatory to, in the process of, or as a 
consequence of, interstate movement of persons and objects or interstate 
communication. To Dixon J. consideration of the scope or purpose of the 
Statute in question was irrelevant; so too was the matter of reasonableness 
of the law when considered in the light of the legitimate interests of the 
46 
State. The protection afforded by Section 92 was seen as absolute: 
42. Nygh,P., op.cit,, p. 338. 
43. Sawer, G., "The Constitution and Its Politics", op.cit., p. 210. 
44. Ibid. 
45. (1935) 52 CLR 204. 
46. Sec for example, Willard v. Rawson (1933) 48 CLR pp. 316 and 332, 
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" 'Free' must at least mean free of a restriction or burden 
placed upon an act because it is commerce, or trade, or 
intercourse, or because it involves movement into or out 
of the State. By this I mean that the application of the 
restriction or burden to the act cannot be made the 
consequence of that act's being of a commercial or trading 
character, or of its involving intercourse between two places, 
or of its involving movement of persons or things into or out 
of the State."47 
Moreover, Dixon J saw the object of Section 92 as that of 
enabling individuals to undertake their business and personal intercourse 
with one another independently of State borders. In his own words: 
"The constitutional provision is not based on mere economic 
considerations. I am unable to agree with the view that 
trade, commerce and intercourse should, in applying Section 
92, be regarded as a whole and not distributively The 
Constitution is dealing with a governmental power It is 
not easy to appreciate the meaning of a guarantee of freedom 
of trade and intercourse unless it gives protection to the 
individual against interference in this commercial relations 
and movements."4° 
As in R. V. Vizzard, Mr Justice Dixon's ruling in 0. Gilpin v. The 
Commissioner for Road Transport, was a minority view and remained so, at 
least as far as the Transport cases are concerned, tintil the early 1950's. 
4. The Period from 1935 to 1948 
Two non-transport cases of considerable importance to our 
discussion occurred in 1935 and 1948. They are, respectively, the case of 
49 James v. The Commonwealth and the case of Bank of New South Wales v. 
The Commonwealth. 
47. (1935) 52 CLR 205. 
48. Ibid., p. 211. 
49. (1935) 52 CLR; (1936) 55 CLR 1. 
50. (1948) 76 CLR 1; (1949) 79 CLR 497 (P.C.) 
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In the former case the issue before the High Court concerned 
the validity of the Coimnonwealth Dried Fruits Act 1928-1935, the effect 
of which was to prevent a producer of dried fruit from marketing any 
of his output interstate except on conditions laid down in the Act, which 
included conditions relating to the export of dried fruit from Australia. 
Control was achieved by means of an overseas export quota. The Act 
made it an offence to market dried fruit interstate without a licence, and the 
issue of a licence was only made on the condition that the owner of dried 
fruit agreed to the Commonwealth Government's determination of the amount 
to be made available for export overseas. 
The means of control employed by the Commonwealth were in 
essence no different from those previously employed by the South Australian 
Government, and which, in James v. Cowan, were held by both the High 
Court and the Privy Council as contravening Section 92. However, in the 
case of James v. The Commonwealth the High Court upheld the validity of 
the Act, but only for the reason that it had, in 1928, held expressly in 
52 James v. The Commonwealth , that Section 92 did not bind the Commonwealth. 
This decision was reversed in a subsequent appeal to the Privy 
Council. Their Lordships, mindful of the argument enunciated in McArthur's 
case that if the Commonwealth is bound by Section 92 then Section 51(i) is 
nullified, contended that "... though trade and commerce mean the same 
thing in Section 51(i) they do not cover the same area, because Section 92 
53 is limited to a narrower context by the word 'free'; ...". But what 
was the nature of the freedom afforded by Section 92? The Privy Council's 
answer to this question is encapsulated by the phrase "... freedom as at 
the frontier ...". This was explained by stating that the essential 
conception was that: 
51. (1930r43 CLR 386; (1932) 47 CLR 386 (P.C.) 
52. (1928) 41 CLR p. 442. 
53. (1936) 55 CLR 60. 
54. Ibid., p. 58. 
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"... the people of Australia were to be free to trade with 
each other and to pass to and fro among the States without 
any burden, hindrance, or restriction based merely on the 
fact that they were not members of the same State."55 
Such a formulation would appear to suggest that all that Section 
92 prohibits is discrimination against interstate trade based on its being 
interstate. That this was not intended by the Privy Council is illustrated 
as follows: First, at an earlier point in the judgement the discrimination 
test was expressly rejected. A second* example is to be found in the Privy 
Council's treatment of previous authority. Here we refer to the Privy 
57 Council's decision in James v. Cowan and a High Court decision in the 
58 
Peanut case, in which both James v. Cowan and McArthur were followed. 
These cases dealt with compulsory acquisition powers and in each of them 
such power was held to contravene Section 92 on the ground that it prevented 
traders from selling their goods interstate if they so desired. The 
discrimination test was not invoked. As Howard points out: 
"If in James v. Commonwealth* the discrimination test was 
going to be approved it would have been necessary to over-
ride McArthur60 on this point as well as the main doctrine; 
to explain James v. Cowan"! on a discrimination ground and 
to overrule the Peanut case.62 instead both the more recent 
decisions were approved and this part of the McArthur doctrine 
was left untouched."63 
55. Ibid., p. 58. 
56. Ibid., p. 56. 
57. (1932) 47 CLR 386. 
58. Peanut Board v. Rockhampton Harbour Board (1933) 48 CLR 266. 
59. (1936) 55 CLR 1. 
60. (1920) 28 CLR 530. 
61. (1932) 47 CLR 386. 
62. (1933) 48 CLR 266. 
63. Howard, C , Australian Federal Constitutional Law (Australia: The Law 
Book Company Ltd., 1968), p. 221. 
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The existing anomalous approach to Section 92, however^ was 
reinforced by also giving approval to the Transport cases, thereby 
accepting the discrimination test and the approach adopted by Evatt J 
In 1937 another transport case came before the High Court. 
64 This was the case of Riverina Transport Pty. Ltd. V. Victoria. Here 
the appellant's claim was that the Victorian Transport Board's refusal 
to grant licences to particular motor vehicle operators wishing to carry 
goods interstate was for no other reason than that they wished to engage 
in interstate trade. The High Court upheld the validity of the Victorian 
Transport Regulation Act on the ground that it was in principle no 
different from legislation considered in previous transport cases and that 
the decisions made there were vindicated by the approval given in 
James v. The Commonwealth to Vizzard's case. 
As stated by Evatt J : 
"The applications were refused, not because the vehicles were 
carrying or intended to carry goods inter-state but because in 
the board's opinion, the carriage of goods inter-state was 
being provided for already and in a more efficient manner by 
co-ordinating the services of the railway system of the two 
States with local motor transport from all points in the 
Riverina to appropriate railway terminals.""6 
The case of the Commonwealth v. The Bank of New South Wales 
represents another important landmark in the history of Section 92 litigation 
in that it resulted in a rejection of the Evatt doctrine and a victory for 
the views of Dixon J. What was at issue in this case was the attempt by the 
Commonwealth, in the Banking Act of 1946, to exclude private banks from conduct-
ing business in Australia. The ruling of the High Court was that such action 
was contrary to Section 92 and this decision was subsequently upheld on 
appeal by the Privy Council. 
64. (1937) 57 CLR 327 
65. (1936) 55 CLR 1. 
66. (1937) 57 CLR 369. 
67 (1948) 76 CLR 1 (H.C.) and (1949) 79 CLR 497 (P.C.) 
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The essential elements of the Commonwealth's argument were as 
follows. First, it was contended that the business of banking did not 
fall within the ambit of Section 92. Instead, banking was merely a 
facility that might be used by commerce but could not itself be regarded 
as trade or commerce. This argument was accepted by Latham C.J. and 
McTiernan J, but was refuted by Dixon J. and other members who argued 
that the conception of commerce embraced intangibles as well as the movement 
of goods and persons. This opinion was accepted by the Privy Council. 
A second argument which proved unacceptable to the Privy 
Council was that Section 92 does not guarantee the freedom of individuals 
to engage in interstate trade. In their Lordships' view Section 92 
".. does not create any new juristic rights, but it does 
give the citizen of State or Commonwealth, as the case may 
be, the right to ignore, and if necessary, to call upon the 
judicial power to help him to resist, legislative or 
executive action which offends against the section." 
After all how was the success of Mr, James in the James cases 
to be explained if not in terms of the protection afforded by Section 92 
to the individual trader? 
A cognate argvmient that Section 92 was not offended if the 
law in question was not designed to, or had no tendency to, restrict 
the flow of business, was also rejected. This argument, it will be 
recalled was first enunciated by Evatt J. in Vizzard's case. It was 
opposed by Dixon J. on the ground that it was an irrelevant consideration 
•.. a consideration of an economic and not a legal character" and by 
the Privy Council on the grounds of its conflict with reasoning in the 
James, cases and its impracticability With regard to the latter: 
68. (1949) 79 CLR 632. 
69. Ibid., p. 635. 
70. (1948) 76 CLR 388. 
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"... the test of,total volume is unreal and unpractical, for 
it is unpredictable whether by interference with the individual 
flow the total volume will be affected and it is incalculable 
what might have been the total volume but for the individual 
interference."71 
Further, the Privy Council denied the relevance of the 
72 discrimination test i.e., that the prohibition affected intrastate as 
well as interstate transactions of private banks and agreed with Dixon J., 
that the object or purpose of the legislation was also irrelevant. 
As to the fundamental issue of the nature of the freedom 
afforded by Section 92 the Privy Council advanced two propositions: 
"(1) that regulation of trade, commerce and intercourse 
among the States is compatible with its absolute 
freedom; and 
(2) that Section 92 is violated only when a legislative 
or executive act operates to restrict such trade 
and commerce and intercourse directly and immediately 
as distinct from creating some indirect or consequential 
impediment which may fairly be regarded as remote."73 
While their Lordships were convinced that the Commonwealth 
Banking Act 1947 did not satisfy the above tests no attempt was made 
to clarify the boundary between legislative and executive acts which 
were to be regarded as direct or indirect in their consequences for 
trade, commerce and intercourse among the states: this task was bequeathed 
to the High Court. 
5. The Transport Cases: 1950 to the Present 
The implications of the Privy Council's reasoning in the Banking 
case for the decisions taken by the High Court in the Transport cases arose 
for judgement by the High Court in 1950 in McCarter v. Brodie. The 
fundamental issue was whether the Victorian Transport Act 1933-1947, which 
disallowed commercial vehicles to use the State's highways unless licensed 
71. (1949) 79 CLR 635. 
72. Ibid,, p. 636. 
73. Ibid., p. 639. 
74. (1950) 80 CLR 432. 
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in accordance with the Act was prohibitive or regulatory Notwithstanding 
that the Act vested almost unlimited powers of granting and refusing 
licences in a State Transport body a majority of the Court took the 
view that the Act did not contravene Section 92. Dixon J. argued that the 
Privy Council's decision in the Banking case had destroyed the arguments 
which had previously been held by the High Court as validating the various 
Statutes considered in the Transport cases, and dissented. He was joined by 
Fullagar J. who reasoned along similar lines. 
In 1953 the issue was raised again in Hughes and Vale Pty.Ltd. 
75 
v. New South Wales (No. 1). The plaintiff was a transport company 
incorporated in New South Wales and engaged in interstate transport of 
general merchandise between Sydney and Brisbane: the statute challenged 
was the State Transport Co-ordination Act 1951 The same majority ruling 
was reached by the High Court as that in McCarter v. Brodie. Moreover, 
Dixon who was then Chief Justice formed one of the majority- His 
decision to support previous rulings, however, was not based on a change 
of argument, but instead, was advanced for the reason that he felt bound to 
accept the authority of the judgement in McCarter v. Brodie since nothing 
had occurred which altered,or added to, the circumstances then under 
consideration. Dixon CJ. was influenced by the reasoning of Williams J. 
76 
in McCarter v. Brodie and contended that as long as the decision taken 
in that case would not be applied outside the realm of commercial road 
transport there was no imperative reason to overirule that decision. 
In his own words: 
75. (1953) 87 CLR 49. 
76. (1950) SO CLR 477 
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"If the Transport Cases have no future application except 
where the conditions or considerations exist that arise 
from the State providing facilities for the carriage of 
goods both in the form of railways and in the form of 
roads, the danger is removed of the decision operating 
generally over the whole area of Section 92 and on that 
footing I think that we ought not to reconsider it."77 
While the High Court's decision supporting the validity of the 
New South Wales Act was based on a four to three majority, five of the seven 
members of the Court found it difficult to reconcile the validity of the 
Transport Acts with the principles set down and adopted in the Banking 
case. Nor surprisingly the matter came before the Privy Council. The 
appeal was successful. 
The basis for their Lordships' verdict were the dissenting 
arguments advanced by Dixon CJ. and Fullager J. in McCarter v. Brodie. 
There Dixon C J had argued that the Privy Council's decision in the 
Banking case had destroyed the three main premises upon which the 
Transport cases were predicated, namely: 
(i) that Section 92 does not guarantee the freedom of 
individuals; 
(ii) that if the same volume of trade flowed from State 
to State before as after the interference with the 
individual trader, the freedom of trade among the 
States remains unimpaired; and 
(iii) that because a law applied alike to interstate 
commerce and to the domestic commerce, it may escape 
objection notwithstanding that it prohibits, restricts 
or burdens interstate commerce.78 
In addition to the above Dixon CJ. cited two further 
propositions settled by the Banking case which were pertinent to the basis 
upon which the Transport cases rested. These were: 
77 (1953) 87 CLR 71. 
78. (1954) 93 CLR 21-22, 
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(i) " that the object or purpose of an Act challenged as 
contrary to 592 is to be ascertained from what is 
enacted and consists in the necessary legal effect of 
the law itself and not in its ulterior effect socially or 
economically " and 
(ii) '': that the question of what is the pith and substance 
of the impugned law is beside the point when the law 
a.mounts to a prohibition, or the question of regulation 
cannot fairly arise."79 
A further proposition refuted by Dixon C.J-, but not considered 
by the Privy Council in the Banking case, was that concerning the distinction 
between motor vehicles as "integers of traffic", and the trade of carrying 
by motor vehicles as part of commerce. ' To Dixon C.J. no such 
distinction should be made. 
The acceptance by the Privy Council of these five arguments meant 
that the only ground which could be invoked to support the legislation 
was that it was regulatory and not prohibitive of interstate trade and 
commerce. On this issue the Privy Council accepted the reasoning 
of Fullager J in McCarter v. Brodie: 
"As to what is not regulation in the relevant sense, one thing 
at least is clear. Prohibition is not regulation It is 
quite impossible; in my opinion, to distinguish the present 
case from the case of a simple prohibition. If I cannot 
lawfully prohibit altogether, I cannot lawfully prohibit 
subject to an absolute discretion on my part to exempt 
from the prohibition."^2 
The outcome was a rejection of the majority views in Vizzard's 
case and of the licensing system which had applied to interstate commercial 
8^ 
road users for a little more than twenty years. Moreover, the Privy 
Council's decision vindicated the purely conceptual test enunciated so 
forcefully by Dixon CJ. in Gilpin's case. 
79. Ibid., p. 22. 
80. Ibid., p. 23. 
81. See for example the judgement of Rich J. in Vizzard's case 50 CLR 51 
82. (1954) 93 CLR 20 
85. Note: The provisions of the Transport Acts were not invalid in so far 
as they applied to intrastate transport. 
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The annulment of the decision in Vizzard's case compelled the 
States to remould their road transport legislation. However, when the 
new legislation came before the High Court in 1955 it, too,was held 
to contravene Section 92. While separate decisions were made by the High 
84 85 
Court in regard to legislation in four States (N.S.W., Victoria, 
86 87 
Queensland, and South Australia ) the principal case was Hughes and 
88 
Vale Pty. Ltd. v. N.S.W, (No. 2). 
The scheme of the amended legislation brought before the High 
Court in Hughes and Vale (No. 2) provided for a new set of provisions 
applicable to interstate commercial road operators. While it was still 
an offence to operate a commercial vehicle interstate unless a licence was 
granted by the Commissioner for Road Transport,the exercise of the latter's 
power to grant or refuse a licence was subject to a number of limitations. 
These were mainly whether the applicant was a fit and proper person to hold 
89 
a licence, whether the vehicle was properly constructed and adequately 
90 
equipped, and whether the vehicle could result in unreasonable damage, 
91 danger or unreasonable interference with other traffic on the roads. 
Each of these restrictions was held by the High Court as 
92 displaying ". a tendency to vagueness and imprecision " the 
effect of which was to invest the Commissioner ", with an extremely wide 
93 
discretion" rather than a limited discretion as apparently intended. 
84. (1955) 93 CLR 127. 
85. Armstrong v. Victoria (1955) 93 CLR 264. 
86. Hughes and Vale Pty. Ltd. v. Queensland (1955) 93 CLR 247 
87 Nilson v. South Australia (1955) 93 CLR 292; Pioneer Tourist Coaches 
Pty, Ltd. V. South Australia (1955) 93 CLR 307 
88. (1955) 93 CLR 127 
89. Ibid,, p. 156. 
90. Ibid., p. 157 
91. Ibid,, p. 153. 
92. Ibid,, p. 157 
93. Ibid., p. 158. 
350. 
The limitations laid down lacked substance because in each case it was not 
whether the applicant for a licence met the stated requirements that were 
of paramount importance, but rather whether the Commissioner thought he did. 
The legislation failed to provide an objective test against which the 
Commissioner's opinion could be evaluated. 
In addition to these matters the legislation granted the 
Commissioner wide powers concerning terms and conditions to be attached 
to a licence. These conditions related to such matters as route, road, area 
of use, traffic regulations, preservation and maintenance of the roads, 
94 
and the use and enjoyment of the roads by the public. The Commissioner's 
interpretation of these conditions was also unrestrained except for the 
requirement that they be of a regulatory nature. The High Court disposed 
95 
of this argument and concluded that the licensing provisions were contrary 
to Section 92 as they were designed to maintain a situation in which 
interstate carriage of goods and/or persons by private commercial 
operators was prohibited, subject only .to the unfettered discretionary 
power of the Commissioner. 
A second issue examined by the High Court in Hughes and Vale 
(No. 2) concerned the extent to which road charges might legitimately 
be imposed on commercial carriers as a condition of a licence as well 
as the validity of fees for registration of interstate vehicles. While 
there was no logical necessity for the Court to consider the afore 
mentioned charges in view of its decision on the licensing arrangements,it 
was nonetheless felt that it was "... undesirable to refrain from expressing a 
view upon this important subject"?^ a subject which had hitherto."... not 
94. Ibid., p. 158. 
95. Ibid., pp. 159-164. 
96. Ibid., p. 167. 
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received consideration in this Court untrammelled by the conceptions 
held to be erroneous by the Privy Council in Hughes and Vale Pty. Ltd. v. 
97 98 
New South Wales (No. 1)." ' The Court also considered that since 
both the charges and the registration fees were financial imposts on 
interstate carriers that common principles applied to both. 
The provisions relating to road charges were laid down in 
Section 18(4) to (6) of the State Transport Co-ordination Act 1931-1954. 
The Commissioner for Motor Transport was empowered by the Act to set 
charges, at his discretion, for the use of the State's highways by 
interstate carriers. The Act specified that the rate and scale of 
charges may be determined on the basis of a mileage rate according to the 
weight of the vehicle, laden or unladen. In determining the actual rate 
for any vehicle the Commissioner was directed by sub-<section (5E) to take 
into account a variety of considerations. These were stated as follows: 
"All relevant matters including the cost of construction and 
maintenance of roads, the depreciation and obsolescence of 
roads, the necessity or desirability for the widening or 
reconstruction of roads, the wear and tear caused by 
vehicles of different weights, types, sizes and speeds and 
the monies available for the purpose of construction, 
maintenance, widening and reconstruction of roads from 
sources other than charges imposed pursuant to sub-section (4) 
of this section and the amount to be expended or proposed to 
be expended from Country Main Roads Fund established under 
the Main Roads Act 1924-1954" 
Once again it was the Court's view that the executive 
discretion to determine a charge was too great and the system of charges was 
declared as invalid. However, while all members of the Court concurred 
with this decision,they differed as to the right of a State to impose 
a charge for the use of roads by vehicles involved in interstate trade, 
Kitto J opposed, without qualification, the notion that the States could 
impose road charges on interstate carriers on the ground that such charges 
9^7. lbid_. ~ 
98. Ibid., p. 171. 
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were "... indistinguishable from a tax" and that Section 92 "... is 
not open to mitigation by reference to the just and equitable". 
Taylor J. also rejected the validity of a charge on interstate carriers, 
although he made one concession, namely, that a State could prevent the 
use of its roads by vehicles which by reason of their weight or construction, 
were destructive of them and that the State could impose an appropriate 
charge for removing the restriction. 
The majority of the Court found grounds for reconciling the 
imposition of a charge on interstate carriers with Section 92 by 
drawing on USA case law. Dixon C.J., McTiernan and Webb J.J., explained 
that: 
"The American phrase is that inter-state commerce must pay 
its way. It is but a constitutional aphorism, but it 
serves to bring home the point that in a modern community 
the exercise of any trade and the conduct of any business 
must involve all costs of fiscal liabilities from which, 
in reason, inter-state trade or business should have no 
immunity. Those who pay them are not unfree, they merely 
pay the price of freedom"102 
Pursuing this further their Honours observed that what was of 
crucial importance in the interpretation of the phrase "inter-state 
commerce must pay its way" in the American litigation was that charges 
imposed on State owned highway facilities used for interstate commerce 
103 
must "... represent a fair compensation or recompense ..." and that to 
be reasonable or fair the charge must be related to the use of the highways 
and the wear and tear incurred. Moreover, the charge should not treat 
interstate carriers unfavourably compared with intrastate operators and 
the proceeds of the charge should be devoted to highway purposes. 
99. Ibid., p. 223. 
100. Ibid., p. 224. 
101. Ibid., pp. 239-240. 
102. Ibid., p. 172. 
103. Ibid., p. 174. 
104. Ibid. 
353. 
Accepting this principle the majority of the Court held that it 
would be legitimate for a State to impose a charge for the use of its 
highways by interstate carriers provided that the charge was related to 
highway maintenance costs only Dixon CJ., McTiernan and Webb J.J. 
stated that: 
"It does not seem logical to include capital costs of new 
highways or other capital expenditure in the costs taken 
as the basis of the computation (i.e., of the charge) It 
is another matter with recurring expenditure incident to the 
provision and maintenance of roads."1^5 
while Williams J contended: 
"... (a road charge) could not include an item relating to the 
cost of construction of new roads, although it could contain 
an item relating to the cost of widening and reconstructing 
old roads where some additional width or a strengthened pave-
ment was required to carry the evergrowing amoiont of traffic 
and the ever-increasing size and weight of vehicles using the 
roads."106 
No attempt was made by their Honours to elaborate on these views. 
Finally, the Court also held that the imposition of registration 
fees on interstate commercial carriers calculated on the basis of vehicle 
weight, type of engine and type of tyre were invalid since the fees did 
107 
not bear any clear relationship to the use of the roads, and hence 
could not be viewed as an attempt to extract a fair and reasonable payment 
108 
for road maintenance costs caused by interstate commercial vehicles. 
As a consequence of the decision in Hughes and Vale (No. 2) 
the States were forced to amend their Transport Acts a second time. This 
effort received the initial approval of the High Court in 1957 in Armstrong 
V. Victoria (No, 2)}^^ 
105. Ibid., p. 176. 
106. Ibid., p. 195. 
107. Ibid., p. 181. 
108. Ibid., p. 182. 
109. (1957) 99 CLR 28, 
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The amended Victorian legislation imposed a scheme of road 
charges designed to take account of the observations made in Hughes and 
Vale (No. 2). It also provided for a scheme of registration charges. 
The road charge was referred to in Part II of the Act as a contribution 
to maintenance charge and was assessed at the rate of one third of a 
penny per ton of the sum of (a) the tare weight of the vehicle, and 
(b) forty percent of the load capacity of the vehicle per mile of public 
highway along which the vehicle travelled in Victoria. In addition, 
the charge applied only to vehicles having a load capacity in excess of 
four tons The revenues derived from the charge were to be credited to a 
special road maintenance account and could only be spent on the maintenance 
of public highways either directly by the Country Roads Board, or indirectly 
by Local Authorities, 
The High Court held by a majority of four to three that the charge 
was constitutional on the ground that it was in line with the guidelines 
enunciated in Hughes and Vale (No. 2). The dissenting judges (Webb, 
Kitto and Taylor J.J.) followed the opinion of the minority in Hughes and 
Vale (No, 2). 
In contesting the validity of the legislation the plaintiffs 
argued that the charge was unreasonable on the grounds that it was a flat 
rate, and as such,failed to distinguish between different types of goods. 
The reply of Dixon CJ. to this argument was that while the charge was 
a fixed amount per ton mile it varied with the weight of the vehicle, and 
that vehicles assessed as causing relatively minor damage to the roads were 
excluded from the charge. Further, it was also argued by Dixon C J and 
Williams J. that it would be unreasonable to expect the calculation of the 
charge to be determined according to the route taken by a vehicle of a 
particular weight carrying a particular load. In the words of Williams J.: 
110. Sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the Commercial Goods Vehicle Act 1955 
(Victoria), 
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"Section 92 protects the freedom of the inter-State trader 
to use every road in the State. In such a calculation 
therefore it is reasonable to take into account this net-
work as a whole."!!! 
The inclusion of the multiplier of 40 percent of load capacity 
in the determination of the charge was also accepted by the Court as a 
reasonable element based on what "- experience suggests as the likely 
112 
average of the loads carried by vehicles .." and in the circumstances 
accommodated the criticism that vehicles engaged in trade were not 
always fully loaded and that the nature of their loads varied. 
Further points accepted by Dixon C J . and Williams J. relating 
to the issue of maintenance and estimates were: 
(a) that it is proper to ignore that a proportion of 
road costs is met from rates; 
(b) there is no reason for excluding from the figures 
for maintenance an estimate of what ought to have 
been expended but had not been expended. 
Another argument that the legislation should be declared invalid 
because its true purpose was to protect the interests of the railways 
was also rejected by the Court. Dixon C J . contended that he could find no 
evidence to support this view, but pointed out that even if he could, it 
would not be a sufficient reason for opposing otherwise valid legislation. 
Williams J. adopted the same attitude declaring that: 
" the fact that the position of the railways in this 
competition is improved by making these vehicles contribute 
to the maintenance of the roads is not a ground for invalidat-
ing the legislation if the charge is properly related to the 
use of the roads."114 
111. Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
112. Ibid., p. 48. 
113. Ibid., p. 50. 
114. Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
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Finally, as to the matter of the registration fees, the Court 
declared these to be invalid because it was not lawful to operate a 
commercial goods vehicle in Victoria without a Victorian registration 
and the fees were not assessed according to the use made of the 
Victorian roads. 
Following the decision in Armstrong's case New South Wales and 
Queensland levied the same fee of one-third of a penny per ton mile. Subsequent 
litigation in 1959 challenging the validity of the New South Wales and 
116 Queensland statutes were rejected by the High Court, notwithstanding that 
117 
road conditions were not identical in all States. The Court held that 
no evidence had been produced to suggest that the legislation was not a 
genuine attempt to impose a reasonable charge for road maintenance costs. 
Another attempt to have the New South Wales legislation declared 
118 invalid was made in 1961 in Breen v. Sneddon. In this case the 
defendant sought to introduce evidence which he contended would show that 
the road maintenance charge bore no relation to the wear and tear of the 
roads. Some of the reasons given were stated as follows: the charge 
was based on load capacity; heavier vehicles as such did not necessarily 
cause more damage to roads than vehicles of lighter loads; and related to 
this were such factors as number and size of tyres, tyre pressure and the 
distribution of the load over the road surface, speed and speed limitations. 
In addition it was contended that the Commonwealth petrol tax should also 
be taken into account when ascertaining whether the charge was prohibitive. 
^1^- «>f. Nilson V. South Australia (1955) 93 CLR 292. 
116. Commonwealth Freighters Proprietary Limited v, Sneddon (1959) 102 
CLR 28 (NSW Legislation); and Boardman v. Duddington (1959) 104 
CLR 456 (Queensland legislation) 
117 South Australia and Western .Australia introduced road maintenance 
charges respectively in 1964 and 1966. 
118. (1961) 106 CLR 406. 
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The High Court refused to admit this evidence. The judgement 
made a distinction between facts relevant to a matter of constitutional 
119 
validity and facts relevant to an issue between parties. In ascertaining 
a matter of validity it was pointed out that the court would inform itself 
of whatever facts it viewed as relevant at the time. This was not meant to 
suggest that litigants could re-open the issue of validity whenever they 
felt that they were in a position to provide evidence showing some neglect 
or variation in the facts relied on in a previous judgement. As stated by 
Howard: 
"The question of validity once being determined, it remained 
determined unless and until the court permitted it to be 
re-opened. In the present case (i.e. Breen v. Sneddon) the 
evidence was inadmissable because it was not relevant to any 
issue between the parties themselves but only to the validity,„p 
of the law to be applied to the determination of that issue". 
The Court held that the reasonableness of the road maintenance 
charge had been resolved in Armstrong's case and subsequently confirmed in 
Commonwealth Freighters Pty, Ltd. v, Sneddon and in Boardman v, Duddington 
and that in its opinion there was no reason to reconsider the question of its 
validity. 
The Queensland legislation was also the subject of another High 
121 
Court case in 1962 in Allwrights Transport Ltd, v. Ashby. Here the 
defendant contended that the legislation was invalid with respect to 
commercial vehicles using the Barkly Highway for journeys between 
Queensland and the Northern Territory. It was argued that one half the cost 
of maintaining the highway, insofar as it lies in Queensland was met by the 
Commonwealth Government, and further, that the revenues collected from the 
charges imposed on vehicles using the highway were in excess of the amount 
expended in its upkeep. The Court rejected these arguments declaring that: 
TT9T (1961) 106 CLR 411. 
120, Howard, C , op.cit., p. 269. 
121. (1962) 107 CLR 662. 
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"The validity [of a change] has depended on the question of 
whether such a thing, considered as a whole, is inconsistent 
with, freedom of inter-State commerce: not whether this or that 
carrier of goods or the users of this or that highway, consider-
ed separately and in their particular circumstance, obtain a full 
return for what they pay by way of charge or whether the Govern-
ment receives from them, regarded as separate individuals, more 
money than it spends to cover their particular needs or to 
repair the wear and tear for which they may properly be held 
responsible; still less is a particular contribution by the 
Commonwealth to be taken into account."122^ 
No further challenges to State road maintenance contribution 
legislation occurred until 1967 when the validity of the N.S.W. Road 
Maintenance Contribution Act 1958-1965 was considered by the Privy Council 
in the case of Freightlines and Construction Holding Ltd. v. New South 
123 
Wales. The appeal was rejected by the Privy Council and since then the 
law on the subject of financial exactions from interstate commercial road 
carriers has remained as enshrined in Hughes and Vale (No, 2) and Armstrong 
V, Victoria (No. 2). 
Another series of transport cases which followed the Hughes and 
Vale (No. 1) decision has dealt with the issue of what is actually an 
interstate journey. The cases involved fall into two categories; (i) those 
dealing with intrastate parts of interstate journeys and (ii) the matter 
of "border-hopping" No attempt will be made to trace out the details 
of these cases. The main conclusions will suffice. 
With regard to the former category it seems that the closest 
that one can get to giving a statement of the High Court's current view 
is that an intrastate journey takes on an interstate character if it is 
an integral or normal part of another transactions which is itself clearly 
of an interstate character. Recent decisions -^ as in Pilkington v. 
1 74 
Hanmiond Pty, Ltd. — have tended to stress the element of continuity 
12 2. Ibid., pp. 668-669. 
123. (1967) 46 CLR 1. 
12L (1974) 2 ALR 563. 
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If there is a lack of continuity in the journey it is likely that the 
High Court will conclude that more than one journey is involved and that the 
intrastate segment will not be entitled to the protection guaranteed by 
Section 92. Use of phrases such as "physical continuity" and "integral 
part", however, are likely to result in different interpretations and so 
no precise conclusions are possible. 
As to the second mentioned category the issue before the High 
Court has concerned the practice of transport operations crossing a State 
border for the purpose of seeking the protection of Section 92 and then 
recrossing the border to a destination in the original State. This 
practice was spawned by the decision in Hughes and Vale (No. 1) since that 
decision made it financially advantageous for road transport operators to 
engage in interstate transportation as against intrastate transport. 
By 1962 six cases concerning border-hopping had come before 
the High Court. Three of these were viewed as genuine cases of border 
125 
crossing and the other three as contrived. The rule that emerged was 
that Section 92 will protect only those interstate journeys that are 
properly incidental to the transactions taken as a whole. Along 
with this approach the judgements made many references to the main 
purpose and essential character of the transactions. 
Since 1965, however, loopholes in the form of "contract 
manipulation" and "load shifting" have been successfully exploited so 
that overall the interpretation of this aspect of the protection afforded 
by Section 92 is less certain than it might have once appeared. However, 
with recent movements towards de-regulation it is likely that the incentive 
125. The so called genuine cases are: 
Naracoorte Transport v. Butler (1956) 95 CLR 455; 
Golden v. Hotchkiss (1959) 101 CLR 568; and 
Beach V. Wagner (1959) 101 CLR 644. 
The contrived cases are: 
Harris v. tVagncr (1959) 103 CLR 452; 
Western Interstate Pty. Ltd. v. Madsen (1961) 107 CLR 102; and 
Egg Marketing Board v. Bonnie Doone Trading Co. (NSW) Pty.Ltd. (1962) 
107 CLR 27. 
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for border hopping will be reduced. 
6. Recent Developments: The Wheat Case (1978) 
One final piece of Section 92 litigation which requires mention 
is the case of Clarke King and Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Australian Wheat Board 
127 
and the State of New South Wales. While this case is concerned with 
the area of marketing arrangements it overlaps road transport and could be 
of importance for the issue of road user charges as well as to other matters 
concerning the regulation of transport in general. 
Briefly, the 1978 Wheat case concerned the validity of the 
Australia-wide wheat pooling and stabilisation scheme established under 
the provisions of the Commonwealth Wheat Stabilisation Act (1974) and of 
the complementary legislation of the Australian States including, in 
particular, the New South Wales Wheat Stabilisation Act (1974) 
The purpose of the scheme is to stabilise the return to 
Australian wheat growers by avoiding the consequences of fluctuating 
international demand and prices for wheat,and to ensure a uniform 
domestic price for wheat set aside for local consimiption. 
The principal issue for judgement by the High Court was 
whether Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the State Act could lawfully be applied 
to wheat subject to interstate trade. These sections in effect prevent 
any grower from selling any of the wheat he has grown except through the 
Australian Wheat Board. 
126. Another recent form of avoiding the imposition of State taxes is the 
formation of a "straw" company. Such a company incurs liability 
to pay road maintenance charges, but when recovery of the charges is 
sought the company has no assets to meet the liability and is wound 
up. The carrier then establishes another company and the process 
is repeated. 
127 (1978) 52 ALJR 670. 
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The centre piece of the defence argument was that the State 
Act v/as part of a legislative arrangement which combined Australian and 
State legislation in substantially identical terms for the purpose of 
stabilising the wheat industry in Australia and that while the scheme 
involved the creation of a government monopoly, such action should, given 
the nature of the industry, be viewed as a practical and reasonable 
form of regulation. The inspiration for this argument is to be found 
in an obiter statement by the Privy Council in its judgement in the Banking 
case, namely: 
"- their Lordships do not intend to lay it down that in 
no circumstances could the exclusion of competition so as 
to create a monopoly either in a State or Commonwealth 
agency or in some other body be justified. Every case 
must be judged on its own fact and in its own setting of 
time and circumstances, and it may be that in regard to 
some economic activities and at some state of social 
development it might be maintained that prohibition with a 
view to State monopoly was the only practical and reasonable 
manner of regulation and that interstate trade and intercourse ^^ g 
thus prohibited and thus monopolised remained absolutely free." 
The defendants' argument was supported in a joint judgement by 
Mason and Jacobs J.J. and rejected by Barwick CJ., and Stephen J while 
Murphy J. in a brief statement contended that, since the legislation 
did not impose directly or indirectly, any customs duty or similar tax 
discriminatory against trade or commerce among the States, it did 
not contravene Section 92. Thus the scheme was held to be valid by a 
majority of three to two. 
In rejecting the validity of the legislation Barwick C J stated 
"There can be no warrant, in my opinion, by reason of changing 
political or economic climate for pushing out the perimeters 
of laws regulatory in nature to the point where they effective-
ly destroy the guaranteed freedom (i.e. of Section 92)" 129 
12«. (1949) 79 CLR pp. 640-641. 
129. (1978) 52 ALJR 681. 
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Stephen J. likewise rejected the relevance of the quoted 
passage from the Banking case. In addition he was plainly influenced by 
evidence in the form of a draft report prepared by the Australian Industries 
Assistance Commission on the Wheat Stabilisation Scheme. The report was highly 
critical of existing arrangements and recommended a number of alternative 
schemes each of which it considered would lead to a more efficient use 
of resources than the existing arrangements. 
What seems to have been of importance to Mason and Jacobs J.J.. 
was the complementary nature of the Commonwealth and State statutes. 
"A State marketing scheme which prohibits sale and delivery 
of a product interstate faces immediate problems with Section 
92 and it is not easy to see how such a prohibition is 
regulatory of all trade and commerce (including interstate 
trade and commerce) in the product. An Australian wide scheme 
providing for acquisition of the product by a single marketing 
authority constituted by the Commonwealth and existing in each 
State means that at one place or another the product will come 
within the operation of complementary statutes of the Commonwealth 
and the States."130 
Moreover, Mason and Jacobs J.J made no reference in their 
judgement to the above mentioned report and yet were able to conclude that 
"We are left in no doubt that a stabilisation scheme is 
needed and that the tests of practicality and reasonableness 
(which includes fairness to all without discrimination 
throughout Australia) are satisfied by the comprehensive 
compulsory scheme which has been adopted."131 
130. (1978) 52 ALJR 670. 
131. Ibid. 
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For our purposes the decision in the Wheat case (1978) 
adds a possible new dimension, namely that policy decisions taken by the 
States and Commonwealth in co-operation with each other may not be held to 
contravene Section 92 when in fact they might be declared to do so if 
132 
taken unilaterally We will return to this matter in the next 
Chapter 
132. The decision taken in the Wheat Case (1978) has recently been 
challenged by a N.S.W. farmer, Mr- C Uebergang. In a decision 
handed down on 28.10.80, the High Court decided that it required 
more facts before it determined whether the Commonwealth-State 
Wheat Stabilisation Scheme is contrary to Section 92. According 
to one commentator: "The court's non-decision means that it could 
be at least another year before the validity of the Wheat scheme 
is finally decided by the High Court" Solomon, D., "Wheat Board to 
Argue for Its Life", Australian Financial Review, 29th October, 1980, p.l 
It should also be noted that by seeking out the facts of the matter the 
Court would appear to be providing room for argument about the 
economic facts of life, e.g., whether present arrangements for wheat 
marketing by monopoly are the only "reasonable and practicable" 
means for regulating the industry 
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CHAPTER 12 
ROAD PRICING POSSIBILITIES FOR AUSTRALIA 
1. Introduction 
It is the purpose of this Chapter to direct attention to an 
examination of the practical possibilities for charging for the use of 
roads in Australia in ways which are less arbitrary in their resource 
allocation effects than recent and current methods. 
These resource allocation effects are manifest in a number of ways. 
First, the manner in which road users are charged is important from the 
standpoint of inter-modal competition, especially between the road and rail 
sectors. While it is true in Australia, as it is indeed elsewhere, that the 
rail sector is heavily subsidised - to the extent that few State railways 
are able to meet annual operating costs, let along make a contribution to 
capital expenditure - we will not get bogged-down with arguments 
concerning the problem of second best. We ignore this problem and suggest 
that the rail sector should be required to seek commercial viability by 
adopting more efficient pricing and investment strategies. 
Second, the resource allocation effects of inefficient pricing 
for roads is evident in terms of the mix of vehicle types which use the 
road system, especially those in the freight transport category 
Vehicles of different weight and axle configurations have different 
destructive effects on the road system. If prices for road use do not 
take account of these differences,, then from society's point of view 
incorrect substitution effects between vehicle types will occur, with 
consequent adverse effects for maintenance and investment decisions. 
Third, and related to the above, we have also seen that 
getting prices right is of fundamental importance to the issue of 
detcnnining an optimal level of expenditure on the road system. 
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Obviously, the extent to which improvements in the efficiency 
in resource allocation objective can be achieved will depend on the nature 
and significance of constraints on policy options. Apart from constraints 
imposed by the costs of obtainiiig information on the various components of 
track costs, the quality of available and administratively feasible (and 
politically acceptable) pricing mechanisms and so on, there are, in 
Australia's case, institutional constraints posed by the division of 
financial powers between the Commonwealth and the States, and the High 
Court's interpretation of S92 of the Constitution. Various pricing options 
are possible. In examining these options we confine our attention to the 
pricing of the declared roads system. We ignore the pricing of those 
roads whose predominant function is to provide access to property. 
This Chapter begins by restating the principles that need to be 
adopted if road user charges are to recover road track costs efficiently 
This is followed by a discussion of a number of feasible pricing 
alternatives for Australia involving the use of traditional and non-
traditional pricing instruments. A crucial assumption relating to these 
alternatives is whether or not the Commonwealth is willing to co-operate with 
the States in the implementation of efficient road pricing policies. The 
next section examines the practicability of the various proposals in the 
context of the High Court's interpretation of S92. 
1. No attempt is made to review recent empirical studies to establish the 
relationship between road costs and revenues from road users in Australia, 
Some of these studies are found in: (1) Commonwealth Bureau of Roads, 
Reports on Roads in Australia, 1973, Appendix 5; (2) Commonwealth 
Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1975, Appendices, 
Appendix 2, and (3) Bureau of Transport Economics, Cost Recovery in 
Australian Transport 1974-75 (A.G.P.S,, Canberra, 1977) Chapter 6, 
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2, Recovering Road Track Costs Efficiently 
In Chapter 4 of this study we divided road track costs into 
three main categories: (i) maintenance costs which vary directly with use 
(ii) separable capacity costs and (iii) non-separable capacity and 
maintenance costs. The reason for making this distinction is to make it 
clear that if the costs of maintaining and supplying the road track are to 
be recovered efficiently, then user charges need to be based on both cost 
and demand factors. As indicated, the separable costs represent those 
costs which are uniquely assignable to various road user groups. Once 
a road is built the lower limit to price for any particular user class 
(e.g. ordinary sedan passenger vehicles) is given by the costs which the 
road authority could avoid by excluding that class from using the roads. 
These short run separable costs are represented largely by those maintenance 
costs which are caused by use. Similarly, at the planning stage it may be 
possible to identify capital costs incurred on behalf of particular 
classes of users. These costs represent the lower limit to capital costs 
to be recovered from those classes of users. All other track costs 
represent the joint costs of the road system and should be allocated among 
the various user classes on the basis of demand considerations. 
Given this framework the first task for the road authority will 
be to determine, over the relevant planning period, the level of expenditure 
to be incurred on each part of the road system, and to identify the separable 
and joint cost components. The significance of these elements will vary 
according to the supply policy adopted by the road authority 
The best available research evidence suggests that a high 
proportion of the separable costs of road supply, namely routine maintenance 
of pavements, reseals and reconstruction of pavements which fall below 
minimum tolerable standards, are largely a function of vehicle weight and 
axle load configuration. This relationship, derived as a result of 
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extensive tests conducted by the American Association of State Highway 
Officials (A.A.S.H.O.), is that damage to the road surface increases in 
2 
proportion to the fourth power of the increase in axle laden weight. 
For example, the damage caused by an axle load of eight tonnes is 
sixteen times that caused by an axle load of four tonnes. However, the 
damage caused by successive axles is additive: thus eight tonnes on 
two separate axles results in twice the damage caused by four tonnes on 
one axle. The more axles that are used to carry a given load, the less 
damage caused to the road pavement. 
Application by a road authority of the A.A.S.H.O. formula 
would enable a number of vehicle classes to be established for the purpose 
of determining the separable cost components of an efficient track 
cost recovery pricing policy Interestingly such an approach has recently 
3 4 been adopted by the New Zealand Government. * In that government's 
scheme there are twenty-four heavy vehicle classes determined on the 
basis of vehicle weight, axle configuration and wheel spacings. 
Another important matter for consideration by the road authority 
is the approach to be taken to the treatment of capital: that is, it 
will be necessary to decide between the public enterprise approach and 
the current expenditure method. Again we note that there are theoretical 
problems associated with either approach, and that it is still very much 
a matter of dispute among contributors to the road track cost debate'as 
to which approach is to be preferred. 
2. For a discussion of the 'fourth power rule' see Stevenson, J.McL., 
"A Study of the Economics of Road Vehicle Limits: Pavements", 
Study Report T4 (N.A.A.S.R.A.:. Melbourne, 1976), pp. 4-15. 
3. The Road User Charges Act 1977 (New Zealand 1977) 
4. See also Jennings, A., "Infrastructure Pricing and E.E.C Common 
Transport Policy", Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, May 1976, 
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Once the above matters have been resolved, the next step 
confronting the road authority is to seek administratively feasible 
methods of charges which enable prices for road use to be systematically 
related to separable and non-separable costs. Since separable and non-
separable costs are likely to vary from one part of the road system to 
another, an economically efficient cost recovery pricing strategy would 
confront users with prices which vary according to their use of the various 
parts of the road system. The cost component of the charge for any 
particular vehicle type would vary according to the use made of roads 
having different quantity/quality characteristics. In practice it is 
unlikely that such a degree of fine tuning in administratively feasible 
pricing methods will be available in the foreseeable future. In view of 
this the determination of the minimum price to be extracted from each user 
class will need to be based on estimates of the separable costs, for each 
class, over the system as a whole. 
The recovery of separable costs requires the use of a variable 
charge so that the amount contributed to these costs by members of each 
user class varies according to the extent to which they use the road 
system. While it may be possible to bring about some minor improvements 
in the structure of variable charges using existing variable road user 
taxes, new methods are necessary if significant improvements are to be 
achieved. What is required is a metering system which is cheap to install 
and cannot be tampered with. One such devise which satisfies these 
requirements reasonably well and is already in use in some countries, e.g. 
New Zealand, is the hubometer. This device (as the name suggests) 
is fitted to the hub of a wheel of the vehicle and records distance travelled.' 
5. The hubometeris not the only known metering device. There are more 
sophisticated types, some of which might be acceptable for larger 
vehicles. The simplest - the tachograph - records time and mileage, and 
enables some provision to be made for charging for high demand road 
space (i,e. because the vehicle would be travelling slowly and this would 
be indicated on the punched tape which results). The tachograph is 
currently in use in the EEC and U.S.A. on larger vehicles. Its present 
use is for checking compliance with safety requirements and not as a user 
charge device. 
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The New Zealand system requires the majority of heavy vehicles 
to be fitted with such a device. For each of these vehicles a pre-paid 
distance licence is purchased with the distance charge related (as 
noted above) to vehicle weight, axle spacing and tyre spacings. When 
purchasing the distance licence (which is available in multiples of 1000 
kilometres) the operator of a vehicle nominates the maximvmi gross laden 
weight for which the vehicle is to be licensed, specifies the vehicle 
class to which the vehicle belongs, and nominates the distance required. 
The scheme also provides exemptions for certain types of 
vehicles. These include off road vehicles, the operators of which are 
required, instead, to purchase time licences; all trailers with a gross 
laden weight less than 3% tonnes and all petrol powered vehicles with a 
gross laden weight of 3% tonnes or less. For the latter mentioned vehicles 
the petrol tax has been set at a rate to produce revenue more or less 
equivalent to the rate which a distance licence would have produced. On 
the other hand for petrol driven vehicles having a gross laden weight 
in excess of 3% tonnes the distance charge is levied and a rebate of the 
petrol tax paid on all petrol purchases. 
While the New Zealand scheme provides an example of the practicality 
of the use of a simple metering device as an instrument for charging for the 
use of the roads, and indicates the possibilities for achieving a more 
efficient pricing structure,as shown by the degree of disaggregation of 
the distance licence rates, it does have at least one major weakness. This 
is to be found in its treatment of the joint costs of road supply. Like 
all the cost allocation proposals considered in Part I of this study, the 
New Zealand scheme also treats the joint cost element in an arbitrary 
fashion. 
6. However, calculations by Starkie, D.N.M., op.cit., p. 21, suggest that 
given such factors as the road expenditure figures to be recovered 
and the fourth power law, the user charges imposed on heavy vehicles in 
the 1978 schedules are, in all probability, not too distorted by arbitrary 
allocations and that comparatively small distortions will be of little 
consequence because of the inelasticity of road use" 
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Economic theory indicates that under competitive conditions these 
costs would be allocated according to elasticities of demand. In the 
absence of statistically derived estimates of elasticities it is obvious 
that a rule-of-thumb or rules-of-thumb for the price elasticity of demand 
for road use by different road users will need to be found. There is nothing 
unusual about this. Enterprises such as railways have used a value/ 
weight rule-of-thumb for the determination of demand elasticities. Here 
the argument was that the greater the value per unit weight of traffic the 
lower the demand elasticity Other enterprises such as electricity, gas 
and telephone suppliers have also made use of rules-of-thumb for the same 
reason by distinguishing in their charging system between commercial, 
industrial, government, private and other user classes. 
For the road transport case it should also be possible to 
find suitable indicators of demand elasticities. One suggestion is that 
vehicles might be classified according to such characteristics as value 
of vehicle, type of use (i.e. private, commercial, or government), and 
7 
performance characteristics. Thus, for example, one would expect that 
the owner of a high value vehicle would be less sensitive to an increase 
in road user charges than the owner of a low value vehicle. Clearly, 
whatever factors are chosen as indicators of demand elasticities the initial 
choice of relative weights to be applied to each will need to be based on 
reasoned judgement. A trial and error approach seems likely Again there 
is nothing unusual about this. Suppliers of other outputs frequently 
engage in similar market experiments. 
7, See Kolsen, H.M,, Ferguson, D,C. and Docwra, G.E., op.cit. 
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Once the initial set of elasticity coefficients is determined the 
next step for the road authority is to incorporate this in the charging 
system. If a metering system is used,then all that is necessary is to 
multiply the cost-determined charge per mile (i.e. the separable cost 
charge) for each vehicle class by the estimated demand determined coefficient 
(e.g. 1.0 for private use, 1.1 for commercial use, 0.98 for farmers, 1.02 
for special purpose vehicles) It would of course be possible to recover 
part of the joint cost component of track costs by means of differential 
fixed charges, but there seems little point to this option if it is possible 
to incorporate the demand determined component in the variable charge. 
If metering is not acceptable to policy makers then the 
possibilities for efficient road pricing strategies are much more 
circumscribed. The road authority will be forced to rely on the use of 
standard pricing instruments such as petrol and diesel fuel taxes, fixed 
charges in the form of vehicle registration and licence fees, weight/distance 
taxes, tolls and possibly tyre taxes. 
As far as the fuel tax is concerned it is clear that neither 
demand nor cost factors are reflected in such a tax. The fact that some 
vehicles might consume twice as much fuel per mile as another vehicle 
type does not necessarily mean that the former is responsible for twice 
as much in track costs, or that the difference can be rationalised in terms 
of differences in elasticities of demand. In addition to these factors 
there are other problems as well: by and large discrimination between 
classes is not practicable (i.e. having different rates of fuel taxes 
for different road user classes); and the tax distorts engine design 
and results in distortions in capital/labour ratios. There is, however, 
some scope for differentiating in the fuels tax between petrol driven 
vehicles and diesel powered vehicles. By and large fuel tax payments 
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are inversely related to vehicle size. This is a consequence of both the 
economies of operation of larger vehicles and the lower cost of the fuel 
consumption of diesel powered vehicles which comprise the majority of the 
heavy vehicle population. Since the latter group are responsible for a 
Q 
substantial part of the separable costs of road supply there is clearly 
a case for having a higher level of tax on diesel fuel than petrol. However, 
care would need to be exercised in determining the differential in order 
to avoid undesirable substitution effects between petrol and diesel powered 
vehicles and within the diesel powered category 
It is sometimes suggested that use should be made of a tax on 
tyres to recover road track costs. While there is obviously a connection 
between road use and tyre wear there is no simple relationship between 
tyre wear and vehicle characteristics. Such a tax experiences difficulties 
similar to those associated with fuels taxes, although maybe .not to the 
same degree. Even if it were possible to devise a differential tyre tax 
which would establish some connection between tyre wear and road costs 
there are likely to be some difficulties on the administrative side. 
Here we refer specifically to the problem of distinguishing between 
vehicles which use the same size tyre, but have different weight and 
axle load characteristics. The remaining variable tax, namely the ton/ 
mile tax, fares somewhat better However^ there are problems associated 
with its reliance on vehicle weight; difficulties in discriminating 
between user classes, and problems of evasion. 
8. See for example: 
Affleck, F-, Road User Charges in Australia: An Assessment of the 
Existing System and Guidance for Future Policy, Vol. I, December 1976, 
prepared for the Australian Transport Advisory Council, unpublished. 
Webber, J.R., Both, G.J, and Ker, I.R,, "Commercial Vehicle Costs and 
Charges: A Study of Separable Pavement Costs". Paper presented to the 
9th ARRB Conference, Brisbane, 1978. 
Todd, T-R., South Western Australia Transport Study, Chapter 8, Main 
Report, Director General of Transport and Commissioner of Railways, 
Perth (December 1977) 
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Finally, there is the matter of the use of fixed charges. As 
a general rule it would seem that there is little to be said in their 
favour: the extraction of a fixed charge from a vehicle operator bears no 
relationship to the amount of use made of the vehicle. However, in the 
absence of a metering system, and given the difficulties associated with 
the other mentioned variable charges, it should be possible for a road 
authority to make some use of fixed charges (e.g. vehicle registration fees) 
to recover at least some part of the joint cost components of road 
9 
supply in a more efficient manner It should be possible to determine the 
level of fixed charges paid by different vehicles according to differences 
in elasticities of demand. Moreover, the use of a fixed charge would 
also enable a limited approach to be taken to the distinction between high 
and low cost road space where these differences occur on a geographical 
basis. 
Our discussion in this section has ignored the problem of the 
pricing of congested road space, especially in urban areas. Obviously this 
is a matter of considerable importance and one which should be given 
serious attention by policy makers. All we note here is that there are 
practical, although far from perfect, means of tackling this problem. 
If a congestion pricing policy is also considered by policy makers as 
desirable it could easily be grafted to a policy aimed at the efficient 
recovery of system track costs. 
9. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of fixed charges 
see for example, Foster, CD., The Transport Problem, (London: Croom 
Helm, Second Revised Edition, 1975), Chapter 10, pp. 239-241. 
10. See for example, Beesley, M.E., "Road Pricing : Economics, Techniques 
and Policy", Urban Transport: Studies in Economic Policy (London: 
Butterworths, 1973,) Chapter 9. 
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3. Road Pricing Possibilities for Australia: Commonwealth-State 
Co-operation 
We now turn our attention to matters which are of particular 
relevance to an examination of road pricing possibilities for Australia. 
Here we refer to the fact that both Commonwealth and State Governments 
are involved in the funding of the nation's declared roads system and to 
the implications of the High Court's interpretation of S92 of the 
Constitution. In this section we examine possible pricing scenarios without 
reference to possible problems posed by S92. This is done purely as a matter 
of convenience. We consider problems posed by S92 in the following section. 
The fact that the Commonwealth Government is a major contributor 
to the funding of State road programmes and that it has sole power to 
levy the fuels tax,means that an important element affecting the ability 
of the State Road Authorities to implement the principles for efficient 
road track cost recovery,is the willingness of the Commonwealth Government 
to co-operate with the States in implementing such a policy. A number of 
pricing strategies are possible. We assume a current expenditure 
approach to the treatment of capital. 
Option A 
Here we suppose that the Commonwealth shows no interest in 
co-operating with the States in putting into effect an 'efficient' 
cost recovery pricing policy- tVhat can the State Road Authorities do to 
improve methods of charging? Since the bulk of State sources of revenue 
for road expenditure purposes are derived from vehicle registration fees, 
one possibility is for the States to ensure that these fixed imposts are 
structured in such a wa.y as to contribute to the recovery of the joint 
cost elements of road supply as efficiently as possible. Given estimated 
motor vehicle registration revenues over the planning period, the States 
could attempt to structure motor vehicle registration fees in such a manner 
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as to give explicit consideration to elasticities of demand. As suggested 
earlier variations in charges might also be made on a geographical or 
regional basis to take some account of locational differences in opportunity 
costs of road supply 
Option B 
A second option for the States, assuming zero co-operation from 
the Commonwealth Government, includes (A), but in addition attempts to 
recover from heavy vehicle operators separable costs incurred on their 
behalf. As we have seen the road maintenance tax adopted by the States 
after Hughes and Vale (No. 2) no longer applies (Chapter 8, p. 249) 
Available evidence provided by Kolsen, et al. , Affleck, Webber, et-al.'and 
S.W.A.T.S. also shows that this tax failed to confront the various classes 
of heavy vehicles with their separable costs of road supply 
If an alternative to the road maintenance tax is sought, and if 
it is also assumed that the States must rely on traditional methods, 
then it would seem that the next best option would be for the States to 
consider the possibility of imposing a differential fuels tax by increasing 
the rate of tax on diesel fuel. It would not of course be possible for 
the States to do this directly, since it is the Commonwealth's prerogative 
to impose a fuels tax. However, one way of achieving such a differential, 
with some chance of withstanding constitutional challenge, would be for the 
States to impose a licensing charge on wholesalers of fuel. Two States, 
namely. Western Australia and Victoria have recently adopted such a strategy 16 
11. For a detailed discussion of this road pricing option see 
(i) Kolsen, H.M., Ferguson, D,C, and Docwra, G.E., op.cit. 
(ii) Docwra, G.E., "The Public Enterprise Concept and Road Supply", 
Australian Transport Research Forum, Sydney 29th - 30th April 
1975, Forum Papers [A.G.P.S. 1976] 
12. Kolsen, H.M., Ferguson, D.C. and Docwra, G.E., op.cit. 
13. Affleck, F., op.cit. 
14. Webber, J.R., Both, G.J. and Ker, I.R., op.cit. 
15. Todd, T.R., op.cit. 
16. For details see: Western Australia, Acts Amendment and Repeal (Road 
Maintenance), No. 9 of 1979 and Victoria, Business Franchise (Petroleum 
Products) Act 1979, No. 9272. 
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While such a method would lead to improvements in the contribution 
of heavier vehicles towards separable costs, it is obviously a fairly 
blunt policy instrument: it does not allow for differences in costs 
imposed by the various categories of heavy commercial vehicles and may, as 
implied earlier, lead to undesirable substitution effects between petrol 
and diesel powered vehicles. 
Option C 
A third possibility, again including (A), and assuming no 
co-operation from the Commonwealth, is for the States to take the initiative 
and have all heavy commercial vehicles fitted with a distance meter. 
User classes could be determined on the basis of axle weight configurations 
and a schedule of charges determined. It would be necessary to determine 
what proportion of a vehicle's travel is incurred within its State of 
origin. While this presents some difficulties these are not likely to be 
any greater than those associated with the collection of the former road 
maintenance tax. What is important is that the value of the benefits from 
the distance meter system exceed administrative and other costs, and that the 
ratio of benefits to costs of the distance meter system exceed the ratio of 
benefits to costs of alternative proposals. 
The assumption of zero Commonwealth co-operation suggests one 
qualification: if the charges calculated by the States ignore the 
existence of the fuels tax, then this would be tantamount to an assumption 
that no part of the fuels charge is viewed as a price for road use. 
It is unlikely that such an assumption would be politically acceptable. 
Assuming this to be correct the calculation of the ton/mile charge for each 
class of user would need to be modified to take account of the Commonwealth 
fuels tax. Whatever modification is made, a structure of charges based 
on the ton/mile component plus a fuels charge component will be less 
efficient than one which excludes a fuels charge component. 
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Option D 
This option represents an improvement of (C) by providing for 
Commonwealth Government co-operation. The Commonwealth Government could 
assist in improving (C) by enabling contributions to separable costs to 
be determined without reference to the fuels charge. In effect the 
Commonwealth would be required to indicate what proportion of the charge 
levied on motor fuels (as applied to heavy commercial vehicles) represents 
a general revenue tax, and where necessary adopt the New Zealand approach 
of providing for .xebates of fuel charges. 
Option E 
Option (E) requires that the metering system be extended to 
private vehicles and the charging scheme be refined so as to enable the 
recovery of separable and non-separable costs by means of a variable charge. 
It seems likely that the separable costs incurred on behalf of 
the private motorist will represent a relatively small part of total 
separable costs, and indeed it may not be possible (given present 
knowledge) or worthwhile to attempt to categorise private motor vehicles 
into a number of classes on the basis of separable costs. If the latter 
assumption applies then separable costs can be averaged out over the 
entire group on the basis of the group average annual miles of travel. 
The extension of the metering system to the private vehicle 
category will of course require Commonwealth participation in the scheme. 
Once again it will be necessary for the Commonwealth to indicate what 
proportion of the fuels charge - in this case the charge on fuel consumed 
by private and commercial vehicles - represents a general purpose tax, 
and therefore, the proportion which can be regarded as a price for road 
use. 
Thus proposal (E) requires the Commonwealth to collect the 
'price' component of the fuels tax in a manner which is significantly 
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more efficient than current practice. To do this,.the separable cost 
charge determined for each vehicle class would need, as indicated earlier, 
to be multiplied by a demand determined coefficient. 
The adoption of a universal system of metering would obviously 
represent a dramatic change in attitude on the part of Government to the 
problem of pricing for the use of roads. But the advantages would be 
significant. The political problem is for Government to convince the 
electorate that road outputs are no different from other outputs supplied 
by Government, and for which it is broadly accepted that prices should be 
related to costs. It would be necessary for Government to convince the 
motorist, the motorist associations, and the road haulage industry of the 
advantages of such a scheme. Both the efficiency and equity aspects 
would need to be stressed. Not all users of the roads will be required 
to pay more than they currently do; some will pay more and some will pay 
less. Those who pay more will do so because of the higher costs they 
impose on the system compared to other motorists, and/or because of their 
lower elasticities of demand. It is unlikely that the principles involved, 
if carefully explained, would not prove to be acceptable to many 
road users. 
In addition a decision by the Commonwealth Government to 
separate the road payment element from the fuels charge has obvious 
advantages from the standpoint of intermodal competition policy. It would 
also remove once and for all some of the obfuscation which characterises 
much of the debate in Australia (and no doubt elsewhere) concerning the 
1 "7 
road-rail tax/subsidy issue. This should also have considerable appeal 
for the road haulage industry 17- This issue is examined in detail in Docwra, G,E, and Kolsen, H.M,, 
"Taxes and Subsidies in Transport: Some Unsettled Issues", Australian 
"Transport -^ lesearch Forum, Perth 24th to 26th May 1978. Forum Papers. 
Paper No,"TO^ [Office of Director General of Transport, Perth, 
Westem Australia.] 
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4. Constitutional Considerations: Problems Posed by Section 92 
We now turn our attention to the implications of the High Court's 
interpretation of Section 92 of the Constitution for road pricing 
possibilities. 
As we saw in Chapter lo the High Court's decision in Hughes and 
Vale (No. 2) accepted that the States were entitled to impose a charge on 
vehicles engaged in interstate trade provided that the charge could be 
shown to represent "reasonable recompense" for use of the roads. To satisfy 
this test it was necessary for the States to demonstrate that the charge 
was related to use of the highways and to the wear and tear incurred. 
With regard to the latter, the Court emphasised that the charge should 
relate to maintenance costs only: no provision was to be made for capital 
expenditure incurred in the provision of new roads. However, Williams J. 
did allow for the possibility that the charge could include an element to 
take account of the costs incurred in widening and strengthening old roads, 
where these costs were necessitated by growth in traffic and increases 
in vehicle size and weight. Apart from this possible concession no 
rationale was given by the High Court why the costs of capital 
associated with the construction of new roads should not be reflected 
in the charge. 
It will also be recalled that the Hughes and Vale (No. 2) 
decision made it clear that the charge should not discriminate between 
interstate and intrastate vehicle operators and that it should not 
include a fixed component such as a vehicle registration charge. 
What are the implications of the Hughes and Vale (No. 2) 
judgement for the pricing options outlined above? Obviously options (A) 
and (B) can be ignored. For the remaining options the answer is not 
entirely clear A great deal would depend on the response of the Court 
to economic argument and whether that argument could be reasoned as being 
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consistent with established legal principles. One can only speculate 
as to the Court's reaction. 
One possibility is that the Court would refuse to depart from 
the Hughes and Vale (No. 2) reasoning regarding the legitimate components 
of a charge which represents reasonable recompense for the use of the 
roads. If this is so then options (C), (D) and (E) would be declared 
invalid. This of course does not mean that the States would not be able 
to introduce a system of metering use of the roads by heavy commercial 
vehicle operators, but it would mean that the variable charge imposed on 
interstate operators would (subject to possible qualifications of the kind 
referred to by Willaims J.), relate only to maintenance costs. Any attempt 
to recover separable capital costs would have to be confined to intrastate 
operations. 
A second possibility is that the Court would accept the 
inclusion of a separable capital cost component in the charge imposed on 
interstate operators. There is some ground for believing that this 
possibility would stand a reasonable chance of success. The main reason 
for believing this to be so stems from the argument in Hughes and Vale (No. 2), 
that for a charge to represent reasonable recompense it must be related 
to use, and to the wear and tear caused by use. Since it is possible to 
show that the wear and tear of the roads caused by heavy commercial vehicles 
is greater than what would be regarded as normal surface maintenance - that 
expenditure of a capital nature must also be incurred if the quality of the 
road system is to be retained, then it is conceivable that the Court 
would not find it too difficult to accept a charging system which includes 
a charge for separable capital as well as variable maintenance costs. 
If this proved to be correct, then options (C) and (D) would not be 
affected. Option (E) on the other hand would be affected since it 
allows for a contribution by interstate commercial operators to non-
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separable costs. Our earlier remarks concerning the collection of the 
'price' component of the fuels charge may also apply 
A third possibility is for the Court to rescind the Hughes and 
Vale (No. 2) decision and allow for the inclusion of all capital 
(separable and non-separable) in the computation of a charge for the use 
of the roads by vehicles engaged in interstate trade. While such a 
possibility is apparently considered by legal experts to be highly 
unlikely it seems to this writer that there is an argument for it which could 
be demonstrated to be consistent with the apparent reasoning in the 
Hughes and Vale (No. 2) case. 
One can only suggest that the Court's judgement that capital 
costs should be excluded from the charge was predicated on the assumption 
that a charge on capital would amount to a tax on interstate trade and that 
this would constitute prohibition,, not regulation. A maintenance charge 
was acceptable because it was seen as a charge to meet the recurring 
expenses (i.e. the revenue so derived would be ploughed back into 
the system), while a charge on capital was not acceptable because it was 
apparently assumed that such a charge could not be viewed as recompense 
for use of the system, but as an exaction levied for other purposes. As 
stated by Dixon CJ. 
"But the conception (i.e. freedom of inter state transportation 
by road) appears to be based on a real distinction between 
remuneration for the provision of a specific physical service 
of which particular use is made and a burden placed upon inter-
State transportation in aid of the general expenditures of the 
State."18 
18, Hughes and Vale Pty.Ltd. v. The State of N.S.W, (1955) 93 CLR, 
179-180. 
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If our understanding of the Court's reasoning is correct there 
may be some cause for hope that option (E) would receive a sympathetic 
hearing. The point to be made is that the arguments which form the basis 
of an efficient cost recovery strategy have never been presented to the 
Court, Moreover, what distinguishes proposal (E), for example, from the 
legislation which gave rise to Hughes and Vale (No. 2) is that the former 
is concerned with collecting a given planned expenditure on roads in an 
economically efficient manner: all revenue collected is to be used for 
road expenditure purposes. A charge on capital is not levied to finance 
other activities or to prohibit movement: no user is excluded from 
using the system unless he is unwilling to meet the cost which his use 
of the road imposes on the road authority 
There is, however, one other aspect of the Court's reasoning 
in Hughes and Vale (No. 2) and in subsequent related litigation which also 
needs to be mentioned. And this is that in declaring that it is legitimate 
for a State to impose a maintenance charge for the use of the roads, the 
Court has made frequent allusions to the right of Governments to impose 
charges for the use of facilities such as aerodromes and wharves - facilities 
which are also used by persons and firms engaged in interstate transport 
activities. Since many of such enterprises include in their fees a 
component for capital, the question arises as to how the Court's acceptance 
of this is to be reconciled with the approach taken in the case of the 
road system. Some insight is provided by the following statements by 
Kitto J 
"Presumably a State may charge what it likes for the use, 
even by inter State travellers or carriers, of wharves, 
or of landing grounds, or of railways, or anything else 
in respect of which it may, by virtue of ownership or 
otherwise, exclude persons at will consistently with section 
S92. But as Fullagar J. said, persons travel as a right 
on a public highway; and it has been in consequence of the 
Privy Council's decision in Hughes and Vale Pty.Ltd, v The 
State of New South Wales (No. 1), namely the decision that 
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S92 prevents a State from excluding at will inter-State 
users from using the roads which for the time being are 
public highways, that a doctrine has arisen with respect 
to such roads which has to do with recompense or compensation 
and not with reward."19.20 
It would seem that the Court has also been influence»(by popular, 
but from an economic standpoint, rather peculiar views regarding the 
pricing and funding of road space. The Court's apparent acceptance of the 
pricing practices of other State-owned enterprises results in only 
partial acceptance of the similarity of such enterprises to the road 
sector So,for the Court to alter the Hughes and Vale (No. 2) doctrine 
to allow for the inclusion of all capital in the determination of a charge 
for road use, it would appear that it would also have to be persuaded 
that, in principle, roads are no different from other State-owned enterprises. 
Let us now suppose that the above argioments fail to bring about 
a change in the Hughes and Vale (No. 2) doctrine on capital. Are there any 
other ways by which the impact of that doctrine on a pricing system such 
as (E) might be avoided? Two approaches might be considered. 
The first of these would be for the Commonwealth Government to 
seek to amend or abolish S92. However, Constitutional change in Australia 
can only be sought via a referendum, and in the light of Australia's history 
of unsuccessful referenda the chanties of a change in such a controversial 
area as S92 would appear to be extremely remote.2! 
The other approach would be for the Commonwealth and the States 
to invoke the reasoning of Mason and Jacobs J.J in the case of Clarke King 
and Co. Pty. Ltd. vs. Australian Wheat Board and the State of New South Wales. 
^- Breen vs. Sneddon (1961) 106 ('.\.\i, p,4l^. 
20. See also, Hughes and Vale Pty.Ltd. vs. The State of New South Wales (No.2) 
(1955) 93 CLR, p, 223, 
21. Up to April 1977, thirty-two proposed changes to the Constitution were 
put to the people and only five were successful. (Yearbook Australia 
No. 62, 1977/78, pp. 71/72, Commonwealth Government Printer 1978) 
22. (1955) 93 CLR p. 223. 
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Since the essential feature of that reasoning was that a marketing arrange-
ment involving co-operation between the Commonwealth Government and the 
States was not contrary to S92 because it involved complementary 
Commonwealth and State legislation,it is conceivable that the Court might 
accept an argioment that if the Commonwealth and the States co-operate 
to formulate a pricing arrangement for roads, such as (E), that this 
also should not be viewed as prohibitive but as regulatory and as such 
not contrary to the interpretation of S92. However, whether this approach 
can be regarded as a real alternative may now depend on the outcome of an 
appeal against the Wheat Case (1978) judgement (see Chapter 11, p.363n) 
P A R T V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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CHAPTER 13 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
It is now necessary to bring together the main conclusions Of 
this study. We consider first the issues raised in Part I. This is followed 
by a summary of the major issues and conclusions relating to our analysis 
of roads policy in Australia. Some implications for future policy are 
also considered. 
In Part I of this study we provided a fairly detailed review of 
the literature concerning optimal road user charges and investment policy 
A number of approaches were identified. We saw that the differences in 
approach could be explained in terms of disagreement about the ingredients 
of an efficient (from an economic point of view) road pricing policy; by 
differences in objectives of road price and investment policy; by 
differences in assumptions (explicit or implicit) concerning the availability 
of administratively feasible pricing mechanisms ; and finally, by differences 
in approach to cost complexities as manifest, in particular, by the joint 
cost element in road supply. 
It will be recalled that our discussion of the theoretical 
issues began with a short statement of the economics of the road supply 
industry in the context of the classical model of simple competition. In 
that model the link between price, output and investment policy is quite 
explicit. We then proceeded to focus our attention on the analysis of 
optimal road price and investment policy for the road supply industry as 
outlined by A.A. Walters in his 1968 study for the World Bank entitled. 
The Economics of Road User Charges and by the authors of the Allais Report 
published in 1966. Reference to these studies is important because of their 
significance in the theoretical literature and because the approach we 
have adopted is somewhat different. 
As we have seen the approach taken by Walters and the Allais 
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Report is to argue that if the road supply industry is instructed to 
pursue the efficiency in resource allocation goal then prices will need 
to be equated with short run marginal cost and the investment problem 
resolved by means of the application of the consumers' surplus criterion. 
By setting prices on this basis paramount importance is given to the need 
to optimise use of existing capacity, while the need to invoke the consumers' 
surplus investment criterion is justified on the ground that road investment 
is characterised by substantial indivisibilities, economies of scale, 
and joint products in the form of quantity/quality dimensions. These 
attributes mean that if it is accepted that the appropriate basis for 
pricing policy is short-run marginal cost then it is not possible to make 
optimal adjustments to capacity on the basis of revenue/cost considerations 
(as in the competitive model) Thus the case for the consumers' surplus 
investment criterion. The argument also means that for optimal capacity 
adjustment many parts of the road system (mainly rural and inter urban 
roads) will fail to generate revenues equal to annuitised resource costs. 
Our response to this model was to suggest that there is scope 
for some critical comment. To begin with we have expressed some disagree-
ment with the significance which Walters and many other economists attach 
to indivisibilities in road supply- Obviously there is some minimum size 
plant (road) which must be constructed before it can be of use to at 
least some users. Beyond that it seems that there is much more scope 
for adjustments in the quantity/quality characteristics of road supply 
than conventional wisdom is prepared to concede. Part of the problem is 
that in practice most decisions about quantity/quality adjustments to 
road supply are based on technical considerations, rather than economic 
criteria. The experience of road construction practice can easily lead 
one to suppose that road supply is characterised by large indivisibilities. 
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The approach we have taken is to suggest that what are generally 
viewed as large indivisibilities in road supply are really economies of 
scale, and in that form, they do not pose problems any more difficult than 
those which confront many other similarly situated areas of economic 
endeavour. 
However, to argue along these lines does not mean that we deny the 
claim that, for some parts of the rural and inter-urban road system, 
optimal additions to capacity will result in a high degree of excess 
capacity over the planning period. What does concern us is the emphasis 
given to the application of the short run marginal cost pricing rule to 
the use of uncongested rural/inter-city roads. It is also important to 
confront users of such roads with the resource costs which have been 
incurred on their behalf. The "bygones are bygones" argvmient is only 
relevant if an investment mistake has been made. If an investment mistake 
has occurred, then obviously the lower limit to price is given by the resource 
costs which could be avoided by preventing use of the road. Moreover, as 
far as the investment problem is concerned one can only really be sure 
whether an investment decision was 'right' or not if the estimates of 
willingness to pay (derived by means of the consumers' surplus criterion) 
are translated into actual prices, and hence revenues. The investment 
check argument should, in our view, not be treated lightly. 
If one accepts the prescriptive advice of the Walters/Allais 
model there is also the possibility that too many resources would be 
allocated to the road sector vis-a^ -vis the rest of the economy. This is 
so even if it is assumed that most of the resources shifted to the road 
sector, as a result of an expansion programme, are transferred from 
highly competitive markets. The fact that firms in such markets have 
perfect or near to perfect elastic demand curves is not really relevant 
to arguments about losses and gains in consumers' surplus. What is important 
is the elasticity (in the relevant range) of the industry demand curve. 
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There are no a priori reasons for assuming that losses of consumers' surplus 
in such markets would be outweighed by gains in consumers' surplus in the 
road sector. 
Our examination of the economic characteristics of the road 
supply industry has led us to conclude that for both efficiency and equity 
reasons road users should be required to meet the costs of road supply. 
We have emphasised the joint cost (and hence joint product) element in road 
siq)ply and accordingly have adopted a multi-product firm approach to the 
issue of optimal price and investment policy. We have pursued this in the 
context of a competitive framework. 
The multi-product nature of the road supply industry is clearly 
indicated not only by the existence of peak and off peak demand periods, 
and the fact that roads are location specific, but also because the road 
track is used by different user classes. *By classifying costs according 
to whether they are separable or non-separable (i.e. joint costs), it 
is clear, under competitive conditions,that the lower limit to price for 
each vehicle class would, in the short-run, be equal to short-run separable 
costs, and in the long-run, to long-run separable costs, and that the joint 
cost element of the road track would be allocated according to elasticities 
of demand. 
While the competitive approach may not provide us with the 'second 
best' optimum,we have suggested that it is more likely to be a move 
in the right direction than a policy which fails to confront road 
users with the resource costs which have been incurred on their behalf, 
and especially if the same guidelines are laid down for other publicly supplied 
transport services. 
In addition to considering the prescriptive advice of the Walters/ 
Allais model we also drew attention to the methodologies employed in a 
number of fairly recent road track cost allocation studies. Here the 
emphasis is on practical solutions. However, none of the solutions 
offered,attempt to deal with the joint cost elements of road track supply 
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in a manner consistent with correct theory The usual approach is to 
adopt a formula based on the technical characteristics of vehicles. 
Since the existence of joint cost elements in road supply is well known 
one can only assume that the popularity of non-joint cost solutions is 
based on a lack of knowledge of the appropriate theory, or on implicit 
assumptions regarding the quality of administratively feasible pricing 
mechanisms, and/or of the relative importance of joint and separable cost 
con5)onents. 
Our discussion of the road track cost apportionment also drew 
attention to difference in approach to the treatment of capital. If the 
public enterprise approach is adopted, the charge for capital will be 
determined by the interest on a stock of capital. Different charges will 
result according to the choice of starting date, and assumptions made 
with regard to asset life and the appropriate rate of interest. Further, 
the results will be affected according to whether asset valuation is 
determined on an historic cost or replacement cost basis. The current 
expenditure approach on the other hand treats all capital as being consumed 
in the year in which it is created, thereby ignoring intertemporal equity 
and efficiency matters. 
We have found it difficult to throw any new light on this issue. 
Ultimately, what is probably of most relevance to this problem is the inter-
modal resource allocation issue. Common sense would seem to suggest that 
the same approach to the treatment of capital should be adopted for both 
the rail and road sectors. 
1. For example, Pryke, R. and Dodgson, J , op.cit,, p. 220 opt for a current 
expenditure approach for U,K. roads partly for the reason that this 
approach was recommended for British Rail "Use of the current 
expenditure method, while far from perfect, does enable a better 
comparison to be made between the capital costs of the road track, 
and the costs of the rail track as they are to be treated under the 1974 
reconstruction. Henceforth, rail track cost will be estimated on a 
current expenditure basis, with annual track costs equal to actual 
expenditure on track and signalling " 
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So much for Part I. We now turn our attention to our discussion 
of roads policy in Australia. 
Not surprisingly our discussion reveals a wide gap between the 
theoretical models of optimal price and investment policy examined in 
Part I, and the models of practice as revealed by our examination of 
Commonwealth roads policy (especially for the period 1922 to 1969) and 
the objectives pursued by the Queensland Main Roads Department 
(Chapters 9 and 10)«. 
In Chapters 6 and 7 we considered the part played by the 
Commonwealth Government in the formulation of roads policy While the 
Commonwealth is unable to engage directly in the construction and 
maintenance of roads - this power being vested in the States - we have 
seen that since the early 1920's the Commonwealth has provided grants to 
the States for road construction purposes via its powers under S96 of the 
Constitution. These grants now represent approximately 1/3 of all 
government expenditure on road works. 
We divided our discussion of Commonwealth policy into two 
periods: (i) the period from 1922 to 1969 and (ii) the period from 1969 
to 1980. The two periods are distinguished largely in terms of the 
extent to which the Commonwealth has invoked its powers under S96 of the 
Constitution to participate in the programming of road works; in restricting 
the discretion of the States with regard to the allocation of Commonwealth 
funds among the various classifications of road types; in the choice of 
criteria for determining the distribution of Commonwealth funds among the 
States ; and in the availability of economic advice. 
During the first period the Commonwealth provided road grants 
to the States for the purpos*^  of developing the rural roads network. The 
size of the grants was determined in an arbitrary fashion, and from 1926 
to 1959 the grants were explicitly linked to fuel consumption, a decision which 
reflected the Commonwealth's view that, by and large, road users should pay 
for the roads. 
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The grants were distributed among the States on a rule-of-thumb 
basis. From 1922 to 1959 the rule-of-thumb adopted was that the smallest 
State (Tasmania) should receive 5 percent of the grant with the remainder 
divided among the other States on the basis of 2/5 according to area and 
3/5 according to population. It is difficult to impute any significant 
economic content to this rule. As noted in Chapter 6 the rule's attractive-
ness to the Bruce/Pace Government was that it struck an "equitable" balance 
in the distribution of funds among the States. For the remainder of the 
period a slightly different rule-of-thumb was adopted: Tasmania continued 
to receive 5 percent of the total grant while the remainder was apportioned 
among the other States on the basis of 1/3 according to area; 1/3 
according to population, and 1/3 according to motor vehicle registrations. 
In addition to these matters we also noted that, with the exception 
of the years 1926 to 1930, the Commonwealth allowed the States complete 
discretion in the programming of road works involving Commonwealth funding. 
However, during the 'forties, and as a result of sustained political pressure 
from rural Local Government Authorities, the Commonwealth limited, to 
some extent, the States' discretion in determining expenditure by class 
of road by earmarking part of its grants for expenditure on minor rural 
roads. By 1954 this earmarked category represented 40 percent of total 
Commonwealth funding. The 'fifties also saw the Commonwealth re-introduce 
matching grant requirements. These, however, were designed solely for 
the purpose of preventing the States from substituting Commonwealth funding 
for State revenues. 
The second period witnessed a marked change in the approach of 
the Commonwealth to its involvement in the roads sector 
In 1964 the Commonwealth established the Commonwealth Bureau of 
Roads. This was a statutory authority which was given the task of providing 
advice to the Commonwealth on matters relating to Commonwealth roads policy-
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The Bureau set about this task with considerable dedication and developed 
economic procedures for assessing Australia's road needs, and on the 
basis of its research made recommendations to the Commonwealth. In short, 
what the Bureau attempted was to determine an optimal (economically 
warranted and feasible) roads programme for Australia (over various time 
horizons), and the financial commitment to that programme by the Commonwealth, 
States and Local Government Authorities. 
The Bureau's economic approach, while constrained by existing 
methods of funding road programmes, and by institutional factors at the 
State level, required an alteration in the established pattern of 
Commonwealth fund allocation among the States,and the categorisation of 
Commonwealth funding by road types. 
Our survey of the recommendations contained in the three Reports 
presented to the Commonwealth during this period, and of the policy 
decisions made by the Commonwealth subsequent to each Report, indicate the 
reluctance of the Commonwealth to completely divest the roads budget of 
its pork-barrel elements. While successive Commonwealth Governments more 
or less accepted the Bureau's recommendations regarding the relative 
distribution of Commonwealth aid among the States, and were willing to 
make greater use of S96 powers to substantially increase Commonwealth 
participation in the road planning process, yet political considerations were 
of considerable importance in determining the actual proportion of funding 
to the various road categories. 
Before proceeding further with the subject of the role of the 
Commonwealth in the formulation of roads policy (actual and potential) 
it is appropriate that we recapitulate what we have discovered about 
roads policy at the State level. 
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Because of the amount of effort required to analyse the expenditure 
decisions of each of the States we were forced to concentrate our attention 
on one State only, namely, the State of Queensland. However, we are 
confident that what we have discovered for this State is more or less true 
for the other States. 
Analysis of Queensland's roads policy since the inception of the 
Main Roads Board (later to become the Main Roads Department) indicates 
that the principal policy objective of the State's road policy has been, 
and still is, the development of the rural roads network. Only during the 
late 1960's and early 1970's did the State inject large sums of money into 
the upgrading of roads in the principal urban regions. 
Granted the rural bias in the State's funding programmes we 
attempted to determine the basis on which funds are allocated among the 
various planning divisions of the State. It seemed reasonable to suppose 
that the disbursement of funds among these regions would not be made on 
a random basis - that some evidence of consistency in decision making would 
emerge if expenditure decisions were examined over a sufficiently long 
period of time. 
Plausible rules-of-thumb were suggested and subjected to econometric 
examination. The results of this analysis indicate that expenditure 
decisions can be "explained" in terms of an area-population rule-of-thumb. 
The weight(s) attached to the area factor suggest that objectives other 
than economic efficiency have played a major part in determining regional 
fund allocation. Support for this conclusion is also provided by an 
examination of the relationship between the percentage share of fund 
allocations received by regions and various indicators of regional demand 
for road space. 
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By and large the emphasis given to broad acres highlights the 
importance of regional equity objectives, frequently rationalised in terms 
of developmental goals. Further, our research suggests that major changes 
in the divisional patterns of expenditure shares are, subject to qualifications 
regarding Commonwealth intervention, unlikely to occur in the short-run. 
Regional shares tend to be institutionalised not only because of political 
pressure applied by Local Government Authorities to the State Goverament 
(to maintain employment of labour and full utilisation of Local Authority 
road building equipment), but also because of the decentralised nature of 
the planning and programming of road works. 
In addition to these considerations we have also noted;/that, 
subject to political directives from State Government, and pressure from 
Local Government Authorities, the choice of project priorities within the 
districts is determined on the basis of technical (engineering) criteria. 
One issue of considerable importance to our analysis of roads 
policy in Australia concerns the ability of the Commonwealth Government 
to impose its expenditure preferences on the States A priori reasoning 
and an examination of the impact, since 1969, of Commonwealth road funding 
arrangements on the allocation of road funds in Queensland, produce the 
following conclusions: 
(i) that it is possible for the Commonwealth Government to impose its 
own preferences for expenditure by road classes on a State road authority 
by earmarking aid funds to reflect those preferences, and especially if 
Commonwealth aid represents a significant proportion of total road funds, 
(ii) that the categorisation of Commonwealth aid will have an impact on 
the regional (Divisional) distribution of road funds if categorisation 
implies regional specificity and, once again, if the potential for fund 
switching is limited. Apart from the significant impact of Commonwealth 
policy on the rural/urban split in road fund allocations during the 
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post 1969 period, it would appear that the categorisation of Commonwealth 
aid has had little impact on the regional distribution of the rural road 
grant. Thus, one implication of this study is that should the Commonwealth 
Government wish to influence the regional distribution of road funds (in 
other words, modify the effects of the State's "allocation rule"), then 
it would seem that aid funds would need to be earmarked by regions. 
However, it is not clear whether the Commonwealth has the power to do this 
directly The powers granted to the Commonwealth under S96 of the 
Constitution may be tempered by other sections of the Constitution - in 
2 3 particular S51(ii), and S99. Moreover, even if it is supposed that 
the Commonwealth does have the power to earmark road grants by regions 
within a State, it is unlikely that the politics of Australian Federalism 
would allow the Commonwealth to move in this direction. 
The existence of institutional and political barriers to the 
achievement of an economically rational roads policy in Australia is not 
confined to the investment issue. Our empirical analysis has also 
highlighted difficulties on the pricing side. 
2. Section 41(ii) states: 
"The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power 
to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the 
Commonwealth with respect to:-
(ii) Taxation; but so as not to discriminate between States 
or parts of States.", 
3. Section 99 states: 
"The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of trade, 
commerce, or revenue, give preference to one State or any part 
thereof over another State or any part thereof." 
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it was argued in Chapter 12 that should the State and 
Commonwealth Governments wish to adopt a road track cost recovery strategy, 
it is possible to achieve that objective in a manner based on the principles 
outlined in Chapter 4. However, new methods of charging would be required. 
It was suggested that a metering system in the form of the hubometer be 
adopted. The hubometer is cheap to purchase and install, and cannot be 
easily tampered with. No doubt tampering would take place, but this can 
be countered to some extent by providing for appropriate penalties. By 
adiopting such a system the road authority would be able to achieve a 
closer relationship between road charges (for each vehicle class) and 
separable road costs,than is presently the case. Our discussion also 
suggested practical means for arriving at a contribution from each vehicle 
class to the recovery of the joint cost element in the provision of the road 
track. This may be collected by means of a fixed charge, determined on the 
basis of estimates of elasticities of demand, or better still, incorporated 
in the variable charge by multiplying the cost determined charge by the 
relevant demand determined coefficient. 
The proposed method of charging does of course fall a long way 
short of the ideal. For instance it does not allow for variations in the 
charge per mile according to the extent to which the road user travels on 
roads having different quantity/quality characteristics. The required 
cheaip technology to do this is simply not available. However, it should 
be possible to take some account of significant differences in regional 
road supply policy. In the Australian context this could apply not only 
to differences in supply policy between States, but also to differences in 
supply policy within States. For example, with regard to the latter, it 
should not be too difficult for a State road authority to vary the variable, 
or fixed charge, for the various classes of users according to whether a 
vehicle's area of predominant use (indicated fairly accurately by its 
area of registration), is in the city or the country. If a State is very 
large in area it may be worthwhile to provide for a more detailed regional 
classification. 
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There are other problems as well, but the point to be stressed 
is that present methods of charging for road use are so inefficient 
that the adoption of the proposed system would represent a substantial 
move in the direction of the of the goal of efficiency in resource use. 
While the technical and administrative problems of devising and 
implementing an efficient road pricing policy are very much the same 
for all countries there are, as noted above, problems of an institutional 
nature which can make the adoption of efficient road pricing policies more 
difficult in some countries than in others. A discussion of such problems, 
in the Australian context, was the principal aim of Chapter 12 where we-
focused attention on the importance of Commonwealth and State co-operation, 
and the difficulties posed by S92 of the Constitution. 
As far as the former is concerned,the co-operation of the 
Commonwealth Government is of paramount importance if an efficient road 
track cost recovery strategy which relates to all vehicles is to be pursued. 
That this is so follows from the Commonwealth Government's power to levy 
the fuel tax. The fuel tax is the principal variable charge imposed on 
road users. If a metering system is contemplated for all vehicle classes 
then it would be necessary for the Commonwealth Government to declare 
what proportion of the fuels charge is to be viewed as a price for road 
use, and to agree to collect that amount on behalf of the States, according 
to the principles we have outlined. If the metering system is rejected by 
both State and Commonwealth Governments then the possibilities for more 
efficient methods of charging are very limited indeed. 
In the final analysis the major constraint affecting road pricing 
possibilities for Australia is the matter of the High Court's interpretation 
of S92 of the Constitution (Chapter 11) The conclusions to be drawn from 
our analysis of the Court's judgements are, not surprisingly, of a highly 
speculative nature. A great deal depends on how receptive the Court would 
be to new arguments and new information. Some possibilities were indicated. 
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It seems that the Court does not view the provision of road 
space in the same manner that it views the provision of other publicly 
supplied outputs. This is suggested by the apparent reasoning in Hughes 
and Vale (No. 2) for the rejection of capital as a legitimate component of 
a charging scheme affecting interstate users of the roads. To significantly 
alter the Hughes and Value (No. 2) doctrine the Court would need to be 
convinced that the purpose of the new charging proposal is to treat the 
provision of road space as a public enterprise: that the aim is not to 
collect more than is in fact expended by the road authorities on the road 
system, but to collect revenue in such a way as to confront road user with 
resource costs. 
Should this reasoning fail then the remaining possibilities for the 
realisation of efficient road track cost recovery policies are as follows: 
(i) that the Commonwealth Government seeks either an amendment to, or the 
removal of S92 or (ii) if the current appeal against the Wheat Case (1978) 
judgement is unsuccessful, for the Commonwealth and the States to present 
an argument in terms of the 1978 decision. Given both of these options the 
latter would probably have a greater chance of success, taking into 
consideration Australia's history of unsuccessful referenda. However, 
it should be noted that if the appeal against the Wheat Case (1978) 
decision is successful, and successful because of an analysis of "the 
economic facts of life" (see Chapter 11, p, 363n) then it is 
possible that the High Court might accept economic arguments to rescind the 
Hughes and Vale (No. 2) judgements. 
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APPENDIX A 1 
FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF ROADS DEFINITIONS * 
Rural Areas 
Class 1' 
Class 2' 
Class 3 
Class 4 
Class 5 
Urban Areas 
Those roads which form the principal avenue for 
communications between major regions of Australia 
including direct connections between capital cities. 
Those roads, not being Class 1, whose main function is 
to form the principal avenue of communications for 
movements: 
(i) between a capital city and adjoining States 
and their capital cities; 
(ii) between a capital city and key towns; 
(iii) between key towns. 
Those roads, not being Class 1, or 2, whose main function 
is to form an avenue of communication for movements: 
(i) between important centres and the Class 1 and 
Class 2 roads and/or key towns; 
(ii) between important centres; 
(iii) of an arterial nature within a town in a 
rural area. 
Those roads, not being Class 1, 2 or 3, whose main function 
is to provide access to abutting property (including 
property within a town in a rural area) 
Those roads which provide almost exclusively for one 
activity or function and which cannot be assigned to 
Classes 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
Class 6' 
Class T 
Class 8 
Class 9 
Those roads whose main fucntion is to perform the 
principal avenue of communication for massive traffic 
movements. (Arterial Roads) 
Those roads, not being Class 6, whose main function is 
to supplement the Class 6 roads in providing for traffic 
movements or which distribute traffic to local street 
systems. (Sub-arterial Roads) 
Those roads not being Class 6 or 7, whose main function 
is to provide access to abutting property 
Those roads which provide almost exclusively for one 
activity or function and which cannot be assigned to 
Classes 6, 7, 8. 
1. See Chapter 2, (Bureau of Roads, Report on Roads in Australia, 1973), 
paragraphs 2.8 and 2.9. 
2, Class 1 and 2 roads comprise the rural arterial roads. 
3. In urban areas Class 6 roads are the arterials and Class 7 are the 
sub-arterial roads. 
*Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Roads Report, 1973. 
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TABLE Bl.O Queensland Main Roads Department Expenditure by 
Divisions (Pre 1945 Boundaries), 1922/23 to 1958/39 
Year 
1922-23 
1923-24 
1924-25 
1925-26 
1926-27 
1927-28 
1928-29 
1929-30 
1930-31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-38 
1938-39 
M.R.D. 
Expenditure 
Southern 
Division 
$ 
291,294 
391,722 
403,702 
655,468 
762,194 
864,448 
1,021,440 
1,384,202 
1,043,477 
675,735 
1,392,924 
996,624 
1,541,194 
1,351,654 
1,136,352 
1,511,742 
2,441,308 
% of 
State 
Total 
55.39 
56.48 
46.09 
48.16 
57.95 
53.11 
51.49 
57.68 
56.76 
59.66 
58.11 
57,06 
50,83 
52,35 
48,27 
52,69 
53,17 
M.R.D. 
Expenditure 
Central 
Division 
$ 
142,171 
308,832 
273,024 
388,284 
318,352 
467,838 
594,626 
577,434 
471,641 
304,633 
617,948 
391,208 
780,847 
628,940 
715,258 
832,498 
1,353,316 
% of 
State 
Total 
27.04 
30.64 
31.17 
28.53 
24.20 
28.74 
29.97 
24.04 
25.65 
26.90 
25.78 
22,40 
25.75 
24,36 
30.38 
29.02 
29.47 
M.R.D. 
Expenditure 
Northern 
Division 
$ 
92,403 
142,253 
199,090 
317,132 
234,754 
295,392 
367,788 
440,084 
323,328 
152,253 
386,300 
358.788 
710,264 
601,500 
502,742 
524,834 
746,700 
% of 
State 
Total 
17.57 
16.88 
22.73 
23.30 
17.85 
18.15 
18.54 
18,32 
17,59 
13,44 
16.11 
20,54 
23.42 
23.30 
21.35 
18.29 
17.35 
Source: Based on data contained in Queensland Main Roads Department 
Annual Reports. 
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TABLE 
Notes: 
B3.0 
A 
B 
C 
D 
Indicators of Expenditure for Selected Shires 
% of Total M.V.R. 
% of M.R.D. Expenditure 
M.R.D 
M.R.D 
Expenditure per M.V.R. 
Expenditure per M.V.R. excluding beef cattle 
grants where applicable 
Average of Average Annual Daily Traffic in 1964 
Area (with % 
of total State 
area in brackets) 
ALBERT 
(.080) 
BRISBANE 
(.058) 
CLONCURRY 
(2.897) 
RICHMOND 
(1.562) 
WINTON 
(3.120) 
CARPENTARIA 
(3.943) 
See Note 
Above 
A 
B 
C 
E 
H 
A 
A 
B 
C 
E 
B 
A 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
B 
A 
A 
B 
C 
E 
B 
A 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
B 
A 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
B 
A 
1,815 
7,830 
50 
45 
40 
25 
1962/63 
0.69 
3.53 
317.98 
5.11 
37,27 
1,36 
2.70 
0.04 
1,29 
1.36 
64,92 
1,05 
0.14 
0.71 
320.16 
5.07 
0.25 
1.72 
423.63 
6.88 
0.04 
0.48 
753.00 
12.00 
1965/66 
0.71 
4.27 
339.18 
6.01 
37.16 
1.43 
2.17 
0.04 
0.19 
2.76 
803.08 
479.01 
14,52 
0,11 
0.79 
395.5 
7.18 
0.20 
2.85 
808.22 
47.20 
14.25 
0.05 
2.37 
2986.27 
312.70 
47.40 
1966/67 
0.73 
4.00 
331.24 
5.48 
36.96 
2.26 
3.73 
0.06 
0.18 
3.50 
1151,42 
430,23 
19,44 
0.10 
0.78 
454.00 
7.80 
0.17 
1.04 
364.00 
224.18 
6.11 
0.04 
1.44 
2119.29 
201.76 
36.00 
1974/75 
1.60 
2.91 
140.81 
1.82 
36.86 
19.97 
42.15 
0.54 
0.13 
1.42 
824.66 
405.12 
10.92 
0,075 
0.98 
1022.80 
13.06 
0.10 
0.58 
440.39 
5.80 
0.07 
2.58 
2881.90 
2402.68 
36.85 
1976/77 
1.89 
3.55 
186.85 
1.87 
35.57 
11.78 
33.04 
0.33 
0.15 
1.17 
771.12 
769.78 
7.80 
0.06 
0.43 
675.25 
7.16 
0.09 
1.24 
1291.60 
13.77 
0.05 
1.05 
1893.79 
1890.85 
21.00 
TABLE 33.0 (continued) 
Area (with % 
of total State 
area in brackets) 
ETHERIDGE 
(2.314) 
MC KINLAY 
(2.361) 
BOULIA 
(3.547) 
TOWNSVILLE 
(0.017) 
CAIRNS 
(0.003) 
COOK 
(7.232) 
NEBO 
(0.590) 
See Note 
Abc>i^*» 
FW 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
B 
A 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
B 
A 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
B 
A 
A 
B 
C 
E 
B 
A 
A 
B 
C 
E 
B 
A 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
B 
A 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E • 
B 
A 
35 
45 
25 
2,335 
5,250 
20 
65 
1962/63 
0.05 
0.56 
645.54 
-
11.20 
0.16 
3.48 
1341.43 
-
21.75 
0.06 
0.83 
906.63 
-
13-83 
3.24 
1.11 
21.21 
0.34 
1.68 
0.01 
0.64 
0.005 
0.05 
0.74 
961.83 
-
14.80 
0.04 
1.17 
1470.28 
-
29.25 
1965/66 
0.05 
4.09 
4522.95 
200.66 
81.80 
0.13 
1.13 
487.20 
330.65 
8.76 
0.04 
0.62 
812.99 
338.16 
15.50 
3.37 
0.24 
3.97 
7.12 
1.71 
0.043 
1.40 
0.025 
0.04 
0.58 
717.93 
-
14.50 
0.04 
0.59 
793.46 
-
14.75 
1966/67 
0.05 
4.32 
5055.57 
225.44 
86.40 
0.12 
5.96 
306.36 
276.32 
49.66 
0.04 
0.64 
1005.36 
260.83 
16.00 
3.54 
0.84 
14.44 
0.24 
1.69 
0.45 
16.06 
0.26 
0.05 
0.52 
576.04' 
10.40 
0.04 
1.12 
1545.00 
-
28.0 
1974/75 
0.03 
0.59 
1222.21 
-
19.66 
0.07 
1.12 
1570.20 
— 
16.00 
0.03 
0.43 
1281.47 
1015.22 
14.33 
4.12 
0.74 
14.04 
0.17 
1.71 
0.46 
20.76 
0.26 
0.15 
0.21 
105.91 
105.89 
1.40 
0.03 
0.53 
1094.98 
827.41 
• 
17.66 
1976/77 
0.03 
0.36 
1084.92 
887.21 
12.00 
0.06 
1.84 
2846.62 
-
30.66 
0.03 : 
0.51 '• 
1989.37 
1989.26 
17.00 
4.16 
1.67 
40.09 
^ 
0.40 
1.78 
0.13 
7.25 
0.07 
0.17 
0.41 
237.18 
_ 
2.41 
0.03 
1.00 
2679.62 
564.89 
33.33 
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TABLE B3.0 (continued) 
Area (with % 
of total State 
area in brackets) 
ILFRACOMBE 
(0.381) 
DALRYMPLE 
(3.924) 
Source: Queens1 
See Note 
Above 
A 
B 
C 
E 55 
6 
A 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 95 
B 
A 
and Main Roa 
1962/63 
0.06 
1.01 
1075.32 
16.83 
0.12 
1.94 
963.21 
16.16 
ds Departm 
1965/66 
0.05 
0.93 
997.55 
18.60 
0.09 
2.00 
1268.10 
22.22 
ent 
1966/67 
0.05 
0.19 
255.00 
3.80 
0.08 
2.53 
1861.84 
1212.96 
31.62 
1974/75 
0.02 
0.36 
1112.96 
18.00 
0.05 
2.52 
2733.90 
925.05 
59.40 
1976/77 
0.02 
0.26 
1028.88 
13.00 
0.05 
2.24 
4860.66 
694.25 
44.80 
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TABLE B3.3 Table of Residuals: Model A (Quadratic Form) 
OBSN.NO. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
i 
7 
8 
9 
If 
n 12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
\7 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
7? 
78 
79 
80 
81 
Y VALUE 
25.94000 
2.89000 
-5.82000 
25.97000 
4.11000 
-8.66000 
24.13000 
3.92000 
-5.04000 
27.06000 
2.18000 
-9.17000 
28.46000 
0.69000 
-9.41000 
27.66000 
0.87000 
-7.26000 
26.52000 
4.95000 
-10.46000 
27.21000 
3.47000 
-10.96000 
24.93000 
4.40000 
-11.37000 
22.98000 
1.88000 
-8.40000 
24.19000 
-1.74000 
-7.39000 
26.13000 
-2.74000 
-8.79000 
25,62000 
-3.55000 
-7.37000 
25.61000 
-4.33000 
-7.39000 
24.32000 
-4.46000 
-7.12000 
22.31000 
-4.53000 
-8.15000 
22.05000 
-2.65000 
-9.39000 
24.03000 
-2.65000 
-10.68000 
25.26000 
-3.45000 
-8.34000 
25.45000 
-4.30000 
-8.83000 
23.85000 
-5.53000 
-8.77000 
23.81000 
-5.60000 
-9.41000 
27.15000 
-4.56000 
-10.97000 
31.84000 
-6.15000 
-11.39000 
31.53000 
-7.57000 
-9.67000 
29.57000 
-6.74000 
-8.89000 
30.23000 
-7.72000 
-8.07000 
Y ESTIMATE 
25.63518 
-4.49427 
-9.44117 
25.16346 
-4.45355 
-9.12709 
24.72235 
-4.39263 
-9.22232 
24.61675 
-4.42162 
-9.17802 
24.38434 
-4.40428 
-9.09159 
24.18920 
-4.38956 
-9.02064 
24.02783 
-4.38623-
-8.96536 
23.88436 
-4.40270 
-8.90934 
23.56570 
-4.45547 
-8.87378 
23.47811 
-4.50744 
-8.88750 
23.47155 
-4.47311 
-9.01)76 
23.54194 
-4.52509 
-8.93972 
23.63242 
-4.52832 
-8.98703 
24.00196. 
-4.62224 
-9.05154 
23.91192 
-4.67188 
-9,07573 
24,12207 
-4.92567 
-8.93840 
24.46188 
-5.09570 
-9.11202 
24.79053 
-5.08740 
-9.21564 
25.01268 
-5.31375 
-9.29372 
25.59482 
-5.50627 
-9.46592 
26.04514 
-5.84839 
-9.55971 
26.56589 
-6.11959 
-9.70015 
27.17683 
-6.34824 
-9.92055 
27.76483 
-6.56428 
-10,13637 
28.38278 
-6,80448 
-10.36062 
29.10716 
-6.90539 
-10.58794 
30.18479 
-6.97067 
-10.70849 
RESIDUAL 
0.30482 
7.38427 
3.62117 
0.80654 
8.56355 
0.46709 
-0.59235 
8.31263 
4.18232 
2.44325 
6.60162 
0.00802 
4.07566 
5.09428 
-0.31841 
3.47080 
5.25956 
1.76064 
2.49217 
9.33623 
-1.49464 
3.32564 
7.87270 
-2.05066 
1.36430 
8.85547 
-2.49622 
-0.49811 
6.38744 
0.48750 
0.71845 
2.73311 
1.62176 
2,58806 
1.78509 
0.14972 
1.98758 
0.97832 
1.61703 
1.60804 
0.29224 
1.66154 
0.40808 
0,21188 
1.95573 
-1.81207 
0.39567 
0.78840 
-2.41188 
2.44570 
-0.27798 
-0.76053 
2.43740 
-1.46436 
0.24732 
1.86375 
0.95372 
-0,14482 
1.20627 
0.63592 
-2.19514 
0,31839 
0.78971 
-2.75589 
0.51959 
0.29015 
-0.02683 
1.76824 
-1.04946 
4.07517 
0.41428 
-1.25363 
3.14722 
-0.76552 
0.69062 
0.46284 
0.16539 
1.69794 
0.04521 
-0.74933 
2.63849 
NORHALIZED RESIDUALS 
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TABLE B3.5 Percentage Distribution of M.R.D. Expenditure by Legal Class 
of Road for the South Eastern Division for the Period 1949/50 
to 1977/78 
Period 
1949/50 
1950/51 
1951/52 
1952/53 
1953/54 
1954/55 
1955/56 
1956/57 
1957/58 
1958/59 
1959/60 
1960/61 
1961/62 
1962/63 
1963/64 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
State 
Highways 
% 
48.08 
52.10 
57.22 
53.35 
42.26 
54.83 
56.12 
57.49 
53.10 
52,41 
48.14 
47 74 
54.89 
56.42 
44,97 
51.91 
52.61 
50.20 
44.94 
44.12 
38.28 
41.26 
21.39 
23.98 
25.75 
30.25 
37 79 
37.97 
38.20 
Main Roads 
% 
39.19 
38.46 
34.98 
38.78 
49.13 
35.91 
36.15 
35.93 
35.38 
36.76 
41.44 
45.55 
35.40 
35.14 
36.53 
34.09 
27.12 
32.68 
36.01 
35.15 
25.63 
24,58 
13.12 
11.70 
13.46 
14.07 
17.22 
20.59 
31,49 
Development 
Roads 
% 
1.62 
1.04 
0.70 
1.00 
1.18 
0.97 
0.95 
0.82 
0.95 
2.47 
1.37 
2.10 
1.01 
1.95 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.59 
0.08 
-
1.01 
-
-
* 
Secondary 
Roads 
% 
3.70 
1.93 
2.60 
3.59 
3.27 
4.28 
3.54 
3.79 
7.50 
8.36 
9.05 
4.61 
8.70 
6.49 
18.50 
14.00 
20.27 
17.13 
19.05 
20.73 
16.57 
15.34 
6.65 
6.22 
6.23 
8.40 
6.60 
10.35 
9.16 
Other 
% 
7.41 
6.46 
4.50 
3.28 
4.16 
4.00 
3.24 
1.98 
3.07 
-
-
-
-
-
r 
-
-
-
urban" 
arterial ^ 
sub arterial 
19.52 
18.82 
58.22 
58.00 
53.53 
47 25 
38.37 
31.09 
21.13 
Source: Queensland Main Roads Department Annual Reports 
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TABLE B3.6 Percentage Distribution of M.R.D. Expenditure by Legal 
Class of Road for the South Western Division of the 
state for the Period 1949/50 to 1977/78 
Period 
1949/50 
1950/51 
1951/52 
1952/53 
1953/54 
1954/55 
1955/56 
1956/57 
1957/58 
1958/59 
1959/60 
1960/61 
1961/62 
1962/63 
1963/64 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
State 
Highways 
% 
60.40 
58.25 
60.02 
55.18 
53.59 
55.61 
51.96 
54.85 
55.55 
60.24 
62.42 
56.15 
51.09 
54.88 
46.73 
46.85 
49.33 
44.66 
41.93 
44.52 
41.59 
46.36 
42.98 
45.24 
51.25 
54.14 
55.92 
51.82 
55.45 
Main Roads 
% 
35.92 
35.70 
• 36.44 
37.53 
40.54 
37.67 
43.84 
41.24 
40.28 
35.28 
34.41 
41.67 
46.69 
41.91 
20.25 
22.12 
17.61 
18.94 
20.60 
22.84 
20.09 
20.10 
19.56 
17.93 
16.83 
17.15 
18.94 
22.36 
23.97 
Developmental 
Roads 
% 
0.20 
0.23 
0.19 
0.58 
0.46 
0.28 
0.25 
0.15 
0.20 
0.10 
0.11 
0.18 
0.15 
0.20 
13.52 
10.11 
12.44 
14.09 
14.51 
8.95 
15.31 
10.20 
12.10 
11.71 
10.81 
7.04 
7.95 
8.01 
4.95 
Secondary 
Roads 
% 
2.50 
3.39 
2.53 
4.38 
4.28 
4.22 
3.17 
2.94 
3.40 
4.34 
3.05 
1.99 
2.05 
2.99 
19.47 
20.90 
20.60 
22.28 
22.95 
23.68 
23.00 
23.32 
25.37 
25.12 
21.12 
21.67 
17.20 
17.80 
15.61 
Other 
% 
9.05 
1.89 
0.82 
2.33 
1.12 
2.22 
0.79 
0.82 
0.50 
-
-
-
-
-
-^  
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Source: Queensland Main Roads Department Annual Reports. 
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TABLE B3,7 Percentage Distribution of M,R,D. Expenditure 
by Legal Class of Road for the Central Division for the 
Period 1949/50 to 1977/78 
Period 
1949/50 
1950/51 
1951/52 
1952/53 
1953/54 
1954/55 
1955/56 
1956/57 
1957/58 
1958/59 
1959/60 
1960/61 
1961/62 
1962/63 
1963/64 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
State 
Highways 
% 
56.06 
61.59 
63.96 
65.22 
63.63 
59.19 
62.68 
59.79 
58.88 
56.23 
56,95 
54.75 
57.20 
59.29 
46.23 
48.14 
52.35 
54.27 
53.93 
40.35 
42.59 
43.85 
49.36 
54.37 
55.59 
59.92 
52.99 
54,15 
62,55 
Main Roads 
% 
38.32 
35.29 
31.64 
29.83 
30.74 
35.20 
32.29 
35.62 
35.14 
37.47 
33.59 
36.92 
37.98 
34.47 
21.07 
16.68 
12.81 
18.20 
20.24 
23.17 
23,34 
17.41 
17.88 
13.73 
13.58 
13.96 
13.74 
15.06 
14.05 
Developmental 
Roads 
% 
0.37 
0.38 
0.17 
0.14 
1.18 
2.01 
1.31 
0.83 
0.78 
1.62 
1.68 
1.55 
1.58 
0.95 
17.45 
22.75 
21.10 
12.63 
13.01 
22.89 
22.38 
22.13 
20,85 
17.52 
16.12 
14.70 
17.46 
16.19 
10,71 
Secondary 
Roads 
% 
0.59 
0.56 
1.65 
1.76 
1.14 
1.24 
1.29 
0.88 
1.30 
4.69 
7 79 
6.78 
3.23 
5.28 
15.25 
12.43 
13.74 
14.90 
12.82 
13.60 
11.69 
13.22 
11.91 
14.39 
14.71 
11.42 
15.80 
14.58 
12.68 
Other 
% 
4.65 
2.18 
2.85 
3.05 
3.31 
2.36 
2.43 
2.88 
3.90 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Source; Queensland Main Roads Department Annual Reports. 
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TABLE B3.8 Percentage Distribution of M.R.D. Expenditure 
by Legal Class of Road for the Northern Division for the 
Period 1949/50 to 1977/78 
Period 
1949/50 
1950/51 
1951/52 
1952/53 
1953/54 
1954/55 
1955/56 
1956/57 
1957/58 
1958/59 
1959/60 
1960/61 
1961/62 
1962/63 
1963/64 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
State 
Highways 
% 
53.05 
53.95 
60.15 
55.74 
57.53 
55.66 
57.40 
63.57 
68.16 
62.15 
65.92 
66.44 
59.18 
60.11 
44.33 
43.21 
41,10 
41.52 
45.23 
55.95 
45.67 
35.47 
35.23 
40,38 
49.63 
43.86 
45.13 
48.79 
57.82 
Main Roads 
% 
32.19 
34.54 
26.94 
30.78 
34.43 
34.48 
34.78 
29.42 
26.59 
30.41 
30.18 
28.35 
35.75 
34.63 
20.65 
10.74 
13.40 
11.11 
10.62 
5.41 
5.54 
15.71 
7.42 
12.63 
8.31 
12.20 
10.37 
11.74 
12.56 
Developmental 
Roads 
% 
1.40 
0.85 
0.87 
0.21 
0.20 
0.73 
0.36 
0.61 
0.46 
1.14 
0.34 
0.74 
0.17 
0.09 
22.50 
37.26 
33.95 
37.38 
32.46 
33.20 
34.25 
40.22 
49.43 
37.16 
29.29 
30.93 
29.34 
26.17 
16.42 
Secondary 
Roads 
% 
1.55 
1.59 
0.56 
0.29 
0.45 
1.17 
1.75 
1.30 
0.26 
6.31 
3.56 
4.47 
4.90 
5.17 
12.52 
8.78 
11.56 
9.99 
11.69 
16.44 
14.54 
8.64 
7.92 
9.83 
12.76 
13.01 
15.16 
13.29 
13.20 
Other 
% 
11.82 
9.08 
11.48 
12.97 
7.40 
7.95 
5.71 
5.10 
4.53 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Source; Queensland Main Roads Department Annual Reports, 
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TABLE B3,9 Average Percentage Distribution of M,R.D. Expenditure by 
Legal Class of Road by M,R,D. Divisions, 1963/64 to 1968/69 
and 1969/70 to 1977/78 
South Eastern 
Division 
South Western 
Division 
Central 
Division 
Northern 
Division 
South Eastern 
Division 
South Western 
Division 
Central 
Division 
Northern 
Division 
1963/64 to 1968/69 
State 
Highways 
% 
48.12 
45.67 
49.21 
43,39 
Main 
Roads 
% 
33.59 
20.39 
18.69 
11.98 
Developmental 
Roads 
% 
12.27 
18.30 
32.79 
Secondary 
Roads 
% 
18.28 
21.64 
13.79 
11.88 
Urban 
Arterial 
and Sub-
Arterial 
Roads 
% 
-
1969/70 to 1977/78 
32.76 
49.42 
52.81 
44,66 
19.09 
19.65 
15.86 
10.72 
0.56 
9.78 
17.56 
29,24 
9.50 
21.13 
13.37 
12.03 
38.45 
Source: Queensland Main Roads Department Reports 
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TABLE C,1 Payments to States for Roads Under Aid Roads Acts and Comparable 
Legislation, 1925-24 to 1978-79'='''^  
1923-24 
1924-25 
1925-26 
1926-27 
1927-28 
1928-29 
1929-30 
1930-31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-38 
1938-39 
1939-40 
1940-41 
1941-42 
1942-43 
1943-44 
1944-45 
1945-46 
1946-47 
. 1947-48 
1948-49 
1949-50 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1955-57 
1957-59*^  
1958-59*^  
igsg-eo** 
1960-61 
1962-63 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-65 
1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
New 
South 
Vales 
40 
190 
268 
358 
596 
1,538 
1,750 
1,156 
1,444 
1,046 
1,256 
1,346 
1,518 
1.665 
2,272 
2,410 
2,524 
1,985 
1,244 
926 
334 
1,118 
1,792 
2,666 
4,048 
3,898 
4,992 
7,228 
8,347 
8,415 
9,373 
12,381 
14.316 
15,859 
19,130 
21,355 
24,345 
25,741 
27,622 
29.880 
32,443 
36,345 
39,191 
41,744 
44.457 
47.319 
Victoria 
88 
154 
302 
330 
786 
688 
1,018 
668 
566 
682 
878 
818 
990 
1,086 
1,418 
1.500 
1.572 
1,236 
776 
575 
640 
760 
1,116 
1,650 
2,002 
2,404 
3,080 
4,462 
5,150 
5,192 
5,783 
7,905 
9,161 
10.795 
12,618 
14,042 
17,319 
18,367 
20.159 
21,754 
22,824 
25,576 
27,508 
29,443 
31.286 
33.113 
Queensland 
48 
210 
302 
410 
886 
754 
982 
882 
732 
712 
854 
918 
1.034 
1,136 
1,544 
1,638 
1,716 
1,350 
846 
628 
700 
830 
1,218 
1.812 
2.210-
2,652 
3,400 
4,920 
5,683 
5,729 
6,381 
8,649 
10.019 
11.805 
13,268 
14,825 
16,042 
16.855 
18,187 
19,591 
21.070 
23,669 
25,538 
27,415 
29.266 
31.098 
Vnnn 
South 
Austcalia 
20 
154 
226 
310 
514 
424 
510 
408 
474 
432 
518 
556 
626 
688 
898 
952 
996 
784 
496 
362 
406 
482 
708 
1,054 
1,266 
1,520 
1,948 
2',818 
3,256 
3,282 
3,656 
5,045 
5,581 
6,894 
7,814 
8,724 
9,846 
10.256 
11.505 
12,400 
13.337 
14,903 
16.024 
17,222 
18.364 
19.433 
Westecn 
Australia 
68 
306 
254 
426 
466 
436 
1,606 
872 
664 
728 
874 
938 
1,054 
1,160 
1,554 
1.646 
1,724 
1,358 
842 
640 
704 
834 
1,226 
1,822 
2,214 
2,552 
3,400 
4.920 
5,683 
5,729 
6,381 
8,779 
10,179 
11.994 
13.414 
14,996 
15,927 
16,181 
17,527 
18.975 
20.526 
23.007 
24.739 
25,676 
28,597 
30,537 
Tasaania 
24 
86 
94 
148 
246 
318 
256 
156 
190 
228 
244 
274 
302 
404 
428 
450 
354 
224 
162 
184 
218 
320 
474 
576 
690 
884 
1,284 
1,480 
1,492 
1,662 
2,251 
2,606 
3,072 
3,492 
3,897 
4,368 
4.600 
5.000 
5.400 
5.800 
5.500 
7.000 
7.500 
8.000 
8,500 
Total 
264 
1.038 
1.438 
1,928 
3.196 
4,086 
6,186 
4,242 
4.036 
3,790 
4.608 
4.820 
5,495 
6.038 
8,090 
8.574 
8,982 
7,068 
4,428 
3,294 
2,968 
4,242 
6,380 
9,488 
12,316 
13,816 
17,704 
25,632 
29,499 
29,839 
33,236 
45,010 
52,132 
61.429 
69.736 
77.839 
87,847 
92,000 
100.000 
108,000 
116.000 
130.000 
140.000 
150,000 
160.000 
170.000 
Act 
Kain Roads 
Oevelopaent Act 
1923-1925 
Federal Aid 
Roads Act 1926 
Federal Aid 
Roads Act 
1931-1936 
• 
Federal Aid 
Roads and •-
Works Act 
1937 
CoEEonwealth 
Aid Roads and 
Works Act 1947-1949 
CoBoonwealth 
Aid Roads 
Act 1950 
Connonwealth 
Aid Roads Act 
1954-1956 and 
CooiBonuealth Aid 
Roads (Special 
Assistance) Act 
1957 
Connonwealth 
Aid Roads 
Act 1959 
Commonwealth 
Aid Roads 
Act 1964 
445, 
TABLE C l (continued) 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
New 
South 
Vales 
57,060 
64,980 
74,500 
85,590 
98,270 
109,173 
136,232 
135,489 
155,611 
164,485 
Victoria 
38.160 
43,480 
49,820 
57,240 
65,720 
71,848 
91,989 
91,100 
98,900 
105.771 
Queensland 
34,740 
39,560 
45,350 
52,110 
59,830 
71,457 
90.049 
90.700 
100,000 
106,947 
South 
Australia 
21,000 
23,500 
25,500 
28,000 
31,000 
31,196 
41,484 
38,800 
40,400 
43,207 
Vestern 
Australia 
32.940 
36.270 
39,250 
43,910 
48,030 
^9,261 
62.225 
57.199 
61.301 
64,382 
Tasiania 
9,100 
10,230 
10,820 
12,150 
13,950 
17.065 
20.097 
20,500 
21.700 
23,208 
Total 
193,000 
218,000 
245,250 
279,000 
316,800 
350,000 
442,076 
433,788 
477.912 
508,000 
Act 
Cosaonwealth 
Aid Roads 
Act 1969 
National Roads 
Bill 1974 
Roads Grants 
Bill 1974 
Transport (Planning 
and Research) Act : 
1974 1 
1 
The States Grants • 
(Roads) Act 1977 
Notes: a) The amounts paid to the States under Aid Roads and comparable 
legislation did not coincide with allocations made by the 
Australian Government under such legislation before 1959-60. 
Amounts allocated for roads by the Australian Government under Aid 
Roads and comparable legislation in each year since 1923-24 are 
shown in the following table. 
b) These figures do not include expenditure in the States on strategic 
roads or roads serving Australian Government properties. 
c) The figures for 1957-58 and 1958-59 include the following amounts 
which each State received from the $6,000,000 special assistance 
grant for roads allocated in each of those years; New South 
Kales, $1,600,000;- Victoria, $1,400,000; Queensland, $1,000,000; 
South Australia, $650,000; Western Australia, $950,000; and 
Tasmania, $300,000. 
d) These figures include a special adjusting payment of $508,000 to 
Kestem Australia under Section 4(3) of the 1959 Act and a 
final adjusting payment of $3,338,000 to complete commitments 
under the 1954 Act. This latter payment was distributed: New 
South Wales, $916,000; Victoria, $586,000; Queensland, $642,000; 
South Australia, $374,000; Westem Australia, $652,000; 
and Tasmania, $168,000. 
Source: The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Payments to or for 
the States and Local Government Authorities, 1974/75 to 1978/79. 
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APPENDIX D 
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ADDENDUM TO CHAPTER 4 
THEORIES OF ROAD USER CHARGES AND INVESTMENT POLICY: AN ASSESSMENT 
While part of the discussion in Chapter 4 examined the issue 
of optimal pricing for a multi-product road supply authority constrained 
to cover the costs of road supply in the traditional public enterprise 
framework, it is desirable - for the purposes of comprehensiveness -
to show how this discussion fits in with the wider debate on second-
best resource allocation. It is also desirable - for the same reason 
of comprehensiveness - to draw attention to other matters of relevance 
in the formulation of public enterprise pricing policies, such as the 
influence of equity and political considerations. 
The fairly recent formal discussion of optimal departures 
from marginal cbst pricing for public enterprises required to meet a 
budget constraint, is to be found in contributions by a number of 
1 2 3 
writers, m particular, Baumol and Bradford , Boiteux , and Rees, 
4 
The theory builds on the seminal contribution by Ramsey in 1927 to 
the theory of taxation. The Ramsey article addressed the following 
problem: 
",,, a given revenue is to be raised by proportionate 
taxes on some or all uses of income, the taxes on 
different uses being possibly at different rates; how 
should these different rates be adjusted in order that 
the decrement in utility may be a minimum?"^ 
Baumol, William J. and Bradford, David F., "Optimal Departures 
from Marginal Cost Pricing", American Economic Review, June 1970, 
Vol. LX/No. 3, 
Boiteux, M., "On the Management of Public Monopolies Subject to 
Budgetary Constraints", Journal of Economic Theory, 3, (2): 1971. 
Rees, R., Public Enterprise Economics, London: Weindenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1976, Chapter 7. 
Ramsey, F,P,, "A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation", Economic 
Journal, March 1927, Vol, 37, 
Ibid,, p, 47, 
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This is analogous to the problem of determining a set of 
Pareto optimal prices for a multi-product enterprise (such as a road 
authority) required to achieve a specified revenue target. The usual 
assumption is that the adoption of Pareto first-best pricing would 
result in a financial loss (e.g. because of economies of scale) For 
reasons examined in Chapter 4 subsidisation may not be an acceptable 
policy option for government, or at least not at the level implied by 
setting prices equal to marginal costs. The revenue constraint may 
therefore be imposed in order to recover the total costs of supply 
from the consumers of the enterprise's outputs, or to reduce the subsidy 
to a politically acceptable level. Alternatively, it may be that 
government requires that an enterprise earn a minimum surplus which 
could not be obtained by marginal cost pricing. In each case the 
task is to meet the revenue constraint in such a way as to maximise 
welfare gains (or minimise welfare losses) 
A familiar solution to this problem is that the price of each 
output should be fixed so that the percentage deviation from its 
marginal cost is inversely proportionate to the output's elasticity 
of demand. In other words, the higher a product's elasticity of demand 
the smaller the deviation of price from marginal cost. Conversely, 
the lower a product's elasticity of demand the greater the deviation 
of price from marginal cost. This requirement is usually referred to 
7 
as Ramsey pricing, or as the inverse-elasticity rule. 
6. It is assumed that the revenue target for a public enterprise is 
less than the amount indicated by profit maximisation. 
7 See for example: 
(i) McGillivray, R., Neels, K. and Beesley, M. (1978), "Towards 
Rational Road User Charges", Transportation Research Record, 
No. 680, pp. 35-39. 
(ii) Phillips, Almarin, "Ramsey Pricing and Sustainability with 
Interdependent Demands", in Regulated Industries and Public 
Enterprise, (Editors: Bridger, M. Mitchell, and Paul R. 
Kleindorfer: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 
Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto (1979) 
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The derivation of the inverse elasticity rule can be shown, 
by para-phrasing Baumol and Bradford, as follows. Assume that the 
multi-product enterprise produces outpirts q q^, ..., q and has a 
cost function given by C (q^, q^, .,., q ), Since the aim is to 
maximise welfare gains or minimise welfare losses, given a revenue 
constraint, the problem becomes: 
Maximise W = U(qj, q^, . . . , q^) - C(qj, q^, ,.., q^) (1) 
Subject to EP^q. - C(q^, q2, .,., q^) = S ; i = 1, ..., n (2) 
where U(-) is the utility function; S is the revenue constraint; 
q^  the rate of output of product i and P. its price. It is also 
= P. (3) 
accepted that 
_5U 
6q, 
Using the Lagrangian multiplier method we have 
W = U(q^, q^, ,,,, q^) - C(q^, q^, . , . , q^ 
+ X[ZP^q^ - C(q^, q^, ..., 0^^3-5] = 0 (4) 
Differentiating with respect to q. yields 
6W 6U 6C , ."^^^i^ 6C, 
6q^ 6q^ 6q^ 6q^ 6q^ 
i.e. 
SZP.q^ 
"1-°=! = - ^ 1 - 5 ^ - ^ 1 tS.l) 
Now, if the demands for the various outputs are independent (i.e. cross 
elasticities between the various outputs are zero) then 
SEP q 6(P.q.) 
(6) 6q^ 6q^ 
8. This follows the discussions by Phillips, Almarin, ibid, and 
Rees, R,, op,cit, 
451 
Since mR. = P.(1 - -^) (7) 
lie- ^ ' 
1 
where mR- is marginal revenue for the ith product, and e. is the 
own price elasticity of demand for that product. Substitution 
yields, 
P. 
P- - mc. = -X[P. - mc. 1^ (8) 
1 1 *• 1 1 e - -• ^ 
1 
where mc^ is the marginal cost of the ith product. Rearranging (8) 
we obtain (P^ - mc^)(l + A) ^ 
_ = 
1 1 
and with k = X/(l+X) it follows that 
P- - mc. , 
1 1^  _ _k_ 
P^  " e. 
1 1 
(9) 
(10) 
Applied to the task of determining a second-best Pareto-
optimal set of prices for the outputs (services) of a road supply 
authority which is instructed to recover the monetary costs of road 
supply, the inverse elasticity rule requires that the mark-up of 
price above the marginal cost of road supply for each road user class 
should be proportionate to the inverse of the demand elasticity of 
each class for road services. Thus vehicle classes which have very 
inelastic demand are levied a price which exceeds the marginal cost 
attributed to them by a far greater amount than for those vehicle 
classes which have very elastic demands. 
As noted earlier the above presentation of the inverse 
elasticity rule assumes independent demands. If this assumption is 
invalid then equation (10) needs to be modified. The divergence 
between price and marginal costs will depend not only on own price 
elasticities of demand but cross elasticities as well. 
The application of the inverse elasticity rule requires a 
great deal of information on both' the demand and supply side. As Rees 
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concludes in his analysis of second-best pricing: 
"The most notable feature of the results for anyone who 
is concerned with trying to formulate practical pricing 
policies is their complexity, and the fact that their 
informational requirements are unlikely to be met."^ 
In the transport area, in a recent study by McGillivray. et al , 
estimates of demand elasticities by vehicle class were obtained by 
using available estimates of short-run elasticities of demand for 
petrol by cars and petrol and diesel fuel by trucks An important 
assumption made was that these elasticities would be invariant with 
respect to changes in input costs. The analysis also involved a 
high degree of aggregation. In the authors own words: 
"Values for gasoline-powered and diesel-powered trucks 
had to be combined. Light trucks were assumed to be 
like automobiles and buses like trucks The only 
variability over road types was due to different 
proportions of gasoline-powered and diesel powered 
heavy vehicles, because elasticity estimates for 
gasoline and diesel trucks differed substantially 
The elasticity measures aggregate over market 
conditions; for example, surely the elasticity of 
demand for use of some road types by heavy trucks 
would be considerably lower than for others. It is 
also clear that, given price changes of this magnitude, 
elasticities will change as adjustments to new price 
levels proceed. The effect of this among vehicle 
classes is unknown, yet it is relevant to policy 
because a move to a new taxation system has a long-
lasting effect."10 
Thus, to obtain more accurate estimates of demand elasticities by 
vehicle class and by road type- more refined techniques would need to 
be employed in conjunction with a more suitable segmentation of markets. 
Such estimates could only be obtained after considerable research 
effort and presumably at great expense. To quote Rees again: 
9. Rees, R., "Second-Best Rules for Public Enterprise Pricing", 
Economica, Vol. 35, August 1968, p, 270, 
10. McGillivray, et al , op.cit,, p, 39. 
11. Ibid. 
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"It might well be that the welfare loss arising from 
the exclusion of many of the terms would be less than 
the costs of including them; but the decision as to 
which terms should be included itself requires 
information on the relevant costs and benefits" ^^ 
There is also a need for more research concerning the link 
between vehicle characteristics, frequency of use and damage to the 
road system. While the AASHO road tests (see Chapter 12) suggest a 
definite link between initial construction standards and pavement 
deterioration, they provide little information concerning the connection 
between maintenance policy and pavement durability McGillivray et al. 
observe: 
"The possibility of varying the level of maintenance 
provided affects the choice between initial and future 
inputs in a way that requires new clarification" 1-5 
In other words, there is a need for more attention to be given to 
the fundamental question of the optimal design of the road system. 
Closer examination of the economic trade-offs between capital and 
maintenance may lead to different design standards, and thus to 
differences in the proportion of costs which can be unambiguously 
attributed to particular vehicle classes and those which are common to 
all users 
The above remarks are not intended to imply that efforts 
to restructure road charges (using the inverse elasticity formula) 
should not be attempted until information of better quality is provided. 
They are simply intended to demonstrate the need for caution in 
interpreting results based on present knowledge. 
Apart from difficulties of the above kind there are other 
reasons why public enterprises and regulated industries will not 
pursue a pricing policy based on the inverse elasticity rule. In 
particular, policy makers will not be indifferent to the equity 
12, Rees, R,, "Second-Best Rules for Public Enterprise Pricing", op,cit, 
13, McGillivray, et al,, op,cit,, p. 35, 
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and political consequences of alternative pricing policies. As far 
as the equity aspect of public enterprise pricing policy is concerned 
it is unlikely that many economists would wish to argue that these 
should be ignored. However, there are differences in approach. 
While some economists (cf. Farrell ) view manipulation of public 
enterprise prices as a fairly blunt approach to achieving equity 
goals, others would argue that if the distributional effects of an 
efficient structure of charges deviate substantially from accepted 
equity standards then alternative means of correcting this deviation 
should be considered - including departures from the efficient 
structure of charges. This view is clearly expressed by Webb: 
"Since the distributional effects of the policy (i.e. 
adoption of the inverse elasticity rule) could be 
serious they must be considered beforei the policy is 
implemented. If the distributional effects are judged 
to be unacceptable, then the set of prices which would 
result from the pursuit of the efficiency objective 
should only be changed if this is the most efficient and 
effective way of achieving the desired distributional 
objective. An alternative policy would obviously be to 
increase cash payments in the form of unemployment 
benefits, pensions and family allowances, to adversely 
affected consumers and to leave the optimal second-best 
prices as determined" 15 
Further, there are also economists who argue that if efficiency and 
equity are regarded as inseparable then equity considerations should 
be explicitly incorporated in the decisions taken by public enterprises 
An examination of this issue in the context of public investment 
appraisal is to be found, for example, in contributions by Weisbrod 
14. Farrell, W,J., "In Defence of Public-Utility Price Theory", Oxford 
Economic Papers, New Series, Vol, 10, (1958) Reprinted in Public 
Enterprise, Turvey, R. (ed,). Penguin Modem Economics, 1968. 
15. Webb, Michael G., Pricing Policies for Public Enterprises, Macmillan 
Studies in Economics, Macmillan Press Ltd.: London and Basingstoke, 
1976, p. 77 
16. Weisbrod, B,A., "Income Redistribution Effects and Benefit Cost 
Analysis", in Chase, S.G. Jr (ed,). Problems in Public Expenditure 
Analysis, The Brookings Institution, 1968. Also reprinted in 
Layard, Richard (ed.), Cost-Benefit Analysis, Penguin Books Ltd., 
Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1976, Chapter 16. 
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and Nwaneri 
That there may be a case on equity grounds for departing from 
an optimal set of prices for public enterprise outputs was long ago 
1 8 
recognised by Little. Specifically, in examining the attributes of 
multi-part pricing (which, according to Little involves discrimination) 
Little commented that: 
"The larger the difference between marginal and average 
cost, and the nearer to marginal cost one tries to get, 
the greater the discrimination would have to be. Whether 
discrimination can be worked in this way depends mainly 
on whether suitable impersonal categories (e.g. size of 
motor car, or house) can be found as a basis for 
discrimination. In my judgement and for the usual reasons, 
it would be folly to strive after the 'ideal' by attempting 
to discriminate in a manner which would be regarded as 
unfair"-1^ 
20 More recently, contributions by Feldstein show how 
equity considerations may be explicitly incorporated in the pricing 
decision. He contends that since optimal lump sum redistribution is 
impossible and because equity consequences of public pricing is 
important to policy makers "[the] Ramsey-Boiteux rule is therefore 
21 inadequate" and that " it is important to develop a more complete 
22 theory of public pricing" 
17 Nwaneri, V.L., "Equity in Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Case Study of 
the Third London Airport", Journal of Transport Economics and 
Policy, September 1970. 
18. Little, I.M.D., A Critique of Welfare Economics, Oxford Paperbacks, 
Oxford University Press, 1965. 
19. Ibid., p. 200. 
20. Feldstein, M.S., "Equity and Efficiency in Public Sector Pricing: 
The Optimal Two Part Tariff", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1972. 
Feldstein, M.S., "Distributional Equity and the Optimal Structure 
of Public Prices", American Economic Review, March 1972 
21. Feldstein, M.S., "Distribution Equity and the Optimal Structure of 
Public Prices", ibid., p, 32. 
22. Ibid., p. 36. 
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No attempt will be made to provide a detailed examination 
of Feldstein's approach. Suffice it to say that Feldstein's argument 
requires knowledge of the size distribution of incomes (expressed as 
a density function, f(-)); specification by government of a social 
welfare function, and knowledge of the 'distributional characteristics' 
of a public enterprise output. The latter concept is defined by the 
ratio 
h = i-C i^^ y^  ^^ y^^  ^^y^ ^y 
^i " 
where N = the number of households in the population being served 
Q, = the total quantity of good i 
q-Cy) = quantity of i consumed by a household with income y 
u'(y) = the marginal social utility of income to a household with 
income y. 
The value of R. is thus '.., a weighted average of the marginal social 
utilities, each household's marginal social utility weighted by that 
23 household's consumption of good i'. If the marginal utility of 
income [u''(y)] is assumed to decline with increases in income this 
implies that the value of R. is greater for essentials than for 
luxuries. Feldstein's analysis provides a basis for measuring the 
distributional impact of prices: in particular it enables the 
examination of the effects for distributional equity of application 
24 25 
of the Ramsey rule. As Feldstein demonstrates it is possible 
that an increase in the size of the revenue constraint will require 
the prices of goods with a relatively low income elasticity to rise 
relative to the prices of goods with higher income elasticities. If 
this happens then lower income households would be required (according 
to the Ramsey rule) to make a greater contribution to the increased 
23, Ibid., p. 33. 
24, The Ramsey rule assumes that the distributional characteristics of 
the enterprise's outputs are irrelevant. In the two goods case 
discussed by Feldstein this means that R-|=R2 C^ ®® Feldstein, M.S., 
ibid,, p, 34). 
25, Ibid, 
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budget than those households on higher incomes This might not be 
acceptable to government. In general terms: 
" the distributional characteristics may offset 
or reinforce the effects of different demand 
elasticities among goods. A good with both a high 
demand elasticity and a high distributional 
characteristic will have a relatively lower price/ 
marginal cost ratio than one with opposite 
characteristics Thus the overall allocation of the 
profit target among outputs will depend in part upon 
the relative losses in allocative efficiency, as 
represented by demand elasticities, and in part upon 
relative losses in distributional equity, as measured 
by the distributional characteristics."26 
Whatever the approach taken by the economist to the efficiency/ 
equity issue it is doubtful (as suggested above) that policy makers will 
be willing (or able) to avoid manipulating the prices of public 
enterprise outputs to achieve objectives other than efficiency in 
resource use. The explanation for this is to be found, in part, in the 
27 political process which affects wealth transfers (cf Stigler and 
28 
Peltzman ) and the community's perception of what is a "fair" or 
"equitable" pricing policy 
With regard to the latter it is possible that a set of prices 
based on the inverse elasticity rule may be compatible with some broadly 
accepted notion of equity (as implied, for example, by minimum wage 
legislation, social security payments and the progressive income tax 
structure), and yet be perceived by some or all user groups as 
inequitable. On the other hand, it is also possible that those who 
have relatively inelastic demands and hence pay the higher prices might 
be members of relatively low income groups, while those who pay less 
have much higher incomes. Therefore, the Ramsey rule may or may not 
be compatible with perceptions of equity. 
26. Rees, R., Public Enterprise Economics, op.cit., p. 121 
27 Stigler, George J , "The Theory of Economic Regulation", Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 2, 1971"! 
28. Peltzman, Sam, "Towards a More General Theory of Regulation", 
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol, 19(2), August 1976. 
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The importance of the community's perception of equity as a 
constraint on public enterprise price policy (already noted in the 
29 quotation from Little) is raised by McGillivray et al in their 
examination of alternative road user charges for the U.S.A. In 
reference to the inverse elasticity formula they suggest that: 
" there may well be practical snags in applying 
it that imply that it is not necessarily the 
dominant solution (not least) how far it will 
be seen to be fair by users, which depends primarily 
on how radical a departure from current methods of 
raising road taxes is implied".•^ '^  
On interpretation of the above statement is this: if the 
existing structure of charges for road use is viewed as "fair" or 
"just" then a road pricing scheme which requires a significant change 
in relative and absolute prices would be met by opposition from the 
loser groups irrespective of their income/wealth status It might not 
be possible for government to ignore such opposition either because it 
accepts the losers' view of equity and/or because it is not prepared to 
accept the political cost which rejection of the losers' views might 
imply. 
The political aspects can be briefly explained as follows: 
since a road pricing scheme based on the inverse elasticity rule will 
make some people better off and some worse off it is reasonable to 
expect both support for, and opposition to, the proposed scheme. Whether 
the proposed scheme is adopted, rejected, or subject to modification 
will depend, inter alia, on the political influence which each group 
is able and prepared to exert. This, in turn, will depend very much 
on the level of the per capita gains and losses which accrue to each 
31 group. If the per capita gains or losses from application of the 
inverse elasticity rule to road pricing are substantial there is a strong 
29, McGillivray, R., et al , op.cit. 
30. Ibid., p. 37 
31 See Peltzman, S., op.cit. 
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incentive for those kith a common interest to organise (collude) for 
the purpose of supporting or opposing the change. 
Related to the above is the possibility that full implementation 
of the inverse elasticity rule would be rejected by government if the 
distributional effects are assessed in terms of the so-called 
32 Conservative Welfare Function. As noted by Corden the distributional 
objective in such a function requires that '.,, any significant absolute 
reductions in real income of any section of the community should be 
33 
avoided'. This means - in terms of welfare weights - that government 
would give a relatively low weight to increases in real income and a 
relatively high weight to decreases in real income, Corden argues 
(in the context of international trade policy) that the conservative 
welfare function expresses a number of ideas: 
"Firstly, it is 'unfair' to allow anyone's real 
income to be reduced significantly - and 
especially if this is the result of deliberate 
policy decisions - unless there are very good 
reasons for this and it is more or less unavoidable. 
Secondly, insofar as people are risk averters, 
everyone's real income is increased when it is known 
that a government will generally intervene to prevent 
a sudden or large and unexpected income loss. The 
conservative social welfare function is part of a 
social insurance system. Thirdly, social peace 
requires that no significant group's income shall 
fall if that of others is rising ,,,"2^. 
Much the same kind of argument is to be found in a recent 
35 paper by Layard in which he explores the link between human happiness, 
income, the pursuit of status, and the role of expected income and 
expected status. One of the assumptions made by Layard is that 
marginal utility is considerably less for increases in income than 
it is for a decline, starting from a specified level of income. Evidence 
to support this assumption is that ' [people] seem to fight against cuts 
32. Corden, W,M,, Trade Policy and Economic Welfare, Clarendon Press: 
Oxford, 1974, Chapter 5, 
33. Ibid,, p, 107. 
34. Ibid,, pp. 107-108. 
35. Layard, R,, "Human Satisfactions and Public Policy", Economic 
Journal, Vol, 90, December 1980. ' 
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in their living standards much more energetically than they fight for 
increases' Layard suggests that politicians accept the above 
assumption which ' explains their unwillingness even to make anybody 
37 
worse off It explains, therefore, the willingness of politicians 
to protect the income status of people even if they are already very 
38 
well off This supposed desire of politicians to preserve the status 
quo does not imply that they are interested in maximising an ethical 
social welfare function, regardless of votes The argument for not 
causing too great a change in relative income/wealth positions is 
easily tied in with the arguments by Stigler and Peltzman. However, 
Layard sees this conservative approach to income redistribution as 
having special significance in the short-run. The possibilities are 
assiimed to be greater in the long-run as ' expectations respond 
41 to actual income experienced, with a lag.' 
A further aspect of perceptions of equity in relation to a 
road pricing scheme based on the Ramsey rule, is that such a scheme 
involves discriminatory pricing. Whether, in terms of pure economic 
theory such pricing is in fact discriminatory (see Chapter 4) is then 
beside the point. If differences in charges are seen as discriminatory, 
and discrimination is viewed as unfair, then government will take this 
into account when formulating policy. Adverse reaction to differences 
in charges (based on cost and demand elasticities) may lead government 
to opt for a policy which results in "averaging" of prices across user 
groups. Indeed this is a common practice in other public enterprises 
36. Ibid., p. 747. 
37 Ibid., p. 745. 
38. Ibid., p, 747 
39. Stigler, G,, op.cit. 
40. Peltzman, Sam, op.cit. 
41. Layard, R., "Human Satisfactions and Public Policy", op.cit,, 
p. 749. 
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and regulated industries The fact that "averaging" of charges may 
be perceived by the community in general as non-discriminatory (and 
therefore as equitable) even though cross subsidisation is involved, 
highlights the community's lack of understanding of the distinction 
in economic terms between discriminatory and non-discriminatory pricing. 
While it is likely that opposition to differential charges 
will in most cases have an income redistribution motive it is also 
possible that the notion of "fairness" invoked is that people should 
pay similar prices for what are perceived by them to be similar services 
A related view is that public enterprises and regulated industries should 
not "discriminate" among consumers on the basis of location. What 
seems to be involved here is the notion that people have a "right" to 
equality of treatment in terms of the prices of services and the quality 
of services supplied, irrespective of where they live or of their income 
situation. 
Finally, the point also needs to be made that, in terms of 
the political calculus, it is often politically rational for 
government to pursue some of its equity and political objectives by 
cross subsidisation of public enterprise and public authority outputs 
rather than by use of direct cash transfers. The former approach 
obscures the real cost of the transfer thereby making it difficult for 
the electorate (as a whole) to make a rational decision as to whether 
or not particular groups of consumers should be subsidised, and if so., 
to what extent. 
To summarise: the achievement of an economically efficient 
road track cost recovery policy requires the application of what is 
now known as the inverse elasticity rule. However, there are a number 
42. See for example, Waverman, Leonard, "Pricing Principles: How 
Should Postal Rates Be Set?", in Perspectives on Postal Service 
Issues, Sherman, Roger (ed.), American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C, 1980. 
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of difficulties. Apart from the practical problems of estimating 
demand elasticities and measuring the costs imposed on the road 
authority by the various user groups, there are likely to be equity 
and/or political considerations which will necessitate modification 
to the rule. Much will depend on how great a departure from the 
status quo is involved. The greater the departure the more likely 
it is that those who stand to lose (irrespective of income or wealth 
status) will resist the scheme. 
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ADDENDUM TO CHAPTER 12 
ROAD PRICING POSSIBILITIES FOR AUSTRALIA 
While the theory of congestion pricing is reviewed in some 
detail in Chapters 2 and 3, the discussion in Chapter 12 of feasible 
pricing policies for Australia does not include an examination of the 
problems associated with congestion charging in Australia. This 
appendix explains the reasons for this 
The analysis of Commonwealth and State road expenditure 
policy undertaken in this study clearly demonstrates that, with the 
exception of one brief period (1969-1973), the major part of Commonwealth 
and State road funds has been allocated to the non-urban (including 
inter-state) road system. Table B3.1 (p, 432) shows, as an example, 
that Main Roads Department expenditure in Queensland devoted less than 
9% of total road funds available to it to the urban areas (metropolitan 
and provincial cities) during the period 1955/6 to 1968/9 Expenditure 
then increased to a peak of 31,06% in 1973/4. declining thereafter (to 
approximately 14.89% in 1977/8) 
The reality of Commonwealth and State road fund allocations is 
that congestion has rarely been an important part of the criteria which 
determine where Commonwealth and State road funds should be spent. It 
seems reasonable therefore that a discussion of practical road pricing 
possibilities for Australia, in the context of Commonwealth and State 
road expenditure policy, concentrates on charging policies which in 
fact do not distinguish between use of congested and uncongested road 
space. This is not to say that congestion pricing in Australia is 
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unworthy of study; its neglect in this thesis is essentially a 
matter of judgement about the appropriate focus of attention. 
Specifically, the approach to the discussion of road pricing 
possibilities is in large part a logical consequence of the emphasis 
which this study gives to the institutional and constitutional framework 
within which the Australian road sector actually operates Thus this 
While congestion is an important problem in the Australian urban 
transport scene, and although Australia is one of the most highly 
urbanised economies, its cities are characterised by relatively 
low population densities. It is therefore possible that the 
congestion problem is not as great in Australia as it is in 
many cities in Europe and North America. Available data on 
population densities can only be used as a rough guide for the 
purpose of city comparisons. The reasons for this include differences 
in definition of city boundaries, differences in city form - in 
particular the extent to which a city's employment activities are 
centralised and decentralised, the quantity and quality of alternative 
transport modes, and differences in motor vehicle ownership levels 
However, a comparison of population densities of Australian cities 
with those of major cities in the U.K. (and the U.S.A.) reveals 
some striking results. For example, Sydney (statistical division) 
had 249 persons per square kilometer (ppk)2 (1976 census data), or, 
on a more narrow definition (Sydney Area Transportation Study 1971) 
772 ppk2; while London (Greater London area, 1981), had 4,238 ppk^; 
Brisbane (statistical division 1977) had 323 ppk^, or on a more 
narrow definition (city of Brisbane 1977) had 584 ppk2, while 
Birmingham (1981) had 4,402 ppk2 (Sydney data from: Handbook of 
Local Statistics (1981), ABS, NSW Office, p. 21; Sydney Area 
Transportation Study (1974), Vol 1, p 1-1, p. 2-1 London data 
from: Annual Abstract of Statistics (1982) CSO, No. 118 (HMS), 
p. 24; Birmingham data ibid., Brisbane data from: Queensland 
Yearbook 1979, ABS Qld. Office, p. 102-3 ) 
Bearing all the difficulties in mind, the differences in density 
are nevertheless so great that they suggest a possible reason for 
the relative unimportance of congestion pricing in the minds of 
policy makers. Indeed, the Commonwealth Bureau of Roads in its 
1973 Report on Roads in Australia stated that: 
"In Australian cities, where congestion is generally 
not as severe as in European cities, the case for 
congestion pricing is less valid than for cities 
overseas" [Para 6.47, p. 112] 
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thesis examines, inter alia, how road expenditure decisions are made 
by the Commonwealth and the States; how decisions are affected by the 
division of powers and responsibilities between the Commonwealth and 
the States; how decisions at the State level are constrained by 
political and constitutional factors; and finally, to examine the 
interaction of Commonwealth and State policies, in particular the 
extent to which the Commonwealth government (given its wide powers under 
section 96 of the Constitution) is able to impose its preferences on 
State road authorities. 
The discussion in Chapter 12 of road pricing possibilities 
in Australia approaches this issue within the same framework. It 
draws on the discussion in part 1, and considers the problem of achieving 
a second-best road track cost recovery policy in the context of the 
problems presented by the Australian institutional and constitutional 
environment. This is the focus of attention. Thus the objective of 
Part 4 (Chapters 11 and 12) is to highlight the importance of the 
implications of the High Court's interpretation of section 92 of the 
Australian Constitution, for road track cost recovery strategies. The-
issue of constitutional constraints for road pricing in Australia is, as 
shown in Chapters 11 and 12, essentially a non-urban issue; it is 
concerned with the extent to which the Court's view of section 92 has 
limited, currently limits, and will limit in the future, the ability 
of the States and the Commonwealth to impose charges on road transport 
operators who engage in interstate trade. Given the demonstrated 
difficulties of maintaining different regulatory and pricing policies 
for inter-state and intra-state road transport, this discussion 
emphasises again the differences between the theoretical treatment 
of the ingredients of an efficient road track cost recovery policy. 
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and the practical possibilities under the existing constitutional 
constraints. The point is that the scope for implementation of an 
economically appropriate pricing scheme is very limited indeed. In 
this regard it should be mentioned that if the High Court prevented 
application of the inverse elasticity rule to inter-state road 
transport (as the current interpretation of section 92 makes clear it 
would), attempts by the States to apply this rule to intra-state 
transport would merely produce the difficulties which existed during 
the period of continued attempts to maintain different policies for 
intra-state and inter-state road transport. Thus it would be very 
inefficient and, as the former ton-mile tax demonstrated, not very 
practicable. The discussion in Part 4 therefore indicated that the 
difficulties in implementing the inverse elasticity rule, or some 
version of it, are likely to be far greater in Australia than they 
are for countries with a unitary system of government, or with different 
constitutional provisions„ 
In addition to the constitutional considerations. Chapter 12 
examined the implications of co-operative and non-co-operative action 
between the Commonwealth and the States. As argued there, not only 
is it important to get agreement between the States about what should 
be done, but it is also important that Commonwealth co-operation and 
involvement be obtained, in view of the Commonwealth's powers (e.g. over 
the excise tax on transport fuels) Both the constitutional and 
institutional issues are of fundamental importance to the subject of 
road cost recovery in Australia. As far as the author is aware, these 
issues have hitherto received little if any attention from economists. 
It is appropriate, therefore, that a thesis which examines the economics 
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of road supply in the Australian context, at the Commonwealth and 
State levels, should concentrate on these issues. 
Another point to be made is that while the discussion in 
Chapter 12 ignores the congestion pricing issue, there are many 
2 
precedents for such an approach. The literature on road user 
charges can be broadly divided into two categories. On the one hand 
there are those studies which have focussed on the pricing of scarce 
road space, and, in so doing, have recommended charges which take 
account of the costs of delay inflicted by each road user upon others. 
Such studies ", have frequently used the terminology of 'road 
congestion' charges to define their subject matter" 
On the other hand there have been a large number of studies 
(see Chapter 3) in which the major concern is to arrive at a set of 
charges which reflect the cost to road authorities of supplying 
road space for different types of vehicles In these studies " , the 
distinguishing terminology of 'track cost' or 'cost allocation' is 
4 
used." The discussion in Chapter 12 belongs to the second category 
Moreover, recent discussions of road pricing possibilities for Australia, 
found mainly in government-sponsored documents, concentrate on the 
track cost approach (i.e. the congestion issue is by-passed) The 
discussion in this thesis has therefore concentrated on making a 
contribution to this Australian debate. 
2. See for example: 
(i) U,K, Ministry of Transport, Road Track Costs, (London, H.M.S.O., 
1968) 
(ii) Haritos, Z., Rational Road Pricing Policies in Canada, 
(Canadian Transport Commission, Ottawa, 1973) 
3. Starkie, D,N,M,, "Charging Freight Vehicles for the Use of Roads", 
Australian Road Research, Vol, 9, No. 2, (June 1979), p 3. 
4. Starkie, D.N.M., ibid. 
5 See for example: 
(i) Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Victorian Land Transport 
System, (Government Printer, Melbourne, 1972) 
(ii) Bureau of Transport Economics, Cost Recovery in Australian 
Transport 1974-75, (AGPS, Canberra, 1977) 
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Given the above arguments, it does not seem necessary to 
provide a review of methods of congestion charging. There are many 
excellent reviews and discussions of the advantages and disadvantages 
of these methods in the literature, and little would be achieved 
with regard to the main objectives of this thesis by providing yet 
another review A study of congestion costs and congestion pricing 
possibilities is a thesis on its own. 
7 
Finally, as argued by many writers, the major barrier to 
implementation of the various forms of congestion pricing including 
supplementary licensing schemes, is the political barrier This 
6. See for example: 
(i) Beesley, M,E,, Urban Transport: Studies in Economic Polic>", 
(London: Butterworths, 1973), Chapter 9, 
(ii) Maycock, G,, "Implementation of Traffic Restraint", Road 
Research Laboratory, Department of the Environment, RRL Report 
LR422 (1972) 
(iii) Kulash, D., "Congestion Pricing: A Research Summary", 
Washington, D.C, The Urban Institute, Report No. 1212-99, 
July 1974 
(iv) Kiran, Bhatt, "Road Pricing Technologies: A Survey", 
Washington, D.C, The Urban Institute, Report No. 1212-11, 
August 1974, 
(v) Jose, A. Gomez-Ibanez and Garry R. Fauth, "Downtown Auto 
Restraint Policies: The Costs and Benefits for Boston", 
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, Vol. XIV, No. 2, 
May 1980. 
(vi) Philip A. Viton, "Equilibrium Short-Run-Marginal-Cost Pricing 
of a Transport Facility: The Case of the San Francisco Bay 
Bridge", Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, Vol. XIV, 
No. 2, May 1980. 
7 See for example: 
(i) Alan A. Walters, "Summary of Barriers to Implementing Pricing 
Innovation", Transportation Research Board: Special Report 
No. 181: Urban Transportation Economics, National Academy 
of Sciences, Washington, D.C, 1978. 
(ii) Higgins, Tom, "Road Pricing - Should and Might It Happen?", 
Transportation, 8 (1979), 99-113. 
469, 
appears to be related to the community's attitude to the benefits 
which would follow from such measures, and to the community's perception 
8 9 
of the income redistribution effects of congestion charges, ' 
The importance of the community's perception of equity for road 
pricing possibilities is examined in the Appendix to Chapter 4. 
For a discussion of congestion charges and income distribution see, 
for example: 
(i) Foster, CD., "The Regressiveness of Road Pricing", 
International Journal of Transport Economics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
April 1974. 
(ii) Foster, CD,, "A Note on the Distributional Effects of Road 
Pricing: A Comment", Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 
Vol, IX, No, 2, May 1975, 
(iii) Richardson, H,W,, "A Note on the Distributional Effects of 
Road Pricing", Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 
Vol, VIII, No, 1, January 1974, 
(iv) Layard, R., "The Distributional Effects of Congestion Taxes", 
Economica, Vol, 44, August 1977 
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